{"id":117179,"date":"2014-05-08T14:21:29","date_gmt":"2014-05-08T14:21:29","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/?p=117179"},"modified":"2014-05-08T14:21:29","modified_gmt":"2014-05-08T14:21:29","slug":"folly-playing-high-stakes-poker-vladimir-putin-lose-gain-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/latest-news\/folly-playing-high-stakes-poker-vladimir-putin-lose-gain-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"The Folly of Playing High-Stakes Poker with Vladimir Putin: More to Lose than Gain over Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"

Johanna C. Granville
\nRINF Alternative News<\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

In the weeks following the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, both the United States and European Union have issued a range of sanctions to punish the Putin administration. But a belligerent response aimed at \u201cpunishing Putin,\u201d even if confined to economic measures, will probably just escalate the crisis. Such actions increase ill will, freeze vital channels of communication, and damage the U.S. and EU economies.\u00a0<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Military measures, such as deploying NATO, especially U.S., ground troops on Russia\u2019s borders, staging military exercises, and sending military aid to the unelected interim government in Kiev are even more counterproductive and dangerous. The Crimean annexation should be a wake-up call on another level. If the United States and NATO violate international law as they have in the Balkans, Iraq, and other locales, other states will feel entitled to do so as well.\u00a0<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

\u00a0The most important goal should be to prevent current East-West tensions from getting any worse. An especially crucial step is to help preserve Ukraine\u2019s unity and prevent the outbreak of a civil war. That requires a decent working relationship with Moscow. There is an even worse scenario than growing disorder in Ukraine, however. The prospect of a full blown new cold war, and perhaps even an armed clash, with Russia is all too real, if the United States and the European Union powers do not adopt more sober, realistic policies soon.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Ominous Parallel: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Its Aftermath<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

When 80,000 Soviet soldiers invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, U.S. policy analysts and officials like National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski raised the alarm that the Kremlin had a \u201cgrand design\u201d to push further into the Persian Gulf to seize oil and acquire more warm water ports. The Carter administration imposed punitive sanctions on the U.S.S.R., including a grain embargo that hurt U.S. farmers and a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. The policy of d\u00c3\u00a9tente brokered in 1969 by Henry Kissinger came to an end. Almost twenty years later, after a new cold war had developed, Brzezinski told a French newspaper that, unbeknownst to the world, the Carter administration had been funding the Afghan \u201cfreedom fighters\u201d (mujahedeen) covertly as early as July 1979, a full six months before the Soviet invasion. \u201cI wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention,\u201d Brzezinski said. As he explained to Carter, \u201cWe now have the opportunity of giving to the U.S.S.R. its own Vietnam war.\u201d<\/a>[1]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Thanks to declassified top-secret documents and oral histories published by the National Security Archive, we now know that members of the Brezhnev leadership believed they were acting defensively, fearing that the United States intended to move into Afghanistan, having lost neighboring Iran as an ally in the wake of the revolution and hostage crisis there.<\/a>[2]<\/span> As early as 1982, the Soviet leaders realized the intervention was a mistake and actively sought international mediation to pave the way for withdrawal. Hardliners in Washington (\u201cbleeders\u201d), however, wanted to keep funding the mujahedeen via Pakistan\u2019s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to make the Russians suffer in a quagmire, pauperizing themselves in the process.<\/a>[3]<\/span> Steady funding of the mujahedeen by the United States, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, and China helped transform the Soviet incursion into a bloody nine-year war.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although Moscow\u2019s actions in Afghanistan were largely defensive (albeit brutal), that is not how U.S. officials portrayed the situation to the American people and the world.\u00a0 Instead, Washington treated the Soviet intervention as an unprovoked act of aggression against a small, weak neighbor. The American public accepted that narrative without much criticism and supported aid to Afghan \u201cfreedom fighters,\u201d even though the mujahedeen included more than a few Islamic extremists and other unsavory elements. Washington is still paying a heavy price for the consequences of that policy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s Annexation of Crimea and the West\u2019s Confrontational Response<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Thirty-five years later, policy analysts focus on another \u201cRussian incursion\u201d, emphasizing (if not exaggerating) the extent of Moscow\u2019s aggressive intentions, and exhort President Obama to take \u201cstrong\u201d action in response. After the overthrow of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich in late February, Vladimir Putin\u2019s government moved quickly to implement ambitious policy goals regarding the Crimean peninsula. On March 1, 2014, following an appeal by Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov, Putin asked Russia\u2019s Federation Council for permission to \u201cuse the armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine until the normalization of the socio-political situation in that country.\u201d<\/a>[4]<\/span> The following day, hundreds of Russian troops advanced towards Simferopol, the capital of the Crimean Autonomous Republic.<\/span><\/p>\n

Arseny\u00a0Yatsenyuk, Ukraine\u2019s interim prime minister, accused Russia of declaring war on his country. Although most UN Security Council members voted to declare any local referendum on Crimea\u2019s secession to Russia to be illegal, Russian authorities went ahead with the balloting in mid-March. There is little doubt that the secession and change of sovereignty was widely popular among the reported 83.1% of Crimeans who voted. However, the referendum only presented them with two similar choices: either join the Russian Federation or restore the 1992 Crimean constitution, each of which amounted to de facto separation from Ukraine. The presence of Russian troops likely discouraged opponents of secession from voting.<\/a>[5]<\/span> The formal annexation was completed the following day. Encouraged by that annexation, \u201cAnti-Maidan\u201d demonstrations directed against the pro-Western interim Ukrainian government have taken place throughout eastern Ukraine, especially in cities such as Odessa, Donetsk, Kharkov, and Lugansk.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0The West Imposes Economic Sanctions<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In response to the Crimean referendum and annexation, the Obama administration issued three executive orders (13660, 13661, and 13662) targeting Russian Federation policymakers, the inner circle that supports them, Bank Rossiya, and potentially certain sectors of the Russian economy. These \u201cUkrainian Orders\u201d have thus far frozen the U.S.-based assets of at least twenty Russian and Ukrainian (Crimean) officials deemed responsible for the crisis and banned them from entering the United States. Targets include the exiled Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov, Putin\u2019s aide and chief ideologist Vladislav Surkov, co-founder of the left-wing nationalist party Rodina (\u201cMotherland\u201d) Sergei Glazyev, Federation Council chair Valentina Matviyenko, deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin, and four billionaires close to Putin (Yuri Kovalchuk, Gennady Timchenko, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg).<\/a>[6]<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The U.S.-based Visa and MasterCard companies also stopped servicing the credit cards of customers at Russian banks like Bank Rossiya, Sobinbank, InvestKapitalBank, and SMP Bank.<\/a>[7]<\/span> The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) suspended all engagements with Russia\u2019s Roscosmos with the exception of joint work on the International Space Station.<\/a>[8]<\/span><\/span><\/span> President Obama and other leaders of the G7 nations (Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Japan and Canada) canceled plans to meet in Sochi. They met instead without Russia in Brussels on March 24, where they condemned the annexation and threatened further sectoral sanctions on the Russian economy if Russia \u201cescalates the situation,\u201d presumably by intervening elsewhere in Ukraine.<\/a>[9]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

European Union (EU) leaders, meanwhile, have frozen assets and banned visas for as many as 51 Russian policymakers and military personnel and senior political officials in the Crimean peninsula.<\/a>[10]<\/span><\/span><\/span> As for loans to Ukraine, the EU has promised to provide $15 billion, the International Monetary Fund $18 billion in loans, Japan about $1.5 billion, and the United States has offered $1 billion in loan guarantees.<\/a>[11]<\/span><\/span><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

The Campaign for Military Measures<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Hawkish critics in the United States have derided the preliminary sanctions as mere \u201cwrist-slapping\u201d measures. But Washington has also undertaken a number of military measures. On April 18, the Obama administration announced the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Poland and Estonia for exercises. Anders Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO, stated that alliance aircraft would fly more sorties over the Baltic region, and NATO ships would be deployed in the Baltic Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Pentagon earlier had dispatched F-15 planes to Lithuania and about three hundred U.S. airmen and a dozen F16 fighters to Poland for joint exercises. A U.S. Navy destroyer entered the Black Sea for training exercises with Bulgarian and Romanian navies. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) flights are taking place over the Polish and Romanian borders.<\/a>[12]<\/span> At the Brussels meeting on April 1-2, NATO officials announced the suspension of \u201call practical civilian and military cooperation\u201d between NATO and Russia. NATO officials canceled an exercise that was scheduled to take place in July in the Russian city of Cheliabinsk, deciding instead to hold a twelve-nation exercise (\u201cRapid Trident\u201d) in the Ukrainian city of Lviv.<\/a>[13]<\/span> Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary, announced plans to send more aid to the Ukrainian army in the form of water purification devices, uniforms, and medical supplies.<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite these measures, Republican leaders fault the Obama administration for its allegedly weak response to the Russian annexation of Crimea and call for still harsher economic sanctions and more robust displays of military resolve. Many claim that, having annexed Crimea, Putin will now attempt to seize other parts of eastern Ukraine, and they accuse Russia of fomenting unrest in Ukraine\u2019s eastern cities. Expressions of alarm are bipartisan in nature. Hillary Clinton even stated that Putin is trying to \u201crewrite the boundaries of post-World War II Europe.\u201d Senator John McCain (R-AZ) opined that \u201cPresident Obama thinks the Cold War is over, but Vladimir Putin doesn\u2019t, and that\u2019s what this is all about.\u201d<\/a>[14]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

