Ο Μπους κάλυψε επάνω τους δεσμούς Musharraf με Qaeda, Khan
(IPS) - Η πακιστανική Δευτέρα παραίτησης Προέδρου Pervez Musharraf's θέτει τέλος σε μια εξαιρετικά στενή σχέση μεταξύ Musharraf και του George W. Διοίκηση των Μπους, στην οποία Musharraf κατασπαταλήθηκε με τα πολιτικά και οικονομικά οφέλη από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες παρά τις πολιτικές που ήταν αιχμηρή σύγκρουση με τις ΗΠΑ. ενδιαφέροντα ασφάλειας.
Είναι καλά - γνωστός ότι ο Μπους εγκωμίασε επανειλημμένα Musharraf ως πιστότερο σύμμαχο των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών ενάντια στην τρομοκρατία, ακόμα κι αν οι πακιστανικοί στρατιωτικοί βαθειά συμβιβάζω από τη σχέση του με τους Taliban και πακιστανικούς ισλαμικούς μαχητές.
Αυτό που δεν έχει αναφερθεί είναι ότι η διοίκηση των Μπους κάλυψε επάνω τη συμμετοχή του καθεστώτος Musharraf στις δραστηριότητες του Α. Το Q. Το πρόγραμμα εξαγωγής πυρηνικής τεχνολογίας Khan και του εξετάζει τους πακιστανικούς φυλετικούς συμμάχους Al Qaeda.
Το πρόβλημα που αντιμετωπίστηκε από τη διοίκηση των Μπους όταν μπήκε σε το γραφείο ήταν ότι πακιστανικός ο στρατιωτικός, πέρα από τον οποίο Musharraf προήδρευσε, ήταν ο πραγματικός τρομοκρατικός δεσμός με Taliban και το Al Qaeda. Σαν Bruce Riedel, ο εθνικός ανώτερος διευθυντής του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας (NSC) για τη Νότια Ασία στην κυβέρνηση του Μπιλ Κλίντον, που έμεινε στο προσωπικό NSC κάτω από τη διοίκηση των Μπους, παρατηρηθείς σε μια συνέντευξη με αυτόν τον συγγραφέα τον περασμένο Σεπτέμβριο, Al Qaeda «ήταν μια δημιουργία του πολιτισμού jihadist του πακιστανικού στρατού».
Εάν υπεάρξε ένας κρατικός χορηγός του Al Qaeda, Riedel εν λόγω, αυτό ήταν πακιστανικό το στρατιωτικό, ενεργώντας μέσω της διεύθυνσης νοημοσύνης διά-υπηρεσιών του (ISI).
Ο αντιπρόεδρος Dick Cheney και το neoconservative-εξουσιασμένο Πεντάγωνο των Μπους γνώριζαν την οικεία σχέση μεταξύ του καθεστώτος Musharraf και Taliban και Al Qaeda. Αλλά το Al Qaeda δεν ήταν μια προτεραιότητα για τη διοίκηση των Μπους.
Μετά από το 9/11, ο λευκός οίκος δημιούργησε τον πολιτικό μύθο ότι Musharraf, που βρέθηκε αντιμέτωπο με μια σαφή επιλογή, «είχε ενώσει τον ελεύθερο κόσμο στην πάλη των τρομοκρατών». Αλλά ως Ασία ειδικό Selig S. Το Harrison έχει επισημάνει, το SEP. 19, 2001, ακριβώς έξι ημέρες αφότου είχε συμφωνήσει υποθετικά με τις ΗΠΑ. οι απαιτήσεις για συνεργασία ενάντια στο Taliban καθεστώς και το Al Qaeda, Musharraf έδωσαν μια ομιλία σε Urdu στο οποίο δήλωσε, «εμείς δοκιμάζουν το καλύτερό μας για να βγούν από αυτήν την κρίσιμη κατάσταση χωρίς οποιαδήποτε ζημία στο Αφγανιστάν και Taliban.»
