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Saturday, May 24th, 2008 週六， 2008年5月24日

By 通過 Sam Smith 山姆史密斯 | As it tries to recover from the most expensive failure in American military history, the Pentagon has its eyes on an easier target. |因為它試圖收回從最昂貴的失敗，在美國的軍事歷史，五角大樓已著眼於更容易的目標。 The beauty of this adversary is that it is not from an indecipherable culture, it doesn’t speak a strange language and it doesn’t scatter IEDs in the path of Hummers. 美麗的對手，這是它是不是從一indecipherable文化，它不發言，一個奇怪的語言，並沒有散射簡易爆炸裝置在道路hummers 。 In fact, it’s not even armed and its headquarters, far from concealed in the mountains of Pakistan, are easily found in the high rises of Washington, DC. 事實上，它的不是，甚至武裝和其總部，到目前為止，從隱藏在山區的巴基斯坦，很容易發現，在高樓的華盛頓哥倫比亞特區。 The new foe: The State Department, USAID and other civilian diplomatic and development operations - proving once again that our military leaders’ real skill set is not fighting mile by mile on some foreign battlefield but line by line in the domestic budget. 新的敵人：美國國務院，美國國際開發署和其他文職人員的外交和發展業務-再次證明了我們的軍事領導人的實際技能的人才是沒有戰鬥力英里英里就由一些外國戰場，但逐行在國內的財政預算案。

There is no doubt that the domestic surge is working. 這是毫無疑問的國內風是工作。 Between 2002 and 2005, the share of government development assistance flowing through the Pentagon rose from 6% to 22%. 2002年至2005年，中所佔的份額，政府發展援助流經五角大樓上升6 ％至22 ％ 。

Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, in a paper last fall for the Center on Global Development, outlined the problem: 斯圖爾特帕特里克和kaysie布朗，在一份文件，去年秋天，該中心就全球發展，概述了問題：

These trends have stimulated concerns that US foreign and development policies may become subordinated to a narrow, short term security agenda — at the expense of broader, longer-term diplomatic goals and institution building in the developing world — and that US soldiers may increasingly assume responsibility for activities more appropriately conducted by civilians skilled in development challenges. 這些趨勢的關注，刺激，美國外交政策和發展政策有可能成為服從於一個狹窄的，短期的安全議程-犧牲了更廣泛，更長遠的外交目標和制度建設，在發展中世界-和美國士兵可能會越來越多承擔責任為更恰當的活動所進行的平民在技術發展方面的挑戰。 . 。 . 。

We attribute growing US reliance on the US military to carry out reconstruction, development, and capacity-building activities to three factors: an overwhelming focus within the Bush administration on programs that can help in the global war on terror, particularly in unstable, conflict-prone, and post-conflict countries; the vacuum left by civilian agencies, which struggle to deploy adequate numbers of personnel and to deliver assistance in highly insecure environments; and a general failure on the part of the US government to invest adequately in non-military instruments of global engagement, including by creating deployable US civilian post-conflict capabilities. 我們的屬性越來越多，美國的依賴，對美國的軍事進行重建，發展和能力建設活動，以下三個因素：一壓倒性的重點，布什政府內部對程序，可以幫助在全球反恐戰爭，尤其是在不穩定，衝突易，中和衝突後國家;留下的真空由文職機構，其中的鬥爭，部署足夠數量的人員和提供援助，在高度不安全的環境;和一個一般的失敗，部分美國政府充分的投資在非軍用文書的全球參與，包括通過創造部署美國平民在衝突後的能力。 . 。 . 。

A less polite way of looking at it is that the military is aggressively and greedily invading territory that traditionally has been left to civilians. 那麼禮貌的方式看，那就是軍隊是積極和貪婪入侵領土傳統上一直留給平民。 Of course, anyone familiar with the militarization of law enforcement will not be surprised, but the new stakes should not be underestimated. 當然，任何人都熟悉的軍事化執法將不會感到驚奇，但新的利害關係不應被低估。 Do we really want to turn civilian development activities that have lent our country honor over to a crowd that is in no small part to blame for America’s current pitiful world reputation? 我們是否真的希望把平民的開發活動已借給我們國家的榮譽給一個人群，就是在不小的一部分要歸咎於美國目前的可憐世界的聲譽呢？

o o At the end of the Cold War, a top Soviet official promised America one last horrible surprise: the loss of an enemy. 在冷戰結束，蘇聯官方頂端承諾，美國最後一個可怕的驚喜：失去了一位敵人。 It was as the Greek poet Constantine Cavafy had written early in the century: 這是由於希臘詩人康斯坦丁cavafy曾致函早在本世紀：

Night is here but the barbarians have not come. 晚上是在這裡，但野蠻人沒有來。
And some people arrived from the borders, 和一些人從抵達邊界，
and said that there are no longer any barbarians. 並表示不再存在任何的野蠻人。
And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? 現在是什麼，應成為我們沒有任何的野蠻人呢？
Those people were some kind of solution. 這些人是一些種解決辦法。