This pugnacious stance is foolish and risky for a number of reasons. Deploying Western\u2014especially U.S.\u2014ground troops on Russia\u2019s borders, staging military exercises, sending military aid to the vehemently anti-Russian government in Kiev, imposing sanctions, and adopting other punitive measures exacerbate an already tense situation. That course merely increases ill will, freezes vital channels of communication, and risks damaging the U.S. and EU economies. Worse, such measures create the specter of a full-blown diplomatic and military cold war with Moscow.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

Facing Reality: The Crimean Annexation is a Fait Accompli<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

What is the ultimate goal of sanctions and displays of military force? If it is to induce Putin to return Crimea to Ukraine, that is highly unlikely to happen. The annexation is a fait accompli, and, as mentioned, apparently a majority of the local population is happy to be part of the Russian Federation once again. Prospects of compelling Moscow to relinquish territory that it already has formally incorporated into the Russian Federation are not good. If the goal of military exercises and economic sanctions is to dissuade Putin from annexing other regions of Ukraine, that is at least a more plausible objective. But how will Washington know when the goal has been achieved? How long will the sanctions have to remain in place before the Obama administration is convinced that Putin has no \u201cgrand design\u201d for the rest of Ukraine\u2013much less for the rest of Eastern and Central Europe? Moreover, Washington\u2019s actions thus far fail to address the real grievances of the anti-Maidan, pro-Russian protesters, which include the dubious legality of the Kiev interim regime, the presence of ultranationalist Ukrainians in it, and the government\u2019s unilateral decisions regarding highly controversial items, such as accepting IMF austerity measures. U.S. officials openly cheered on pro-Western demonstrators and the overthrow of the Yanukovich government, much to Moscow\u2019s displeasure. Now, instead of considering a diplomatic retreat, the Obama administration flirts with making an already bad situation even worse.<\/span><\/p>\n

Crimea has a unique importance to Russia that cannot be measured merely in financial terms. The peninsula contains some of Russia\u2019s most important strategic assets crucial to the Federation\u2019s self-defense, including the Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol, the shipyard at Mykolaiv, the air base at Kacha, another large naval air base at Gvardeyskoye, an anti-aircraft missile regiment in Sevastopol, and other installations. The Black Sea is Russia\u2019s sole means of projecting power into the Mediterranean.<\/span><\/p>\n

One should bear in mind that the annexation of Crimea, with its insolvent economy, will involve substantial costs to the Russian economy, an estimated $3 billion a year. Moscow now needs to pay the pensions of roughly 620,000 senior Crimean citizens, costing about 70 billion rubles ($1.9 billion) per year, according to former Russian tax minister Alexander Pochinok.<\/a>[15]<\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00a0The World Bank estimates that Russia\u2019s GDP growth may slow to 1.1 percent for the year 2014.<\/a>[16]<\/span> If Putin was willing to accept such an extra economic burden because of strategic and geopolitical considerations, Western sanctions and military displays will probably not influence his decisions to a great degree.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Putin government plans to construct a new submarine power cable, local power generators, and a new gas pipeline from Krasnodar to Sevastopol, all of which could cost at least another billion dollars. Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev has also pledged to build a 4.5 kilometer bridge across the Kerch Strait to connect Crimea with Russia, which could cost another half billion dollars.<\/a>[17]<\/span> Russian leaders surely had to recognize and accept such burdens when they made the annexation decision. Foreign economic sanctions are only an additional cost. There is no credible evidence that they will weaken the Russian leadership\u2019s collective will to persist with the current policy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pursuing a Risky Policy toward Moscow<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Analysts often point out the Russian Federation\u2019s weaknesses: a consistently declining birth rate, widespread corruption, an export economy dependent on high energy prices, military technology inferior to the West\u2019s, and growing competition from China and South Korea.<\/a>[18]<\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00a0Nevertheless, the U.S. and NATO\u2019s military escalation is provocative and unwise, given Russia\u2019s status as a nuclear power with first strike capability. The Russian military has extensive countermeasures planned in the event of a decapitation strike by the United States or another nuclear power. Both the United States and Russia have abandoned policies of strict no first use, thereby making any escalation of a confrontation even more dangerous.<\/a>[19]<\/span><\/span><\/span> Both countries have \u201claunch on warning\u201d systems that send off rockets before it is confirmed a nuclear attack is underway.<\/a>[20]<\/span><\/span><\/span> In the midst of tensions over Ukraine, Russian commanders\u2019 early warning systems could falsely detect evidence of an attack and retaliate reflexively. NATO\u2019s options are constrained by Russia\u2019s concept of \u201cde-escalation,\u201d articulated in 2000 and influenced by the conflict in Kosovo. It stipulates that if Russia were faced with a large-scale conventional attack that exceeded its capacity for defense, it might respond with a limited nuclear strike.<\/a>[21]<\/span><\/span><\/span> Such factors should be a major incentive for the United States to exercise great caution and not casually provoke Moscow.<\/span><\/p>\n

U.S. Aid to the Kiev Interim Regime Antagonizes the Kremlin<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

U.S. military aid to the Kiev government enmeshes the United States in the Ukrainian conflict even more deeply than do economic sanctions. \u00a0Indeed, those military measures risk creating a future proxy war in Ukraine between the U.S.-backed regime and Russian-backed protesters in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine is not a NATO member and Washington will tarnish its reputation further by assisting a regime that lacks legitimacy with sizable portions of the country\u2019s population. Following CIA chief John Brennan\u2019s visit to Kiev in April, acting Ukrainian President Aleksandr Turchinov ordered an \u201canti-terrorist operation\u201d in the eastern city of Slaviansk. It quickly failed when Ukrainian commanders refused to fire on civilians who were clearly not terrorists.<\/a>[22]<\/span>\u00a0Vice President Joe Biden\u2019s subsequent visit may have reassured regime leaders, but it also made the Kiev regime look even weaker and more dependent on the West in the eyes of the anti-Maidan protesters.<\/span><\/p>\n

U.S. Ground Troops in Poland and the Baltic States: An Especially Provocative Step<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Some hardliners in Washington argue that after the transfer of thousands of U.S. troops from Europe as part of the \u201cpivot\u201d to Asia, NATO\u2019s Central European members are now vulnerable to Russian aggression. When the Soviet Union fell in late 1991, the total U.S. troop presence was approximately 285,000 personnel. Today, about 67,000 U.S. military members are currently stationed in the European theater, primarily in Germany (40,000), Italy (11,000), and Great Britain (9,500). These and other NATO nations are \u201cjittery\u201d and \u201clooking for reassurance,\u201d claims Steven Pifer, a former ambassador to Ukraine.<\/a>[23]<\/span><\/span><\/span> That is especially true of Alliance members in Central and Eastern Europe. Some hawkish analysts on both sides of the Atlantic argue that U.S. ground troops should be stationed permanently in those countries, not just as part of temporary military exercises. However, such an escalation is unnecessary and highly antagonistic, given Russia\u2019s historic fear of encirclement.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Just because Ukrainian citizens are protesting against the Kiev government in Ukraine\u2019s eastern cities does not automatically entail a Russian threat to the territorial integrity of Poland and the Baltic states. There is a big difference between the annexation of Crimea (which many Russians see as a reunification, since the region was part of Russia from 1783 to 1954), and an outright invasion of fully sovereign countries. Moreover, since NATO allies enjoy the Article 5 security guarantee (an attack on one member is considered an attack on all), Moscow would hesitate to take such a grave risk, regardless of how Russian minorities within those NATO countries might be \u201cmistreated.\u201d<\/a>[24]<\/span><\/span><\/span> It is important for U.S. and other Western policymakers not to exaggerate the extent of Moscow\u2019s apparent territorial ambitions.<\/span><\/p>\n