In his memoirs, published in 2006, Musharraf revealed the seven specific demands he had been given and claimed that he had refused both “blanket overflight and landing rights” and the use of Pakistan’s naval ports and air bases to conduct anti-terrorism operations.
Musharraf also famously wrote that, immediately after 9/11, Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage had threatened to bomb Pakistan “back to the stone age” if Musharraf didn’t side with the United States against bin Laden and his Afghan hosts. But Armitage categorically denied to this writer, through his assistant, Kara Bue, that he had made any threat whatsoever, let alone a threat to retaliate militarily against Pakistan.
For the next few years, Musharraf played a complicated game. The CIA was allowed to operate in Pakistan’s border provinces to pursue al Qaeda operatives, but only as long as they had ISI units accompanying them. That restricted their ability to gather intelligence in the northwest frontier. At the same time, ISI was allowing Taliban and al Qaeda leaders to operate freely in the tribal areas and even in Karachi.
The Bush administration also gave Musharraf and the military regime a free ride on the A. Q. Khan network’s selling of nuclear technology to Libya and Iran, even though there was plenty of evidence that the generals had been fully aware of and supported Khan’s activities.
Journalists Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins wrote in their book “The Nuclear Jihadist” that one retired general who had worked with Khan told them there was no question that Khan had acted with the full knowledge of the military leadership. “Of course the military knew,” the general said. “They helped him.”
But the Bush administration chose to help Musharraf cover up that inconvenient fact. According to CIA Director George Tenet’s memoirs, in September 2003, he confronted Musharraf with the evidence the CIA had gathered on Khan’s operation and made it clear he was expected to end its operations and arrest Khan.
The following January and early February, Khan’s house arrest, public confession of guilt and pardon by Musharraf was accompanied by an extraordinary series of statements by high-ranking Bush administration officials exonerating Musharraf and the military of any involvement in Khan’s activities.
That whole scenario had been “carefully orchestrated with Musharraf”, Larry Wilkerson, then a State Department official but later Colin Powell’s chief of staff, told IPS in an interview last year. The deal that had been made did not require Musharraf to allow U.S. officials to interrogate Khan.
But the Bush administration apparently conveyed to the Pakistani military after that episode that it now expected the Musharraf regime to deliver high-ranking al Qaeda officials — and to do so at a particularly advantageous moment for the administration. The New Republic magazine reported Jul. 15, 2004 that a White House aide had told the visiting head of ISI, Ehsan ul-Haq, that “it would be best if the arrest or killing of any HVT [high value target] were announced on 26, 27 or 28 July.” Those were the last three days of the Democratic National Convention.
The military source added, “If we don’t find these guys by the election, they are going to stick the whole nuclear mess up our a**hole.”
Just hours before Democratic candidate John Kerry’s acceptance speech, Pakistan announced the capture of an alleged al Qaeda leader.
Meanwhile, Musharraf was making a political pact with a five-party Islamic alliance in 2004 to ensure victory in state elections in the two border provinces where Islamic extremist influence was strongest. This explicit political accommodation, followed by a military withdrawal from South Waziristan, gave the pro-Taliban forces allied with al Qaeda in the region a free hand to recruit and train militants for war in Afghanistan.
Yet another deal with the Islamic extremists in 2006 strengthened the pro-Taliban forces even further.
But Bush chose to reward Musharraf by designating Pakistan a “Major Non-NATO Ally” in 2004 and by agreeing to sell the Pakistani Air Force 36 advanced F-16 fighter planes. Prior to that, Pakistan had been denied U.S. military technology for a decade.
In July 2007, a National Intelligence Estimate concluded that al Qaeda’s new “safe haven” was in Pakistan’s tribal areas and that the terrorist organisation had reconstituted its “homeland attack capability” there. That estimate ended the fiction that the Musharraf regime was firmly committed to combating al Qaeda in Pakistan.
Had the Bush administration accurately portrayed Musharraf’s policies rather than hiding them, it would not have avoided the al Qaeda safe haven there. But it would have facilitated a more realistic debate about the real options available for U.S. policy.
*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, “Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam”, was published in 2006.
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