California Limits E-Voting


[The Times plays down the import of this story, but basically the California Secretary of State found that these machines, used to decide who won recent elections, are not to be trusted.]
NY TIMES – Expressing concern that several brands of electronic voting machines used in California were vulnerable to tampering, Secretary of State Debra Bowen late Friday ordered new security protections be added and limited the use of two types of machines that were to be used in next year’s elections in several Southern California counties. Bowen also withdrew state approval of the InkaVote Plus machines used in Los Angeles County, saying that the machines’ maker, Election Systems and Software, had failed to submit its equipment to her office in time to analyze its vulnerability to hacking. . .
Bowen ordered that some machines made by Diebold Election Systems and Sequoia Voting Systems be limited to one per polling place to limit the chances that they could be tampered with. The Sequoia machines are used in Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura Counties.
Bowen said the presence of the machines, though limited, would be helpful for disabled voters, though any voter could use the machines. Weir, however, said she was creating a “separate but unequal” voting system.
The security requirements Bowen imposed include: reinstalling the software before the Feb. 5. election to ensure it has not already been tampered with; placing special seals at vulnerable parts of the machines to reveal tampering; securing each machines at the close of each day of early voting; assigning a specific election monitor to safeguard each machine; and conducting a complete manual count of all votes cast.

BRAD BLOG – The [review] had found that all electronic voting systems certified in California were easily accessible to hacking. A single machine, the testers discovered, could be easily tampered with by an election insider, voting machine company employee, or other individual in such a way that an entire election could be effected without detection. . .