Broader Destabilizing Consequences of a New Cold War<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In response to the series of confrontational U.S., NATO, and EU measures, Russia will retaliate. Indeed, it has already done so to a limited extent. Mirroring Washington\u2019s visa bans, Russia quickly responded with entry bans on nine U.S. government officials. More important, Moscow can also hurt U.S. interests in a host of other arenas.<\/span>\u00a0This is no time to alienate Russia, a member of the UN Security Council with veto power, whose cooperation is sorely needed to resolve crises involving such countries like Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In the spring of 2009, President Obama and Dmitry Medvedev (Russian Federation president at the time) pledged to \u201creset\u201d U.S.-Russian relations. Breakthroughs were reached on the new START treaty (April 2010), UN sanctions against Iran (June 2010), and\u2014after Obama set the 2014 deadline for withdrawal\u2014Russian support of the U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) war effort in Afghanistan. Putin\u2019s return as Russia\u2019s president need not undo the \u201creset.\u201d For example, although the Syrian civil war continues, Putin\u2019s diplomatic initiative in September 2013 gave President Obama a face-saving tactic to avoid the overt use of force against Damascus, something a clear majority of Americans opposed.<\/a>[25]<\/span><\/span><\/span> If Washington\u2019s pressure on Moscow continues to mount, though, Putin could renege on his promise to cooperate with the West in getting Assad to fulfill his pledge to destroy the country\u2019s arsenal of chemical weapons. We would then be back in crisis mode regarding Syria.<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Working within the P5 + 1 forum on Iran, Russia helped to broker an interim agreement in November 2013 entailing a six month freeze of Iran\u2019s nuclear program in exchange for decreased economic sanctions on Iran. The agreement expires on July 20, and P5+1 representatives hope to convert the interim deal into a comprehensive, permanent agreement. However, new signs have emerged that Russia might link the Ukraine and Iran problems to obtain diplomatic leverage with the United States and EU. According to Reuters, Moscow and Teheran are close to signing a barter deal amounting to about $20 billion. In exchange for receiving Russian equipment and goods, Iran will sell up to 500,000 barrels of oil per day. Although only food and industrial\u2014not military\u2014goods would be sold to Tehran, such a barter deal would significantly undercut the Western sanctions and oil embargo imposed to isolate Iran.<\/a>[26]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Afghanistan<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Working through the Russia-NATO Council, Moscow has cooperated in fighting drug production in Afghanistan and has permitted use of Russian air space and new overland supply routes to be established through Russian territory. That is no small consideration, since U.S. and ISAF supply convoys using the Pakistan route have been attacked repeatedly by Taliban forces.<\/a>[27]<\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00a0Considering the Soviets\u2019 nine-year bloody quagmire, which some analysts term a catalyst for the Soviet empire\u2019s collapse, Moscow could have chosen instead to fund the Taliban since the start of the NATO intervention in 2001, thereby making the U.S.-led mission far more perilous and gaining revenge against Washington for its support of the mujahedeen in the 1980s. If further sanctions against the Russian economy are levied, Putin could close the supply routes or demand higher transit fees, obstructing the planned U.S. withdrawal of its 51,000 soldiers later this year.<\/span><\/p>\n

A Possible Russia-China Axis<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Washington\u2019s adversarial approach toward Russia also motivates the Putin leadership to forge stronger military and economic ties with China. The Beijing government, which abstained from voting against the Crimean referendum in the UN Security Council, also worries about the situation in Ukraine. Zhao Jinglun, a correspondent for the official news service of the communist country\u2019s State Council, denounced the \u201cU.S.-backed fascist putsch\u201d in Kiev, noting that ultra-nationalist \u201cSvoboda party activists hold at least eight top cabinet positions.\u201d<\/a>[28]<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Moreover, the Chinese government often affirms the principle of noninterference in a sovereign state\u2019s internal affairs. Foreign sponsorship of separatist movements within a sovereign state is anathema to the Beijing leaders, who have their own restless regions, especially Tibet and Xinjiang. While they do not condone Russia\u2019s Crimean annexation, they understand that Russia is following the precedent set earlier in 1999 by NATO. Citing the need for a \u201chumanitarian intervention,\u201d and with no authority from the UN Security Council, NATO intervened in Kosovo, and removed that territory from Belgrade\u2019s control. Administered by a UN mission for several years after the war, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia with enthusiastic backing from the United States and leading EU powers. In 2010, the International Court of Justice judged the declaration legal, but nearly half of the countries in the world, including China, still refuse to recognize Kosovo\u2019s independence. Interestingly, Russia used to oppose Kosovo\u2019s independence, but after the Crimea\u2019s declaration of independence from Ukraine, Moscow now states that such unilateral declarations are not inconsistent with international law.<\/a>[29]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Some Possible Long-Term Adverse Economic Consequences to the United States<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

As Dwight Eisenhower warned half a century ago, a robust military depends on a healthy economy. The long-range economic effects of Washington\u2019s combative approach to the Ukrainian crisis cannot be ignored. After the G7 leaders snubbed Russia, Moscow signaled plans to strengthen economic ties with the other members of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) group, which collectively control about a quarter of the world\u2019s economy. They have discussed the possibility of buying each other\u2019s sovereign bonds and swapping currencies to reduce their vulnerability. Obama administration officials boasted about freezing Bank Rossiya \u201cout of the dollar,\u201d but Washington underestimates the potential power other countries have eventually to begin freezing the U.S. dollar out of its privileged status as the world\u2019s reserve currency. Politicians and officials from Russia and China have often articulated desires to do just that. Yi Gang, deputy governor of the People\u2019s Bank of China announced plans on November 20, 2013 to limit U.S. dollar reserves and to allow the Chinese yuan to appreciate faster. \u201cIt\u2019s no longer in China\u2019s favor to accumulate foreign-exchange reserves,\u201d he said.<\/a>[30]<\/span><\/span><\/span> More recently, Sergey Glazyev\u2014one of the Russian politicians the U.S. has sanctioned\u2014 hinted about the need to drop the dollar as a reserve currency.<\/a>[31]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Beginning in 2010, Russia and China have conducted bilateral trade in their own currencies. In reaction to the possible loss of the European energy market, Russia will probably sell more gas and oil \u2014 in rubles \u2014 to China, which has already agreed to buy more than $350 billion of Russian crude oil in coming years.<\/a>[32]<\/span><\/span><\/span> President Putin lobbied the Upper House of the Duma for a new ruble-based payment system on March 27.\u00a0<\/a>[33]<\/span><\/span><\/span> One day later, Andrei Kostin, the president of one of Russia\u2019s largest banks (VTB), told Itar-Tass: \u201cRussia should sell domestic products\u2014from weapons to gas and oil\u2014abroad for rubles and buy foreign goods also for rubles.\u201d<\/a>[34]<\/span><\/span><\/span> Should Putin start demanding rubles (or yuan) for the gas sold to EU countries, U.S. and EU officials may soon rue the initiation of even symbolic sanctions against Moscow.<\/span><\/p>\n

There are other warning signs of Washington\u2019s growing financial vulnerability. According to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, although the U.S. dollar is still the most heavily traded currency, the Chinese yuan overtook the euro to become the second most-used currency in global trade finance in October 2013.<\/a>[35]<\/span><\/span><\/span> Accordingly, e<\/span>ven U.S. allies Great Britain and Germany have taken steps to increase use of the Chinese currency, and both London and Frankfurt have become centers for yuan-denominated transactions.<\/a>[36]<\/span><\/span><\/span> Total U.S. public debt is now $17.226 trillion or over 100 percent of annual GDP, and roughly 47 percent of that debt is owned by foreign investors. China is the largest holder of U.S. government debt ($1.294 trillion), while Russia is the eleventh largest foreign creditor ($139 billion). In light of this reality, threats and sanctions against Russia are risky and counterproductive in the long run, especially if they serve to cement a Russian-Chinese diplomatic and economic partnership.<\/span><\/p>\n

Economic Sanctions Are Rarely Successful Foreign Policy Tools<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Obama administration is making plans for a second round of more serious economic sanctions against Russia. However, history shows that economic sanctions rarely influence foreign policy behavior significantly, and even more rarely cause a reversal of a fait accompli. Modern nation-states tend to resist external pressure; often such sanctions only increase a nation\u2019s discipline to endure hardship rather than surrender.<\/a>[37]<\/span><\/span><\/span> While the Russian MICEX index plummeted 20.4 percent after a two and a half month selloff, it partially rebounded in April, and Putin\u2019s approval rating rose to 80 percent.<\/a>[38]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Even in countries where the incumbent leadership elites are unpopular, they usually invent modes of self-protection and shift the economic burden of sanctions onto disenfranchised segments of the population. Sanctions against Iraq lasted from 1990, after the invasion of Kuwait, until 2003 when the U.S.-led invasion deposed Saddam Hussein. Approximately 567,000 infants died from the sanctions\u2019 effects, including malnutrition.<\/a>[39]<\/span> If sanctions were imposed on sections of Russia\u2019s economy, new and stronger trade alliances will probably develop between Russian and traditional U.S. competitors and adversaries like China, Iran, Syria, and North Korea, which would cause Washington greater problems in the future. Economic sanctions are a blunt instrument, which, in causing pain and financial hardship to others only harden decades-long animosities, as exemplified by U.S. sanctions regimes against North Korea (since 1950), Cuba (since 1962), Iran (since 1979), and Syria (since 1986).<\/span><\/p>\n

Sanctions Will Damage U.S. and EU Economies<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

As the Obama administration ought to realize, such blunt instruments are ineffective, even masochistic, in the hyperconnected global economy of the twenty-first century. Russian corporations like Severstal are the world\u2019s largest exporters of crucial industrial metals like palladium, upon which global producers of cars and airplanes depend. Granted, direct U.S. trade ties with Russia are minimal; exports came to $11 billion in 2013, equivalent to less than 0.1 percent of U.S. GDP, and imports from Russia amounted to $27 billion, or just under 0.2 percent of GDP.<\/a>[40]<\/span><\/span><\/span> A natural target of sanctions would be the Russian energy sector, since oil and petroleum products comprise over two-thirds of total Russian exports and finance over half of the Russian federal budget. However, sections on Russia\u2019s energy sector, as well as the kind of sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea (i.e. on investments, technology deliveries and financial transactions) would also hurt U.S. companies like Exxon Mobil, General Electric (including GE Capital Aviation Services), Chevron, and Boeing. Exxon, in joint ventures with Rosneft, drills for oil and gas in the Arctic and on the island of Sakhalin, and has several other long-term drilling and hydraulic fracturing (\u201cfracking\u201d) projects in Iraq\u2019s Kurdistan and elsewhere.<\/a>[41]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The EU\u2014as Russia\u2019s number one trading partner accounting for almost 41 percent of all the country\u2019s trade\u2014has more power than does the United States to hurt the Russian economy. According to the European Commission\u2019s Directorate-General for Trade, 75 percent of foreign direct investment in the Russian stock market came from EU member states.<\/a>[42]<\/span>\u00a0However, EU countries also depend more heavily on Russian trade than the United States. In 2012 alone, European countries exported as much as $170 billion in goods to Russia.<\/a>[43]<\/span> If the EU and the United States curtail their exports, they will hurt their own balance sheets.<\/span><\/p>\n