A decade later, a Pentagon office still sported a sign that read, WANTED: A GOOD ENEMY. 十年之後，五角大樓的辦公室仍然sported的標誌，讀，想：一個很好的敵人。 It was not long after the Cold War, in fact, that the military went out shopping for new enemies to buck up the welfare fathers of the defense industry. 這是不長，冷戰結束後，在事實上，軍事走出去商場為新的敵人，以推卸責任了福利的父親國防工業。 It had not yet received the budgetary blessing - heralded by a handful of young men with box cutters - of Iraq and Afghanistan. 它尚未收到預算的祝福-預示著由少數的青年男子與框剪子-伊拉克和阿富汗。 Who could have imagined that so few could cause so much fear among so many? 誰能夠想到這麼少可能導致了這麼多的恐懼之間有這麼多？ Who would have thought that, instead of pursuing the perps, you could turn the whole affair into the most expensive war in history and the first to be waged against a perpetual abstraction - terror - rather than an actual country? 誰會想到，而不是追求perps ，您可以把整件事情到最昂貴的戰爭中的歷史和首先要發動對一個永恆的抽象-恐怖-而不是一個實際的國家呢？ Who would have dreamed that the public could be sold the notion that the way to deal with guerillas was to engage in warfare that would increase the number of their allies? 誰將會有夢想，市民可以出售概念，即如何處理與游擊隊是在從事戰爭將增加的人數及其盟友？

Instead, mostly unreported, America’s political and military planners worked hard developing an external threat to compensate for the disappearance of the USSR. 相反，大多未下，美國的政治和軍事規劃人員努力工作，發展的外部威脅，以補償失踪的蘇聯。 Although in the short run, the Pentagon had been remarkably successful in exempting itself from the deficit-cutting hysteria, there was always the danger that the public and politicians might start asking too many questions. 雖然在短期來說，五角大樓已成功地在免除自己從赤字削減歇斯底里，總有危險，公眾和政界人士可能會開始問太多的問題。

So uncertain was the trumpet, in fact, that planners were forced to resort to abstractions that were not only uninformative, they were truly absurd. 因此，不確定的是小號，事實上，這規劃者被迫訴諸抽象的說，不僅是uninformative ，他們真正是荒謬的。 Thus, we were told to spend hundreds of billions to protect ourselves against a generic composite peer competitor, myriad formless threats, and even, god forbid, an asymmetrical niche opponent. 因此，我們被告知要花費數千億，以保護自己免受一個通用的複合同行的競爭對手，無數無形的威脅，甚至，但願上帝阻止，是不對稱的利基對手。 (What did you do in the last war, Daddy? Well, son, I killed 14 generic composite peer competitors and would have wasted more if a frigging asymmetrical niche opponent hadn’t got me in the chest.) （什麼你在過去的戰爭中，爸爸呢？好，兒子，我殺死14通用複合同行的競爭對手，並會浪費更多，如果frigging不對稱利基的對手並沒有讓我在胸部） 。

As Clinton’s budget director Franklin Raines told a meeting of high level Pentagon officials, “We will protect your purchasing power.” 作為克林頓的預算主任富蘭克林雷恩斯會議上說，高層次的五角大樓官員， “我們將保護您的購買力” 。

o o Thus is was not surprising to see a new enemy starting to turn up in the military planners’ mind: the US citizen. 因此，是並不令人感到意外看到一個新的敵人開始出現，在軍事規劃人員心態：美國公民。 For the first time since the Civil War, American government officials began seriously considering the possibility of armed conflict in, and occupation of, their own country. 對於第一次自內戰以來，美國政府官員開始認真考慮的可能性，在武裝衝突中，和佔領，他們自己的國家。 There was a growing assumption that the interests of those with power and those without might diverge to the point of insurrection. 有一個日益增長的假設，即利益的那些與權力和那些沒有可能發散，以點暴動。

The major media steadfastly ignored the trend despite ample evidence lying about. 各大媒體，堅定不移地忽視的趨勢，儘管有充分的證據撒謊。 For example, Defense Week reported that “Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer said the Army needs to focus more on homeland defense and welcomes a ‘mission creep’ into that area.” A 1996 article by military historian and strategist Martin van Creveld in the Los Angeles Times argued that 舉例來說，防禦週報導說， “陸軍參謀長上將丹尼斯拉瑞蒙說，軍隊需要更多地集中於國土防衛，並歡迎'的使命蠕變'進入該地區。 ” 1996年的文章，軍事歷史學家和戰略家馬丁範creveld在洛杉磯時報認為，

As the 20th century draws to an end, it is time that military commanders and the policy makers to whom they report wake up to the new realities. 作為20世紀即將結束，現在是時候說，軍事指揮官和決策者向他們報告醒覺起來，新的現實。 In today’s world the main threat to many states, including specifically the US, no longer comes from other countries. 在今天的世界上的主要威脅，許多國家，包括特別是美國，不再是來自其他國家。 Either we make the necessary changes, or what is commonly known as the modern world will lose all sense of security and dwell in perpetual fear. 要么我們作出必要的改變，或什麼是普遍被稱為現代世界將失去所有的安全感，和住在永恆的恐懼。

