BBC 英國廣播公司

Panorama asks why the British Army in Iraq used interrogation techniques that were banned over 30 years ago. 全景問，為什麼英國陸軍在伊拉克使用的審訊技術被禁止在30多年前。

Panorama: On Whose Orders? 全景：誰的命令？ BBC One 8.30pm on Monday 25 February 2008 BBC的一個晚上八時三十分於週一2008年2月25日

In 1972 the techniques - hooding, stress positions, constant noise, sleep deprivation and being starved of food and water - were banned by the Heath government which said they would never be used again. 1972年，技巧-戴頭罩，強調立場，不斷的噪音，剝奪睡眠和被餓死的食物和水-被禁止，由希思政府表示，他們將永遠不會被再次使用。 Their reintroduction in 2003, whether official or unofficial, could have had serious consequences.他們回复原來在2003年，無論是官方或非官方的，可有嚴重的後果。 Now solicitors are launching claims for compensation on behalf of Iraqis alleging mistreatment.Ministry of Defence (MoD) rules now specifically state the five techniques should never be used.現在律師正在發起追討賠償代表伊拉克人的指控mistreatment.ministry國防部（ MOD ）的規則，現在特別說明五個技術應該永遠不再使用。 However, immediately after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 British soldiers witnessed Iraqi prisoners hooded and made to stand for hours with no food or sleep.不過，後，立即進行了2003年入侵伊拉克英軍士兵目睹伊拉克戰俘戴頭罩，並提出要站好幾個小時沒有食物或睡眠。

The Attorney General is responsible for setting the rules under which the British Army operates. 總檢察長是負責制定規則，而英國軍隊的運作。 Lord Goldsmith held this position during the Iraq war and the resulting occupation. 戈德史密斯勳爵舉行的這一立場在伊拉克戰爭期間以及由此而來的佔領。

When we asked him how it was that the ban had been side-stepped, he told Panorama:當我們問他，它是怎麼說，這項禁令已經副作用加強，他告訴全景：

“There is no question of anyone in my office, let alone me, advising me that it was legitimate to interrogate whilst hooding or using sleep deprivation or any of those techniques. "這是毫無疑問的人在我的辦公室裡，更何況是我，向我說，它是合法的訊問，而戴頭罩或使用剝奪睡眠或任何這些技巧。 Full stop.”句號" 。

When asked why it was happening despite this, he said:當問及為何有發生，雖然如此，他說：

“I think the Ministry of Defence are probably the responsible department to understand with the army what actually took place, to learn the lessons from it to make sure it never happens again.” "我認為，內政部，國防部很可能是負責的部門，以了解與陸軍現在究竟發生了，找教訓，從它，以確保它永遠不會再發生" 。

In response to the allegations of prisoner abuse in Iraq which went beyond the five techniques and included beatings and in the case of hotel worker Baha Mousa, death, the then Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Michael Jackson commissioned a report.在回應這些指控的虐俘在伊拉克，這超出了五個技術，其中包括毆打，並在案件酒店工作者巴哈穆薩，死亡，當時的國防參謀長，一般索馬雷傑克遜委託的一份報告。

Brigadier Robert Aitken’s findings were published last month and said that abuse was not widespread.準將羅伯特埃特金得出的結果，在上月公佈了，並說虐待並不普遍。

General Sir Michael Jackson told Panorama:一般索馬雷傑克遜告訴全景：

“Robert Aitken makes the point in his report that he would need another look at why that statement by the Heath government appears to have gone into a black hole… I don’t know the answer to that.” "羅伯特埃特金，使該點在他的報告中說，他將需要再看看為什麼該聲明由希思政府似乎已經變成了一個黑洞… …我不知道答案。 "

Jackson continued:傑克遜續說：

“There was no evidence whatsoever on any endemic behaviour of that nature.” "沒有證據顯示，任何地方性的行為，這種性質" 。

Allegations 指控

The programme goes on to weigh the evidence from the Battle of Danny Boy, that is at the centre of the latest legal challenge.該方案的推移權衡證據，從戰役，丹尼男孩，這是在該中心的最新法律上的挑戰。

Iraqi prisoners have made serious allegations of abuse against the British Army that the MoD is now re- investigating despite previous inquiries that found nobody to be at fault.伊拉克戰俘都進行了認真的有關虐待的傳聞，對英國軍隊，英國國防部現正重新調查，儘管先前的調查發現，沒有人可以加以過錯。

Iraqi prisoners captured by the army on 14 May 2004 and taken back to Camp Abu Naji claim other prisoners taken alive with them off the battlefield were killed that night by the British in Camp Abu Naji.伊拉克戰俘的俘虜，由軍隊， 2004年5月14日，並帶返營阿布納吉聲稱其他囚犯採取了勃勃的將它們趕走在戰場上被殺害這天晚上，由英國文化協會在難民營阿布納吉。

Iraqi medical staff who received the bodies returned by the army the next day say some of the bodies show signs of torture.伊拉克醫務人員接受團體經由陸軍第二天說，有些屍體顯示，受虐待的跡象。

They claim that there is evidence that people died later in Camp Abu Naji and not in the battlefield.他們宣稱，有證據表明，人死亡後，在營阿布納吉而不是在戰場上。

Battlefield injuries 戰場傷亡

The MoD deny the allegations.英國國防部否認上述指控。

They say the injuries are consistent with modern battlefield injuries and that the claims of deaths at the camp may have arisen from an unusual decision to remove bodies from the battlefield and take them to the base. 他們說，受傷的都是一致的，與現代戰場上受傷，並索賠死亡，在營可能產生的一個不尋常的決定，以消除屍體從戰場，並帶他們到基地。 A full statement from the MoD is available above. 正式聲明，由國防部提供以上。

Panorama has spent over a year talking to battlefield survivors, medical staff, and Iraqi former prisoners in Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.全景花了超過一年的交談戰場上的倖存者，醫療人員，以及伊拉克前囚犯在伊拉克，土耳其和約旦。

The programme critically examines claims made by lawyers who are representing the Iraqis in their action against the British Government and who held a press conference last Friday.該方案嚴格審查索賠所作出的律師，他們是代表伊拉克人民，在他們的行動對英國政府和世衛組織舉行了一個記者招待會上週五。

Panorama has seen no proof that prisoners died at the hands of their captors and concludes that the case being brought by solicitors Phil Shiner and Martyn Day represents the most extreme interpretation of a troubling but confusing incident.全景並未見到證明囚犯死在手中，他們綁架並得出結論，認為此案所帶來的律師菲爾shiner和馬丁一天，代表了最極端的詮釋了一個令人不安的，但混亂的事件。 They are asking for the bodies to be disinterred and evidence to be handed to Scotland Yard.他們要求該機構將disinterred和證據交給蘇格蘭場。

General Sir Michael Jackson, speaking generally and not about this incident specifically, says that the army’s best defence is the law:一般索馬雷傑克遜來說，一般並沒有關於這一事件的具體說，軍隊的最好的防禦就是法律：

“I would look… what are the facts? "我會去了解一下… …什麼都是事實嗎？ If they make an allegation the allegation gets investigated, people don’t always say truthfully as they might such things as I’m afraid some of the court cases revealed but I would say that any allegation of ill treatment should be investigated and the due process of law must take place.”如果他們提出指控的指控得到查處，人們不總是說，如實反映，因為他們可能這樣的事情，因為我擔心一些法院的案件顯示，但我會說，任何指稱的虐待，應進行調查和正當程序法律必須發生" 。

Whatever the outcome of any potential court case it maybe that bringing back the five techniques - banned as inhuman in 1972 - would appear to have made the army’s position more difficult.無論結果如何，任何潛在的法庭案件中，它也許是帶回了5個技巧-禁止不人道的，在1 972年-似乎已作出了軍隊的立場變得更加困難。

Panorama: On Whose Orders? 全景：誰的命令？ BBC One 8.30pm on Monday 25 February. BBC的一個晚上八時三十分於週一2月25日。

Up to 10,000 Turkish troops launch an incursion which threatens to destabilise the country’s only peaceful region 多達10000名土耳其部隊發動的入侵威脅要破壞該國的，只有和平區

By由 Patrick Cockburn帕特里克科伯恩

A new crisis has exploded in Iraq after Turkish troops, supported by attack planes and Cobra helicopters, yesterday launched a major ground offensive into Iraqi Kurdistan.新的危機已經引爆，在伊拉克之後，土耳其軍隊的支持下攻擊機和眼鏡蛇直升機，昨天展開了大規模的地面攻勢，伊拉克庫爾德斯坦。

The invading Turkish soldiers are in pursuit of Kurdish guerrillas hiding in the mountains.入侵的土耳其士兵是在追求庫爾德游擊隊躲藏在山上。 They are seeking to destroy the camps of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) along the border between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan.他們正在尋找摧毀難民營內的庫爾德工人黨（庫爾德工人黨）之間邊界沿線土耳其和伊拉克庫爾德斯坦。 “Thousands of troops have crossed the border and thousands more are waiting at the border to join them if necessary,” said a Turkish military source. "幾千名士兵已經越過邊界，成千上萬的人守候在邊境加入他們的行列，如果有必要，說： "土耳其軍方的消息。