EU\u2019s Heavy Dependence on Russian Gas<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Moreover, the EU member states import 84 percent of Russia\u2019s oil and 76 percent of its natural gas. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania are 100 percent dependent on Russian gas.<\/a>[44]<\/span> A network of thirteen distinct pipelines spread from Russia across Ukraine like veins and capillaries, carrying more than half of Russia\u2019s gas exports to Europe. Because of the construction of the Nord Stream underwater pipeline directly linking Russia to Germany, the latter imports around 35 percent of its gas directly from Russia, bypassing Ukraine. Germany has only about four months\u2019 worth of reserves stored.<\/a>[45]<\/span> At least thirty-three percent of EU countries\u2019 petroleum is also imported from Russia.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Tensions Between Washington and European Countries Over Sanctions<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Further sanctions directed at the Russian economy, given the disparity in U.S. and EU dependence on Russia, risk increasing anti-American sentiment on the continent. That is especially true at a time when the revelations of NSA spying of European allies still rankle. The EU is struggling to recover after the 2007-2008 mortgage crisis and consequent Great Recession. After a series of bailouts by the European Central Bank (to Greece in May 2010, Ireland in November 2010, Portugal in May 2011, and others), European taxpayers are loath to bear the brunt of the EU\u2019s $15 billion assistance package to Ukraine, which is not even an EU member. \u00a0Disrupting lucrative trade relations with Russia is the last straw. As Ewald Stadler, an Austrian Member of the European Parliament, said in a television interview, \u201cI think we as the Europeans have to pay the price, and not the power that is behind the sanctions; that\u2019s the United States of America.\u201d<\/a>[46]<\/span> Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt also criticized the idea of further sanctions against Putin\u2019s Russia, telling Die Zeit newspaper they are \u201cstupid\u201d and will only hurt the West.<\/a>[47]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

According to a German public opinion poll on March 6, only 38 percent of German citizens think economic sanctions against Russia will be useful.<\/a>[48]<\/span> President Putin has pledged not to cut off gas and, other than Russian television flashing pictures of violent fascists in western Ukraine, the evidence is mixed about whether Russia is providing significant logistical or financial support to pro-Russian activists protesting in eastern Ukrainian cities. The murky nature of Moscow\u2019s role in the Ukrainian turmoil makes Germany and other western European countries wary of embracing a more confrontational policy toward Russia. Even if Russia is meddling in eastern Ukraine, the United States can hardly claim innocence either. By its own admission, Washington has spent some $5 billion to influence Ukraine\u2019s political evolution in recent years through some 65 projects run by so-called nongovernmental organizations throughout Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

Export of U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas: Not A Cheap, Quick Option to Undermine Russia\u2019s Influence<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

O<\/span>fficials in the energy sector at the G7 summit in Brussels plan to strengthen the \u201ccollective energy security\u201d of the G7 by developing alternative sources of gas for Europe, including exporting U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG).<\/a>[49]<\/span> To raise U.S. gas prices that had fallen due to the recent boom in \u201cfracking,\u201d Fortune 500 energy companies had been lobbying Congress vigorously to fast-track export of liquefied natural gas. But such capabilities cannot be developed until late 2015 and will cost billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Even then, it could be years before U.S. gas exports significantly eroded Russia\u2019s dominant position in gas exports to the rest of Europe.<\/a>[50]<\/span>\u00a0 Moreover, according to noted geoscientist J. David Hughes, shale gas production has plateaued since December 2011.<\/a>[51]<\/span> Thanks to the Ukrainian crisis, though, the House Energy and Power Subcommittee passed bills on April 9, 2014 to fast-track LNG exports.<\/span><\/p>\n

Even if EU countries stop or drastically reduce their gas and oil imports from Russia, it may only make a mutually damaging confrontation with Russia more likely in the long run. The growing economic interdependence of NATO countries with former Soviet bloc countries since the end of the Cold War has been a boon to all parties; interdependent states would rather trade than invade. Economic interdependence is beneficial and should be welcomed, not undermined. For example, both China and Russia have had to make key, market-oriented changes to their economies in order to be admitted into the World Trade Organization in 2001 and 2012, respectively. Spiraling sanctions and combative tactics between the West and Russia threaten to unravel that progress. Such an unraveling could not come at a worse time, as the world economy struggles to recover from recession.<\/span><\/p>\n

American Public Opinion: Against U.S. Involvement in Ukraine Crisis<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Obama Administration\u2019s decisions, including the dispatch of U.S. troops to Poland, run counter to American public opinion. According to a Pew Research Center poll of March 20-23, 2014, 65 percent of Americans opined that Russia is \u201cnot an adversary\u201d.<\/a>[52]<\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00a0Of the 35 percent who believe it is important for the U.S. to \u201ctake a firm stand against\u201d Russian actions, only 6 percent say military options should be considered.<\/a>[53]<\/span>\u00a0(Americans apparently think better of Russia than Russians think of the United States).<\/a>[54]<\/span>\u00a0In another poll of March 6-9, 2014, fifty-six percent of American stated that they do not want the United States to \u201cget too involved\u201d in the Ukrainian situation.<\/a>[55]<\/span><\/span><\/span> Fifty-one percent opposed U.S. economic sanctions against Russia if the European allies do not participate fully. Washington\u2019s abovementioned pledge of $1 billion in loan guarantees to Ukraine means that if Kiev defaults, the United States will be obligated to pay $1 billion of Ukraine\u2019s debts (ironically, mostly to Russia). This comes at a time when fifty million Americans now live below the poverty line, at least eleven million are unemployed, 1.6 million children are homeless, and eight U.S. cities and towns have gone bankrupt since 2010.<\/a>[56]<\/span> They wonder why, given such circumstances, Congress seems ready to send money to a non-NATO country.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hard-Line Policies Will Inadvertently Harm Ukraine\u2019s Economy<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Unemployment and prices will soar in Ukraine as well, since Western sanctions against Russia w<\/span>ill boomerang most forcefully on its weaker neighbor. Unfortunately, amidst the momentum of the Obama-vs.-Putin drama, fewer people seem to be thinking seriously about the welfare of the Ukrainian people. The Maidan demonstrations resulted from widespread despair over the declining economy and the Yanukovych family\u2019s chronic embezzlement. Ironically, the Ukrainian people will be even more impoverished in the coming years as a result of the revolution. Russian banks like Sberbank and VTB have already halted all lending to Ukraine. Should the United States and the EU levy further sanctions against Russia, that will also hurt Ukraine\u2019s economy, since Russia has been Ukraine\u2019s largest trading partner.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moreover, President Putin has announced that from now on Ukraine must pay one month in advance for gas, and on April 10, he sent a letter to all European countries that might be affected by a termination of Russian gas because of Ukraine\u2019s nonpayment. He explained that Ukraine owes $1.55 billion for gas that it has already consumed. As part of the aid package Russia had offered the former president Yanukovych on December 17, 2013, the gas price was slashed to $268.5 per 1000 million cubic meters (mcm) for the first quarter of 2014. \u201cEven at that price, Ukraine did not pay a single dollar,\u201d Putin declared.<\/a>[57]<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In any case, Moscow rescinded that discount after the February 21, 2014 power-sharing agreement was broken in Kiev by the opposition leaders, overpowered by ultra-rightist groups like Pravyi Sektor (Right Sector). On March 21, Russian press secretary Dmitri Peskov announced that, beginning April 1, the price of gas would rise to $480 per mcm. He explained that the gas discount had been granted in exchange for Ukraine\u2019s extension of the lease to Russia of the Sevastopol Naval Base to 2042. Since Crimea is now arguably part of Russia, the gas discount becomes void.<\/a>[58]<\/span> Should Ukraine fail to pay in advance, the Russian government can retaliate by cutting off gas to Ukraine completely. That happened briefly in 2006 and 2009, when Moscow suspected Ukrainians of illegally siphoning off gas meant for European countries.<\/a>[59]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

