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BP shuts down Georgia pipelines

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

Energy giant BP says it has shut two of three pipelines that run through Georgia as a precautionary measure.

A spokeswoman for the firm said the oil and gas pipelines, which run from the Caspian Sea into Georgia, had not been damaged by the recent fighting.

The oil pipeline, which BP owns as part of a consortium, can carry up to 90,000 barrels of oil per day.

Another key oil pipeline, which runs from Azerbaijan through southern Georgia into Turkey, is already shut.

The closure comes as the International Energy Agency (IEA) warned that the conflict posed a threat to key oil and gas pipelines that pass through Georgia.

The IEA said that Georgia was of strategic importance to energy markets but that so far oil prices “had not been materially affected”.

BP said it had closed the Western Route Export Pipeline (WREP), which runs from Baku on the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan to the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa, this morning.

It has also stopped pumping gas into the South Caucasus pipeline, which runs from the Caspian Sea, through Georgia, into Turkey, although BP said gas will continue to run through the line for another seven days.

Precarious

The larger Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline has been closed since early August following an explosion on the eastern Turkish section of the line. The current conflict could also delay its reopening, scheduled for September.

It is the world’s second-largest pipeline and runs from Azerbaijan through southern Georgia into Turkey. It can transport up to 1.2 million barrels of oil a day.

“Renewed flows through Georgia could be further delayed if the line is damaged during the Russia-Georgia conflict,” the IEA said in its monthly report.

It added that the outage and the eruption of hostilities highlighted the potentially precarious nature of pipeline energy supplies in the region.

BP has a 30% stake in the BTC pipeline.

It had been hoped that transporting oil through the region would make the West less dependent on supplies from Russia.

Figures released by the IEA later in the day showed the sharpest drop in demand for US crude oil in 26 years, sending the price of oil down to $113 a barrel.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7556215.stm

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Bush Is the Worst Commander in Chief Ever

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

By Matthew Rothschild | Here’s the news flash from Wednesday’s New York Times: “Al Qaeda is more capable of attacking inside the United States than it was last year.”

That’s not my conclusion.

Or the conclusion of a Bush critic like Richard Clarke.

No, that’s the conclusion of the Bush Administration’s senior terrorism analyst, Ted Gistaro.

What a damning indictment!

Not only has Bush failed, for seven years now, to get Osama bin Laden.

He’s actually enabled bin Laden to regroup and become an increasing threat.

This alone makes Bush the worst commander in chief ever.

Let’s review.

He was warned that bin Laden was going to attack in the United States, and he did nothing.

He had bin Laden surrounded at Tora Bora, and then he outsourced the operation.

He diverted intelligence resources over to Iraq to go fulfill a fantasy there, thus enabling bin Laden to keep hiding.

And Bush warmly embraced Musharraf, who went easy on the Pakistani militants who are in league with bin Laden.

Some of those militants actually work with the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, and Bush is giving billions to Pakistan’s government.

This is the very definition of “criminal incompetence.”

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Credit Card Debt: This Popping Bubble Is Really Going to Hurt

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

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South Africa Hearing Claims Elite Unit Controlled by CIA, MI5

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

iol | British intelligence organisation MI5 and the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are the masters of South Africa’s elite crime fighting unit, the Scorpions, a public hearing into their dissolution heard in Durban on Tuesday.

Sam Kikine, the head of the International Traditional and Medicine Research Council, accused these two organisations of controlling the Scorpions.

“Why have the Scorpions not investigated [chemical warfare expert] Wouter Basson and the CIA who have created this Aids? The Scorpions are working for MI5 and the CIA and not for South Africa,” he told the hearing at the Umlazi Indoor Sports Complex.

Kikine claimed that the Scorpions were loaded with apartheid era “special branch” operatives, who had also been responsible for the death of activist and lawyer Griffiths Mxenge, who was assassinated in 1981.

Kikine said the council was supporting the proposed legislation to replace the Directorate of Special Operations, known as the Scorpions, with a new division within the South African Police Service, known as the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation.

The hearings earlier kicked off amid singing and toyi-toying amid a heavy police presence.

A crowd of about 80 Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) supporters had gathered outside the building before entering the complex singing.

Many in the crowd wore shirts bearing logos of Cosatu’s various member unions, while some wore shirts in support of African National Congress president Jacob Zuma.

At one stage the crowd broke into Zuma’s trademark “awulethu’ mshini wami” song, taunting local Democratic Alliance supporters who had also turned up for the hearing.

South African Communist Party (SACP) provincial secretary Themba Mthembu called for the inclusion of the Scorpions into the South African Police, because “integration would streamline and strengthen capacity in the fight against crime”.

He said the SACP agreed with most of the findings of the Khampepe Commission, with the exception of keeping the unit separate from the police.

The Democratic Alliance’s KwaZulu-Natal safety and security spokesperson Radley Keyes called for the retention of the unit, saying that it had achieved much.

He said that one hearing in the province was insufficient and questioned whether the parliamentarians would take heed of the representations.

Keyes pointed to “the futility” of public representations of Matatiele where, despite residents’ overwhelming support to remain in the province, the government had nevertheless supported the municipality’s inclusion in the Eastern Cape.

African Christian Democratic Party representative Cyril George described the Scorpions as “the sunlight that exposed crime”.

The South African Democratic Teachers Union secretary general Sipho “KK” Nkosi claimed that the Scorpions had been created by a political decision.

“Disbanding it requires a political decision. The Scorpions chose some prime cases because they were serving the interests of their own political masters,” he said.

He criticised the Scorpions for highlighting their successes in the media.

“Where they have not succeeded they have been mum to the media,” he said.

Parliament’s portfolio committees on justice and constitutional development, and safety and security were holding the hearings, which started on Monday and were expected to finish on Friday.

Members of the public have until August 20 to hand in their written submissions against the disbanding. - Sapa

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Busting the Anthrax Myth

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart of Stratfor.com | Dr. Jeffrey W. Runge, chief medical officer at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, told a congressional subcommittee on July 22 that the risk of a large-scale biological attack on the nation is significant and that the U.S. government knows its terrorist enemies have sought to use biological agents as instruments of warfare. Runge also said that the United States believes that capability is within the terrorists’ reach.

Runge gave his testimony before a subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology that was holding a field hearing in Providence, R.I., to discuss the topic of “Emerging Biological Threats and Public Health Preparedness.”