Perhaps most startling was an article in the Winter 1992 issue of Parameters, a quarterly published by the US Army College. 也許最驚人的是一篇文章，在1992年冬季的問題參數，每季出版的由美國陸軍學院。 The author was Lt. Col. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., a graduate of Villanova School of Law, the Armed Forces Staff College, and a distinguished graduate of the National War College. 作者中校查爾斯j.鄧拉普小，畢業於維拉諾瓦法律學院，武裝部隊參謀學院，和一位傑出的畢業生，國家戰爭學院。 He had been named by the Judge Advocates Association as the USAF’s outstanding career armed services attorney. 他已被任命為法官所主張協會作為美國空軍的優秀職業軍種律政司。 In short, not your average paranoid conspiracy theorist. 在短期內，而不是您的平均偏執的陰謀理論家。 Dunlap’s article was called “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012.” 鄧拉普的文章被稱為“起源的美國軍事政變， 2012年” 。

In it, Dunlap quoted one of Washington’s journalistic cherubs, James Fallows, who wrote in a 1991 article 在資訊科技，鄧拉普引述之一，華盛頓的新聞小天使，詹姆斯休閒，誰寫在1991年的文章

“I am beginning to think that the only way the national government can do anything worthwhile is to invent a security threat and turn the job over to the military . “我開始認為，只有這樣，國家，政府可以做任何事情值得是發明一種安全威脅，把工作移交給軍事。 . 。 . 。 The military, strangely, is the one government institution that has been assigned legitimacy to act on its notion of the collective good. 軍事，說來奇怪，是一個國家的政府機構已指派的合法性，其行事的概念，集體的利益。

Fallows was not alone within the Washington establishment. 休閒是並不孤單，與華盛頓建立。 Stephen Rosenfeld of the Washington Post wrote a column praising an Army advocate of Dunlap’s nightmare. 斯蒂芬羅森菲爾德的華盛頓郵報寫了一欄讚揚軍隊的主張，鄧拉普的夢魘。 Rosenfeld described US Army Major Ralph Peters this way: 羅森菲爾德所描述的美陸軍的主要拉爾夫彼得斯這樣說：

“At home, use of the military appears inevitable to him — though not yet to an American consensus — “at least on our borders and in some urban environments” . “在家裡，使用軍隊，似乎無可避免的向他-雖然尚未到美國的共識- ”至少在我們的邊界和在一些城市的環境“。 . 。 . 。 He would dutifully prepare for the traditionally ‘military’ missions, plus the new one of missile defense. 他將盡職盡責地作好準備，傳統的軍事任務，再加上新的一個導彈防禦系統。 But he would be ready to engage with drugs and crime, terrorism, peacekeeping, illegal immigration, disease control, resource protection, evacuation of endangered citizens . 但他願意從事與毒品和犯罪，恐怖主義，維持和平，非法移民，疾病控制，資源保護，疏散瀕危的公民。 . 。 .” “ 。

What Dunlap described and Peters advocated was not a bold military stroke against the civilian society, but simply a coup by attrition. 什麼鄧拉普描述和彼得斯主張是不是一個大膽的軍事中風對平民社會，而只是政變減員。 Something similar seems to be going on now, only the target is not our domestic, but our foreign, affairs. 類似的似乎是目前正在進行的，只有目標，是不是我們國內，但我們的外交，內政。 The goal: all war all the time, with the Pentagon in charge of as much as possible. 目標：所有戰爭的所有時間，與五角大樓在負責，盡可能多地。

o o Before raising philosophical questions about whether the military should be supplanting the civilian in matters of diplomacy and development, some sense of scale is useful. 前提高哲學問題是否軍事應supplanting平民在事項的外交和發展，從一定意義上的規模是有益的。 Based on figures from a few years ago, for example, the amount of money the military spent annually on useless - in fact heavily counterproductive - drug interdiction and anti-drug activities was nearly a half billon dollars. 的基礎上的數字從幾年前，舉例來說，這筆錢軍事每年花費在無用的-事實上，大量反作用-緝毒和掃毒活動是近一個半億美元。 This was approximately the same sum being spent by USAID on agriculture, or the environment, or child survival and maternal health or family planning. 這是大約相同的總和用於由美國國際開發署對農業，或環境，或兒童生存和產婦的健康或計劃生育。 And it was vastly more than was spent on higher education or diseases other than AIDs. 這是很大的多是用於高等教育或其他疾病，比艾滋病。

One example of how the military has infiltrated civilian diplomacy has been the new African Command. 其中一個例子是如何的軍事已經滲透到平民的外交一直是新的非洲司令部。 You may not have noticed too many wars against the US in that part of the world, but the Pentagon has managed to con Congress into a grand operation that includes, according to its website, achievements such as the following: 您可能沒有注意到，太多的戰爭，反對美國在這世界的一部分，但五角大樓已設法結論國會成為一個大的運作，其中包括，根據其網站上，取得的成就，如下列：