As a condition for receiving IMF aid, Ukrainians will have to pay 50 percent more in energy prices beginning May 1 and bear a four percent cut in pensions.<\/a>[60]<\/span> Already one quarter of the population (eleven million) live below the official poverty line (1,176 hryvnia or $127 per month). Rising prices and less disposable income will decrease consumer spending and drag down GDP for at least the next two years, according to Sergei Kiselyov, an economist from Kiev-Mogilyanskaya Academy.<\/a>[61]<\/span> It is no coincidence that the most visible opposition leaders during the Maidan protests (Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Oleksandr Turchynov, Vitali Klitschko) do not plan to run for president in the May 25 elections. After having agreed to meet all the IMF\u2019s conditions, Acting Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk famously said, \u201cI\u2019m going to be the most unpopular prime minister in the history of my country.\u201d<\/a>[62]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Ukrainian Ultra-Right Parties Will Grow Stronger<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Thus, while Ukrainian citizens\u2014<\/span>humiliated by the loss of Crimea\u2014may initially cheer the West\u2019s punitive measures against Russia, they will likely rue them in the long run. History shows that a failing economy, coupled with loss of territory, tends to breed ultranationalist, revisionist parties with racist, xenophobic attitudes. (The extreme right-wing leaders in the anti-Yanukovich protests, Oleh Tyahnybok of the Svoboda Party and Dmytro Yarosh of Right Sector do indeed plan to run in the May 25 elections.) Adolf Hitler became popular by denouncing the Treaty of Versailles, which blamed Germany for World War I and demanded draconian reparations. His Nazi Party was the largest party following elections in 1933. Likewise, Hungary\u2019s loss of two-thirds of its territory after the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 ushered in the highly conservative regime of Mikl\u00c3\u00b3s Horthy, whose alliance with Hitler was motivated by the desire to retrieve the lost lands. His successor, the anti-Semitic fascist Gyula G\u00c3\u00b6mb\u00c3\u00b6s, would have established a Nazi-like, one-party government in Hungary within two years, had he not died of cancer in 1936.<\/a>[63]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Chances of an Anti-American Backlash in Ukraine<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The effects of the West\u2019s anti-Russian sanctions, combined with the IMF\u2019s austerity measures, may also give rise to anti-American sentiments throughout Ukraine, especially in eastern cities. It should be recalled that in Greece, a NATO ally, where GDP has plummeted after four years of austerity measures, 57 percent of Greeks expressed an unfavorable view of the United States, according to a Pew Research poll of March 2013.<\/a>[64]<\/span> The neo-fascist Golden Dawn party won seven percent of the popular vote in 2012 elections, initially receiving 21 seats in Parliament.<\/span><\/p>\n

Similar risks exist in Ukraine. T<\/span>he atmosphere in the country has shifted since November 2013. The main goal uniting the population in their initially peaceful protests was to remove Yanukovich. They were divided about the issue of the EU Association agreement. In a December 5, 2013 poll, 37 percent of Ukrainians supported Ukraine\u2019s steps toward joining the EU, while 33 percent preferred joining the Russian-led Customs Union.<\/a>[65]<\/span> (Incidentally, most Ukrainian citizens in conversation refer to the protests as simply \u201cMaidan,\u201d the name of the main square in Kiev, not \u201cEuromaidan.\u201d The latter came from the Twitter hashtag of a young Polish student Ziemowit J\u00c3\u00b3\u00c5\u00bawik, on November 21, 2013, when Yanukovych decided not to sign the EU association agreement because of its austerity measures). Now that roughly over one hundred citizens have been killed, Yanukovych has been ousted, and the IMF\u2019s conditions have been publicized, the jubilation from the November-December period has been replaced with shock, dread, cynicism, and growing xenophobia.<\/span><\/p>\n

After the loss of Crimea, combined with the YouTube postings of the Nuland-Pyuatt and Ashton-Paet hacked phone calls, indignant comments in everyday conversations like \u201cUkrainians can take care of themselves,\u201d and \u201cUkraine is being used as a bargaining chip [razmennaia monetka] between Russia and the West\u201d have become more frequent.<\/a>[66]<\/span> A sign appeared at the barricades in Donetsk in mid-April: \u201cBloodthirsty America. Despicable Europe. Leave Ukraine alone.\u201d Increased U.S. involvement in the Ukrainian crisis via military aid and NATO military exercises threaten to exacerbate such sentiments, especially in the east. Deepening divisions in the country may result in the fragmentation of Ukraine.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Much intellectual energy in the West has been expended about how to punish President Putin\u2014far more, perhaps, than would be required to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. And few analysts and pundits have considered seriously the long-range effects of an antagonistic economic and military approach and the ways Putin can retaliate. Prudent troubleshooting should be a required step in foreign policy decision making, and optimistic wishful thinking eschewed. Russia could cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and EU countries, sell nuclear-weapons technology to Iran and Syria, protect Iran at the UN Security Council, permit Russian banks to operate in Iran, stop using the U.S. dollar and dump its U.S. treasury bills, seize U.S. assets in Russia (such as its oil-production facilities), forbid all U.S. companies from doing business in Russia, escalate support of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, and close all Russian-controlled supply routes to Afghanistan. Any of those scenarios, much less a combination of several, would create major headaches for Washington.<\/span><\/p>\n

A Strategy to De-Escalate the Crisis<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The path of de-escalation would be to view the Crimean issue in the total context of the Maidan protests and their origins. Efforts to understand Russian perceptions of the situation would facilitate fruitful dialogue. The Russians raise questions about a number of issues. Thus far, few portions of the Western news media have addressed the legality of the opposition leaders\u2019 seizure of power on February 21, 2014, the extensive U.S. funding of Ukrainian NGOs leading up to the November protests,\u00a0<\/a>[67]<\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00a0the presence of extreme right-wing elements in the Kiev interim government,<\/a>[68]<\/span>\u00a0and the identity of the snipers during the Maidan protests.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>Suspicions will linger, zigzagging accusations continue, until these issues are examined.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>(\u201cInvestigation into recent acts of violence conducted under joint monitoring\u201d was one of the conditions in the February 21 agreement, but now the interim leaders do not want to investigate). It takes a strong leader to face the truth; weak leaders refuse dialogue and rush to a military response.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, signed on December 5, 1994, Ukraine agreed to relinquish its stockpile of nuclear weapons between 1994 and 1996. In return, the signatories (the United States, Russian Federation, and United Kingdom, and later China and France) pledged to respect Ukrainian independence and sovereignty, refrain from the use of force, and avoid using economic pressure in Ukraine to influence its domestic politics. Putin\u2019s annexation of Crimea is a violation of the Budapest Memorandum, as well as other international agreements. But so, too, was the extensive economic pressure by the United States and EU on and within Ukraine\u2014prior to the Crimean annexation\u2014to influence its domestic politics. While the Maidan revolution was not a \u201cU.S.-backed fascist coup,\u201d as Russian reporters claim, it was hijacked by Right Sector and other radical groups. Moreover, clear evidence indicates that U.S. funds were a force multiplier for several opposition groups on Maidan working to overthrow Yanukovych. Speaking to the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation Conference on December 16, 2013, Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland announced, \u201cWe have invested more than five billion dollars \u2026 to promote Ukraine to the future it deserves.\u201d<\/a>[69]<\/span> In a Washington Post article on September 27, 2013, National Endowment for Democracy president Carl Gershman referred to Ukraine as \u201cthe biggest prize.\u201d<\/a>[70]<\/span> It is hardly surprising that Moscow would react badly to such Western meddling in a neighboring country deemed essential to Russia\u2019s security. That is especially true because such actions occurred on the heels of NATO\u2019s seemingly inexorable eastward expansion.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since the February 21 seizure of power in Kiev has been the catalyst for the later events in Crimea and Ukraine\u2019s eastern cities, a key U.S. policy objective should be to promote free elections on May 25. A number of major decisions have been made by the interim regime in the intervening months without the consent of Ukrainian citizens nationwide. They have not had a chance to vote on a number of crucial matters. These include voting for their representatives, reverting to the 2004 constitution, determining whether to sign the political section of the EU association agreement, and deciding whether the Crimean referendum was legal or not.<\/span><\/p>\n

Washington should seriously consider ways it might help to preserve Ukraine\u2019s unity, by encouraging Ukrainians to engage in national dialogue about possible solutions, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov\u2019s federalization concept. Washington should also consider endorsing neutrality for Ukraine, somewhat similar to what Austria achieved in 1955 or Turkmenistan in 1995.<\/a>[71]<\/span>\u00a0\u00a0Such a treaty would enable the country to stay united and guarantee the rights of all minorities in Ukraine (Russians, Hungarians, Romanians, and Roma). As part of such an arrangement, any further foreign annexations would be forbidden. Ukraine would be free to trade with both the West and East to restore its economy, but would not join the EU, NATO, Eurasian Customs Union, or the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Ukraine\u2019s status as a neutral buffer zone would eliminate the specter of NATO enlargement on Russia\u2019s western borders and thus obviate Moscow\u2019s rationale to mass troops near Ukraine\u2019s border. Likewise, NATO would have no justification to stage military exercises on Ukrainian territory, citing the threat of Russian expansion.<\/span><\/p>\n

As Albert Einstein famously wrote, \u201cProblems cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them.\u201d Going forward, serious efforts should be made to stop promoting Russophobia in the Western media, which mainly serves to justify NATO expansion. The achievements during the \u201creset\u201d show that U.S. leaders can negotiate successfully with President Putin when they seek compromise outcomes. But they must learn to accept Russia as an equal partner regarding collective security issues.<\/span><\/p>\n

The annexation of Crimea is the first real \u201cexpansion\u201d since the USSR\u2019s collapse in 1991. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, Russia has no messianic communist ideology, nor does it directly threaten core U.S. security interests. In contrast, since 1999, NATO has admitted numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and Washington has withdrawn from the ABM treaty and constructed a missile defense system. The expansion of NATO\u2014originally an anti-Soviet alliance created in 1949\u2013by admitting former Warsaw Pact countries while pointedly excluding Russia, was a grave mistake that helped lead to the current crisis in Ukraine.<\/a>[72]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