During his testimony, Runge specifically pointed to al Qaeda as the most significant threat and testified that the United States had determined that the terrorist organization is seeking to develop and use a biological weapon to cause mass casualties in an attack. According to Runge, U.S. analysis indicates that anthrax is the most likely choice, and a successful single-city attack on an unprepared population could kill hundreds of thousands of citizens.

Later in his testimony, Runge remarked that many do not perceive the threat of bioterrorism to be as significant as that of a nuclear or conventional strike, even though such an attack could kill as many people as a nuclear detonation and have its own long-term environmental effects.

We must admit to being among those who do not perceive the threat of bioterrorism to be as significant as that posed by a nuclear strike. To be fair, it must be noted that we also do not see strikes using chemical or radiological weapons rising to the threshold of a true weapon of mass destruction either. The successful detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city would be far more devastating than any of these other forms of attack.

In fact, based on the past history of nonstate actors conducting attacks using biological weapons, we remain skeptical that a nonstate actor could conduct a biological weapons strike capable of creating as many casualties as a large strike using conventional explosives — such as the October 2002 Bali bombings that resulted in 202 deaths or the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191.

We do not disagree with Runge’s statements that actors such as al Qaeda have demonstrated an interest in biological weapons. There is ample evidence that al Qaeda has a rudimentary biological weapons capability. However, there is a huge chasm of capability that separates intent and a rudimentary biological weapons program from a biological weapons program that is capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people.

Misconceptions About Biological Weapons

There are many misconceptions involving biological weapons. The three most common are that they are easy to obtain, that they are easy to deploy effectively, and that, when used, they always cause massive casualties.

While it is certainly true that there are many different types of actors who can easily gain access to rudimentary biological agents, there are far fewer actors who can actually isolate virulent strains of the agents, weaponize them and then effectively employ these agents in a manner that will realistically pose a significant threat of causing mass casualties. While organisms such as anthrax are present in the environment and are not difficult to obtain, more highly virulent strains of these tend to be far more difficult to locate, isolate and replicate. Such efforts require highly skilled individuals and sophisticated laboratory equipment.

Even incredibly deadly biological substances such as ricin and botulinum toxin are difficult to use in mass attacks. This difficulty arises when one attempts to take a rudimentary biological substance and then convert it into a weaponized form — a form that is potent enough to be deadly and yet readily dispersed. Even if this weaponization hurdle can be overcome, once developed, the weaponized agent must then be integrated with a weapons system that can effectively take large quantities of the agent and evenly distribute it in lethal doses to the intended targets.

During the past several decades in the era of modern terrorism, biological weapons have been used very infrequently and with very little success. This fact alone serves to highlight the gap between the biological warfare misconceptions and reality. Militant groups desperately want to kill people and are constantly seeking new innovations that will allow them to kill larger numbers of people. Certainly if biological weapons were as easily obtained, as easily weaponized and as effective at producing mass casualties as commonly portrayed, militant groups would have used them far more frequently than they have.

Militant groups are generally adaptive and responsive to failure. If something works, they will use it. If it does not, they will seek more effective means of achieving their deadly goals. A good example of this was the rise and fall of the use of chlorine in militant attacks in Iraq.

Anthrax

As noted by Runge, the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis is readily available in nature and can be deadly if inhaled, if ingested or if it comes into contact with a person’s skin. What constitutes a deadly dose of inhalation anthrax has not been precisely quantified, but is estimated to be somewhere between 8,000 and 50,000 spores. One gram of weaponized anthrax, such as that contained in the letters mailed to U.S. Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy in October 2001, can contain up to one trillion spores — enough to cause somewhere between 20 and 100 million deaths. The letters mailed to Daschle and Leahy reportedly contained about one gram each for a total estimated quantity of two grams of anthrax spores: enough to have theoretically killed between 40 and 200 million people. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the current population of the United States is 304.7 million. In a worst-case scenario, the letters mailed to Daschle and Leahy theoretically contained enough anthrax spores to kill nearly two-thirds of the U.S. population.

Yet, in spite of their incredibly deadly potential, those letters (along with an estimated five other anthrax letters mailed in a prior wave to media outlets such as the New York Post and the major television networks) killed only five people; another 22 victims were infected by the spores but recovered after receiving medical treatment. This difference between the theoretical number of fatal victims — hundreds of millions — and the actual number of victims — five — highlights the challenges in effectively distributing even a highly virulent and weaponized strain of an organism to a large number of potential victims.

To summarize: obtaining a biological agent is fairly simple. Isolating a virulent strain and then weaponizing that strain is somewhat more difficult. But the key to biological warfare — effectively distributing a weaponized agent to the intended target — is the really difficult part of the process. Anyone planning a biological attack against a large target such as a city needs to be concerned about a host of factors such as dilution, wind velocity and direction, particle size and weight, the susceptibility of the disease to ultraviolet light, heat, dryness or even rain. Small-scale localized attacks such as the 2001 anthrax letters or the 1984 salmonella attack undertaken by the Bhagwan Shri Rajneesh cult are far easier to commit.

It is also important to remember that anthrax is not some sort of untreatable super disease. While anthrax does form hardy spores that can remain inert for a period of time, the disease is not easily transmitted from person to person, and therefore is unlikely to create an epidemic outside of the area targeted by the attack. Anthrax infections can be treated by the use of readily available antibiotics. The spores’ incubation period also permits time for early treatment if the attack is noticed.

The deadliest known anthrax incident in recent years occurred in 1979 when an accidental release of aerosolized spores from a Soviet biological weapons facility in Sverdlovsk affected some 94 people — reportedly killing 68 of them. This facility was one of dozens of laboratories that were part of the Soviet Union’s massive and well-funded biological weapons program, one that employed thousands of the country’s brightest scientists. In fact, it was the largest biological weapons program in history.

Perhaps the largest attempt by a nonstate actor to cause mass casualties using anthrax was the series of attacks conducted in 1993 by the Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo.

In the late 1980s, Aum’s team of trained scientists spent millions of dollars to develop a series of state-of-the-art biological weapons research and production laboratories. The group experimented with botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera and Q fever and even tried to acquire the Ebola virus. The group hoped to produce enough biological agent to trigger a global Armageddon. Its first attempts at unleashing mega-death on the world involved the use of botulinum toxin. In April 1990, the group used a fleet of three trucks equipped with aerosol sprayers to release liquid botulinum toxin on targets that included the Imperial Palace, the National Diet of Japan, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, two U.S. naval bases and the airport in Narita. In spite of the massive quantities of toxin released, there were no mass casualties, and, in fact, nobody outside of the cult was even aware the attacks had taken place.