- US service members from the Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa gathered with residents of Mikocheni on May 15 to celebrate the completion of a newly built health clinic. -美國服務的成員來自聯合專責小組-非洲之角的聚集與居民m ikocheni5月1 5日，以慶祝完成了新建的衛生所。 The Jaypal Singh Babhra Memorial Clinic was completed by US service members of the CJTF-HOA. 該jaypal辛格babhra紀念診所完成了由美國服務成員對cjtf -清化。 . 。 . 。

– A group of 20 sailors from the US Navy’s USS Momsen visited a school in the port city of Mombasa on May 7, as part of a community relations program called Project Handclasp. -一個2 0國集團的船員由美國海軍的號m omsen參觀了學校在港口城市蒙巴薩，於五月七日，作為一個組成部分，社區關係計劃，所謂的項目h andclasp。 Project Handclasp is a US Navy program that provides donated items such as books, clothes, toys, and medical. 項目handclasp是美海軍計劃提供捐贈物品如書籍，衣服，玩具，和醫療等。 . 。 . 。

– The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa funded the renovation of the Mokowe Primary School in Mokowe, Kenya,and helped construct a fence to secure the facility. -合併的聯合工作隊-非洲之角的資助翻新的m okowe小學在m okowe，肯尼亞，並幫助建造一個柵欄，以確保該設施。

Patrick and Brown cautiously describes the Pentagon’s African mission this way 帕特里克和布朗謹慎地描述了五角大樓的非洲特派團這種方式

According to DoD, the new command’s primary mission will be “shaping” activities, designed to ameliorate troubling trends in the region by helping to eliminate the roots of extremism, terrorism and violent conflict before they reach a crisis, rather than traditional operations involving the use of force. 根據國防部，新的命令的首要任務將是“塑造 ” 活動，旨在紓緩令人不安的趨勢在該地區的幫助，以消除根源，極端主義，恐怖主義和暴力衝突之前，他們達成一項危機，而非傳統的業務涉及使用武力。 . 。 . 。

“The Pentagon’s new focus on conflict prevention and its commitment to US-government-wide policy planning and implementation are to be welcomed. “五角大樓的新的重點放在預防衝突和其承諾，我們政府全政策的規劃和實施是值得歡迎的。 What has not yet been satisfactorily explained is how AFRICOM’s interagency process will interact with other US programs and activities - and how DoD will ensure that its military activities do not compete with, undermine, or overshadow US development and diplomatic objectives throughout the continent.什麼至今仍未得到令人滿意的解釋，是如何africom的機構間的互動過程中會與其他美國的計劃和活動-以及如何國防部將確保其軍事活動，不競爭，破壞，或掩蓋了美國發展和外交目標，在整個非洲大陸。 The risks, which are both symbolic and practical, will need to be carefully managed.風險，這都是象徵性和實際，將需要認真加以管理。 From a public diplomacy perspective, the elevation of AFRICOM to a position of apparent leadership in integrating US policy toward Africa may create the damaging impression (or allow US adversaries to argue) that the United States has a militarized approach to the continent.46 More substantively, the enormous asymmetry between the resources available to the Pentagon, on the one hand, and the State Department, USAID and other civilian agencies, on the other, raises the danger that any “shaping” activities that emerge from AFRICOM will be dominated by US defense priorities while giving short shrift to broader political and developmental considerations, (including the democratic accountability of those same security forces).從公共外交的角度來看，海拔africom一個立場明顯的領導，在整合，美國對非洲政策可能造成的破壞性的印象（或允許美國對手的爭論）表示，美國有一個軍事化的方法來continent.46更實質性的，巨大的不對稱性之間的現有資源，向五角大樓，一方面，和美國國務院，美國國際開發署和其他文職機構，另一方面，提高了危險，即任何“塑造”活動中出現的從africom將主導美國國防優先，兼顧短期shrift ，以更廣泛的政治和發展的考慮， （包括民主問責制的同時，這些安全部隊） 。 . 。 . 。

“In a recent briefing, the head of the AFRICOM Transition Team, Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, declared that “Strategic Success” for the new command would include the achievement of the following goals: “在最近的發布會上，頭部的africom過渡時期工作隊，海軍少將羅伯特默勒 ， 宣稱”戰略的成功“為新的命令將包括實現以下目標：

- An African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity -一個非洲大陸的知的自由，和平，穩定與日益繁榮

- Fragile states strengthened; decreased likelihood of failed states; all territory under the control of effective democracies -脆弱的國家加強;下跌的可能性失敗的國家;所有控制下的領土有效的民主政體

-Economic development and democratic governance allow African states to take the lead in addressing African challenges. -經濟發展和民主治理，使非洲國家率先採取措施解決非洲問題的挑戰。 . 。 . 。

What is impressive about these strategic objectives - beyond their breadth — is how few lend themselves to DoD leadership. 什麼是令人印象深刻的關於這些戰略目標-超越其廣度-是如何數借給自己的國防部的領導。 Generally speaking, the US military is not well-equipped, by its mandate and personnel, to expertly address the structural sources of underdevelopment, alienation and instability in target countries. 一般來說，美國軍方是不是裝備良好，其任務和人員， expertly解決結構性來源不發達，異化和不穩定的目標國家。 Although requisite skills can sometimes be found within the civil affairs component of the US Army, few soldiers possess deep expertise on matters of governance, development, and the rule of law. 雖然所需的技能，有時可以找到民政組成部分，美國軍隊，只有少數士兵具備深厚的專業知識，對問題的治理，發展和法治。 . 。 . 。