“There are severe clashes,” said Ahmed Danees, the head of foreign relations for the PKK. "有嚴重衝突， "一位名叫艾哈邁德danees ，總行的外交關係，為庫爾德工人黨。 “Two Turkish soldiers have been killed and eight wounded. "兩名土耳其士兵被打死， 8人受傷。 There are no PKK casualties.” Turkish television said that the number of Turkish troops involved was between 3,000 and 10,000, and they had moved 16 miles inside Iraq.有沒有PKK的傷亡" 。土耳其電視台說，土耳其部隊的人數，涉及3000和10000 ，他們已搬遷16英里內的伊拉克。

But the escalating Turkish attacks are destabilising the Kurdish region of Iraq which is the one peaceful part of the country and has visibly benefited from the US invasion.但日益升級的土耳其攻擊破壞庫爾德地區的伊拉克是一個和平國家的一部分，並已明顯得益於美國的入侵。

The Iraqi Kurds are America’s closest allies in Iraq and the only Iraqi community to support fully the US occupation.伊拉克庫爾德人是美國的親密盟友，在伊拉克和唯一的伊拉克社會全力支持美國的佔領。 The president of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani, said recently he felt let down by the failure of the Iraqi government in Baghdad to stop Turkish bombing raids on Iraqi territory.總統自治區庫爾德斯坦地區政府，巴爾扎尼說，最近他覺得讓下跌的失敗，伊拉克政府在巴格達，以阻止土耳其空襲伊拉克境內。

The incursion is embarrassing for the US, which tried to avert it, because the American military provides intelligence to the Turkish armed forces about the location of the camps of Turkish Kurd fighters.這次入侵是尷尬的對美國來說，試圖以避免它，因為美國軍方提供的情報，以土耳其武裝部隊約位置營地的土耳其庫爾德戰士。 Immediately before the operation began, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, called President George Bush to warn him.立即開始運作前就開始，土耳其總理埃爾多安，呼籲總統布什，以警告他。

The US and the Iraqi government are eager to play down the extent of the invasion.美國和伊拉克政府都渴望保持低調程度的入侵。 Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, a US spokesman for Iraq, said: “We understand [it] is an operation of limited duration to specifically target PKK terrorists in that region.” The Iraqi Foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, claimed that only a few hundred Turkish troops were in Iraq.海軍少將格雷戈里史密斯，一位美國發言人伊拉克，說： "據我們所知， [它]是一個經營期限，以專門針對庫爾德工人黨恐怖分子在該地區" ，伊拉克外長霍希亞爾茲巴里聲稱只有幾百土耳其語部隊在伊拉克。

But since last year Turkey has succeeded, by making limited incursions into Kurdistan, in establishing a de facto right to intervene militarily in Kurdistan whenever it feels like it.但自去年以來，土耳其已成功，使有限的侵入庫爾德斯坦，在建立一個事實上的權利，以軍事介入庫爾德斯坦每當它感到喜歡它。

Many Iraqi Kurdish leaders are convinced that a hidden aim of the Turkish attack is to undermine the Kurdish region, which enjoys autonomous rights close to statehood.許多伊拉克庫爾德領導人確信，一個隱藏的目的，土耳其攻擊，以破壞庫爾德地區，享有自主的權利，接近建國。 Ankara has always seen the semi-independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Kurds’ claim to the oil city of Kirkuk, as providing a dangerous example for Kurds in Turkey who are also demanding autonomy.安卡拉一直看到了，半獨立的伊拉克庫爾德地區，和庫爾德人的索賠，以石油城市基爾庫克，提供了一個危險的例子，為庫爾德人在土耳其的人，也強烈要求實現自治。

Many Turkish companies carrying out construction contracts in the region have already left.許多土耳其公司進行建造工程合約，在該地區已經離開。 And businesses that remain are frightened that Ankara will close Iraqi Kurdistan’s lifeline over the Harbour Bridge into Turkey.和企業仍然是害怕說，安卡拉將關閉伊拉克庫爾德地區的生命線超過海港大橋到土耳其。

During the 1990s the Turkish army carried out repeated attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan with the tacit permission of Saddam Hussein, but this is the first significant offensive since the US invasion of 2003.在1990年代，土耳其軍隊進行了多次襲擊，在伊拉克庫爾德斯坦與默許薩達姆政權，但是，這是一次具有重要意義的攻勢，自美國入侵2003 。 “A land operation is a whole new level,” said the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, adding that the incursion was “not the greatest news”. "土地經營是一個全新的水平， "說，美國副助理國務卿馬修bryza補充說，這次入侵是"不是最大的新聞" 。

The Turkish army is unlikely to do much damage to the PKK, which has some 2,500 fighters hidden in a mountainous area that has few roads, with snow drifts making tracks impassable.土耳其軍隊是不可能做很多破壞庫爾德工人黨，其中有2500名戰鬥人員隱藏在山區有少數道路，積雪漂移，使鐵軌不可逾越的。

The Turkish ground offensive was preceded by bombing.土耳其地面進攻之前，轟炸。 “We were certain yesterday after this bombing that a military operation would take place and we got ready for it,” said Mr Danees, adding that bombing and artillery had destroyed three bridges on the Iraq-Turkish border as well as a PKK cemetery. "我們一定昨天經過這次轟炸行動的一項軍事行動，將採取地方，我們準備為它說： " danees補充說，轟炸和大砲摧毀了三座橋樑對伊拉克-土耳其邊界以及作為庫爾德工人黨的墳場。

Another reason why Turkey has launched its offensive now has as much to do with Turkish internal politics as it does with any threat posed by the PKK.另一個原因是土耳其發起了進攻，現在已為很多事要做，與土耳其國內政治的，因為它與任何威脅所構成的庫爾德工人黨。 The PKK launched a military struggle on behalf of the Kurdish minority in eastern Turkey in 1984 which lasted until the PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan was seized in Kenya in 1999 and later put on trial in Turkey.庫爾德工人黨發動了軍事鬥爭中，代表庫爾德人在土耳其東部，在1984年，一直持續到庫爾德工人黨領導人阿卜杜拉奧賈蘭被檢獲肯尼亞在1999年和以後經審訊，在土耳其。 The PKK has been losing support ever since among the Turkish Kurds, but at the end of last year it escalated guerrilla attacks, killing some 40 Turkish soldiers.庫爾德工人黨一直在流失，支持自其中土耳其庫爾德人，但在去年年底最後升級游擊隊襲擊，打死大約40名土耳其士兵。

Limited though the PKK’s military activity has been, the Turkish army has used it to bolster its waning political strength.雖然有限的庫爾德工人黨的軍事活動，一直是，土耳其軍方已用它來強化其式微的政治力量。 For its part, the mildly Islamic government of Mr Erdogan is frightened of being outflanked by jingoistic nationalists supporting the military.就其本身而言，溫和的伊斯蘭政府的埃爾多安先生是害怕被outflanked由jingoistic民族主義者支持軍方。 Mr Erdogan has pointed out that previous Turkish army incursions into Kurdistan in the 1990s all failed to dislodge the PKK.埃爾多安先生曾指出，以往的土耳其軍隊侵入庫爾德斯坦在20世紀90年代都未能取出庫爾德工人黨。

The area which the Turkish army has entered in Iraqi Kurdistan is mostly desolate, with broken terrain in which bands of guerrillas can take refuge.該地區土耳其軍隊已經進入伊拉克庫爾德斯坦大多是荒涼，破碎的地形中階的游擊隊可以採取避難。 The PKK says it has left its former bases and broken up into small units.庫爾德工人黨稱，它已經離開其原基地和破碎成小單位。 The main bases of the PKK are along Iraq’s border with Iran, notably in the Kandil mountains, to the south of where the Turkish troops entered.主要基地的庫爾德工人黨是沿著伊拉克的伊朗邊境的問題，特別是在坎迪爾山脈，南何處土耳其軍隊進入。 At this time of year the villagers, many of them herders and shepherds, leave their houses and live in the towns in the plain below the mountains until the snow melts.在每年的這個時候，村民，他們中的許多牧民和牧羊人，離開自己的房子和生活在城鎮，平原低於山區，直到冰雪融化。

The New Statesman新政治家

In July 2003, in the week following the death of David Kelly, a reader contacted the New Statesman and suggested that the media were missing the obvious. 2003年7月，在一周內死亡後，大衛凱利，一位讀者接觸新政治家 ，並建議媒體人失踪，是顯而易見的事實。 The Commons foreign affairs committee had just cleared the government of “sexing up” the September 2002 dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction - a claim, first made by Andrew Gilligan on the BBC’s Today programme, for which Dr Kelly may or may not have been the source.下議院外交事務委員會剛剛清理政府的"三千寵愛"於二零零二年九月和諧社會對伊拉克大規模殺傷性武器-索賠時，首先發了言，鄭家富g illigan對英國廣播公司的節目， 今天，其中博士，凱利可能或不可能已源頭。

Our caller pointed out that although the Commons committee had said it was satisfied the “first” draft dossier, produced on 10 September for a meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), was the unspun work of intelligence, it had missed the true significance of a meeting the day before, chaired by Alastair Campbell.我們來電指出，雖然下議院委員會曾表示，這是滿意的是"首家"草案卷宗，產生於9月10日在某次會議上的聯合情報委員會（專營） ，是這unspun的工作，情報，它已失去了真正的意義一個會議的前一天，主持了由坎貝爾。