When the botulinum operations failed to produce results, Aum’s scientists went back to the drawing board and retooled their biological weapons facilities to produce anthrax. By mid-1993, they were ready to launch attacks involving anthrax; between June and August of 1993, the group sprayed thousands of gallons of aerosolized liquid anthrax in Tokyo. This time, Aum not only employed its fleet of sprayer trucks but also used aerosol sprayers mounted on the roof of their headquarters to disperse a cloud of aerosolized anthrax over the city. Again, the attacks produced no results and were not even noticed. It was only after the group’s successful 1995 subway attacks using sarin nerve agent that a Japanese government investigation discovered that the 1990 and 1993 biological attacks had occurred.

Biological Weapons Production

Aum Shinrikyo’s team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a virtually unlimited budget. They were able to travel the world in search of deadly organisms and even received technical advice from former Soviet scientists. The team worked in large, modern laboratory facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. They were able to operate these facilities inside industrial parks and openly order the large quantities of laboratory equipment they required. Yet, in spite of the millions of dollars the group spent on its biological weapons program — and the lack of any meaningful interference from the Japanese government — Aum still experienced problems in creating virulent biological agents and also found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively.

Today, al Qaeda finds itself operating in a very different environment than that experienced by Aum Shinrikyo in 1993. At that time, nobody was looking for Aum or its biological and chemical weapons program. By contrast, since the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States and its allies have actively pursued al Qaeda leaders and sought to dismantle and defang the organization. The United States and its allies have focused a considerable amount of resources in tracking and disassembling al Qaeda’s chemical and biological warfare efforts. The al Qaeda network has had millions of dollars of its assets seized in a number of countries, and it no longer has the safe haven of Afghanistan from which to operate. The chemical and biological facilities the group established in the 1990s in Afghanistan — such as the Deronta training camp, where cyanide and other toxins were used to kill dogs, and a crude anthrax production facility in Kandahar — have been found and destroyed by U.S. troops.

Operating in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border, al Qaeda cannot easily build large modern factories capable of producing large quantities of agents or toxins. Such fixed facilities are expensive and consume a lot of resources. Even if al Qaeda had the spare capacity to invest in such facilities, the fixed nature of them means that they could be compromised and quickly destroyed by the United States.

If al Qaeda could somehow create and hide a fixed biological weapons facility in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas or North-West Frontier Province, it would still face the daunting task of transporting large quantities of biological agents from the Pakistani badlands to targets in the United States or Europe. Al Qaeda operatives certainly can create and transport small quantities of these compounds, but not enough to wreak the kind of massive damage it desires.

Al Qaeda’s lead chemical and biological weapons expert, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, also known as Abu Khabab al-Masri, was reportedly killed on July 28, 2008, by a U.S. missile strike on his home in Pakistan. Al-Sayid, who had a $5 million dollar bounty on his head, was initially reported to have been one of those killed in the January 2006 strike in Damadola. If he was indeed killed, his death should be another significant blow to the group’s biological warfare efforts.

Of course, we must recognize that the jihadist threat goes just beyond the al Qaeda core. As we have been writing for several years now, al Qaeda has undergone a metamorphosis from a smaller core group of professional operatives into an operational model that encourages independent grassroots jihadists to conduct attacks. The core al Qaeda group, through men like al-Sayid, has published manuals in hard copy and on the Internet that provide instructions on how to manufacture rudimentary biological weapons.

It is our belief that independent jihadist cells and lone-wolf jihadists will almost certainly attempt to brew up some of the recipes from the al Qaeda cookbook. There also exists a very real threat that a jihadist sympathizer could obtain a small quantity of deadly biological organisms by infiltrating a research facility.

This means that we likely will see some limited attempts at employing biological weapons. That does not mean, however, that such attacks will be large-scale or create mass casualties.

The Bottom Line

While there has been much consternation and alarm-raising over the potential for widespread proliferation of biological weapons and the possible use of such weapons on a massive scale, there are significant constraints on such designs. The current dearth of substantial biological weapons programs and arsenals by governments worldwide, and the even smaller number of cases in which systems were actually used, seems to belie — or at least bring into question — the intense concern about such programs.

While we would like to believe that countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia have halted their biological warfare programs for some noble ideological or humanitarian reason, we simply can’t. If biological weapons were in practice as effective as some would lead us to believe, these states would surely maintain stockpiles of them, just as they have maintained their nuclear weapons programs. Biological weapons programs were abandoned because they proved to be not as effective as advertised and because conventional munitions proved to provide more bang for the buck.

In some ways, the psychological fear of a “super weapon” — undetectable, microscopic, easily delivered and extremely deadly — shapes assessment of the threat, more so than an objective understanding of actual capability and intent (not to mention the extreme difficulties of ever creating some sort of a super bug). Conventional weapons systems, and unconventional tactics, continue to be the most cost-effective and proven methods of warfare, whether between state actors or between state and nonstate actors. Nuclear weapons have also been shown to have true weapons of mass destruction power.

To help keep the cost-benefit calculation of a biological warfare program in perspective, consider that Seung-Hui Cho, the man who committed the shooting at Virginia Tech, killed 32 people — more than six times as many as were killed by the 2001 anthrax letters. John Mohammed, the so-called “D.C. Sniper,” was able to cause a considerable amount of panic and kill twice as many people (10) by simply purchasing and using one assault rifle. Compare Mohammed’s effort and expenses to that of the Aum Shinrikyo anthrax program that took years of work by a huge team and millions of dollars to develop but infected no one.

Now, just because biological weapons are not all they are cracked up to be does not mean that efforts to undermine the biological warfare plans and efforts of militant groups such as al Qaeda should not continue or that programs to detect such agents or develop more effective treatments and vaccines should be halted. Even though an anthrax attack probably will not kill huge numbers of people, as we saw in the case of the anthrax letters, such an attack can be quite disruptive. Cleaning up after such an attack is expensive and takes considerable time and effort. Like a dirty bomb, an anthrax attack will more likely serve as a weapon of mass disruption and not a weapon of mass destruction.

Due to the disruption and the potential for some deaths as a result of an anthrax attack, the threat against the United States does remain a significant concern. However, the threat it represents is not as great as that of conventional attacks using firearms and explosives against soft targets, and it certainly does not rise anywhere near the level of a threat posed by a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon.