Finally, a number of European officials have expressed misgivings about the integration of US counter-terrorism and development agendas, suggesting that the new command could complicate common approaches to Africa within the donor community. 最後，一些歐洲官員已表示疑慮一體化的美國反恐怖主義和發展議程，這表明新的命令複雜的共同做法非洲國家捐助社會。 . 。 . 。

To be sure, there is far from total agreement on the nature and distance of this shift in the military, even within the Pentagon. 可以肯定的是，有遠從總的協議的性質和距離，這種轉變在軍事上，甚至在五角大樓。 There are, for example, plenty of Army and Marine officers who would just as soon not be running day care centers in Tanzania. 有，例如，大量的軍隊和水警人員誰只想盡快不能運行日托中心在坦桑尼亞。

Even Defense Secretary Gates seemed to side with traditional diplomatic and development approaches in a recent speech in which he praised the role of civilian agencies. 甚至國防部長蓋茨似乎方面與傳統的外交和發展的辦法，在最近一次講話中，他讚揚的作用文職機構。 According to the Pentagon release: 據五角大樓發布日期：

Speaking at the Academy of American Diplomats in Washington, the secretary said there is bipartisan support on Capitol Hill to devote more resources to the State Department and other civilian agencies. 會上科學院美國外交官在華盛頓，局長說是兩黨的支持在國會山，以投入更多資源，以美國國務院和其他文職機構。

Since the war on terror began, President Bush, defense officials and military officers have stressed that all parts of the federal government must work together to combat extremists — that the military can put in place conditions for security, but civilian agencies are the repositories of expertise on governance, economics, agriculture and so on. 自反恐戰爭開始，布什總統，國防部官員和軍事人員都強調，各部分聯邦政府必須攜手合作，以打擊極端主義分子-即軍事可以把在地方的安全條件，但文職機構是存放專門知識關於治理，經濟，農業等。 Countries like Iraq and Afghanistan need these skills to cement progress in place. 國家，如伊拉克和阿富汗需要這些技能，以水泥進展情況的地方。

“There is a need for a much greater integration of our efforts,” Gates said. “是有需要的大得多整合我們的努力， ”蓋茨說。 “There is clearly a need for a better way to organize interagency collaboration.” “這顯然是一個需要有一個更好的方式來組織間合作” 。

The problem with the civilian agencies providing the personnel has not been a lack of will, but a lack of capabilities, Gates said. 問題與文職機構提供人事尚未缺乏意願，但缺乏能力，蓋茨說。 The State Department has about 6,600 Foreign Service officers. 國務院關於6600外交人員。 To put it in perspective, that’s barely enough to crew one carrier battle group in the Navy, the secretary said. 把它的角度看，這只能勉強船員一航艦戰鬥群在海軍，局長說。

The upshot is that when civilian agencies cannot deploy personnel, service members step in to take up the slack. 其結果是，當文職機構不能部署人員，服務委員的一步採取行動疲弱。 The provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq are primary examples of this, Gates said. 省級重建隊，在阿富汗和伊拉克，小學這方面的例子，蓋茨說。 The teams, which have slots for officials from the departments of agriculture, commerce, treasury, justice and so on, were staffed by military personnel so they effort could get up and running quickly. 隊，其中有插槽官員從該部門的農業，商業，庫務署，公義和等，配備軍事人員，使他們的努力可以得到快速啟動和運行。

“There aren’t deployable people in agriculture and commerce and treasury and so on that are prepared to go overseas,” Gates said. “有沒有人部署在農業和商業及庫務等，是準備前往海外， ”蓋茨說。 And these skills are desperately needed, he emphasized. 而這些技能是迫切需要的，他強調。

Which all sounds comforting until you discover who’s going to be assigned to whom: 所有的聲音安慰，直到你發現誰的去被分配到其中：

Defense personnel have always worked in the State Department, but now State Department personnel are assigned to DoD, especially with the combatant commands. 國防部人員一直工作在國務院，但現在國務院人員被分配到國防部，尤其是與戰鬥命令。 The newly formed US Africa Command, for example, has a large number of State Department personnel assigned to the organization. 新成立的美國非洲命令，例如，有一大批國務院人事分配給該組織。 US Southern Command also has a large number of personnel from civilian agencies as integral members of the command. 美軍南方司令部也有大量的人員從民事機構作為成員的命令。 . 。 . 。

And he also called the civilian agencies a “combat multiplier,” hardly a reassuring description of peaceful diplomacy. 他還呼籲平民機構的一個“打擊乘數， ”很難描述一個令人安心的和平外交政策。

Now consider this from an Economist article on Gates’ philosophy: 現在認為這是從一位經濟學家的文章對蓋茨的哲學：