Our caller was Chris Ames, whose name will for ever be etched on the memory of all those in government, particularly in the Foreign Office, who have resisted making public what has become known as the Williams draft (after John Williams, the Foreign Office press officer who wrote it).我們來電者是克里斯艾姆斯，他的名字將永遠被鐫刻在紀念所有那些在政府，特別是在外事辦公室，他們的抵制使公眾已經成為眾所周知的，因為威廉姆斯草案（後約翰威廉斯，外交部新聞幹事的人寫的） 。 Using the Freedom of Information Act, Ames has doggedly pursued the evidence that he believed would show that the September dossier was the work not of intelligence experts, but of spin doctors whose intention was to “sex up” the known intelligence.利用資訊自由法，埃姆斯曾鍥而不捨地追求的證據，他相信將表明9月份卷宗是不是工作的情報專家，但自旋醫生，其原意是為了"性"已知的情報。

From denying that the document existed, to seeking to have it withheld because publication threatened government confidentiality, to claiming that the Williams draft was an uncommissioned activity by a bored press officer (who just happened to come up with conclusions similar to those of the JIC), the government has ducked and dived and done its utmost to obstruct Ames in his pursuit of the truth.從不可否認的是，該文件存在，以謀求把它隱瞞，因為出版威脅政府保密性，並聲稱這將草案是一個uncommissioned活動，由一鑽孔新聞官（人偏偏來了，與結論相類似，這些利益集團為JIC ） ，政府迴避和俯衝和已盡了最大努力來阻撓埃姆斯在他的真理的追求。

Now, almost five years after he first contacted us, Ames’s efforts have borne fruit.現在，將近5年後，他第一次與我們接觸，艾姆斯的努力已見成效。 On 18 February, just two days before the deadline set by the Information Tribunal, the Foreign Office released the Williams draft. 2月18日，僅兩天規定的截止日期之前，由資訊債審裁處，外事辦公室公佈威廉姆斯草案。

Interpretations of its contents will differ, but on many counts the document speaks for itself.表述的內容，將會不同，但對許多罪狀文件不言自明的。 From it we learn that the draft was, without question, intended as part of a process of producing a dossier that would persuade the British people and parliament of the case for war.從我們了解，該草案是，毫無疑問，作為整個進程的一部分的生產檔案，這將說服英國民眾和議會的情況，為戰爭。 And, importantly, it shows us how much of the final dossier was the work of a spin doctor. ，重要的是，它向我們表明，有多少是最後的檔案是工作的一個附帶的醫生。 Let’s not forget that the Blair government lied repeatedly about this.讓我們不要忘記，布萊爾政府一再說謊，這方面的問題。 The draft also reveals the extent to which Williams reworded and rewrote - and occasionally invented - intelligence assessments that were later presented to the public as the work of intelligence experts and “judgements of the JIC”.草案還顯示，在何種程度上威廉斯改寫，並重寫-偶爾發明-情報評估說，後來被提交給市民的工作，情報專家和"判決對專營"。

We have also learned how raw intelligence was pumped up to make a strongly worded “executive summary”.我們也學會了如何原料情報許久作出措辭強硬的"內容提要" 。 Thus, a draft report from the JIC which claimed that Iraq had “sought to develop” mobile facilities to produce a biological agent becomes, in Williams’s draft, “has developed transportable laboratories”.因此，報告書草稿，由專營聲稱，伊拉克已"尋求發展"流動設施，以生產生物製劑成了，在威廉斯的草稿" ，開發了移動式實驗室" 。 The strengthened Williams version fed into the 10 September dossier (still being claimed as the unspun work of intelligence) and the final document.加強了威廉姆斯版反饋到9月10日的檔案（仍被稱作為unspun的工作，情報） ，並在最後文件。 Williams does not attempt to disguise the fact that his task is to produce a document which will persuade.威廉斯並不試圖掩蓋這一事實，他的任務是要制定一個文件，這份文件會說服。 Judge for yourself whether the following is driven by spin or intelligence:法官對於自己是否以下是驅動旋轉或情報：

The bombs that fell on Halabja that Friday morning were equipped with (what chemical?).炸彈落在哈萊卜傑週五上午配備（什麼化學？ ） 。 (what does the chemical do to the body - how does it kill? Sorry to be grisly, but this will have real impact on real people, not journalists who take it as read). （什麼是化學做身體-它是怎樣殺人嗎？對不起被可怕的，但這樣做將有實質的影響，真正的人，而不是記者們，是否可以作為閱讀） 。

As our political editor, Martin Bright, argues on page 10, the release of the Williams draft leaves no room for doubt that the Blair government set out to deceive us.因為我們的政治主編馬丁光明的，辯稱在第10頁，釋放威廉姆斯草案葉毫不懷疑，布萊爾政府列出來欺騙我們。 Cynics may shrug.冷眼旁觀者可能就此屈服。 Governments lie.政府的謊言。 But the consequences of this deception have been catastrophic and tragic.但後果這一欺騙手段已災難性和悲劇性的。 The roll-call of victims runs into tens of thousands and includes that early casualty in July 2003, the government scientist whose suicide started an angry debate over whether the case for war had been “sexed up”.唱名表決的受害者遭遇數以萬計，其中包括去年初，傷亡在2003年7月，政府科學家的自殺開始，憤怒的爭論事件是否為戰爭已被"添油加醋" 。

Thanks to Chris Ames, we at last have an unequivocal answer.感謝克里斯艾姆斯，我們終於有一個明確的答案。 And it shames all those involved in the process.它shames所有參與這一進程。

The saints stop marching in聖徒停止遊行

You can’t get to heaven,” went the old song, “in a limousine,/ ‘Cause the Lord don’t sell no gasoline.” Perhaps not, but under the last pope some felt that transport to the upper echelons of heaven was a little too swift.你無法到天堂" ，卻老調重彈"在一輛豪華轎車， / '事業主不賣，沒有汽油" ，也許不能，但根據過去教宗有些人認為，運輸到上層的天堂是一個有點過於迅速的。 So many saints were created by John Paul II that it did seem as though he was running some form of celestial limo service, or “saint factory”, as others put it: 482 people were canonised and 1,338 beatified (the first stage to sainthood) by the pontiff - more than all his predecessors put together since the current procedures were laid down in 1588.這麼多的聖人創造的教宗若望保祿二世說，它看起來的確，彷彿他是運行某種形式的天體，豪華轎車服務，或所謂"聖人工廠"的，正如其他人所說的： 482人canonised和1338宣福（第一階段以聖人）由教宗-超過了所有前任放在一起，因為目前的程序，訂定在1 588年。

So news that Benedict XVI is to tighten the rules is to be welcomed by those who take such matters seriously.所以消息說，教宗本篤十六世是嚴謹的規定是值得歡迎的，由那些採取這些問題嚴重。 It may also be a relief, however, that the new rigour is not to be applied retrospectively.也可能是一種救濟，但是，這種新的嚴謹作風，是不追溯適用。 It is just possible that not all the “miracles” performed by or attributed to some saints would withstand modern scientific scrutiny.這只是可能的是，並非所有的"奇蹟"的演出或歸功於某些聖人將經受現代科學審議。

What, say, are we to make of the Belgian shrine to the 11th-century St Godeliva?是什麼，也就是說，是我們作出的比利時靖國神社，到11世紀的聖godeliva ？ Drinking from her well is said to have a powerful, yet curiously specific, effect on sore throats.飲酒從她的好，這是說，有一個強大的，可是很奇怪具體，對喉嚨發炎。 Or the 15th-century St Francis of Paola?或十五世紀的聖方濟各的paola ？ Fame of his miracles spread in his own lifetime, yet they were occasionally of a rather prosaic nature.名利的他的神蹟蔓延，在他自己的一生，但他們偶爾的一個比較平淡的性質。 One involved setting a pot of broad beans boiling: handy if you’d run out of kindling, no doubt, but surely a power more appropriate to a domestic goddess than a holy man.其中包括制定了一盆蠶豆沸騰：得心應手，如果你一發不可收拾點燃，毫無疑問的，但肯定是電力更為恰當國內女神比一個神聖的人。 What next - St Nigella?下一步怎麼辦-聖n igella？ Not under the new rules, thank goodness.不能根據新規則，感謝上天。

Up to 20 Iraqi civilians may have been executed by British troops in southern Iraq, it has been claimed.多達20名伊拉克平民可能已被處決，美英軍隊在伊拉克南部，它一直聲稱。

Lawyers published a dossier of evidence from men taken captive after a gun battle near the southern Iraqi town of Majat-al-Kabir in May 2004, which also suggested prisoners were tortured and mutilated by UK military.律師出版了一本卷宗的證據，由男子被捕後，發生槍戰附近的伊拉克南部城市majat -鋁-卡比爾在2004年5月，其中還有人建議，囚犯在監獄中被折磨和殘害，由英國軍隊。

The allegations were first reported within weeks of the incident, known as the Battle of Danny Boy after a checkpoint where it took place, but lawyers for five Iraqis have issued detailed witness statements, photographs of corpses and death certificates of the men who died.有關指控是首次報導在數週內對這一事件，被稱為戰場的丹尼男孩經過一個檢查站，當它發生，但律師五名伊拉克人已經發布了詳細的證人陳述，照片的屍體和死亡證書的男子證實死亡。