Homeland security resources are very limited and have been shrinking as we move further from 9/11 and as other items begin to take precedence in the federal budget. This means that an array of different programs is being forced to scramble for an ever-shrinking piece of the funding pie. In such an environment, it is often a temptation to overstate the threat. Such overstatements are harmful because they can sometimes prevent a rational distribution of resources and prevent resources from being allocated to where they are needed most.

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Credit Card Debt: 5 Ways to Dig Yourself Out

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

The Street |

How do you stop digging yourself deeper into debt?

Americans carry a lot of debt, and it is easy for mounting debt to grow. Sometimes, it grows faster than you can pay it off, and that can be very stressful.

Here are five surefire strategies to help you help yourself:

1. Give yourself a ‘time out.’

Parents know the “time out” routine. You can do the same with your credit card. Vow to wait 48 hours before you buy anything. If you still must have it in 48 hours, then buy it — with cash. Don’t have the cash? Don’t buy it.

2. Stop using your credit cards.

Yes, this is the obvious one. If you’re in the habit of leaning into your credit cards, this can be tough.

Some ways that people have gone cold turkey:

Give your cards to a trusted friend to keep.

Start carrying cash when you go out, and do not take your cards with you.

Get professional help if you can’t stop using them…3. The $100 key rule.

Actually, this can be the $50 or $25 rule, as well. Commit yourself to never spending more than X amount when you go to the store for something else.

Say you go to the store to buy a new shirt for work. You estimate a new shirt will cost you $40. Do NOT leave the store with any additional purchases that add up to an additional $100 (or $50, or $25). Set your spending target amount BEFORE you go shopping. Do not change this magic number.

Here’s the key: that’s $100 (or $50, or $25) you’re not spending in CASH. We’re assuming you’ve decided to listen to Rule 2. This rule helps keep your cash flow flowing — so you’ve got an extra $25, $50, or $100 to put toward your credit card payment.

4. Delete your cookies!

Those who prefer the twice-gratification of online shopping (once when you buy, another buzz when you get the item) … delete your browser cookies! These “helpful” cookies remember your credit card numbers. Delete them so you must dig out your credit card in order to purchase something (after your 48-hour time-out rule is observed, of course).

To delete cookies using the Firefox browser, go to Tools > Clear Private Data… > check “cookies” and hit the “clear personal data” button. Browsers such as Internet Explorer and Mac Safari offer similar solutions.

5. Count to five.

If you can’t seem to wait 48 hours (and that should tell you something!), at least count to five. Tick off five good reasons why you must purchase this item. Hint: the reason “because I don’t have cash” is not acceptable. Count to five with all your cash purchases, too.

Ask yourself whether you can get the item used, for free, or cheaper elsewhere. Also try asking yourself whether you’ll still want and use the item five weeks, five months or five years from now.

Simply put: Look carefully at every purchase. You cannot dig yourself out of debt without curbing your spending habits.

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As many U.S. contractors as troops in Iraq

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

Army Times | The U.S. has about the same number of private contractors in Iraq as uniformed service members, a new congressional report says — a history-making ratio that presents problems in keeping track of all the workers and highlights the difficulties of supporting extended military operations without a larger force.

The Congressional Budget Office, a nonpartisan analytical arm of Congress, issued a report Monday that provides the first detailed accounting of the number of civilian contractors working in the Iraq theater, often doing jobs that historically have been military responsibilities, such as administration and logistics.

“The extent of DoD’s contracting is particularly evident during prolonged, large-scale operations — like those in Iraq — where there may not be enough military personnel available to provide logistics support,” says the report, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations In Iraq.”

Most of the attention and controversy has centered on the estimated 30,000 people hired by the State Department to provide private security — a mission traditionally the responsibility of U.S. military forces in combat zones.

“Providing security for all personnel, including contractors, is an inescapable aspect of U.S. operations in Iraq because of the instability and violence in that country,” the report says.

Under current policy, the military provides security for contractors deploying with a combat force or directly supporting the military’s mission, but nonmilitary agencies of the U.S. government and other contractors, like those involved in reconstruction, use private security.

The presence of private security companies has caused some consternation in military circles because some private guards are earning up to $1,222 a day, compared to $160 to $190 earned in pay and benefits by a midgrade military member with similar skills.

However, the report says private security is not necessarily more expensive because the guards don’t have to be paid when they are not being used, which would not be case if 30,000 more service members were to replace the security contractors in the Iraq theater.

The military also would be expected to have enough troops so that they could rotate personnel in and out of the war zone. Private security companies often do pay employees between deployments, the report says.

Using contractors to support military operations is not new, the report says, although the current one-to-one ratio that has 190,000 private contractors in the Iraq theater “is at least 2.5 times higher than … any other major U.S. conflict.”

However, the ratio is similar to the heavy use of contractors during U.S. military operations in the Balkans in the 1990s, the report says.

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Auditors Question Blackwater Contracts: But Is It Really $107 Million?

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

By Elizabeth Olson | Blackwater Worldwide, the contractor whose provision of private security in Iraq has been under scrutiny, and its affiliated companies may have improperly obtained more than $100 million in contracts meant for small businesses, according to federal auditors.

A report by the Small Business Administration’s inspector general, issued in July, found that Blackwater and its affiliates, including Presidential Airways, won 39 contracts in the fiscal years 2005, 2006 and 2007 despite indications that the companies employed more than the number specified by the U.S. government. In some cases, the report said, the companies also had higher revenues than allowed for a small business.

Blackwater is a major provider of security for American diplomats in Iraq and was the subject of a congressional hearing after a Blackwater shooting in Baghdad last September left 17 Iraqis dead.

Blackwater and Presidential Airways, both based in Moyock, North Carolina, and owned by EP Investments, of McLean, Virginia, won 31 contracts set aside for companies with revenues of $6.5 million or less, and one additional contract for a company with no more than $750,000 in annual revenues. Those contracts, in all, were valued at $2.1 million.

In addition, Presidential Airways, which carries both passengers and cargo, won some $107 million in contracts reserved for companies whose revenues were no more than $25.5 million or had fewer than 1,500 employees.

Although most of the challenged contracts were awarded by the Defense Department, the initial determinations of whether the companies qualified as small businesses were made by the Small Business Administration.

The companies could have skirted small business size criteria because they counted many workers as independent contractors, not employees, which allowed them to exceed the 1,500-employee ceiling set in some contracts, according to the auditors.

