Posted on May\u00a030,\u00a02013<\/h4>\n\n<\/p>\nBy Michael T. Klare, TomDispatch<\/b><\/p>\n
This piece first appeared at TomDispatch. Read Tom Engelhardt\u2019s introduction here<\/a>.<\/i><\/p>\nDid Washington just give Israel the green light for a future attack on Iran via an arms deal? Did Russia just signal its further support for Bashar al-Assad\u2019s Syrian regime via an arms deal? Are the Russians, the Chinese, and the Americans all heightening regional tensions in Asia via arms deals? Is it possible that we\u2019re witnessing the beginnings of a new Cold War in two key regions of the planet\u2013and that the harbingers of this unnerving development are arms deals?<\/p>\n
International weapons sales have proved to be a thriving global business in economically tough times. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), such sales\u00a0reached<\/a>\u00a0an impressive $85 billion in 2011, nearly double the figure for 2010. This surge in military spending reflected efforts by major Middle Eastern powers to bolster their armories with modern jets, tanks, and missiles\u2013a process constantly encouraged by the leading arms manufacturing countries (especially the U.S. and Russia) as it helps keep domestic production lines humming. However, this familiar if always troubling pattern may soon be overshadowed by a more ominous development in the global arms trade: the revival of far more targeted Cold War-style weapons sales aimed at undermining rivals and destabilizing regional power balances. The result, inevitably, will be a more precarious world.<\/p>\nArms sales have always served multiple functions. Valuable trade commodities, weapons can prove immensely lucrative for companies that specialize in making such products. Between 2008 and 2011, for example, U.S. firms sold<\/a> $146 billion worth of military hardware to foreign countries, according to the latest CRS figures. Crucially, such sales help ensure<\/a> that domestic production lines remain profitable even when government acquisitions slow down at home. But arms sales have also served as valuable tools<\/a> of foreign policy\u2013as enticements for the formation of alliances, expressions of ongoing support, and a way to lure new allies over to one\u2019s side. Powerful nations, seeking additional <\/strong>allies, use such sales to win the allegiance of weaker states; weaker states, seeking to bolster their defenses, look to arms deals as a way to build ties with stronger countries, or even to play one suitor off another in pursuit of the most sophisticated arms available.<\/p>\nThroughout the Cold War, both superpowers employed weapons transfers as a form of competition, offering advanced arms to entice regional powers to defect from each other\u2019s alliance systems or to counter offers made by the other side. Egypt, for example, was convinced to join the Soviet sphere in 1955 when provided with arms the West had refused to deliver. In the late <\/strong>1970s, it moved back into the American camp after Washington anted up far better weapons systems.<\/p>\nIn those years, the Americans and the Soviets also used arms transfers to bolster key allies in areas of strategic confrontation like the Middle East. Washington armed Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran when it was still ruled by the Shah; Russia armed Iraq and Syria. These transfers played a critical role in Cold War diplomacy and sometimes helped tilt the scales in favor of decisions to go to war. In the Yom Kippur War<\/a> of 1973, for example, Egypt, emboldened by an expanded arsenal of Soviet antitank missiles, attacked Israeli forces in the Negev desert.<\/p>\nIn the wake of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the commercial aspect<\/a> of arms sales came to the fore. Both Washington and Moscow were, by then, far more interested in keeping their military production lines running than in jousting for advantage abroad, so emphasis was placed on scoring contracts from those with the means to pay\u2013mainly the major oil producers of the Middle East and Latin America and the economically expansive \u201ctigers\u201d of Asia. Between 2008 and 2011, the CRS ranked the leading purchasers of conventional arms in the developing world this way: Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Egypt, and Venezuela. Together, these six countries ordered $117 billion in new weaponry.<\/p>\nArms Sales Take a New Path<\/strong><\/p>\nOnly recently has some version of great power dueling and competition started up again, and in the early months of 2013 it seems to be gaining momentum. Several recent developments highlight this trend:<\/p>\n