The claims - which the Ministry of Defence (MoD) strongly denies - are among the most serious yet levelled against British soldiers who served in Iraq.索賠-財政部國防部（ M OD）強烈否認-是其中最嚴重的，但對英國士兵在伊拉克服役。

Solicitor Phil Shiner said of the dossier: “We would be very surprised if it did not shock the nation.”律師菲爾shiner說，在卷宗說： "我們會很驚訝，如果它沒有震撼民族" 。

However, a spokesman for the BBC’s Panorama programme, which has spent a year examining the claims, said the evidence did not prove Iraqis had died at the hands of British captors, but that prisoners may have been “mistreated”.不過，發言人BBC的全景方案，其中已經花了一年時間研究債權說，沒有證據證明伊拉克已經死在手中的英國人質，但就是囚犯可能已被"虐待" 。

Lawyers Mr Shiner and Martyn Day suggested that prisoners captured after the three-hour gun battle may have been taken to a British base at Abu Naji and killed.律師先生shiner和馬丁一天建議犯人抓獲後， 3個小時的槍戰，可能已被帶到英國基地的阿布納吉和殺害。

Detailed witness statements from the five men - Hussein Jabbari Ali, Hussain Fadhil Abass, Atiyah Sayid Abdelreza, Madhi Jassim Abdullah and Ahmad Jabber Ahmood - described what they heard while in detention, when they were cuffed and forced to wear blacked-out goggles.詳細的證人陳述書，由五男-侯賽因賈巴里阿里，侯賽因f adhil阿巴斯， a tiyahs ayida bdelreza，馬齊賈西姆阿卜杜拉和艾哈邁德的J abbera hmood-描述的是什麼，他們曾聽到在被拘留期間，當他們撤離，並被迫戴上塗黑出護目鏡。

The statements described how they heard other men screaming, moaning in pain and choking and also the sound of gunfire.聲明形容，他們曾聽到其他男子淒厲的慘叫，喉嚨堵在痛苦和哽塞，又響槍聲。

The lawyers are bringing a damages claim in the UK courts, and say the five witnesses are labourers who have lived all their lives in Majar and had “absolutely nothing” to do with the insurgent Mehdi army, which engaged British troops at the Battle of Danny Boy.該律師是帶來了損害賠償的要求，在英國法庭，並說，五名證人都是勞動者，他們沒有辜負所有生活在majar了， "絕對沒有" ，難道與反叛民兵，其中從事英國軍隊在戰鬥中的丹尼男童。

The Irish Times愛爾蘭時報

Four million Iraqis are struggling to feed themselves, and 40 per cent of the country’s 27 million people have no safe water, the UN said today. 4000000伊拉克人正在掙扎能夠養活自己，而百分之四十的國家的2700多萬人沒有安全的飲用水，聯合國今天說。

Iraq has annual economic growth of around 7 per cent, according to UN estimates, and a national budget of €33 billion, buoyed by oil exports of 1.6 million barrels per day.伊拉克有經濟年均增長7 ％左右，據聯合國的估計，和一個國家的預算€ 33億元，提振出口石油160萬桶。

But insurgency and sectarian attacks have displaced more than two million people and left nearly twice as many hungry.但叛亂和教派攻擊流離失所， 200多萬人，並留下了近兩倍，許多處於飢餓狀態。

“Four million Iraqis cannot guarantee they’re going to have food on their table tomorrow,” the United Nations humanitarian co-ordinator for Iraq, David Shearer, said as he unveiled a €182 million appeal to donor governments for 2008. " 400萬伊拉克人並不能保證他們不會有食物，他們的表明天， "聯合國人道主義統籌伊拉克，大衛希勒說，因為他推出了€ 1.82億呼籲捐助國政府在2008年投產。

The United Nations says the number of displaced people has roughly doubled since 2006 to nearly 2.5 million.聯合國說，有多少流離失所的人已幾乎翻了一倍，自2006年以將近250萬美元。 High unemployment has left many others unable to feed themselves.失業率高企，留下了許多別人無法養活自己。

The Iraqi government said it would for the first time give €27.5 million from its own coffers to the aid appeal.伊拉克政府表示，它將為第一次給予€ 27500000從自己的庫房，以援助呼籲。

Matthew Weaver and agencies |馬修Weaver和機構| guardian.co.uk guardian.co.uk

The planned reduction in the number of US troops in Iraq is to be put on hold, the US defence secretary, Robert Gates, indicated today.計劃減少駐伊美軍數量在伊拉克被暫時擱置，美國國防部長羅伯特蓋茨表示，今天的。

Under a plan set out by General David Petraeus, the top US commander in Iraq, Washington had planned to withdraw five of the 20 brigades in the country by July.根據一項計劃中列出了由一般大衛彼得雷烏斯說，最高指揮官，美國在伊拉克，華盛頓曾打算撤回五年的20旅，在該國7月底。

More recently, however, Petraeus called for “period of evaluation” to assess the impact of such a move – a proposal that has now been backed by Gates.然而，最近以來，彼得雷烏斯呼籲， "在一段評價"的影響進行了評估，如此舉動-提出建議，現在已經後盾蓋茨。

“A brief period of consolidation and evaluation probably does make sense,” the defence secretary said, adding that the length of the evaluation was “one of the things we are still thinking about”. "簡短的一段時間的鞏固和評價大概確實會使意義上說， "拉姆斯菲爾德說，他補充說，這麼長的評價是"的事情之一，我們仍然在思考" 。

His caution contrasted with remarks he made to troops in Baghdad yesterday.他告誡對比與他的言論作出了部隊在巴格達昨天。

“What a difference you made – al-Qaida routed, insurgents co-opted, levels of violence of all kinds dramatically reduced,” he told them. "有什麼不同，你做-基地組織單線，反叛分子增選，各級的各種暴力行為大幅度減少了， "他告訴他們。

“The situation in Iraq continues to remain fragile, but the Iraqi people now have an opportunity to forge a better, more secure, more prosperous future.” "伊拉克局勢繼續仍然是脆弱的，但伊拉克人民現在有機會建立一個更美好，更安全，更繁榮的未來" 。

Last year, the US president, George Bush, ordered five additional army brigades to Iraq as part of a “surge” in troop numbers.去年，美國總統喬治布什下令增設五個陸軍旅，以伊拉克作為一個組成部分， "風"在部隊人數。

One of those brigades left in December.其中一人左旅在12月。 The other four are due to withdraw by July, leaving 15 brigades – around 130,000 troops — the same number as pre surge levels.其他四個都是由於撤回7月底，留下15個旅-大約有1 3萬軍隊-數字相同預潮水平。

Yesterday, Gates said Iraq’s political leaders faced hard choices about how to stabilise the country, but praised them for showing recent signs of progress towards reconciliation.昨天，蓋茨說，伊拉克的政治領袖面臨著艱難的選擇，如何以穩定國家，但也稱讚他們為顯示最近取得進展的跡象走向和解。

“They seem to have become energised over the last few weeks,” he added. "他們似乎已成為注入動力在過去數星期， "他補充說。

He said he would ask Iraqi politicians to assess the prospects for other measures including a law that would spell out power-sharing between the provinces and the national government.他說，他將要求伊拉克政界人士，以評估前景等措施，其中包括一項法律，這將列明之間分享權力的省份及全國政府。

Yesterday, insurgent attacks killed at least 50 people across northern Iraq.昨天，叛亂分子的襲擊，造成至少50人，整個伊拉克北部。

Today, Reuters reported that two car bombs had exploded in southern Baghdad, killing at least two people and wounding five others.今天，路透社報導說，兩起汽車炸彈爆炸，在巴格達南部，造成至少2人死亡， 5人受傷。

MATT TAIBBI | 馬特塔伊比| Rolling Stone 滾石

Elected to end the war, Democrats have surrendered to Bush on Iraq and betrayed the peace movement for their own political ends 當選為結束戰爭，民主黨人有自首布什對伊拉克的背叛和平運動，為自己的政治目的

Quietly Quietly, while Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have been inspiring Democrats everywhere with their rolling bitchfest, congressional superduo Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi have completed one of the most awesome political collapses since Neville Chamberlain. 靜靜悄悄地，而希拉里克林頓和巴拉克奧巴馬都令人振奮，到處同盟與他們的滾動bitchfest ，國會superduo里德和佩洛西已經完成了其中一個最令人敬畏的政治倒塌以來，內維爾張伯倫。 At long last, the Democratic leaders of Congress have publicly surrendered on the Iraq War, just one year after being swept into power with a firm mandate to end it.在長期上，民主黨領導的國會已經公開宣布投降，伊拉克戰爭剛剛一年後，被掃進電源，用堅定的任務是結束這種現象。

Solidifying his reputation as one of the biggest pussies in US political history, Reid explained his decision to refocus his party’s energies on topics other than ending the war by saying he just couldn’t fit Iraq into his busy schedule.鞏固自己的聲譽，作為一個最大的pussies在美國政治史上，里德解釋說，他決定重新把他的黨的主要精力放在課題以外的結束戰爭，說他當時還是無法適應伊拉克變成了他在百忙中。 “We have the presidential election,” Reid said recently. "我們有總統大選， "瑞德說，最近。 “Our time is really squeezed.” "我們的時間實在是擠" 。

