Adam Curtis’ new, near three-hour documentary HyperNormalisation, showing on
BBC iplayer, is being garlanded with predictable praise from liberal commentators.
As ever, Curtis joins the dots in interesting, and sometimes compelling, ways.
But HyperNormalisation also continues a trend by Curtis of using his insights
to present a deeply conservative, disempowering and ultimately false impression
of the world.
His recent films have been premised on the notion that our societies are driven
almost exclusively by a struggle of ever-more complex ideas, often dangerous
ones, and only marginally by economic forces. As it has become ever harder to
find plausible solutions to an increasingly interconnected world, and as western
leaders have become ever more lost in the moral and ideological darkness of
modern life, those who have excelled are the usual suspects – from Syria’s Assad
and Putin’s Russia to Donald Trump.
HyperNormalisation is best when it deals with “perception management”.
The west’s repeated reinventions of Libya’s Col. Gaddafi – first as a bogeyman,
then as a hero, then as a bogeyman again, depending on the needs of the day,
and always at odds with the reality – is an incisive rebuttal to those who believe
the media are committed to telling us meaningful things about the world. Though
Curtis does not explicitly draw this conclusion, much of his film suggests correctly
that the corporate media are the chief managers of our perceptions.
But much else is weak and unconvincing. The idea, for example, that the Occupy
movement in the west and the Tahrir Square revolution in Egypt failed for the
same simple reason – that they had no vision of what came next – concisely illustrates
much of what is wrong with Curtis’ thinking.
In Egypt, the revolution failed primarily because the secularists had little
organizational structure behind them, after decades of repression, and because
the forces of reaction – Egypt’s military-industrial complex – were too well-entrenched
and sophisticated to be so easily ousted. The Islamists under Mohammed Morsi
were allowed temporary and very limited access to the levers of government power
by the military in a move to divide the opposition. Morsi’s rule inevitably
pitted the Islamists against the liberal secularists. Morsi was given enough
rope to hang himself, antagonizing the secular opposition so that they would
welcome the military’s return. But in truth, the military never went away. There
was never a vacuum in Egypt, of ideas or anything else. The army was just sophisticated
at perception management – so good at it, in fact, that Curtis himself seems
incapable of seeing behind the curtain.
The other major disappointment is his choice of easy villains. So the exemplars
of perception management become Russia’s Vladimir…