* In early May, Western intelligence sources revealed<\/a> that Russia had supplied several batteries of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles to the embattled Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Moscow had previously provided the Syrians with a version of the missile known as the Yakhont<\/a>, but those delivered recently are said to be equipped with a more advanced radar that increases their effectiveness. With those missiles, the Syrians should be in a better position to deter or counter any effort by international forces, including the United States, to aid anti-Assad rebels by sea or mount a naval blockade of Syria. They are also said to be negotiating<\/a> with the Russians for the purchase of advanced S-300 ground-to-air missiles, a weapons system that would greatly complicate air attacks on the country or the imposition of a no-fly zone.<\/p>\nAside from its military significance, the Yakhont transfer suggests a new inclination on Moscow\u2019s part to engage in provocative arms sales to advance its strategic<\/a> goals\u2013in this case, the survival of the Assad regime, Russia\u2019s sole remaining ally in the region\u2013even in the face of concerted Western opposition. Employing tough language, Secretary of State John F. Kerry warned the Russians<\/a> against such action. \u201cWe\u2019ve made it crystal clear that we prefer that Russia would not supply them assistance,\u201d he declared. \u201cThat is on record.\u201d Despite such admonitions, Russian officials insist that they have no intention of halting arms deliveries to Assad. \u201cRussia enjoys good and strong military technical cooperation with Syria, and we see no reason today to reconsider it,\u201d Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov told<\/a> reporters.<\/p>\n* In April, during a visit to Jerusalem, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced<\/a> a multibillion-dollar arms package for Israel. Although its final details are still being worked out, it is expected to include V-22 \u201cOsprey\u201d<\/a> tilt-rotor transport planes, KC-135<\/a> aerial refueling aircraft, and advanced radars and anti-radiation missiles for Israel\u2019s strike aircraft. \u201cWe are committed to providing Israel with whatever support is necessary for Israel to maintain military superiority over any state or coalition of states and non-state actors [in the region],\u201d Hagel told<\/a> reporters when announcing the package.<\/p>\nThe U.S. has, of course, long been committed to Israel\u2019s military superiority, so there was something ritualistic about much of Hagel\u2019s performance in Jerusalem. No less predictable were the complaints<\/a> from Israeli military and intelligence sources that the package didn\u2019t include enough new arms to satisfy Israel\u2019s needs, or were of the wrong kind. The V-22 Osprey, for example, was proclaimed by some to be of marginal military value. Far more surprising was that no red flags went up in the media over what was included. At least two of the items\u2013the KC-135 refueling planes and the anti-radiation missiles (crucial weaponry for disabling an enemy\u2019s air-defense radar system)\u2013could only be intended for one purpose: bolstering<\/a> Israel\u2019s capacity to conduct a sustained air campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities, should it decide to do so.<\/p>\nAt present, the biggest military obstacles<\/a> to such an attack are that country\u2019s inability to completely cripple Iranian anti-aircraft defense systems and mount sustained long-range air strikes. The missiles and the mid-air refueling capability will go a long way toward eliminating such impediments. Although it may take up to a year for all this new hardware to be delivered and come online, the package can only be read as a green light from Washington for Israel to undertake preparations for an attack on Iran, which has long been shielded from tougher U.N. sanctions by China and Russia.<\/p>\n* In March, Russia agreed<\/a> to sell 24 Sukhoi Su-35 multi-role combat jets and four Lada-class diesel submarines to China on the eve of newly installed President Xi Jinping\u2019s first official visit to Moscow. Although details of the sale have yet to be worked out, observers say that it will represent the most significant transfer<\/a> of Russian weaponry to China in a decade. The Su-35<\/a>, a fourth-generation stealth fighter, is superior to any plane now in China\u2019s arsenal, while the Lada<\/a> is a more advanced, quieter version of the Kilo-class sub it already possesses. Together, the two systems will provide the Chinese with a substantial boost in combat quality.<\/p>\nFor anyone who has followed Asian security affairs over the past few years, it is hard to view this deal as anything but a reaction to the Obama administration\u2019s new Asian strategy, its \u201cpivot\u201d to the Pacific. As announced by President Obama in a speech<\/a> before the Australian Parliament in November 2011, it involves beefing-up the already strong<\/a> U.S. air and naval presence in the western Pacific\u2013in, that is, waters off of China\u2013along with increased U.S. arms aid<\/a> to American allies like Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea.<\/p>\nNot surprisingly, China has responded by bolstering its own naval capabilities, announcing plans<\/a> for the acquisition of a second aircraft carrier (its first began operational testing in late 2012) and the procurement of advanced arms from Russia to fill gaps in its defense structure. This, in turn, is bound to increase the pressure<\/a> on Washington from Japan, Taiwan, and other allies to provide yet more weaponry, triggering a classic Cold-War-style arms race in the region.<\/p>\n* On the eve of Secretary of State John Kerry\u2019s June 24th visit to India, that country\u2019s press was full of reports and rumors about upcoming U.S. military sales. Andrew Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, was widely quoted<\/a> as saying that, in addition to sales already in the pipeline, \u201cwe think there\u2019s going to be billions of dollars more in the next couple of years.\u201d In his comments, Shapiro referred to Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who, he said, was heading up an arms sales initiative, \u201cwhich we think is making some good progress and will, hopefully, lead to an even greater pace of additional defense trade with India.\u201d<\/p>\nTo some degree, of course, this can be viewed as a continuation of weapons sales as a domestic economic motor, since U.S. weapons companies have long sought access<\/a> to India\u2019s vast arms market. But such sales now clearly play another role as well: to lubricate the U.S. drive to incorporate India into the arc of powers encircling China as part of the Obama administration\u2019s new Asia-Pacific strategy.<\/p>\nToward this end, as Deputy Secretary of State William Burns explained<\/a> back in 2011, \u201cOur two countries launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific to ensure that the world\u2019s two largest democracies pursue strategies that reinforce one another.\u201d Arms transfers are seen by the leaders of both countries as a vital tool in the \u201ccontainment\u201d of China (though all parties are careful to avoid that old Cold War term). So watch for Kerry to pursue new arms agreements while in New Delhi.<\/p>\nRepeating History<\/strong><\/p>\nThese are just some examples of recent arms deals (or ones under discussion) that suggest a fresh willingness on the part of the major powers to use weapons transfers as instruments of geopolitical intrusion and competition. The reappearance of such behavior suggests a troubling resurgence of Cold War-like rivalries. Even if senior leaders in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing are not talking about resurrecting some twenty-first-century version of the Cold War, anyone with a sense of history can see that they are headed down a grim, well-trodden path toward crisis and confrontation.<\/p>\n
What gives this an added touch of irony is that leading arms suppliers and recipients, including the United States, recently voted<\/a> in the U.N. General Assembly to approve the Arms Trade Treaty<\/a> that was meant to impose significant constraints on the global trade in conventional weapons. Although the treaty has many loopholes, lacks an enforcement mechanism, and will require years to achieve full implementation, it represents the first genuine attempt by the international community to place real restraints on weapons sales. \u201cThis treaty won\u2019t solve the problems of Syria overnight, no treaty could do that, but it will help to prevent future Syrias,\u201d said<\/a> Anna MacDonald, the head of arms control for Oxfam International<\/a> and an ardent treaty supporter. \u201cIt will help to reduce armed violence. \u00a0It will help to reduce conflict.\u201d<\/p>\nThis may be the hope, but such expectations will quickly be crushed if the major weapons suppliers, led by the U.S. and Russia, once again come to see arms sales as the tool of choice to gain geopolitical advantage in areas of strategic importance. Far from bringing peace and stability\u2013as the proponents of such transactions invariably claim\u2013each new arms deal now holds the possibility of taking us another step closer to a new Cold War with all the heightened risks of regional friction and conflict that entails. Are we, in fact, seeing a mindless new example of the old saw: that those who don\u2019t learn from history are destined to repeat it?<\/p>\n
Michael Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, a <\/em>TomDispatch regular<\/em><\/a>, and the author, most recently, of <\/em>The Race for What\u2019s Left<\/a>, now published in paperback by Picador. A documentary movie based on his book <\/em>Blood and Oil can be previewed and ordered at www.bloodandoilmovie.com. You can follow Klare on Facebook by clicking <\/em>here<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\nFollow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook<\/a> or Tumblr<\/a>. Check out the newest Dispatch book, Nick Turse\u2019s The Changing Face of Empire: Special Ops, Drones, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases, and Cyberwarfare<\/em>.<\/a><\/p>\n\nCopyright 2013 Michael T. Klare<\/small>\n<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"http:\/\/www.truthdig.com\/images\/eartothegrounduploads\/oiuyewq300.jpg\")