In a recent article, General Peter Chiarelli, an adviser to Robert Gates, America’s secretary of defence, says more money has to be spent not on the Pentagon but on the “non-kinetic aspects of our national power”. 在最近的一篇文章，一般彼得chiarelli ，顧問羅伯特蓋茨，美國的國務卿辯護說，更多的錢已被花了而不是五角大樓，但就“非動力學方面，我們國家的權力” 。 He recommends building up the “minuscule” State Department and USAID development agency (so small it is “little more than a contracting agency”), and reviving the United States Information Agency. 他建議建立“微不足道”美國國務院和美國國際開發署開發署（這麼小，這是“多一點訂約機構” ） ，和振興美國新聞署。

As the American army expands, some thinkers. 作為美國軍隊的擴大，一些思想家。 . 。 . 。 say it needs not just more soldiers-nor even linguists, civil-affairs officers and engineers-but a fully fledged 20,000-strong corps of advisers that will train and “embed” themselves with allied forces around the world. 說它需要的不僅僅是更多的士兵-甚至也不語言學家，公務員事務人員和工程師，而是一個完全成熟的2.00萬強團的顧問，將列車與“嵌入”自己與盟軍在世界各地。 The idea makes army commanders blanch, but they do not question the underlying assumption. 的思想，使軍隊指揮官灼過，但他們並沒有問題的基本假設。

As the American media has found in Iraq, embeddedness is not the repose of equals. 正如美國媒體在伊拉克發現的，鑲嵌，是不是repose平等的。

o o Then there is the controversial Defense Department draft directive going around on the topic of irregular warfare that some believe lays down the basis for much further intrusion on civilian roles. 其次是爭議的國防部指令草案繞過關於該專題的非正規戰爭，有些相信了基礎，進一步入侵對平民的角色。 The directive would replace one that had already staked out sizable new turf, of which Patrick and Brown wrote: 該指令將取代一說，已孤注一擲了可觀的新的草坪，其中帕特里克和布朗寫道：

Chastened by its failure to plan for postwar Iraq and the chaos that resulted, the Pentagon has cast off its former aversion to nation-building. chastened其失敗的計劃和伊拉克戰後的混亂所造成的，五角大樓已擺脫了其前的反感國家建設。 This shift was cemented in November 2005 with the signing of DoD Directive 3000.05, which declared that the US military would henceforth treat “Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations” as a core mission, on a par with combat operations. 這種轉變是硬質合金在2005年11月簽署的國防部指令3000.05 ，其中宣稱，美國軍方今後對待“穩定，安全，過渡和重建行動”作為一項核心任務，就等同於作戰行動。 Decidedly broad in scope, this directive extends DoD’s mandates and programs to a wide range of activities that are typically the province of civilian agencies, including reforming the security sector, establishing institutions of governance, reviving market activity and rebuilding infrastructure. 堅決範圍廣泛，這項指令擴展國防部的職權範圍和程序，以各種各樣的活動，通常是全省民用機構，包括改革安全部門，建立治理機構，恢復市場的活動和重建基礎設施。 While the directive openly recognizes that many of these tasks are more appropriately carried out by civilian actors and agencies, it also states that this may not always be possible in highly insecure environments or where such civilian capabilities do not yet exist.” 同時，該指令公開承認，許多這些任務是較為恰當所進行的平民行動者和機構，它也指出，這並非總是可能在高度不安全的環境或如民用的能力，尚不存在“ 。

Still another way it all might look is described in American Diplomacy by Sam J,. 還有另一種方式，這一切看起來可能是描述在美國的外交由Sam J以來， 。 Holliday, a West Pont graduate and a former director of Stability Studies [sic] at the Army War College, and a retired army colonel. 霍利迪，西杜邦研究生和一名前任董事的穩定性研究[原文]在軍隊戰爭學院和一位退休的陸軍上校。

Today there are two broad contending views regarding policy formulation and implementation for irregular warfare: 今天有兩個廣泛爭論的意見，對於政策的制定和執行不規則戰：

1. 1 。 Focus the military on conventional war against the armed forces of other states and focus the Foreign Service on diplomacy and negotiations to avoid war, while muddling through irregular warfare. 重點是軍事上的常規戰爭對軍隊的其他國家和重點對外服務於外交和談判，以避免戰爭，而muddling通過非正規戰爭。

2. 2 。 Recognize irregular warfare as being distinctive from both war and peace by creating a new Department of Stability with career personnel dedicated to irregular warfare. 認識到非正規戰爭作為獨特的，由雙方在戰爭與和平，創造一個新部門，穩定與職業的人員，專責非正規戰爭。 . 。 . 。

The first view has strong support within the military from those that do not want war-fighting forces to be used for internal security against insurgents attempting to overthrow those in authority. 第一種看法，具有很強的支持，軍事，從那些不想作戰力量被用於內部安全防範武裝分子企圖推翻那些在權威。 They do not want to be the handmaidens of “political strife,” and they want to avoid the cruel, violent, and unrewarding activities of internal conflict. 他們不想成為handmaidens “政治紛爭” ，他們希望避免殘忍，暴力，吃力不討好的活動的內部衝突。 . 。 . 。 This first view sees the solution in a plan that unites all agencies of the US government. 這第一種看法認為，解決在一項計劃，團結所有機構的美國政府。 These agencies have different philosophical, political, and institutional agendas. 這些機構有不同的哲學，政治和體制的議程。 Therefore, how to coordinate all US government agencies involved in foreign affairs (State, Defense, Justice, CIA, NSA, etc.) during policy formulation is the critical challenge. 因此，如何協調所有美國政府機構所涉及的外事（國家，國防部，司法部，中央情報局，國家安全局等）在政策的制定是至關重要的挑戰。 Until this is done there will be turf battles, uncertainty, delays, and ineffectiveness. 直到這樣做是會有的草地作戰，不確定性，拖延，效率低下。 . 。 . 。