The inspector general’s office found that Blackwater and the other companies’ sizes and revenues may have “involved misrepresentations,” and suggested that the agency may want to “determine whether it is appropriate for Blackwater affiliates to continue receiving small business set-aside contracts.”

When rival firms had challenged the 2006 contract for helicopter services to Presidential Airways on grounds that the company was too large, the airline provided data that 28 Blackwater-affiliated entities had a total of only 715 employees.

But the inspector general found that Blackwater had hired more than a thousand independent contractors and treated them as if they were regular employees, with scheduled shifts, for example, which called the size determination into question. The report also said the Small Business Administration should have “attempted to reconcile discrepancies” in the data Blackwater provided.

Anne Tyrrell, Blackwater’s spokeswoman, called the report “unnecessarily speculative,” and said the “classification of security personnel as independent contractors is reasonable, correct and legally protected.” She said that “all contracted personnel serving on government contracts in Iraq for Blackwater work under the direct operational control of the United States government.”

The report, which was requested last March by Representative Henry A. Waxman, Democrat of California who heads the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, asked the inspectors general of the Defense Department and other contracting agencies to “review these contracts to determine whether misrepresentations were made” to obtain them.

In a letter to Waxman, the SBA said it had relied on the figures provided by Blackwater and Presidential Airways.

###

~Chip’s note: The SBA IG report states that these small business contracts “could have involved potential misrepresentations by Blackwater.” The SBA IG report states that Blackwater “obtained a total of33 contracts during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2007, totaling $2,188,620, which may have involved misrepresentations to obtain the contract.” The report also finds that “it is possible that misrepresentations took place” on the remaining six contracts, totaling $107,311,356.

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Most Corporations Don’t Pay Income Taxes

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

By Richard Rubin | Most corporations, including the vast majority of foreign companies doing business in the United States, pay no income taxes, according to a Government Accountability Office report released Tuesday.

During the eight-year period covered by the report, 72 percent of foreign-owned corporations went at least one year without owing taxes, and the same was true for 55 percent of domestic corporations.

Small companies were much more likely to pay no taxes than larger companies. Still, more than 3,500 large domestic corporations - with more than $250 million in assets or $50 million in gross receipts - did not pay taxes in 2005.

The report said about 80 percent of the companies studied paid no taxes because they didn’t generate any profit after expenses. Money-losing companies can legitimately owe no tax, and others can use provisions of the tax code to lower or eliminate their liability.

But the lawmakers who sought the data seized on the report as proof of corporate gamesmanship.

“It’s shameful that so many corporations make big profits and pay nothing to support our country,” said Byron L. Dorgan , D-N.D., who requested the report along with Carl Levin , D-Mich. “The tax system that allows this wholesale tax avoidance is an embarrassment and unfair to hardworking Americans who pay their fair share of taxes. We need to plug these tax loopholes and put these corporations back on the tax rolls.”

The report covered the period from 1998 through 2005. During that time, corporate income taxes as a share of gross domestic product dipped, from 2.2 percent in 1998 to 1.2 percent in 2003, the lowest share since 1983. But receipts jumped after that, hitting 2.7 percent in 2006 and 2007, according to the Office of Management and Budget. That was the highest share since the late 1970s.

The GAO report also found that foreign-owned corporations were somewhat more likely to report no income than domestic corporations. There are several possible reasons for that. Foreign corporations may be younger, and startups are more likely to have no net income after expenses. They may also be in industries with lower profit margins.

Another possibility could be the use of transfer pricing, which companies use to account for transactions between subsidiaries in different countries. Creative, rule-stretching use of transfer pricing can allow companies to push their profits into lower-taxed jurisdictions. The report does not attempt to examine whether illegal transfer-pricing caused the difference between foreign and domestic companies.

But companies looking for lower-taxed jurisdictions often take profits out of the United States. The country’s 35 percent top rate on corporate income is among the highest in the industrialized world.

Many tax experts and lawmakers from both parties, including Ways and Means Chairman Charles B. Rangel , D-N.Y., and presidential candidate Sen. John McCain , R-Ariz., have called for lowering the corporate tax rate. Lawmakers are likely to differ on what revenue-raising measures, if any, should be paired with a corporate rate cut.

In addition, Levin, Finance Chairman Max Baucus , D-Mont., and other senators have been trying to close the “tax gap,” the difference between taxes owed and taxes collected.

In a statement, Baucus said, “I’m committed to finding ways to improve compliance and reduce taxpayer burden so that we begin to bridge the tax gap, which accounts for $345 billion in legally owed but uncollected federal revenues each year.”

He said the GAO report “shows yet again the need for full-fledged [tax] reform next year….”

“We are constantly reviewing the tax code to find ways to crack down on those who are trying to avoid paying their fair share, without placing undue compliance or reporting burdens on honest taxpayers. As part of this on-going effort, we are reviewing the GAO report to see what it might suggest about where to target tax gap efforts,” Baucus said.

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Bush administration proposes major cut to endangered species protections

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

By Naomi Spencer | With an eye to the approaching elections, the Bush administration has drafted proposed changes to the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that would take effect within 30 days and would not require the approval of Congress.

Once enacted, the new rules would essentially cut out the role of government scientists at the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service in reviewing the threats to endangered wildlife by dam, highway, mining, drilling and other projects. Instead, political appointees in various federal agencies responsible for overseeing such construction and extraction projects would be empowered to gauge environmental impacts.

The proposal is yet another effort by the Bush administration to dismantle environmental protections that remain as impediments to big business. It is also an undisguised attempt to negate the most modest acknowledgment of the problem of global warming.

Under the proposed rules, federal agencies would not be required to produce any estimate of the consequences of projects’ contributions to greenhouse gas emissions.

More significantly, the new rules would nullify the recent classification of the polar bear as a threatened species because of the melting of the polar ice cap—attributed with virtual unanimity to global warming, caused by greenhouse gas emissions. Among the largest emitters of greenhouse gases are power plants and other large-scale industrial operations.

US government data suggests that two-thirds of the polar bear population will be lost by 2050 due to ice loss. By classifying the polar bear as endangered, the federal government was obligated to take formal, if minimal, steps to prevent the destruction of the animal’s habitat.

In a call with reporters Monday, Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne sought to portray the new proposal as a “narrow regulatory change” that “will provide clarity and certainty to the consultation process under the Endangered Species Act.”

