Peter Van Buren
America’s new strategy for resolving the Sunni-Shi’ite crisis in Iraq? The Surge – again.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Martin Dempsey sounds as if he were reading off the 2007 script, echoing the divide-and-conquer strategy that was the basis for the Surge: “If you can separate those [Sunni] groups,” Dempsey said, “then the problem becomes manageable and understandable.”
So, Washington is now sending U.S. officials to meet with Sunni tribal leaders and others. The ultimate goal – after hopefully forcing out foreign fighters from within Sunni ranks in 2014, as in 2007 – is political reconciliation between Sunni and Shi’ite.
It won’t work, because it hasn’t.
History is, in the end, all that matters. In January 2007, following signs that the metastasizing Sunni-Shi’ite conflict in Iraq was not about to stop without some new sort of intervention, then-President George W. Bush announced the Surge. The most public component was the deployment of 26,000 additional military personnel to Iraq, a clenched fist of freedom.
But there was another side: a plan to take advantage of fissures inside the bloc of Sunni forces, primarily those between foreign fighters such as al Qaeda and the local Sunni tribes. U.S. forces created a cadre of local Sunnis, first dubbed the Orwellian “Concerned Local Citizens” and later renamed the Sahwa, or Sons of Iraq, to cleave off al Qaeda through anAwakening.
In return for Iraqi Sunnis partnering with coalition forces, Washington would pay them well to guard checkpoints and do temporary make-work.
With an eye toward the exits in 2009, Washington attempted to shift the Sahwa payments to Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s Shi’ite-dominated government. Maliki, however, did not continue most of the payments and reneged on his promise to find real jobs for the Sons of Iraq.
The United States walked away from the problem. The Sunni-Shi’ite crisis, kicked off by the near-complete chaos of 2003 and unresolved by the Surge, was left to simmer.