A Stability Department would allow the development of career personnel (military and civilian) dedicated to determining and using the means, strategies, tactics, and methods necessary for irregular warfare. 一個穩定，海關將允許開發人員的職業生涯（軍事和文職人員）致力於確定和使用的手段，戰略，戰術和方法，必要的非正規戰爭。 This should make both policy formulation and implementation more effective and more efficient. 這應該使政策的制定和執行更有效和更有效率。 The result would be professionals without preconceptions shaped by war fighting or diplomacy, without institutional allegiance to either the military establishment or the foreign policy establishment, and without mindsets appropriate only for either war or peace. 其結果將是專業人士，沒有先入為主的形由戰爭或外交，沒有體制效忠，無論是軍隊編制或外交政策的建立，並沒有適當的心態，只有無論是戰爭或和平。 Hopefully these professionals would be able to determine how to achieve stability through equilibrium at the lowest possible costs. 希望這些專業人士將可來確定如何實現穩定的平衡，通過在盡可能最低的成本。 . 。 . 。

Key to the concept of irregular warfare and a Department of Stability is the assumption of perpetual conflict, a chronic absence of peace and America’s continued colonial dominance, which others that see shrinking by the day. 關鍵的概念和非正規戰爭的一個部門，穩定是前提永久衝突，是一種慢性沒有和平與美國的繼續殖民統治地位，別人見萎縮，由天。 A Department of Stability would certainly seem as odd to young students a century from now as reading about the bureaucracy of British colonialism under Queen Victoria does today. 一個部門的穩定肯定會好像奇怪的青年學生一個世紀從現在起，作為讀有關的官僚英國殖民主義下的維多利亞女王今天。

Besides, all morality aside, if there is one thing our time should have taught us it’s that war is about the dumbest way to go about anything that there is. 此外，所有的道德不談，如果有一件事我們的時間應該有告訴我們，它的那場戰爭是關於dumbest路要走，什麼是有。 After all, even the exceptionally well equipped and righteous America hasn’t won a real war against a comparable enemy since WWII and when you add in Vietnam, Korea and Iraq and then find yourself falling back on Grenada for props, it may finally be time to think of other approaches. 畢竟，即使是異常地好，裝備和正義，美國並沒有贏得一場真正的戰爭對一個可比的敵人，自二戰和當您添加在越南，韓國和伊拉克，然後發現自己回落對格林納達為道具，它可能最終時間想其他辦法。

This has not, of course, been the fault of the troops, but of the star bedizened galaxy under which they serve, of presidents with testosteronic insecurities, and of toy boys on Capitol Hill willing to gamble our nation to satisfy another defense contractor aka campaign contributor. 這，當然不會被故障的部隊，但明星bedizened銀河下，他們所服務的，總統與testosteronic的不安全因素，和玩具男孩在國會山願意賭我們的民族，以滿足另一國防承包商又名運動投稿。 After all, even the best boatswain’s mate can’t save a ship from the rocks if those on the bridge can’t, or won’t, read the chart. 畢竟，即使是最好的繩架的伴侶無法保存的船舶，從岩石，如果那些在橋不能，或不會讀圖表。

The tragedy of modern military history is how much courage has been sacrificed for so many puerile, pointless or psychopathic ends. 悲劇的現代軍事歷史是多大的勇氣，已經犧牲了這麼多幼稚的，無謂的或心理變態結束。 Which is one good reason you want the better part of your foreign policy run by civilians and not generals. 這是一個很好的理由，您想要更好的一部分，您的外交政策所辦的平民，而不是將軍。

o o Another reason diplomats, development officials and civilians now working with the Pentagon are concerned abut the expansion of the military role was well outlined by an aide to General Petraeus: 另一個原因，外交官，發展的官員和平民，現在的工作與五角大樓關注的鄰接擴張的軍事作用，以及當時所概述的助手一般彼得雷烏斯：
At present, the US defense budget accounts for approximately half of total global defense spending, while the US armed forces employ about 1.68 million uniformed members. 目前，美國國防預算佔了大約一半的全球總國防開支，而美國軍隊聘用約168.0萬穿制服的成員。 By comparison, the State Department employs about 6,000 Foreign Service officers, while the US Agency for International Development has about 2,000. 相比之下，美國國務院員工約6000對外服務人員，而美國國際開發署已約2000年。 In other words, the Department of Defense is about 210 times larger than USAID and State combined - there are substantially more people employed as musicians in Defense bands than in the entire foreign service. 在其他的話，國防部是約210倍，大於美國國際開發署和國家結合起來-有大幅更多的人受聘為音樂家在防禦帶比，在整個對外服務。