It is clear, however, that the express purpose of the rule is to weaken ESA protections. According to a report Tuesday by the Washington Post, “In a statement yesterday, the Interior Department declared that even if a federal action such as the permitting of a power plant would lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions, the decision would not trigger a federal review ‘because it is not possible to link the emissions to impacts on specific listed species such as polar bears.’”

There is little doubt that the ESA proposal originates from the highest levels of the Bush administration. According to the Associated Press, which obtained a copy of the draft, the proposal is expected to be formally announced in the next few days by the Commerce Department and the Department of the Interior—the decisions of which vice-president Dick Cheney is intimately involved.

Last year, Cheney came under Congressional investigation for interference with ESA enforcement in California and Oregon after promoting a water plan favorable to the ranching industry. The business-tailored plan resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of threatened salmon in the Klamath River.

The Department of Homeland Security has also violated the ESA in its ongoing border wall construction along the US-Mexico border. DHS secretary Michael Chertoff recently invoked his official powers to waive environmental regulations over the department’s activities.

The Bush administration’s continual attacks on environmental protections flow from its role as the representative of the US ruling elite in a period of capitalist decline. Whatever gets in the way of the interests of big business must be pushed aside, be that obstacle scientific integrity, the federal regulatory framework, public health—or ultimately environmental viability and human life.

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Where Are the Weapons of Mass Destruction?

Wednesday, August 13th, 2008

Truthdig | In the past two decades I have had the opportunity to participate in certain experiences pertaining to my work that fall into the category of “no one will ever believe this.” I usually file these away, calling on them only when events transpire that breathe new life into these extraordinary memories. Ron Suskind, a noted and accomplished journalist, has written a new book, “The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism,” in which he claims that the “White House had concocted a fake letter from Habbush [Tahir Jalil Habbush, the director of the Mukhabarat], to Saddam [Hussein], backdated to July 1, 2001.” According to Suskind, the letter said that “9/11 ringleader Mohammad Atta had actually trained for his mission in Iraq—thus showing, finally, that there was an operational link between Saddam and al Qaeda, something the Vice President’s Office had been pressing CIA to prove since 9/11 as a justification to invade Iraq.”

This is an extraordinary charge, which both the White House and the CIA vehemently deny. Suskind outlines a scenario which dates to the summer and fall of 2003, troubled times for the Bush administration as its case for invading Iraq was unraveling. I cannot independently confirm Suskind’s findings, but I, too, heard a similar story, from a source I trust implicitly. In my former line of work, intelligence, it was understood that establishing patterns of behavior was important. Past patterns of behavior tend to repeat themselves, and are thus of interest when assessing a set of seemingly separate circumstances around the same source. Of course, given the nature of the story line, it is better if I introduce this information within its proper context.

In the summer of 2003 I was approached by Harper’s Magazine to do a story on the work of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a CIA-sponsored operation investigating Saddam’s weapons-of-mass-destruction programs in the aftermath of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. David Kay, a former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector who served briefly in Iraq in 1991 and 1992, was at that time the head of the ISG. By October 2003 the group had prepared a so-called interim report, which claimed to have eyewitness evidence of Iraqi WMD-related activities prior to the invasion in March. The key to the ISG’s interim report was the testimony of “cooperative sources,” Iraqis of unstated pedigree purportedly providing the ISG with unverifiable information. With one exception—an Iraqi nuclear scientist who had been killed by coalition forces—David Kay failed to provide the name or WMD association of any of the sources he used for his report, making any effort to verify their assertions impossible. Many of the senior Iraqis who had openly contradicted Kay’s report were, and still are to this day, muzzled behind the walls of an American prison in Baghdad. But there was another group of Iraqis, the former scientists and technicians involved in Iraq’s WMD programs who were known to have been interviewed by the ISG, and who were released back into Iraqi society. These scientists held the key to deciphering the vague pronouncements of the ISG interim report, and could help to distinguish between fact and fiction.

Many of these scientists remained intimidated by their ISG experience, which often involved lengthy imprisonment and harsh interrogation. Loath to run afoul of their American occupiers, and tethered financially to a monthly stipend designed to keep them from exporting their WMD know-how out of Iraq (and, it has been suggested, from talking too freely with the media), these Iraqi scientists possessed a wealth of data which was difficult to tap into. In my own effort to research the veracity of David Kay’s assertions, I made use of my connections within the community of former Iraqi WMD scientists to try to gain access to what they knew. One in particular, who, because of ongoing security concerns, will be identified only as Mohammed, worked to facilitate my visit, arranging for meetings with Iraqis who possessed firsthand knowledge about not only the past WMD programs but also the ongoing efforts of the ISG.

“You are welcome to Baghdad,” Mohammed wrote me in mid-October 2003, after I had informed him of my intent to travel there and what my purpose was. “You can have my full support.” After a back-and-forth exchange of e-mails with Mohammed on the subject of my visit, I finalized my agenda and reconfirmed the interviews I wanted arranged. I followed my e-mail to Mohammed on Nov. 5 with a detailed communication to the Coalition Provisional Authority, outlining both my proposed schedule in Iraq and requests for interviews with CPA and ISG officials and tours of related facilities.

My schedule had me departing the United States two days later. That morning, I did one final check of my e-mail and found a disturbing communication from Mohammed. In it, he reiterated how dangerous the situation had become in Baghdad. But he said more: “I understand that there are some people who wish to bury any new facts concerning the subject of WMD in Iraq. They are ready to liquidate any person or group who ventures into this subject.” Iraqi officials who had been involved with WMD, Mohammed said, “ … are not ready to give interviews because that endangers their life. It would endanger your life as well. I am serious in my warning,” he wrote. “Nobody can guarantee your life. Nor the fate of the material you will be collecting in Baghdad.”

“I request that you adjourn your scheduled trip to Baghdad,” Mohammed pleaded. “If you decide to continue with your intention, then I am very sorry to tell you that taking the overall environment in my country I am not able to support your mission. The main reason would be to preserve my life during or after it is concluded.”

One does not view such a communication lightly. I immediately contacted Lewis Lapham at Harper’s Magazine, as well as some trusted colleagues with experience in journalism and intelligence affairs. All agreed that in this case, discretion was the better part of valor. My trip to Baghdad was called off, but not the pursuit of the fate of Iraq’s WMD. The journey of discovery had simply been re-routed, and instead of going to Mohammed, I brought Mohammed to me. Mohammed made his way to Amman, Jordan, where we met over a period of five days in December 2003 to discuss Iraq’s past proscribed weapons programs. Before we could move forward on that complex topic, however, I needed to clear up the canceled Baghdad trip and, in particular, Mohammed’s e-mail regarding a threat to his, and my, life.

