Os originais revelam o impulso do fotorreceptor para findings precedidos guerra de Iraq intel
Por Entalhe Juliano | Os originais novos dentro da comunidade da administração de Bush e da inteligência dos E.U. durante o run-up à invasão de Iraq revelaram que a casa branca começou a montar um argumento para a guerra antes que compilou o intel que deu forma ostensibly à base desse caso.
A relatório novo nos originais de George Washington da universidade da segurança nacional do arquivo dos presentes também que compelem a evidência que a administração de Bush exerceu pressão sobre o CIA e outras agências de inteligência para costurar seus relatórios ao desejo alternativo de Bush invadir. O relatório sugere que o volume deste esforço estêve funcionado fora do escritório do vice-presidente Dick Cheney, suportando - acima de numeroso outras examinações da pós guerra do trajeto à invasão que viu Cheney como o mastermind da planta para oust Saddam Hussein.
O arquivo publicou um esboço de julho 2002 de um CIA “papel branco” em armas de Iraq da destruição maciça. O esboço foi preparado meses antes de uma estimativa nacional da inteligência no regime de Saddam, que o Congress não exijiu até setembro, embora “o papel branco final” se liberasse em outubro sumariado purportedly isso muito NIE.
Além aos originais recentemente obtidos do arquivo, Dr. John Prados, que compilou o relatório, investigações precedentes examinadas da manipulação pre-war da inteligência tais como da “rhetoric pre-war e livros nos oficiais da administração fase II” do comitê recentemente terminado da inteligência do Senate relatório' no assunto tal como o memoir branco anterior de Scott McClellan do spokesman da casa.
Concliu, essencialmente, que a cereja da administração de Bush escolheu a inteligência justificar uma invasão, que o governo britânico de Tony Blair era complicit em produzir a inteligência shaky em WMDs de Saddam, que as figuras da administração - especialmente Cheney - exerceram pressão sobre o CIA para os dar o que quiseram, e que a inteligência que undercutting o argumento para a guerra estêve ignorada no favor das fontes mais menos de confiança que suportaram a opinião da administração.
• O relatório da fase II em indicações públicas da administração de Bush, conjuntamente com o relatório original de julho 2004 do SSCI em armas alegadas de Iraq da destruição maciça, indica que a manipulação política estendeu além da inteligência própria afetar a investigação das falhas da inteligência em Iraq as well as o uso de administração de Bush dessa informação.
• Conjuntamente com outros materiais recentemente declassified, o relatório da fase II mostra que a administração de Bush solicited a inteligência a seguir usada “substancia” suas reivindicações públicas.
• A recently declassified draft of the CIA’s October 2002 white paper on Iraqi WMD programs demonstrates that that paper long pre-dated the compilation of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi capabilities.
• The timing of the CIA’s draft white paper coincides with a previously available draft of the British Government’s white paper on Iraqi WMD, demonstrating that the Bush administration and the Tony Blair government began acting in concert to build support for an invasion of Iraq two to three months earlier than previously understood.
• A comparison of the CIA draft white paper with its publicly released edition shows that all the changes made were in the nature of strengthening its charges against Iraq by inserting additional alarming claims, in the manner of an advocacy, or public relations document. The draft and final papers show no evidence of intelligence analysis applied to the information contained. Similar comparison of the British white paper shows the same phenomenon at work.
• Declassified Pentagon documents demonstrate that the CIA white paper was modified in ways that conformed to the desires of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and his office, in much the same way that British documents indicate that country’s white paper was changed to conform to the desires of the Blair government.
The CIA was under enormous pressure, which resulted in its production of a White Paper that did not conform to the facts, according to the report.
“Under the circumstances, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the CIA and other intelligence agencies defended themselves against the dangers of attack from the Bush administration through a process of self-censorship,” Prados writes. “That is the very essence of politicization in intelligence.”
He goes on to report that CIA reports had “the character of rhetoric” and did not reflect “the kind of approach characteristic of intelligence analysis.”
The Archive’s report backs up similar contentions that first came to light with release of the Downing Street memo in 2005 and have been reinforced in scores of books and investigative articles. Most recently, investigative journalist Ron Suskind reported in his new book The Way of the World that the British government was secretly in contact before the invasion with the chief of Iraq’s intelligence services who told them unequivocally that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons stockpiles. That revelation — received in plenty of time to delay the invasion — was ignored, Suskind wrote.
Prados reports on other sources the CIA had developed among scientists in Iraq and within Saddam’s foreign minister. Information they provided was ignored in favor of what was later revealed to be untrue exaggerations passed along by Iraqi exiles.
The White Paper went through several drafts, Prados writes, and it is clear to see the administration’s influence in its preparation.
“The net impression is that the CIA white paper was rewritten to conform to administration preferences. If so, U.S. intelligence a priori made itself a tool of a political effort, vitiating the intelligence function and confirming the presence of a politicized process,” he writes. “The specific analytic failures on Iraq intelligence become much less significant in such a climate, especially in that they all yielded intelligence predictions of exactly the kind the Bush administration wanted to hear.”
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This entry was posted on Monday, August 25th, 2008 at 7:19 pm and is filed under Political News . You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
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