In sum, the perils of Russian retaliation and a renewed cold war far outweigh the short-term thrill of punishing Russia. Putin called Washington\u2019s bluff and played the better hand over Crimea. Given the pot odds, the shrewdest move would be to cash out and end the game of deception. The United States remains secure, with its vast arsenal of sophisticated conventional and nuclear weapons, highly trained military personnel, and an annual military budget that far exceeds those of Russia and China combined. It would be even safer if it adopted a more restrained foreign policy instead of pushing forcible regime-change goals and other objectives that generate fear and animosity around the world. Washington should work closely with Moscow on joint problems and eschew attempts to encircle and intimidate Russia. The United States would gain more respect worldwide if it promoted democratic processes as espoused in the U.S. Constitution, and withheld diplomatic recognition of unelected leaders. Only with such a restrained foreign policy can Washington now prevent the kind of cold war impasse that developed in 1979.<\/span><\/p>\n

Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

<\/a>[1]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201cInterview with Zbigniew Brzezinski,\u201d Le Nouvel Observateur. Jan. 15, 1998, p. 76.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[2]<\/span><\/span> See pp. 14-15 of \u201cThe Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of D\u00c3\u00a9tente,\u201d Transcript of discussion. Lysebu, Norway, September 17-20, 1995. National Security Archive.http:\/\/www2.gwu.edu\/~nsarchiv\/carterbrezhnev\/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall_of_detente\/fall_of_detente_transcript.pdf<\/a>. Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin flatly denied that the Soviet leadership had a \u201cgrand design\u201d to move into Pakistan and Iran, as Brzezinski claimed.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[3]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Artemy M. Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 63.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[4]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201cSovet Federatsii razreshil Putinu vvesti voiska na Ukrainu,\u201d Lenta.ru (March 1, 2014).http:\/\/lenta.ru\/news\/2014\/03\/01\/sovfed\/<\/a>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[5]<\/span><\/span> Another vote was held in the 193-member UN General Assembly on March 28, 2014. After heavy lobbying, 100 members declared the Crimean referendum invalid, 11 members including Russia voted against the resolution, 58 members abstained, and 24 were absent. Sangwon Yoon, \u201cCrimea Resolution Backed by U.S. Barely Gets UN Majority,\u201d March 28, 2014.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/2014-03-27\/crimea-resolution-backed-by-west-barely-gets-un-majority.html#disqus_thread<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[6]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Others on the U.S. black list include head of the parliament committee for CIS affairs Leonid Slutsky, Chairman of the Parliament Committee for Family, Women and Children Yelena Mizulina, Ukrainian State Council Speaker Vladimir Konstantinov, and leader of the Ukrainian Choice public movement Viktor Medvedchuk. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 17, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/the-press-office\/2014\/03\/17\/fact-sheet-ukraine-related-sanctions<\/a><\/span>. \u00a0Also ITAR-TASS News Agency, \u201cRussian Senator Says EU Sanctions \u2018Comical\u2019,\u201d March 18, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/en.itar-tass.com\/russia\/724118<\/a><\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[7]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Later, the two credit card companies resumed processing transactions for\u00a0SMP Bank. See \u201cVisa and Mastercard Resume SMP Bank Transactions After Sanctions,\u201d The Moscow Times (March 24, 2014).<\/span>http:\/\/www.themoscowtimes.com\/news\/article\/visa-and-mastercard-resume-smp-bank-transactions-after-sanctions\/496634.html<\/a><\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[8]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201cNASA suspends cooperation with Russia over Ukraine crisis,\u201d Russia Today, April 2, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/rt.com\/news\/nasa-suspends-relations-roscosmos-961\/<\/a><\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[9]<\/span><\/span> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Background Briefing on the G7 Meeting, March 24.<\/span>http:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/the-press-office\/2014\/03\/24\/background-briefing-g7-meeting<\/a><\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[10]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Ewen MacAskill, et al., \u201cEU and U.S. impose sanctions on Russian and Ukrainian officials,\u201d March 17, 2014.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2014\/mar\/17\/eu-imposes-sanctions-21-russian-ukrainian-officials-crimea<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[11]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Steven Erlanger and David M. Herszenhorn, \u201cI.M.F. Prepares $18 Billion in Loans for Ukraine,\u201d New York Times, March 27, 2014. \u00a0A loan guarantee is a promise by the guarantor (the United States) to assume the debt obligation of the borrower (Ukraine) if that Ukraine defaults.<\/span>http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2014\/03\/28\/world\/europe\/ukraine-bailout.html?_r=0<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[12]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Steven Erlanger, \u201cRussian Aggression Puts NATO in Spotlight,\u201d New York Times, March 18, 2014.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2014\/03\/19\/world\/europe\/russias-aggression-in-crimea-brings-nato-into-renewed-focus.html?_r=0<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[13]<\/span><\/span> \u201cUkraine Seeks Joint U.S. War Games After Crimea Takeover,\u201d Agence France-Presse, March 26, 2014,<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/article\/20140326\/DEFREG01\/303260039\/Ukraine-Seeks-Joint-U.S.-War-Games-After-Crimea-Takeover<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[14]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Igor Bobic, \u201cMcCain: Obama Is \u2018Near Delusional In Thinking The Cold War Was Over,\u2019\u201d TPM Livewire (March 7, 2014).\u00a0http:\/\/talkingpointsmemo.com\/livewire\/john-mccain-cold-war-obama-delusional<\/a>. \u00a0Also \u201cPutin wants to rewrite Europe boundaries: Hillary Clinton,\u201d March 19, 2014. See<\/span>http:\/\/article.wn.com\/view\/2014\/03\/19\/Putin_wants_to_rewrite_Europe_<\/a><\/span>boundaries_Hillary_Clinton\/\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[15]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Nana Chronaya, \u201cAnnexation of Crimea: Russian Promises and Reality\u201d (March 21, 2014) UNIAN.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.unian.info\/politics\/898909-annexation-of-crimea-russian-promises-and-reality.html. Also http:\/\/www.aol.com\/article\/2014\/03\/19\/what-annexing-crimea-will-cost-russias-government\/20852911\/
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[16]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Birgit Hansl, Confidence Crisis Exposes Economic Weakness. Russian Economic Report, no. 31. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. March 26, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/documents.worldbank.org\/curated\/en\/2014\/03\/19357185\/confidence-crisis-exposes-economic-weakness<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[17]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201cMedvedev Signs Decree Creating Contractor for Kerch Strait Bridge Project,\u201d The Moscow Times (March 4, 2014).\u00a0http:\/\/www.themoscowtimes.com\/news\/article\/medvedev-signs-decree-creating-contractor-for-kerch-strait-bridge-project\/495511.html<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[18]<\/span><\/span>According to the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index, Russia scored 28 on a scale of zero to 100, where zero is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. Denmark and New Zealand had the highest scores of 91 each. The United States scored 73. Ukraine scored 25. Transparency International,<\/span>http:\/\/www.transparency.org\/cpi2013\/results<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[19]<\/span><\/span>Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia\u2019s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests\u00a0(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 198, 200. \u00a0Also see Thomas M. Nichols, No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), p. 111.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[20]<\/span><\/span>Ronald E. Powaski, Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 200.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[21]<\/span><\/span>Nikolai N. Sokov, \u201cWhy Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike \u2018De-Escalation\u2019 \u201d Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/thebulletin.org\/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[22]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201c<\/span>Spetspodrazdelenie \u2018Alfa\u2019 otkazalos\u2019 podchinit\u2019sia Kievu\u2014CMI,\u201d April 11, 2014. \u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/thekievtimes.ua\/politics\/356195-specpodrazdelenie-alfa-otkazalos-podchinitsya-kievu-smi.html<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[23]<\/span><\/span>Jim Michaels, \u201cNATO Tries To Assure Allies As Ukraine Violence Spreads,\u201d USA Today, April 15, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/news\/nation\/2014\/04\/15\/putin-crimea-ukraine-pentagon\/7743877\/<\/a><\/span>. Also see \u201cU.S. Could \u2018Re-Examine\u2019 Its Military Presence In Europe,\u201d\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/stratrisks.com\/geostrat\/18792<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[24]<\/span><\/span>True, as Ted Galen Carpenter argues, it was probably unwise to admit as NATO members such small countries on Russia\u2019s borders. \u00a0Should President Putin risk provocations on the Baltic States\u2019 borders, it would force Washington to make a very difficult choice. See Ted Galen Carpenter, \u201cAre the Baltic States Next?\u201d National Interest Online, March 24, 2014.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/nationalinterest.org\/commentary\/are-the-baltic-states-next-10103?page=1<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[25]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Andrew Dugan, \u201cU.S. Support for Action in Syria Is Low vs. Past Conflicts,\u201d Gallup Politics, September 6, 2013.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.gallup.com\/poll\/164282\/support-syria-action-lower-past-conflicts.aspx<\/a><\/span>. \u00a0U.S. support for military action in Syria was \u201cthe lowest for any intervention Gallup has asked about in the last 20 years.\u201d<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[26]<\/span><\/span>Jonathan Saul and Parisa Hafezi, \u201cIran, Russia Working to Seal $20 Billion Oil-for-Goods Deal: Sources,\u201d Reuters, April 2, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/2014\/04\/02\/us-iran-russia-oil-idU.S.BREA311K520140402<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[27]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201cRussia broadens transit opportunities for NATO,\u201d Russia Today, June 29, 2012.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/rt.com\/politics\/nato-transit-russia-afghanistan-059\/<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[28]<\/span><\/span>Zhao Jinglun, \u201cUS Grand Strategy and the Ukraine Crisis,\u201d China.org.cn, March 7, 2014.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.china.org.cn\/opinion\/2014-03\/07\/content_31706059.htm.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[29]<\/span><\/span>For further analysis, see Luca j. Uberti, \u201cCrimea and Kosovo: the Delusions of Western Military Interventionism,\u201d March 24, 2014.<\/span>\u00a0http:\/\/www.opendemocracy.net\/luca-j-uberti\/crimea-and-kosovo-delusions-of-western-military-interventionism-nato-putin-annexation-legal<\/a><\/span>. Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, \u201cDon\u2019t Push China and Russia Together,\u201d Cato@Liberty<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