“This was very real,” Mohammed said. “I had made several important contacts in regards to your trip.” I asked him to elaborate. “As you know, the situation inside Iraq is very dangerous and confused, and many people were hesitant to meet with you.” Who were they afraid of? “The Americans,” he said. “They were afraid of what the Americans might do if it was found out that they had met with you.”

One of the contacts Mohammed had arranged for me to meet with while in Baghdad was a former official in the Iraqi Mukhabarat, the intelligence arm of Saddam Hussein’s regime, who was intimately familiar with that organization’s surveillance of U.N. weapons inspectors, both in Iraq and in New York. “The Mukhabarat never went away,” Mohammed said. “They just disappeared into the shadows. They are still very much a presence in Baghdad and Iraq.”

Mohammed had passed on my proposed schedule to the Mukhabarat official, who told Mohammed he “would check with his sources” to see if my visit was feasible or not. On the evening of Dec. 5, 2003, the Mukhabarat agent appeared at Mohammed’s home. “You must cancel the visit,” he told Mohammed. “Mr. Ritter’s life is at risk if he comes here, as well as the life of any Iraqi he meets with.”

The Mukhabarat had been preparing for the American occupation of Iraq for months before the initiation of hostilities in March 2003. By January 2003, orders had been issued to the various Mukhabarat departments to begin preparations for an American occupation. Mukhabarat personnel were instructed that in the case of the occupation of Iraq by the United States, they were to return to their homes and await further instructions. Those agents who were able to do so were encouraged to join the ranks of the various opposition parties that were expected to follow the Americans into Iraq, and to actively cooperate with the American occupiers. In this manner, the Mukhabarat was able to establish a network of informers inside the very ranks of the organizations that were seeking its demise. According to Mohammed, the Mukhabarat had been very successful in this regard. And it was this success, he said, that led to the warning from the Mukhabarat about the threat to my life, and the lives of those who cooperated with me, if I were to go to Baghdad.

According to Mohammed, Baghdad in late 2003 crawled with assassination squads. In addition to simple criminal gangs interested in extortion and murder, there were squads of killers who worked on behalf of the various political forces vying for power inside occupied Baghdad, settling old scores and eliminating potential competitors. One of the major themes among those positioning themselves for a leading role in post-Saddam Iraq was de-Baathification, a policy of identifying and neutralizing the members of the former ruling party, which was associated with the most horrific abuses of the regime of Saddam Hussein. De-Baathification was a primary objective of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and major policy initiatives were passed to remove the Baathists from positions of power and influence. Opponents of the regime of Saddam Hussein were only too willing to aid and assist the CPA in its crusade against the Baathists, using their own networks of informants to locate Baathist members and sympathizers for the American occupiers. Given the abuses of power that occurred in Iraq under the Baathists, however, oftentimes the members of the newly empowered opposition took matters into their own hands, meting out street justice in the form of targeted assassination.

Among the more effective, and brutal, of these politically motivated assassination units were those run by SCIRI (the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and its armed militia, the Badr Brigade. Their efforts to exterminate Baath Party remnants still loyal to Saddam Hussein, or those who were accused of committing crimes against SCIRI or its sympathizers, attracted the attention of the “black” side of the CPA-run de-Baathification efforts —covert operations run by the CIA and elite Special Operations units of the United States military. An abortive effort to formally acknowledge the role played by the various anti-Saddam militias in confronting the Baath holdouts offered a glimpse into what is an unspoken element of the U.S. policy regarding de-Baathification —let the Iraqis do the dirty work. And the Badr militia stood out among those willing and able to take the fight to the Baathist holdouts. For that reason, the Badr militia not only attracted the attention of the CPA but also the Mukhabarat, which, according to Mohammed, had infiltrated the SCIRI-run militia.

Mohammed’s Mukhabarat connection had disturbing news. According to the source, the CPA had passed to the Badr militia my name, the dates of my planned trip to Baghdad, my proposed agenda and a list of Iraqis I had planned to meet with, including Mohammed. This information was in turn passed on to the unit in the Badr militia which specialized in targeted assassination in Baghdad. “Mr. Ritter cannot come to Iraq,” the Mukhabarat agent told Mohammed. “If he does, his life is at risk, your life is at risk, and everyone associated with his visit’s life will be at risk.” And so Mohammed sent his e-mailed warning to me.

On the surface, Mohammed’s story was too much to believe. I was willing to accept any account that held that specific Iraqi groups, such as Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, were opposed to my visit to the extent that they might issue threats in an effort to intimidate me from coming. But the concept of the United States government being involved boggled the mind.

The problem with disbelieving was there were too many pieces of this puzzle that seemed to fit together. The timing of the threat coincided too neatly with my communication with the CPA about my plans while in Baghdad. People in the CPA certainly had the information if they decided to pass it on—I had telephoned and sent faxes and e-mails providing my dates of travel, where I wanted to stay and how I wanted to interact with the CPA. The ability of the U.S. intelligence community to monitor my e-mail communications with Mohammed was a given. And then there was the disturbing fact that, since the time that I had notified the CPA of my intent to travel to Iraq to write this story for Harper’s Magazine, I had been red-flagged by the United States government. On both occasions that I left the United States on assignment for Harper’s Magazine (once to London and Prague, the other to Amman), I had been pulled aside by U.S. immigration and customs officials upon my return for special treatment.

Apparently taking their cues from computer instructions, the customs officials involved were very interested in where I had traveled, whom I had met with, and any documents I might be carrying. When I asked a senior customs official in Washington’s Dulles Airport what the problem was, he simply shrugged. “I guess it’s just because you are who you are,” he said. A customs officer in New York’s JFK Airport, after looking at instructions sent to him on his computer, looked up to me. “You used to work for the U.S. government?” he asked. Prompted again by the computer, he called over a supervisor, who was very interested in documents I had in my possession concerning Iraq’s weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. In both cases, the only thing that seemed to save me from an even greater intrusion into my personal belongings was a letter from Lewis Lapham identifying me with Harper’s Magazine. The letter was carefully examined by customs officers and photocopied, and became the apparent subject of intense exchanges between the customs officers and whoever was on the other end of the computer. In both cases, my First Amendment rights prevailed over the concerns of the U.S. government, and I was allowed to proceed with my notes intact.