There was much public shedding of tears among the Democratic leadership, as Reid, Pelosi and other congressional heavyweights expressed deep sadness that their valiant charge up the hill of change had been thwarted by circumstances beyond their control — that, as much as they would love to continue trying to end the catastrophic Iraq deal, they would now have to wait until, oh, 2009 to try again.有不少市民脫落的眼淚當中，民主黨領導作用，因為里德，佩洛西和其他國會重量級人物表示深切悲痛，他們的英勇收取了山的變化已經挫敗了他們無法控制的情況-即，儘管他們會喜歡繼續努力，以結束伊拉克的災難性處理，他們現在必須等到，哦， 2009年，以再次嘗試。 “We’ll have a new president,” said Pelosi. "我們將有一個新總統上任後，說： "佩洛西。 “And I do think at that time we’ll take a fresh look at it.” "而且我不認為在那個時候我們會重新考慮它" 。

Pelosi seemed especially broken up about having to surrender on Iraq, sounding like an NFL coach in a postgame presser, trying with a straight face to explain why he punted on first-and-goal.佩洛西似乎是打破了約不得不交出對伊拉克，聽起來就像上週教練在postgame壓，試圖以板著一張臉，以解釋他為什麼punted對第一代和目標。 “We just didn’t have any plays we liked down there,” said the coach of the 0-15 Dems. "我們只是一直沒有扮演我們喜歡的存在，他們說： "教練的0-15機電工程署署長。 “Sometimes you just have to play the field-position game….” "有時候你一定要發揮實地位置的遊戲… … " 。

In reality, though, Pelosi and the Democrats were actually engaged in some serious point-shaving.在現實中，雖然，佩洛西和民主黨其實是從事著一些嚴重點剃。 Working behind the scenes, the Democrats have systematically taken over the anti-war movement, packing the nation’s leading group with party consultants more interested in attacking the GOP than ending the war.工作在幕後，民主黨人有系統地接管了反戰運動，打包全國的工作領導小組，黨顧問公司更熱衷於攻擊共和黨比從而結束了第二次世界大戰。 “Our focus is on the Republicans,” one Democratic apparatchik in charge of the anti-war coalition declared. "我們的重點是對共和黨的， "一個民主apparatchik負責反戰聯盟宣布。 “How can we juice up attacks on them?” "我們怎樣才能汁了攻擊他" ？

The story of how the Democrats finally betrayed the voters who handed them both houses of Congress a year ago is a depressing preview of what’s to come if they win the White House.這個故事是如何民主黨人終於背叛了選民的人交給美國國會參眾兩院在一年前是一個令人沮喪的預覽什麼的來，如果他們贏得白宮。 And if we don’t pay attention to this sorry tale now, while there’s still time to change our minds about whom to nominate, we might be stuck with this same bunch of spineless creeps for four more years.如果我們不加以注意，這對不起，現在的故事，而有的還有時間可以改變主意誰提名，我們可能會忍受這同一群spineless討厭的傢伙，為4年。 With no one but ourselves to blame.沒人，但我們自己的責任。

The The controversy over the Democratic “strategy” to end the war basically comes down to whom you believe. 有關的爭議，民主黨的"策略" ，以結束戰爭，基本上可以歸結為其中你相信。 According to the Reid-Pelosi version of history, the Democrats tried hard to force President Bush’s hand by repeatedly attempting to tie funding for the war to a scheduled withdrawal.據該里德-佩洛西版的歷史中，民主派人士極力迫使布什總統的手，一再企圖以配合資金，用於戰爭，一定撤回。 Last spring they tried to get him to eat a timeline and failed to get the votes to override a presidential veto.去年春天，他們試圖讓他吃一張時間表，並沒有得到他們的選票來推翻總統的否決。 Then they retreated and gave Bush his money, with the aim of trying again after the summer to convince a sufficient number of Republicans to cross the aisle in support of a timeline.然後他們退守，並送給布什他的錢，其目的是試圖再次夏天過後，以說服足夠數量的共和黨人穿過走道支持的時間表。

But in September, Gen. David Petraeus reported that Bush’s “surge” in Iraq was working, giving Republicans who might otherwise have flipped sufficient cover to continue supporting the war.但在9月，將軍大衛彼得雷烏斯報導說，布什的"衝勁" ，在伊拉克工作，使共和黨有可能已經翻了足夠的掩護，繼續支持戰爭。 The Democrats had no choice, the legend goes, but to wait until 2009, in the hopes that things would be different under a Democratic president.民主黨人已別無選擇，傳說有雲，但要等到2009年，在希望事情會有所不同，根據民主黨總統。

Democrats insist that the reason they can’t cut off the money for the war, despite their majority in both houses, is purely political.民主派人士堅持認為，他們之所以不能切斷資金用於戰爭，儘管它們多數在這兩個房子，純粹是政治性的。 “George Bush would be on TV every five minutes saying that the Democrats betrayed the troops,” says Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont. "喬治布什將在電視上每五分鐘一班，稱該同盟背叛了部隊，說： "參議員伯尼桑德斯佛蒙特州。 Then he glumly adds another reason.然後他glumly增加的另一個原因。 “Also, it just wasn’t going to happen.” "同時，並沒有問題，只是要發生什麼" 。

Why it “just wasn’t going to happen” is the controversy. 為什麼 "沒有問題，只是要發生什麼" ，是爭議。 In and around the halls of Congress, the notion that the Democrats made a sincere effort to end the war meets with, at best, derisive laughter.在靠近大廳的國會，概念，即民主派作出了真誠的努力，以結束戰爭會見，在最好的，嘲弄的笑聲。 Though few congressional aides would think of saying so on the record, in private many dismiss their party’s lame anti-war effort as an absurd dog-and-pony show, a calculated attempt to score political points without ever being serious about bringing the troops home.雖然少數國會幕僚會認為這樣說是對的紀錄，在許多私人解僱黨的跛腳反戰努力，作為一個荒謬的狗和小馬顯示，計算，企圖以政治分數從來沒有被認真地把部隊回家。

“Yeah, the amount of expletives that flew in our office alone was unbelievable,” says an aide to one staunchly anti-war House member. "是啊，這個數額expletives飛往在我們的辦公室僅是難以置信，說： "一個幕僚之一，堅決反對戰爭的眾議院議員。 “It was all about the public show. "這是所有對公眾查看。 Reid and Pelosi would say they were taking this tough stand against Bush, but if you actually looked at what they were sending to a vote, it was like Swiss cheese.里德和佩洛西會說，他們採取這一強硬立場，對布什，但如果你其實看什麼，他們派進行了表決，它像瑞士奶酪。 Full of holes.”充滿漏洞" 。

In the House, some seventy Democrats joined the Out of Iraq caucus and repeatedly butted heads with Reid and Pelosi, arguing passionately for tougher measures to end the war.在眾議院中，一些七十民主黨人加入進出伊拉克的核心小組，並多次對接元首與里德和佩洛西，慷慨激昂地爭論，為更嚴厲的措施，以結束這場戰爭。 The fight left some caucus members bitter about the party’s failure.撲滅留下一些黨團成員憂傷黨的失敗。 Rep. Barbara Lee of California was one of the first to submit an amendment to cut off funding unless it was tied to an immediate withdrawal.眾議員芭芭拉李的加利福尼亞州是第一個提出一項修正案，以切斷資金，除非它是綁立即撤出。 “I couldn’t even get it through the Rules Committee in the spring,” Lee says. "我不能，甚至通過規則委員會今年春天， "李說。

Rep. Lynn Woolsey, a fellow caucus member, says Democrats should have refused from the beginning to approve any funding that wasn’t tied to a withdrawal.眾議員林恩伍爾西，研究員黨團成員表示，民主黨人應該拒絕從一開始就批准任何資金，這不是綁撤離。 “If we’d been bold the minute we got control of the House — and that’s why we got the majority, because the people of this country wanted us out of Iraq — if we’d been bold, even if we lost the votes, we would have gained our voice.” "如果我們自己被大膽分鐘，我們得到控制眾議院-這也是為什麼我們會得到大多數人，因為這個國家的人民希望我們走出伊拉克-如果我們自己被大膽的，即使我們失去了票，我們會得到我們的聲音" 。

An honest attempt to end the war, say Democrats like Woolsey and Lee, would have involved forcing Bush to execute his veto and allowing the Republicans to filibuster all they wanted.一個誠實的嘗試，以結束戰爭，民主黨人說，像伍爾西和利，將有涉及迫使布什向他的否決權，並允許共和黨人拉布所有他們想要的。 Force a showdown, in other words, and use any means necessary to get the bloodshed ended.武力攤牌，換句話說，用任何必要的手段來獲得流血結束。

“Can you imagine Tom DeLay and Denny Hastert taking no for an answer the way Reid and Pelosi did on Iraq?” asks the House aide in the expletive-filled office. "你能想像湯姆迪萊和Denny哈斯特爾特不採取這個答案的方式里德和佩洛西當時對伊拉克" ，要求眾議院助手在expletive填充辦公室。 “They’d find a way to get the votes. "他們帆船方式獲得選票。 They’d get it done somehow.”他們鎖存這樣做有點" 。