April 10, 2014. Cato Institute,\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.cato.org\/blog\/dont-push-china-russia-together<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[30]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201cPBOC Says No Longer in China\u2019s Interest to Increase Reserves,\u201d Bloomberg News, November 21, 2013.<\/span>http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/2013-11-20\/pboc-says-no-longer-in-china-s-favor-to-boost-record-reserves.html<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[31]<\/span><\/span> \u201c<\/span>Kremlin Aide Warns U.S. of Response if Sanctions Imposed,\u201d Reuters, March 4, 2014. http:\/\/in.reuters.com\/article\/2014\/03\/04\/ukraine-crisis-russia-us-idINDEEA2305J20140304.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[32]<\/span><\/span>http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/2014-03-25\/russian-oil-seen-heading-east-not-west-in-crimea-spat.html<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[33]<\/span><\/span> \u201cPutin: Rossiia sozdast natsional\u2019nuiu platezhnuiu sistemu,\u201d Vzglyad, March 27, 2014.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/vzglyad.ru\/news\/2014\/3\/27\/679258.html?utm_campaign=vz&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=newsanons<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[34]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201cGlava VTB: deistviia banka \u2018Rossiia\u2019 budut sposobstvovat\u2019 uvelicheniiu raschetov v rubliakh,\u201d ITAR-TASS (Moscow), March 28, 2014.http:\/\/itar-tass.com\/ekonomika\/1082230<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[35]<\/span><\/span>Angela Cullen and Weixin Zha, \u201cBundesbank, PBOC in Pact to Turn Frankfurt into Renminbi Hub\u201d Bloomberg Businessweek, March 28, 2014.http:\/\/www.businessweek.com\/news\/2014-03-27\/frankfurt-sets-sights-on-yuan-offshore-trade-as-xi-visits-merkel<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0[36]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201c<\/span>London as a Centre for Renminbi Business,\u201d\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.cityoflondon.gov.uk\/business\/support-promotion-and-advice\/promoting-the-city-internationally\/china\/Pages\/London-as-a-centre-for-international-renminbi-business.aspx<\/a><\/span>. \u00a0Also see Eva Taylor, \u201cFrankfurt Becomes Europe\u2019s First Renminbi Payment Hub,\u201d Reuters, March 28, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/2014\/03\/28\/germany-china-renminbi-idU.S.L5N0MP3DH20140328<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[37]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0See Robert A. Pape, \u201cWhy Sanctions Do Not Work,\u201d International Security, vol. 22, issue 2 (Fall 1997): 90-136.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[38]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Poll taken by the Moscow-based Levada Center from March 21 to 24 among 1,600 respondents across 130 cities in Russia. \u201cPutin\u2019s Approval Rating Rises to 80%\u201d RIA Novosti.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/en.ria.ru\/russia\/20140326\/188776004\/Putins-Approval-Rating-Rises-to-80\u2014Poll.html<\/a><\/span>. \u00a0According to a Gallup poll in the same time period, President Obama\u2019s approval rating was 43 percent. \u201cPresidential Approval Ratings \u2013 Barack Obama,\u201d Gallup.com,\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.gallup.com\/poll\/116479\/barack-obama-presidential-job-approval.aspx<\/a>.<\/span>. \u00a0Russian opinion on the Crimea issue is far from uniform, however. Tens of thousands marched in Moscow on March 15, 2014 to support the Crimea referendum, while tens of thousands also marched to protest the referendum.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[39]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Sarah Zaidi and Mary C. S. Fawzi, \u201cThe Health of Baghdad\u2019s Children,\u201d The Lancet (December 2, 1995), vol. 346, no. 8988, pp. 1485-86.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[40]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201c2013: U.S. Trade In Goods with Russia,\u201d United States Census Bureau.\u00a0http:\/\/www.census.gov\/foreign-trade\/balance\/c4621.html<\/a>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[41]<\/span><\/span>\u201cExxon Mobil i Rosneft\u2019 obsuzhdaiut sovmestnuiu rabotu v Irakskom Kurdistane,\u201d Forbes.ru (March 26, 2014)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.forbes.ru\/news\/253009-exxon-mobil-i-rosneft-obsuzhdayut-sovmestnuyu-rabotu-v-irakskom-kurdistane<\/a><\/span>. \u00a0Also see\u00a0<\/span>Matthew Philips, \u201cPost Crimea, Exxon\u2019s Partnership With Rosneft Feels Weird,\u201d March 20, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.businessweek.com\/articles\/2014-03-20\/post-crimea-exxons-partnership-with-rosneft-feels-weird<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

[42]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201cEuropean Commission: Russia.\u201d See\u00a0http:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/trade\/policy\/countries-and-regions\/countries\/russia\/<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0[43]<\/span><\/span>\u201cRussian Economy, Tycoons Take Hit In Crimea Crisis\u201d Associated Press, March 20, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/www.npr.org\/templates\/story\/story.php?storyId=291840966<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[44]<\/span><\/span>Eurogas Statistical Report 2013.<\/span>http:\/\/www.eurogas.org\/uploads\/media\/Eurogas_Statistical_Report_2013.pdf<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[45]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Valentina Pop, \u201cEurope Looking At Alternatives to Russian Gas\u201d EU Observer, March 14, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/euobserver.com\/economic\/123466<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0[46]<\/span><\/span>\u201cWest sanctions against Russia stupid\u201d (Interview with Ewald Stadler, Austrian Member of the European Parliament), PressTV.IR, March 22, 2014.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

http:\/\/www.presstv.ir\/detail\/2014\/03\/22\/355671\/west-sanctions-against-russia-stupid\/<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[47]<\/span><\/span>\u201cRussia\u2019s actions in Crimea Justified.\u201d \u00a0Interview with German ex-chancellor Helmut Schmidt, March 28, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/voiceofrussia.com\/news\/2014_03_28\/Russias-actions-in-Crimea-justified-German-ex-chancellor-Helmut-Schmidt-3229\/<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[48]<\/span><\/span>\u201cUmfrage: Mehrheit der Deutschen bef\u00c3\u00bcrwortet Hilfen f\u00c3\u00bcr Ukraine,\u201d Zeit Online, March 6, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/www.zeit.de\/news\/2014-03\/06\/d-eu-ukraine-russland-umfragen-umfrage-mehrheit-der-deutschen-befuerwortet-hilfen-fuer-ukraine-06235607<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0[49]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0White House Office of the Press Secretary, Background Briefing on the G7 Meeting, March 24.http:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/the-press-office\/2014\/03\/24\/background-briefing-g7-meeting.<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[50]<\/span><\/span>Zachary Cikanek, \u201cAPI Praises Congressional Action on Natural Gas Exports,\u201d April 9, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/www.api.org\/news-and-media\/news\/newsitems\/2014\/apr-2014\/api-praises-congressional-action-on-natural-gas-exports<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[51]<\/span><\/span>J. David Hughes, Drill, Baby, Drill: Can Unconventional Fuels Usher in a New Era of Energy Abundance? (Santa Rosa, Calif: Post Carbon Institute, 2013), p. 4.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[52]<\/span><\/span>While 22 percent do not view Russia as a problem, 43 percent view the country as a problem, but not as an adversary. Twenty-six percent of Americans, mostly Republicans, view Russia as an adversary. Ten percent had no opinion. See Pew Research Center, \u201cConcerns about Russia Rise, But Just a Quarter Call Moscow an Adversary\u201d March 25, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.people-press.org\/2014\/03\/25\/concerns-about-russia-rise-but-just-a-quarter-call-moscow-an-adversary\/<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[53]<\/span><\/span>\u201cConcerns about Russia Rise, But Just a Quarter Call Moscow an Adversary,\u201d March 25, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/www.people-press.org\/2014\/03\/25\/concerns-about-russia-rise-but-just-a-quarter-call-moscow-an-adversary\/<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[54]<\/span><\/span>In a poll of 1,500 citizens in 100 different cities, taken on March 15-16, the Russian polling organization FOM (Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie), found that 33 percent have a negative opinion of the US, 48 percent believe Russian-US relations are poor, and 31 percent believe Americans have a negative view of Russia. \u201cOtnosheniia mezhdu Rossiei I SShA: Monitoring Mnenii,\u201d FOM, March 26, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/fom.ru\/Mir\/11426<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[55]<\/span><\/span>\u201cMost Say U.S. Should \u2018Not Get Too Involved\u2019 in Ukraine Situation,\u201d Pew Research Center, March 11, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/www.people-press.org\/2014\/03\/11\/most-say-u-s-should-not-get-too-involved-in-ukraine-situation\/2\/<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[56]<\/span><\/span>\u201cThat\u2019s Rich: Poverty Level Under Obama Breaks 50-year Record,\u201d Washington Times, January 7, 2014. http:\/\/www.washingtontimes.com\/news\/2014\/jan\/7\/obamas-rhetoric-on-fighting-poverty-doesnt-match-h\/?page=all. Also Paul Krugman, \u201cJobs and Skills and Zombies,\u201d New York Times, March 30, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2014\/03\/31\/opinion\/krugman-jobs-and-skills-and-zombies.html<\/a><\/span>; and Andrea Elliott, \u201cInvisible Child. Girl in the Shadows: Dasani\u2019s Homeless Life,\u201d December 9, 2013.<\/span>http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/projects\/2013\/invisible-child\/#\/?chapt=1<\/a><\/span>. \u00a0In 2012, the poverty level was defined as an annual income of $23,492 for a family of four.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[57]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201c<\/span>Message from the President of Russia to the Leaders of Several European Countries,\u201d Russia Today, April 10, 2014.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/rt.com\/politics\/official-word\/putin-message-european-leaders-748\/<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[58]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Anders Aslund<\/a><\/span>, \u201cHow Ukraine Can Use Sanctions to Counter Russia\u2019s Aggression,\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