Mohammed’s dire warning aside, it seemed clear that my new assignment for Harper’s Magazine had caught the attention of someone in the U.S. government. What about my probing into the weapons-of-mass-destruction issue could prompt such extreme measures? What would make the U.S. government so afraid as to justify its attempt to intimidate a journalist—even an activist journalist such as myself—from carrying out his work? As a former weapons inspector with the United Nations, I was intimately familiar with the fraudulent case made by the Bush administration before the 2003 invasion, and had quite publicly challenged the president’s allegations. I do not believe the Bush administration would undertake any activity, directly or indirectly, beyond simply harassing me, because of my stance on pre-war WMD claims. However, knowing that I was going to Baghdad to meet with Iraqis who had firsthand knowledge of what had transpired since the invasion was another matter. What could I have learned that troubled them so? I will relay the story as I received it from Mohammed.

On a bright morning one day in late June 2003 Mohammed waited patiently on the side of a street in the Jadariyah district of Baghdad. As a former official in the ousted regime of Saddam Hussein, he had knowledge of programs and activities of interest to the Americans who now occupied the palaces of the former Iraqi president; these programs and activities included but were not limited to weapons of mass destruction. Mohammed had been summoned to a meeting with a special intelligence cell that reported not to David Kay’s Iraq Survey Group, but instead directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Shortly before 9 in the morning, a small convoy consisting of three unmarked Toyota Land Cruisers pulled up alongside Mohammed. Seated in the front passenger seat of the lead vehicle was a short, stocky blond woman named Stacey. One might not have guessed from her plain khaki cargo pants and simple white T-shirt that she was a lieutenant commander in the United States Navy. Stacey motioned for Mohammed to enter the vehicle, and the small convoy sped off.

Crossing the 14th of July Bridge, the convoy turned right, into the grounds of the Republican Palace. Through gates once manned by the most elite forces of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Special Republican Guard, the small convoy now negotiated checkpoints manned by the soldiers of Iraq’s new master, the United States. The Land Cruisers snaked past the main palace building itself, where four large bronze heads of Saddam sporting a Moghul helmet stared impassively above them (these statues were later removed under the orders of the then-head of the CPA, Paul Bremer). The SUVs moved north toward the far end of the former palace complex, now known as the Green Zone. In front of the former offices of the Iraqi National Security Committee, the convoy turned right, cutting through some administrative buildings before emerging on an embankment road running alongside the Tigris River. Heading south, the three vehicles came upon a villa complex surrounded by small decorative ponds, each pond connected with a small footbridge. On each island was an open barbecue pit, complete with accompanying stack of firewood, of the type favored by the former Iraqi president. Disembarking from the Land Cruiser, Stacey led Mohammed to the main villa, where they were ushered in by security personnel wearing similar nondescript clothing.

Seated on a couch in the middle of the elaborately furnished villa was a small, thin woman in her late 30s with short blond hair who introduced herself as Carol. On the table before the couch were plates full of sweets and fruit slices, imported from Kuwait, which Carol invited Mohammed to taste. Stacey joined them, and soon she and Carol began questioning Mohammed. About five minutes into the session, the two women were joined by a third person, an Army lieutenant colonel who introduced himself as Dave. Dave was dressed in the same khaki trousers as Stacey and Carol, but sported a gray T-shirt emblazoned with the seal of the United States and the words “U.S. Embassy Kuwait.” A short, athletic-looking man with gray hair, Dave quickly took over the proceedings, with Carol and Stacey taking notes. For four hours Dave questioned Mohammed about various matters dealing with the Iraqi’s former work.

The final line of questioning focused on weapons of mass destruction. Dave was on his feet, pacing before Mohammed, before turning to him and asking straight out, “Where are the weapons of mass destruction?” Mohammed, who had intimate knowledge of certain aspects of the Iraqi WMD effort, replied straight back: “There are no WMD in Iraq.”

Dave continued pacing back and forth in front of Mohammed. “My president,” he said, “is in trouble. Can you help him?”

Mohammed was taken aback by the question. “Excuse me?” he asked. “Could you repeat yourself?”

Dave sat down next to the Iraqi. “George Bush is in trouble. Our people did not find any WMD in Iraq. Can you help us?”

Mohammed looked back at Dave. “How?”

“Can we prepare something for that? We could bring in some nuclear material from the former Soviet Union, and pretend they are Iraqi.”

Mohammed, stunned by the unexpected nature of the request, indicated that such a ploy could be easily uncovered by forensic examination of the evidence by outside experts, such as UNSCOM (the United Nations Special Commission) or the IAEA, who would undoubtedly be called in to verify such a finding. Dave sat in silence for a few moments, before springing to his feet. “I have to leave for a meeting,” he said. “Stacey will show you out.”

Mohammed was to meet again with Dave, Stacey and Carol in the weeks that followed. The subject of WMD, Iraqi or otherwise, was never again broached by Dave or anyone else in his team.

In my extensive dealings with him, Mohammed has never lied to me or exaggerated about events he was personally involved in. His story establishes a pattern of behavior which shows how the Bush administration, especially when operating in the form of small, ideologically motivated teams functioning outside the norms and conventions of the mainstream, was able to consider (in Mohammed’s case) manufacturing data and circumstances to bolster its false case for invading Iraq, and (per author Ron Suskind) actually manufacture such data and circumstances. I trust Mohammed. And so I am willing to believe Suskind and his sources about similar cases of fraud, this time in the form of the CIA’s manufactured Mukhabarat document.

The question is, what is Congress doing about this? At what point in time will it become clear that a crime against America has been committed, not by any foreign terrorist group, but rather the highest officials in the land, those entrusted with safeguarding the Constitution? If the rule of law is to have any meaning today, Congress has no choice but to institute proceedings mandated by the Constitution against those high officials who have committed high crimes and misdemeanors against the American people. Far from stating that impeachment is off the table, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi rightfully has no option but to instruct the House of Representatives to initiate investigations into the crime of fraud and other related obstructions of government undertaken by the administration of President George W. Bush. And if these investigations confirm that such crimes have indeed occurred, she must, as a servant of the Constitution, undertake impeachment proceedings. That Bush is a lame-duck president, and his time in office is short, is no excuse for failure to defend the rule of law to its fullest.

Scott Ritter is a former Marine Corps intelligence specialist and was a chief weapons inspector for the United Nations in Iraq. He is the author of many books, including “Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein” and “Target Iran: The Truth About the White House’s Plans for Regime Change.”

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