<\/p>\n
bunky pickle<\/a> (CC BY 2.0)<\/a><\/p>\n<\/span>\n<\/div>\n
By Michael T. Klare, TomDispatch<\/b><\/p>\n
This piece first appeared at TomDispatch. Read Tom Engelhardt\u2019s introduction here<\/a>.<\/i><\/p>\n Did Washington just give Israel the green light for a future attack on Iran via an arms deal? Did Russia just signal its further support for Bashar al-Assad\u2019s Syrian regime via an arms deal? Are the Russians, the Chinese, and the Americans all heightening regional tensions in Asia via arms deals? Is it possible that we\u2019re witnessing the beginnings of a new Cold War in two key regions of the planet\u2013and that the harbingers of this unnerving development are arms deals?<\/p>\n International weapons sales have proved to be a thriving global business in economically tough times. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), such sales\u00a0reached<\/a>\u00a0an impressive $85 billion in 2011, nearly double the figure for 2010. This surge in military spending reflected efforts by major Middle Eastern powers to bolster their armories with modern jets, tanks, and missiles\u2013a process constantly encouraged by the leading arms manufacturing countries (especially the U.S. and Russia) as it helps keep domestic production lines humming. However, this familiar if always troubling pattern may soon be overshadowed by a more ominous development in the global arms trade: the revival of far more targeted Cold War-style weapons sales aimed at undermining rivals and destabilizing regional power balances. The result, inevitably, will be a more precarious world.<\/p>\n Arms sales have always served multiple functions. Valuable trade commodities, weapons can prove immensely lucrative for companies that specialize in making such products. Between 2008 and 2011, for example, U.S. firms sold<\/a> $146 billion worth of military hardware to foreign countries, according to the latest CRS figures. Crucially, such sales help ensure<\/a> that domestic production lines remain profitable even when government acquisitions slow down at home. But arms sales have also served as valuable tools<\/a> of foreign policy\u2013as enticements for the formation of alliances, expressions of ongoing support, and a way to lure new allies over to one\u2019s side. Powerful nations, seeking additional <\/strong>allies, use such sales to win the allegiance of weaker states; weaker states, seeking to bolster their defenses, look to arms deals as a way to build ties with stronger countries, or even to play one suitor off another in pursuit of the most sophisticated arms available.<\/p>\n Throughout the Cold War, both superpowers employed weapons transfers as a form of competition, offering advanced arms to entice regional powers to defect from each other\u2019s alliance systems or to counter offers made by the other side. Egypt, for example, was convinced to join the Soviet sphere in 1955 when provided with arms the West had refused to deliver. In the late <\/strong>1970s, it moved back into the American camp after Washington anted up far better weapons systems.<\/p>\n In those years, the Americans and the Soviets also used arms transfers to bolster key allies in areas of strategic confrontation like the Middle East. Washington armed Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran when it was still ruled by the Shah; Russia armed Iraq and Syria. These transfers played a critical role in Cold War diplomacy and sometimes helped tilt the scales in favor of decisions to go to war. In the Yom Kippur War<\/a> of 1973, for example, Egypt, emboldened by an expanded arsenal of Soviet antitank missiles, attacked Israeli forces in the Negev desert.<\/p>\n In the wake of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the commercial aspect<\/a> of arms sales came to the fore. Both Washington and Moscow were, by then, far more interested in keeping their military production lines running than in jousting for advantage abroad, so emphasis was placed on scoring contracts from those with the means to pay\u2013mainly the major oil producers of the Middle East and Latin America and the economically expansive \u201ctigers\u201d of Asia. Between 2008 and 2011, the CRS ranked the leading purchasers of conventional arms in the developing world this way: Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Egypt, and Venezuela. Together, these six countries ordered $117 billion in new weaponry.<\/p>\n Arms Sales Take a New Path<\/strong><\/p>\n Only recently has some version of great power dueling and competition started up again, and in the early months of 2013 it seems to be gaining momentum. Several recent developments highlight this trend:<\/p>\n * In early May, Western intelligence sources revealed<\/a> that Russia had supplied several batteries of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles to the embattled Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Moscow had previously provided the Syrians with a version of the missile known as the Yakhont<\/a>, but those delivered recently are said to be equipped with a more advanced radar that increases their effectiveness. With those missiles, the Syrians should be in a better position to deter or counter any effort by international forces, including the United States, to aid anti-Assad rebels by sea or mount a naval blockade of Syria. They are also said to be negotiating<\/a> with the Russians for the purchase of advanced S-300 ground-to-air missiles, a weapons system that would greatly complicate air attacks on the country or the imposition of a no-fly zone.