March 24, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/blogs.piie.com\/realtime\/?p=4259&wpmp_tp=0<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[59]<\/span><\/span>For background on the \u201cgas war\u201d and its effects on Europe, see Kjell Engelbrekt, Bertil Nygren, eds. Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches<\/span>\u00a0(New York: Routledge, 2010).
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[60]<\/span><\/span>The salaries of elementary and high school teachers in the town of Berehove in Ukraine\u2019s Transcarpathian oblast\u2019 were at first frozen in March and then substantially reduced indefinitely. Author\u2019s interview with high school teachers Timea Srek and Marianna Margitics, April 13, 2014.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[61]<\/span><\/span>Alec Luhn, \u201cWill the IMF Bailout Turn Ukraine Into Another Greece?\u201d The Nation, April 7, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/www.thenation.com\/article\/179212\/will-imf-bailout-turn-ukraine-another-greece#<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[62]<\/span><\/span>Kenneth Rapoza, \u201cWashington\u2019s Man Yatsenyuk Setting Ukraine Up For\u00a0Ruin,\u201d February 27, 2014.<\/span>http:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/kenrapoza\/2014\/02\/27\/washingtons-man-yatsenyuk-setting-ukraine-up-for-ruin\/<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[63]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>Rebecca Haynes and Martyn C. Rady, In the Shadow of Hitler: Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011).<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[64]<\/span><\/span>\u00a0\u201c<\/span>Greeks, Stung by Recession, Lukewarm on U.S. Relations,\u201d Pew Research Center, August 8, 2013.<\/span>http:\/\/webcache.googleusercontent.com\/search?q=cache:BqE0n_DYBYsJ:www.pewresearch.org\/fact-tank\/2013\/08\/08\/greeks-stung-by-recession-lukewarm-on-u-s-relations\/+&cd=3&hl=uk&ct=clnk&gl=ua&client=firefox-a<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[65]<\/span><\/span>See \u201cUkraine Public Opinion Poll Shows Dissatisfaction with Socio-Political Conditions,\u201d International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), December 5, 2013.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.ifes.org\/Content\/Publications\/Press-Release\/2013\/2013-Public-Opinion-Survey-in-Ukraine.aspx<\/a><\/span>. \u00a0Many people I spoke with in cities and villages in Transcarpathian Ukraine, although disgusted with Yanukovych and his sons, were largely uninformed, much less concerned, about EU association. \u00a0Disinterest in politics, pervasive among both Ukrainian and Russian citizens, is a legacy of the Soviet period when they were bombarded with communist propaganda.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[66]<\/span><\/span>In a leaked phone call on January 28, 2014, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland told U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt that Yatseniuk (\u201cYats\u201d) should be prime minister because of his experience, while Klitschko (\u201cKlitsch\u201d) should not go into the government. \u00a0In a second leaked call, Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Urmas Paet discussed with High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton some concerns voiced by physician\u00a0<\/span>Olha Bohomolets<\/span>\u00a0that the wounds she treated in both the protesters and the Berkut policemen were caused by the same bullets. \u00a0On April 5, 2014 former Ukrainian interior minister Vitaly Zakharchenko told reporters that the police were unarmed, that 86 received bullet wounds, and that 14 died. See\u201cBerkut Policemen Were Unarmed. They Did Not Shoot,\u201d ITAR-TASS, April 5, 2014.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/en.itar-tass.com\/world\/726640<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[67]<\/span><\/span>Oleh Rybachuk\u2014Viktor Yushchenko\u2019s campaign chair, and later Yulia Tymoshenko\u2019s assistant\u2014played a key role in the 2004 Orange Revolution. \u00a0He leads the NGO \u201cCenter UA,\u201d which received more than $500,000 in 2012, according to its annual report for that year. \u00a0Fifty-four percent of the money came from Pact Inc., a project funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. \u00a0In March 2012, Rybachuk boasted, \u201cPeople are not afraid. We now have 150 NGOs in all the major cities in our \u2018clean up Parliament campaign\u2019 to elect and find better parliamentarians\u2026. The Orange Revolution was a miracle, a massive peaceful protest that worked. \u00a0We want to do that again and we think we will.\u201d See Mark Ames, \u201cPierre Omidyar Co-Funded Ukraine Revolution Groups With U.S. Government, Documents Show,\u201d February 28, 2014. \u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/pando.com\/2014\/02\/28\/pierre-omidyar-co-funded-ukraine-revolution-groups-with-us-government-documents-show\/<\/a><\/span>. \u00a0<\/span>The Spilna Sprava activist organization, which on January 25 took over the buildings of the ministry of justice, agriculture, and energy has received grants from the Ukrainian International Renaissance Foundation founded by George Soros. \u00a0Christopher J. Miller and Katya Gorchinskaya, \u201cDanylyuk\u2019s Group Under Fire for Seizure of Government Buildings\u201d Kyiv Post, January 27, 2014. \u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/content\/ukraine\/danyluks-group-under-fire-for-seizure-of-government-buildings-335692.html<\/a><\/span>. \u00a0The producer of the \u201cI am a Ukrainian\u201d video that went viral was exposed as a production by Larry Diamond, a senior consultant at the National Endowment for Democracy.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[68]<\/span><\/span>Currently there are seven ministers in the interim government affiliated with the extreme right. They include Andriy Parubiy, secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council. He co-founded the Svoboda party with Oleh Tyahnybok in 1991. Dmytro Yarosh, leader of Right Sector, is Parubiy\u2019s deputy secretary. Oleksandr Sych, the new Deputy Prime Minister, is a Svoboda party member, as are Oleh Makhnitsky (acting prosecutor general) and the heads of the ecology and agricultural ministries, Andriy Mokhnyk and Ihor Shvaika, respectively.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[69]<\/span><\/span>Victoria Nuland, \u201cRemarks at the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation Conference,\u201d Washington, DC, December 13, 2013, U.S. Department of State.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.state.gov\/p\/eur\/rls\/rm\/2013\/dec\/218804.htm<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[70]<\/span><\/span>Carl Gershman, \u201cFormer Soviet States Stand Up to Russia. Will the U.S.?\u201d The Washington Post, September\u00a027, 2013.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/opinions\/former-soviet-states-stand-up-to-russia-will-the-us\/2013\/09\/26\/b5ad2be4-246a-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story.html<\/a><\/span>.<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[71]<\/span><\/span>For background on the conditions that made Austrian neutrality possible and the initial difficulties encountered, see Johanna Granville, \u201cOf Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria dealt with the Hungarian Crisis of 1956,\u201d History,\u00a091, no. 301 (2006): 62-90.<\/span>http:\/\/www.academia.edu\/3541570\/Of_Spies_Refugees_and_Hostile_Propaganda_How_<\/span>Austria_dealt_with_the_Hungarian_Crisis_of_1956
\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[72]<\/span><\/span>Many critics warned of the folly of NATO expansion back in the 1990s. For a review of the arguments, see Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1998), and Johanna Granville, \u201cThe Many Paradoxes of NATO Enlargement,\u201d Current History (April 1999), vol. 98, no. 627, pp. 165-170.\u00a0<\/span>http:\/\/jgm.hostzi.com\/pdf\/The.Many.Paradoxes.of.NATO.Enlargement.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Johanna C. Granville RINF Alternative News In the weeks following the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, both the United States and European Union have issued a range of sanctions to punish the Putin administration. But a belligerent response aimed at \u201cpunishing Putin,\u201d even if confined to economic measures, will probably just escalate the crisis. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":109101,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-117179","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-latest-news"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/117179","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=117179"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/117179\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/109101"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=117179"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=117179"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/rinf.com\/alt-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=117179"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}