But any suggestion that the Democrats had an obligation to fight this good fight infuriates the bund of hedging careerists in charge of the party.但任何暗示民主派有責任打好這一良好撲滅憤怒外灘套期保值careerists負責的黨。 In fact, nothing sums up the current Democratic leadership better than its vitriolic criticisms of those recalcitrant party members who insist on interpreting their 2006 mandate as a command to actually end the war.事實上，沒有什麼總結了目前民主黨的領導優於硫酸批評那些頑抗的黨員，他們堅持對詮釋其2006年的任務，作為一個指揮，真正結束這場戰爭。 Rep. David Obey, chair of the House Appropriations Committee and a key Pelosi-Reid ally, lambasted anti-war Democrats who “didn’t want to get specks on those white robes of theirs.” Obey even berated a soldier’s mother who begged him to cut off funds for the war, accusing her and her friends of “smoking something illegal.”眾議員大衛服從，主持會議的眾議院撥款委員會和一個關鍵佩洛西-里德的盟友，強烈抨擊反戰同盟的人"不想讓斑點那些白色長袍，他們的"絕對服從，甚至們對軍人的母親懇求其切斷資金用於戰爭，指責她和她的朋友們的"吸煙一些非法的" 。

Rather Rather than use the vast power they had to end the war, Democrats devoted their energy to making sure that “anti-war activism” became synonymous with “electing Democrats.” Capitalizing on America’s desire to end the war, they hijacked the anti-war movement itself, filling the ranks of peace groups with loyal party hacks. 而不是利用廣大的權力，他們為了結束戰爭，民主黨人奉獻能源，以確保"反戰爭行動主義"的代名詞，成為與"選舉民主派" ，利用美國的願望，以結束戰爭，他們劫持了反戰運動本身，灌裝的行列和平團體與忠誠的黨棍。 Anti-war organizations essentially became a political tool for the Democrats — one operated from inside the Beltway and devoted primarily to targeting Republicans.反戰組織基本上已成為一種政治工具，為民主黨人-一個班次，由內繞城和主要討論對象的共和黨人。

This supposedly grass-roots “anti-war coalition” met regularly on K Street, the very capital of top-down Beltway politics.這理應基層的"反戰聯盟" ，定期舉行會議，對K街時，很資本的自頂向下繞城政治。 At the forefront of the groups are Thomas Matzzie and Brad Woodhouse of Americans Against the Escalation in Iraq, the leader of the anti-war lobby.在全國前列的群體是托馬斯matzzie和布拉德伍德豪斯的美國人對不斷升級的伊拉克，這位領導人的反戰遊說。 Along with other K Street crusaders, the two have received iconic treatment from The Washington Post and The New York Times , both of which depicted the anti-war warriors as young idealist-progressives in shirtsleeves, riding a mirthful spirit into political combat — changing the world is fun!隨著其他K街十字軍，兩國已收到標誌性待遇，由華盛頓郵報和紐約時報等 ，都表現反戰勇士作為年輕的理想主義者-進步人士在shirtsleeves ，騎歡快的精神，使之成為政治作戰-改變世界是好玩！

But what exactly are these young idealists campaigning for?但究竟這些年輕的理想主義者競選？ At its most recent meeting, the group eerily echoed the Reid-Pelosi “squeezed for time” mantra: Retreat from any attempt to end the war and focus on electing Democrats.在其最近的會議上，專家組的炮火呼應里德-佩洛西"擠時間"的口頭禪：從務虛的任何企圖，以結束戰爭，並重點就選民主黨。 “There was a lot of agreement that we can draw distinctions between anti-war Democrats and pro-war Republicans,” a spokeswoman for Americans Against the Escalation in Iraq announced. "有很多的協議，我們可以區分反戰同盟，並贊成戰爭的共和黨人， "一位女發言人對於美國人對不斷升級的伊拉克宣布。

What the Post and the Times failed to note is that much of the anti-war group’s leadership hails from a consulting firm called Hildebrand Tewes — whose partners, Steve Hildebrand and Paul Tewes, served as staffers for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC).什麼職位和時代沒有要注意的是，大部分的反戰團體的領導，盛讚由一家諮詢公司所謂的門將希爾德布蘭德tewes -其合作夥伴，史蒂夫門將希爾德布蘭德和保羅t ewes，充當幕僚，為民主黨參議院競選委員會（紀律部隊評議會） 。 In addition, these anti-war leaders continue to consult for many of the same US senators whom they need to pressure in order to end the war.此外，這些反戰領導人繼續進行磋商，為許多同樣的，美國參議員的人，他們需要壓力，以結束這場戰爭。 This is the kind of conflict of interest that would normally be an embarrassment in the activist community.

Worst of all is the case of Woodhouse, who came to Hildebrand Tewes after years of working as the chief mouthpiece for the DSCC, where he campaigned actively to re-elect Democratic senators who supported the Iraq War in the first place. Anyone bothering to look — and clearly the Post and the Times did not before penning their ardent bios of Woodhouse — would have found the youthful idealist bragging to newspapers before the Iraq invasion about the pro-war credentials of North Carolina candidate Erskine Bowles. “No one has been stronger in this race in supporting President Bush in the War on Terror and his efforts to effect a regime change in Iraq,” boasted the future “anti-war” activist Woodhouse.

With guys like this in charge of the anti-war movement, much of what has passed for peace activism in the past year was little more than a thinly veiled scheme to use popular discontent over the war to unseat vulnerable Republicans up for re-election in 2008. With guys like this in charge of the anti-war movement, much of what has passed for peace activism in the past year was little more than a thinly veiled scheme to use popular discontent over the war to unseat vulnerable Republicans up for re-election in 2008. David Sirota, a former congressional staffer whose new book, The Uprising , excoriates the Democrats for their failure to end the war, expresses disgust at the strategy of targeting only Republicans. “The whole idea is based on this insane fiction that there is no such thing as a pro-war Democrat,” he says. “Their strategy allows Democrats to take credit for being against the war without doing anything to stop it. It’s crazy.”

Justin Raimondo, the uncompromising editorial director of Antiwar.com, regrets contributing twenty dollars to Americans Against the Escalation in Iraq. “Not only did they use it to target Republicans,” he says, “they went after the ones who were on the fence about Iraq.” The most notorious case involved Lincoln Chafee, a moderate from Rhode Island who lost his Senate seat in 2006. “Not only did they use it to target Republicans,” he says, “they went after the ones who were on the fence about Iraq.” The most notorious case involved Lincoln Chafee, a moderate from Rhode Island who lost his Senate seat in 2006 . Since then, Chafee has taken shots at Democrats like Reid, Hillary Clinton and Chuck Schumer, all of whom campaigned against him despite having voted for the war themselves.

“Look, I understand partisan politics,” says Chafee, who now concedes that voters were correct to punish him for his war vote. “I just find it amusing that those who helped get us into this mess now say we need to change the Senate — because we’re in a mess.”

The The really tragic thing about the Democratic surrender on Iraq is that it’s now all but guaranteed that the war will be off the table during the presidential campaign. Once again — it happened in 2002, 2004 and 2006 — the Democrats have essentially decided to rely on the voters to give them credit for being anti-war, despite the fact that, for all the noise they’ve made to the contrary, in the end they’ve done nothing but vote for war and cough up every dime they’ve been asked to give, every step of the way. Once again — it happened in 2002, 2004 and 2006 — the Democrats have essentially decided to rely on the voters to give them credit for being anti-war, despite the fact that, for all the noise they’ve made to the contrary, in the end they’ve done nothing but vote for war and cough up every dime they’ve been asked to give, every step of the way.

Even beyond the war, the Democrats have repeatedly gone limp-dick every time the Bush administration so much as raises its voice. Most recently, twelve Democrats crossed the aisle to grant immunity to phone companies who participated in Bush’s notorious wiretapping program. Before that, Democrats caved in and confirmed Mike Mukasey as attorney general after he kept his middle finger extended and refused to condemn waterboarding as torture. Democrats fattened by Wall Street also got cold feet about upsetting the country’s gazillionaires, refusing to close a tax loophole that rewarded hedge-fund managers with a tax rate less than half that paid by ordinary citizens.

But the war is where they showed their real mettle. Before the 2006 elections, Democrats told us we could expect more specifics on their war plans after Election Day. Nearly two years have passed since then, and now they are once again telling us to wait until after an election to see real action to stop the war. In the meantime, of course, we’re to remember that they’re the good guys, the Republicans are the real enemy, and, well, go Hillary! Semper fi ! Yay, team!

How much of this bullshit are we going to take? How long are we supposed to give the Reids and Pelosis and Hillarys of the world credit for wanting , deep down in their moldy hearts, to do the right thing?

Look, fuck your hearts, OK? Just get it done. Because if you don’t, sooner or later this con is going to run dry. It may not be in ‘08, but it’ll be soon. Even Americans can’t be fooled forever.

By Ahmed Ali

The violence around the continuing US military operations in this city has robbed children of their childhood.

Only two provincial schools and one private kindergarten school are functioning in this city of 280,000, located 50 km north of Baghdad. Only two provincial schools and one private kindergarten school are functioning in this city of 280000, located 50 km north of Baghdad. Most children know neither school nor play.

Or even the food they want. “We parents can hardly meet the basic requirements of food,” Mahdi Hassan, a father of four, told IPS.

“Nobody even mentions chocolate or pastries or anything else because Iraqis know they are not important,” Baquba resident Wissam Jafar told IPS. “Children eat what the other members of the family eat. Toys and games are offered only at festivals and on special occasions.”

Baquba city, capital of Diyala province, has been at the centre of major US military operations to fight al-Qaeda like forces. People have suffered from the violence from both sides.