There are plenty who won’t be all that happy having to deal with a military surge into diplomacy, including international non-profits, some of our allies and UN organizations. 有很多誰不會被所有的快樂不得不處理軍事激增到外交，包括國際非利潤，我們的一些盟國和聯合國組織。 It is also hard to imagine rock stars throwing themselves into global fundraising fests when they know the money will go to pad the budget of a General Petraeus. 這亦是很難想像搖滾明星投身全球籌款巨星匯，當他們知道這筆錢將去墊預算一般彼得雷烏斯。

Here is how one civilian professional - who represents others who do a lot work for the Pentagon - reacted to the proposed new directive: 在這裡，是如何一平民的專業-誰代表誰別人做了很多工作五角大樓-反應擬議的新指令：

As I understand things, if this change were to be implemented, we would have the following: 據我了解的東西，如果這種改變被實施，我們將有以下內容：

The connection between State and Defense to harmonize stability and reconstruction operations would become moot because the funding and control of the stability operations would be subsumed under “irregular warfare.” It would be up to DoD to decide if they needed to bring in civilians to help them out.之間的聯繫，美國國務院與國防部的協調，穩定和重建行動將成為模擬，因為資金和控制的穩定行動將歸入“非正規戰” 。便高達國防部，以決定他們是否需要把在平民的幫助出來。

It would become even more difficult for civilian organizations and agencies to be involved in any comfortable way, given that all humanitarian aid, providing essential services, building local governance, etc., would become part of “irregular warfare.” In fact, I can’t think of a single humanitarian aid organization that would agree to become involved in “irregular warfare.”它會變得更加困難，為民間組織和機構能夠參與在任何舒適的方式，由於所有的人道主義援助，提供基本服務，建設地方治理等，將成為一部分“非正規戰” ，事實上，我可以'噸認為，一個單一的人道主義援助組織，都會同意，成為所涉及的“不規則戰爭” 。

This would continue and extend the idea that “irregular warfare” is an appropriate approach to dealing with fragile or failed states, with post-conflict situations, or preventing future conflicts.這將繼續和擴大的思想， “非正規戰”是一個適當的辦法來處理與脆弱或失敗的國家，衝突後局勢，或防止未來的衝突。 Such policies will be completely rejected by the civilian agencies of the US Government, NGOs, the international community, without even attending to what the fragile states would think.這些政策將完全拒絕了由文職機構的美國政府，非政府組織，國際社會，甚至沒有參加什麼脆弱的國家會認為。

We would have even more power and control in the military, creating an even greater imbalance between the civilian agencies and the military that are supposed to be working to “harmonize” their activities now.我們將有更權力和控制，在軍事，創造一個更大的不平衡之間的民事機構和軍隊，是為了工作，以“協調”他們的活動現在。 They are so underfunded and undermanned at this point that it is very difficult to manage the civilian side of the “harmonization” process effectively.他們是如此不足和undermanned在這一點上，這是非常難以管理的民事方面的“協調”的過程中有效。

The military would then be left with a mission to provide for stability operations across the board for which they do not have training, are not equipped to do, have not been able to successfully accomplish (witness Iraq and Afghanistan), which would mean that the US capacity to contribute to serious peace building efforts would be seriously undermined even further than it is now.軍事便只剩下一個特派團提供穩定的行動全國委員會，而他們沒有訓練，不具備這樣做，仍未能圓滿完成（證人伊拉克和阿富汗的） ，這意味著該美國作出貢獻的能力嚴重的建設和平的努力將受到嚴重破壞，甚至進一步比現在。

The military takeover of traditionally civilian foreign policy roles is part of a mission creep that has been going on a long time. 軍事接管的傳統民用外交政策的角色是一個組成部分，蠕變的使命已經持續了很長的時間。 My first article on the topic was 12 years ago when the concerns were the military’s expansion of the futile and terribly damaging drug war and its growing interference with domestic civil liberties. 我的第一篇文章就這一專題是12年前，當關注軍事的擴張，該是徒勞的和可怕的戰爭損害的藥物和其日益增長的干擾與國內公民自由權。

Things have only gotten worse since. 事情只有惡化以來。 Now diplomacy and international development are joining the target list for the mission creep, by a military that has finally found a battleground it truly likes. 現在外交和國際發展，是加入的目標名單，該特派團的蠕變，由軍隊，終於找到了真正的戰場，它喜歡。 And we, the citizens funding it all, will once again lose the war. 而我們，公民的資金，這一切，將再次失去了戰爭。

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This entry was posted on Saturday, May 24th, 2008 at 10:11 am and is filed under 此項目被張貼在週六， 2008年5月24日在上午10時11分，並提交下 War & Terrorism News 戰爭和恐怖主義新聞 . 。 You can follow any responses to this entry through the 您可以按照任何的反應，此項目通過 RSS 2.0 2.0 feed. 餵養。 You can 您可以 leave a response 留下的回應 , or ，或 trackback Trackback跟踪 from your own site. 從你自己的網站。

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