<\/p>\n Aside from its military significance, the Yakhont transfer suggests a new inclination on Moscow\u2019s part to engage in provocative arms sales to advance its strategic<\/a> goals\u2013in this case, the survival of the Assad regime, Russia\u2019s sole remaining ally in the region\u2013even in the face of concerted Western opposition. Employing tough language, Secretary of State John F. Kerry warned the Russians<\/a> against such action. \u201cWe\u2019ve made it crystal clear that we prefer that Russia would not supply them assistance,\u201d he declared. \u201cThat is on record.\u201d Despite such admonitions, Russian officials insist that they have no intention of halting arms deliveries to Assad. \u201cRussia enjoys good and strong military technical cooperation with Syria, and we see no reason today to reconsider it,\u201d Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov told<\/a> reporters.<\/p>\n * In April, during a visit to Jerusalem, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced<\/a> a multibillion-dollar arms package for Israel. Although its final details are still being worked out, it is expected to include V-22 \u201cOsprey\u201d<\/a> tilt-rotor transport planes, KC-135<\/a> aerial refueling aircraft, and advanced radars and anti-radiation missiles for Israel\u2019s strike aircraft. \u201cWe are committed to providing Israel with whatever support is necessary for Israel to maintain military superiority over any state or coalition of states and non-state actors [in the region],\u201d Hagel told<\/a> reporters when announcing the package.<\/p>\n The U.S. has, of course, long been committed to Israel\u2019s military superiority, so there was something ritualistic about much of Hagel\u2019s performance in Jerusalem. No less predictable were the complaints<\/a> from Israeli military and intelligence sources that the package didn\u2019t include enough new arms to satisfy Israel\u2019s needs, or were of the wrong kind. The V-22 Osprey, for example, was proclaimed by some to be of marginal military value. Far more surprising was that no red flags went up in the media over what was included. At least two of the items\u2013the KC-135 refueling planes and the anti-radiation missiles (crucial weaponry for disabling an enemy\u2019s air-defense radar system)\u2013could only be intended for one purpose: bolstering<\/a> Israel\u2019s capacity to conduct a sustained air campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities, should it decide to do so.<\/p>\n At present, the biggest military obstacles<\/a> to such an attack are that country\u2019s inability to completely cripple Iranian anti-aircraft defense systems and mount sustained long-range air strikes. The missiles and the mid-air refueling capability will go a long way toward eliminating such impediments. Although it may take up to a year for all this new hardware to be delivered and come online, the package can only be read as a green light from Washington for Israel to undertake preparations for an attack on Iran, which has long been shielded from tougher U.N. sanctions by China and Russia.<\/p>\n * In March, Russia agreed<\/a> to sell 24 Sukhoi Su-35 multi-role combat jets and four Lada-class diesel submarines to China on the eve of newly installed President Xi Jinping\u2019s first official visit to Moscow. Although details of the sale have yet to be worked out, observers say that it will represent the most significant transfer<\/a> of Russian weaponry to China in a decade. The Su-35<\/a>, a fourth-generation stealth fighter, is superior to any plane now in China\u2019s arsenal, while the Lada<\/a> is a more advanced, quieter version of the Kilo-class sub it already possesses. Together, the two systems will provide the Chinese with a substantial boost in combat quality.<\/p>\n For anyone who has followed Asian security affairs over the past few years, it is hard to view this deal as anything but a reaction to the Obama administration\u2019s new Asian strategy, its \u201cpivot\u201d to the Pacific. As announced by President Obama in a speech<\/a> before the Australian Parliament in November 2011, it involves beefing-up the already strong<\/a> U.S. air and naval presence in the western Pacific\u2013in, that is, waters off of China\u2013along with increased U.S. arms aid<\/a> to American allies like Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea.<\/p>\n Not surprisingly, China has responded by bolstering its own naval capabilities, announcing plans<\/a> for the acquisition of a second aircraft carrier (its first began operational testing in late 2012) and the procurement of advanced arms from Russia to fill gaps in its defense structure. This, in turn, is bound to increase the pressure<\/a> on Washington from Japan, Taiwan, and other allies to provide yet more weaponry, triggering a classic Cold-War-style arms race in the region.<\/p>\n * On the eve of Secretary of State John Kerry\u2019s June 24th visit to India, that country\u2019s press was full of reports and rumors about upcoming U.S. military sales. Andrew Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, was widely quoted<\/a> as saying that, in addition to sales already in the pipeline, \u201cwe think there\u2019s going to be billions of dollars more in the next couple of years.\u201d In his comments, Shapiro referred to Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who, he said, was heading up an arms sales initiative, \u201cwhich we think is making some good progress and will, hopefully, lead to an even greater pace of additional defense trade with India.\u201d<\/p>\n To some degree, of course, this can be viewed as a continuation of weapons sales as a domestic economic motor, since U.S. weapons companies have long sought access<\/a> to India\u2019s vast arms market. But such sales now clearly play another role as well: to lubricate the U.S. drive to incorporate India into the arc of powers encircling China as part of the Obama administration\u2019s new Asia-Pacific strategy.<\/p>\n Toward this end, as Deputy Secretary of State William Burns explained<\/a> back in 2011, \u201cOur two countries launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific to ensure that the world\u2019s two largest democracies pursue strategies that reinforce one another.\u201d Arms transfers are seen by the leaders of both countries as a vital tool in the \u201ccontainment\u201d of China (though all parties are careful to avoid that old Cold War term). So watch for Kerry to pursue new arms agreements while in New Delhi.<\/p>\n Repeating History<\/strong><\/p>\n These are just some examples of recent arms deals (or ones under discussion) that suggest a fresh willingness on the part of the major powers to use weapons transfers as instruments of geopolitical intrusion and competition. The reappearance of such behavior suggests a troubling resurgence of Cold War-like rivalries. Even if senior leaders in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing are not talking about resurrecting some twenty-first-century version of the Cold War, anyone with a sense of history can see that they are headed down a grim, well-trodden path toward crisis and confrontation.<\/p>\n What gives this an added touch of irony is that leading arms suppliers and recipients, including the United States, recently voted<\/a> in the U.N. General Assembly to approve the Arms Trade Treaty<\/a> that was meant to impose significant constraints on the global trade in conventional weapons. Although the treaty has many loopholes, lacks an enforcement mechanism, and will require years to achieve full implementation, it represents the first genuine attempt by the international community to place real restraints on weapons sales. \u201cThis treaty won\u2019t solve the problems of Syria overnight, no treaty could do that, but it will help to prevent future Syrias,\u201d said<\/a> Anna MacDonald, the head of arms control for Oxfam International<\/a> and an ardent treaty supporter. \u201cIt will help to reduce armed violence. \u00a0It will help to reduce conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n This may be the hope, but such expectations will quickly be crushed if the major weapons suppliers, led by the U.S. and Russia, once again come to see arms sales as the tool of choice to gain geopolitical advantage in areas of strategic importance. Far from bringing peace and stability\u2013as the proponents of such transactions invariably claim\u2013each new arms deal now holds the possibility of taking us another step closer to a new Cold War with all the heightened risks of regional friction and conflict that entails. Are we, in fact, seeing a mindless new example of the old saw: that those who don\u2019t learn from history are destined to repeat it?<\/p>\n Michael Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, a <\/em>TomDispatch regular<\/em><\/a>, and the author, most recently, of <\/em>The Race for What\u2019s Left<\/a>, now published in paperback by Picador. A documentary movie based on his book <\/em>Blood and Oil can be previewed and ordered at www.bloodandoilmovie.com. You can follow Klare on Facebook by clicking <\/em>here<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook<\/a> or Tumblr<\/a>. Check out the newest Dispatch book, Nick Turse\u2019s The Changing Face of Empire: Special Ops, Drones, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases, and Cyberwarfare<\/em>.<\/a><\/p>\n \nCopyright 2013 Michael T. Klare<\/small>\n<\/p>\n bunky pickle<\/a> (CC BY 2.0)<\/a><\/p>\n <\/span>\n<\/div>\n<\/p>\n