By now Iraq has seen a generation of children pass with just survival a major issue. During the period of economic sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s, more than half a million children died, according to the United Nations.

In 1996, former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright was asked by Lesley Stahl on the CBS ླྀ Minutes’ show if she thought the price of half a million dead children was worth it. She replied, “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price — we think the price is worth it.”

One in eight children in Iraq died during that period of malnutrition, disease, and lack of medicine.

The US-led invasion of Iraq during March 2003 brought hope that things might change, but that change has only been for the worse.

“During the nineties, they were malnourished but they could find a place to play in the streets,” Khalid Ali, a local economist, told IPS. “Nowadays, they cannot even get out of their home because of the violence. And a large number of children have been killed through the violence.”

There is one park in Baquba with some basic swings for children; another was recently renovated by an Iraqi NGO. Both get overcrowded on festivals and holidays. Parents feel obliged to take their children out on these days, despite the risk.

On other days, no more than two or three families visit the parks.

Sajid Asim who earns 175 dollars a month from his job in the water department says the money is barely enough for food for the family. “Surely, there won’t be any extra money to bring the children special food or clothes, or games, or even taking them to picnics.” For those without work — and there are many — the situation is worse.

Schoolteachers and managers spoke to IPS of the problems facing children who do manage to go to school.

“Teaching has been hit by the political situation in Iraq,” said Salma Majid, manager of a local primary school. “Children can often not get to the school, and we may have more than three days off in a week. The whole academic year may be delayed because the violence has been so extreme this year.”

Schools can provide children a chance to play but sometimes it is not safe,” she said. “A number of school buildings have been hit by mortar.”

According to an Oxfam report on Iraq released Jul. 30, “92 percent of children had learning impediments that are largely attributable to the current climate of fear. Schools are regularly closed as teachers and pupils are too fearful to attend. Over 800,000 children may now be out of school, according to a recent estimate by Save the Children UK — up from 600,000 in 2004.” Over 800000 children may now be out of school, according to a recent estimate by Save the Children UK — up from 600000 in 2004.”

The Oxfam report also said that child malnutrition rates in Iraq have risen from 19 percent before the invasion in 2003, to 28 percent. “More than 11 percent of newborn babies were born underweight in 2006, compared with 4 percent in 2003.”

Scarcity has brought all sorts of difficulties for children. “I put a sandwich in the bag for my son to take to school,” said a mother who declined to give her name. “When he got back home, he said he could not have it because his classmates do not bring their own sandwiches; their parents do not give them sandwiches.”

A local primary school teacher, Ali Abbas, said it is common now for students to arrive at school without breakfast.

“One day, one of the children suddenly passed out,” Abbas said. “We immediately took her to the administration room. When she regained consciousness, I asked her why she fainted. She told me that she did not have breakfast because there was no breakfast at home.”

(*Ahmed, our correspondent in Iraq’s Diyala province, works in close collaboration with Dahr Jamail, our US-based specialist writer on Iraq who travels extensively in the region)

Xinhua

The US forces allegedly killed three people and wounded a fourth from one family in a town in Salahudin province, north of Baghdad, on Tuesday, a source from the US and Iraqi liaison office said.

The incident took place at dawn in the town of al-Dowr, 30 km north of the provincial capital of Tikrit, the source from the provincial Joint Coordination Center (JCC) told Xinhua on condition of anonymity.

He said that an interpreter working for the US troops informed the branch of the JCC in the town of the killing and asked them to collect two bodies in a house in one of the town’s neighborhoods.

An Iraqi police force headed to the scene and found three bodies–those of a man and his wife in their 40s as well as their18-year-old son. All of the three were killed with gunshots in the head, he said.

The police also found many spent cartridges of weapons used by US troops at the scene, he added.

Residents at the neighborhood told the police force that they heard gunshots at dawn and saw US military vehicles leaving the neighborhood later, the source said.

He also said that a 16-year-old daughter of the family made a call with a mobile phone for help as she was injured and taken by the US troops to a medical facility in a US base in the province.

The three bodies were transported to the main hospital of Tikrit, some 170 km north of Baghdad, he said.

The US military did not confirm the incident yet.

On Monday, the US military conceded in a statement that its troops had killed accidentally nine Iraqis and wounded three others, including two children, in a military operation against al-Qaida, near the town of Iskandariyah, about 50 km south of Baghdad.

AFP

When Saad Tawfiq watched Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations on February 5 2003 he shed bitter tears as he realised he had risked his life and those of his loved ones for nothing.

As one of Saddam Hussein’s most gifted engineers, Tawfiq knew that the Iraqi dictator had shut down his nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes in 1995 — and he had told his handlers in US intelligence just that.

And yet here was the then US secretary of state — Tawfiq’s television was able to received international news through a link pirated from Saddam’s spies next door — waving a vial of white powder and telling the UN Security Council a story about Iraqi germ labs. And yet here was the then US secretary of state — Tawfiq’s television was able to received international news through a link pirated from Saddam’s spies next door — waving a vial of white powder and telling the UN Security Council a story about Iraqi germ labs.

“When I saw Colin Powell I started crying. Immediately. I knew I had tried and lost,” Tawfiq told AFP five years later in the Jordanian capital Amman.

Now in his fifties, a round-faced man with a small moustache and lively eyes behind delicate spectacles, Tawfiq described how the CIA set up an elaborate operation to recruit Iraqi weapons scientists and then ignored the results.

From the end of 2002 the US spy agency had sources inside Iraq’s weapons plants telling them clearly what the whole world now knows — that Saddam had ended efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Nevertheless in March 2003 the United States and Britain invaded Iraq to disarm Saddam of this non-existent arsenal and in the process triggered the effective collapse of the Iraqi state, plunging it into chaos and bringing thousands of deaths.

Saad Tawfiq’s role in this drama began in June 2002 with calls from his sister Sawsan, a doctor who lives with her husband Ali in Moreland Hills, a pleasant suburb of Cleveland, Ohio, in the mid-western United States.

“Our Abu Mahmuds are putting pressure on me,” she told him, using the nickname they shared for Saad’s secret police minder as a makeshift code for the US intelligent agent who had contacted her, “Chris.”

“Chris was very nice, very polite,” Sawsan, a small energetic woman, told AFP. Chris wanted Sawsan’s help to discover the status of Saddam’s weapons programme, and in particular his efforts to build a nuclear bomb.

She joined one of the most successful attempts by the CIA to penetrate Saddam’s Iraq, a programme dreamt up by agency veteran Charlie Allen to target Iraqi weapons technicians through their relatives.

The scientists were well known to the UN weapons inspectors who had been keeping tabs on Iraq’s arms plants since 1991, and the Americans were able to draw up a list of 30 who had relatives in the United States.

The American relatives were to be sent to Iraq and ask about weapons.

“I was nervous, and we even discussed with Ali what to do if something happened to me,” Sawsan said. “It was a very emotional visit back home, because I had not been there for years and I had not seen my brother for years.”

Sawsan was right to be nervous. Saddam’s notorious secret police dealt with spies mercilessly. She was taking a risk with her life and that of her brother, but was determined to help rid her original homeland of a tyrant.

The CIA provided her with a detailed questionnaire about Iraq’s weapons programmes. Fearing she would forget it, Sawsan disguised it in sketches and crosswords in a kind of homemade code.

Tawfiq picked his sister up from Baghdad airport on September 9, 2002. Her homecoming was emotional, but the pair had work to do. They met secretly at night in the family garden and took walks together in the city.

The weapons engineer was astonished by the CIA’s questions, which he thought showed the depths of the agency’s ignorance about events in his country.

“I went crazy. The questions were dumb. She was telling me: ‘They know you have a programme,’ and I was saying: ‘There is nothing. Tell them there is nothing, absolutely nothing. They have left us with nothing’,” Tawfiq said.

“She was taking notes. There were 20 major questions, and to all of them the answer was: ‘No, no, no…’ I kept swearing on the grave of my mother.”

According to Tawfiq, Saddam Hussein gave the order to dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programmes in 1995, after his brother-in-law and arms chief Hussein Kamel defected and briefed the UN inspectors.

“I was Saddam’s scientist,” Tawfiq declared, with an ironic smile. “In 1991 if you exposed something you were killed. In 1995 if you hid something you were killed!”

Sawsan dutifully gathered this information and returned to the United States to pass it on to her handlers. But the CIA was unimpressed.

“Saad told me there was nothing left,” she told AFP. “That everything had been either destroyed or dismantled by the UN and the regime has abandoned its nuclear programme. And he begged me to explain all that back in the States.

“I went back and I reported what he had told me in full detail. I even went personally to Washington. In the beginning they listened to me but then they told me that my brother was lying,” she said.

Of course Tawfiq and other colleagues approached by the CIA were telling the truth, as the United States would discover after it had launched a bloody war that has cost tens of thousands of lives.

Paul R. Pillar, the CIA’s national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia at the time of the operation to question Tawfiq, said weapons scientists had not been ignored, but had been contradicted by other sources.

“To the extent that the debriefings did not have more of an effect in Washington, it probably was not because the effort came too late but instead because there were other indications that seemed to contradict what the individuals were saying, and that suggested Iraqi unconventional weapons programmes were continuing,” he told AFP. “To the extent that the debriefings did not have more of an effect in Washington, it probably was not because the effort came too late but instead because there were other indications that seemed to contradict what the individuals were saying, and that suggested Iraqi unconventional weapons programmes were continuing,” he told AFP.

But as Saddam’s scientist lamented five years later: “You don’t have to destroy a country for that.”

Research conducted by a leading British polling group shows that more than one million Iraqis have died as a result of war in their country.

The survey, conducted by Opinion Research Business (ORB) with 2,414 adults in face-to-face interviews, found that 20 percent of people had had at least one death in their household because of the conflict, rather than natural causes, Reuters reported. The survey, conducted by Opinion Research Business (ORB) with 2414 adults in face-to-face interviews, found that 20 percent of people had had at least one death in their household because of the conflict, rather than natural causes, Reuters reported.

The survey has been conducted in August and September 2007 with a 1.7 percent margin of error.

The research covered 15 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. Those not covered included two of Iraq’s more volatile regions — Karbala and Anbar — and the northern province of Arbil, where local authorities refused them a permit to work.

The director of the ORB, Allan Hyde, said it had no objective other than to record as accurately as possible the number of deaths among the Iraqi population as a result of the invasion and ensuing conflict.

MGH/RA

Bush and his top officials waged a campaign of misinformation about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

By Charles Lewis and Mark Reading-Smith

President George W. Bush and seven of his administration’s top officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, made at least 935 false statements in the two years following September 11, 2001, about the national security threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. President George W. Bush and seven of his administration’s top officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, made at least 935 false statements in the two years following September 11, 2001, about the national security threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Nearly five years after the US invasion of Iraq, an exhaustive examination of the record shows that the statements were part of an orchestrated campaign that effectively galvanized public opinion and, in the process, led the nation to war under decidedly false pretenses.

On at least 532 separate occasions (in speeches, briefings, interviews, testimony, and the like), Bush and these three key officials, along with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and White House press secretaries Ari Fleischer and Scott McClellan, stated unequivocally that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (or was trying to produce or obtain them), links to Al Qaeda, or both. On at least 532 separate occasions (in speeches, briefings, interviews, testimony, and the like), Bush and these three key officials, along with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and White House press secretaries Ari Fleischer and Scott McClellan, stated unequivocally that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (or was trying to produce or obtain them), links to Al Qaeda, or both. This concerted effort was the underpinning of the Bush administration’s case for war.

It is now beyond dispute that Iraq did not possess any weapons of mass destruction or have meaningful ties to Al Qaeda. This was the conclusion of numerous bipartisan government investigations, including those by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2004 and 2006), the 9/11 Commission, and the multinational Iraq Survey Group, whose “Duelfer Report” established that Saddam Hussein had terminated Iraq’s nuclear program in 1991 and made little effort to restart it. This was the conclusion of numerous bipartisan government investigations, including those by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2004 and 2006), the 9/11 Commission, and the multinational Iraq Survey Group, whose “Duelfer Report” established that Saddam Hussein had terminated Iraq ’s nuclear program in 1991 and made little effort to restart it.

In short, the Bush administration led the nation to war on the basis of erroneous information that it methodically propagated and that culminated in military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003. Not surprisingly, the officials with the most opportunities to make speeches, grant media interviews, and otherwise frame the public debate also made the most false statements, according to this first-ever analysis of the entire body of prewar rhetoric.

President Bush, for example, made 232 false statements about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and another 28 false statements about Iraq’s links to Al Qaeda. Secretary of State Powell had the second-highest total in the two-year period, with 244 false statements about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and 10 about Iraq’s links to Al Qaeda. Rumsfeld and Fleischer each made 109 false statements, followed by Wolfowitz (with 85), Rice (with 56), Cheney (with 48), and McClellan (with 14).

The massive database at the heart of this project juxtaposes what President Bush and these seven top officials were saying for public consumption against what was known, or should have been known, on a day-to-day basis. This fully searchable database includes the public statements, drawn from both primary sources (such as official transcripts) and secondary sources (chiefly major news organizations) over the two years beginning on September 11, 2001. It also interlaces relevant information from more than 25 government reports, books, articles, speeches, and interviews.

Consider, for example, these false public statements made in the run-up to war:

• On August 26, 2002, in an address to the national convention of the Veteran of Foreign Wars, Cheney flatly declared: “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.” In fact, former CIA Director George Tenet later recalled, Cheney’s assertions went well beyond his agency’s assessments at the time. Another CIA official, referring to the same speech, told journalist Ron Suskind, “Our reaction was, ‘Where is he getting this stuff from?’ “
• In the closing days of September 2002, with a congressional vote fast approaching on authorizing the use of military force in Iraq, Bush told the nation in his weekly radio address: “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the British government, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. In the closing days of September 2002, with a congressional vote fast approaching on authorizing the use of military force in Iraq, Bush told the nation in his weekly radio address: “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the British government, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. . . . This regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year.” A few days later, similar findings were also included in a much-hurried National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction — an analysis that hadn’t been done in years, as the intelligence community had deemed it unnecessary and the White House hadn’t requested it. This regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year.” A few days later, similar findings were also included in a much-hurried National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction — an analysis that hadn’t been done in years, as the intelligence community had deemed it unnecessary and the White House hadn’t requested it.
• In July 2002, Rumsfeld had a one-word answer for reporters who asked whether Iraq had relationships with Al Qaeda terrorists: “Sure.” In fact, an assessment issued that same month by the Defense Intelligence Agency (and confirmed weeks later by CIA Director Tenet) found an absence of “compelling evidence demonstrating direct cooperation between the government of Iraq and Al Qaeda.” What’s more, an earlier DIA assessment said that “the nature of the regime’s relationship with Al Qaeda is unclear.” In July 2002, Rumsfeld had a one-word answer for reporters who asked whether Iraq had relationships with Al Qaeda terrorists: “Sure.” In fact, an assessment issued that same month by the Defense Intelligence Agency (and confirmed weeks later by CIA Director Tenet) found an absence of “compelling evidence demonstrating direct cooperation between the government of Iraq and Al Qaeda.” What’s more, an earlier DIA assessment said that “the nature of the regime’s relationship with Al Qaeda is unclear.”
• On May 29, 2003, in an interview with Polish TV, President Bush declared: “We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories.” But as journalist Bob Woodward reported in State of Denial , days earlier a team of civilian experts dispatched to examine the two mobile labs found in Iraq had concluded in a field report that the labs were not for biological weapons. The team’s final report, completed the following month, concluded that the labs had probably been used to manufacture hydrogen for weather balloons.
• On January 28, 2003, in his annual State of the Union address, Bush asserted: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.” Two weeks earlier, an analyst with the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research sent an email to colleagues in the intelligence community laying out why he believed the uranium-purchase agreement “probably is a hoax.” Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.” Two weeks earlier, an analyst with the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research sent an email to colleagues in the intelligence community laying out why he believed the uranium-purchase agreement “probably is a hoax.”
• On February 5, 2003, in an address to the United Nations Security Council, Powell said: “What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources.” As it turned out, however, two of the main human sources to which Powell referred had provided false information. One was an Iraqi con artist, code-named “Curveball,” whom American intelligence officials were dubious about and in fact had never even spoken to. The other was an Al Qaeda detainee, Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, who had reportedly been sent to Eqypt by the CIA and tortured and who later recanted the information he had provided. Libi told the CIA in January 2004 that he had “decided he would fabricate any information interrogators wanted in order to gain better treatment and avoid being handed over to [a foreign government].”

The false statements dramatically increased in August 2002, with congressional consideration of a war resolution, then escalated through the mid-term elections and spiked even higher from January 2003 to the eve of the invasion.

(click for larger version)

In addition to their patently false pronouncements, Bush and these seven top officials also made hundreds of other statements in the two years after 9/11 in which they implied that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or links to Al Qaeda. Other administration higher-ups, joined by Pentagon officials and Republican leaders in Congress, also routinely sounded false war alarms in the Washington echo chamber.

The cumulative effect of these false statements — amplified by thousands of news stories and broadcasts — was massive, with the media coverage creating an almost impenetrable din for several critical months in the run-up to war. Some journalists — indeed, even some entire news organizations — have since acknowledged that their coverage during those prewar months was far too deferential and uncritical. These mea culpas notwithstanding, much of the wall-to-wall media coverage provided additional, “independent” validation of the Bush administration’s false statements about Iraq.

The “ground truth” of the Iraq war itself eventually forced the president to backpedal, albeit grudgingly. In a 2004 appearance on NBC’s Meet the Press , for example, Bush acknowledged that no weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq. And on December 18, 2005, with his approval ratings on the decline, Bush told the nation in a Sunday-night address from the Oval Office: “It is true that Saddam Hussein had a history of pursuing and using weapons of mass destruction. It is true that he systematically concealed those programs, and blocked the work of UN weapons inspectors. It is true that many nations believed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. But much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong. As your president, I am responsible for the decision to go into Iraq. Yet it was right to remove Saddam Hussein from power.”

Bush stopped short, however, of admitting error or poor judgment; instead, his administration repeatedly attributed the stark disparity between its prewar public statements and the actual “ground truth” regarding the threat posed by Iraq to poor intelligence from a Who’s Who of domestic agencies. Bush stopped short, however, of admitting error or poor judgment; instead, his administration repeatedly attributed the stark disparity between its prewar public statements and the actual “ground truth” regarding the threat posed by Iraq to poor intelligence from a Who’s Who of domestic agencies.

On the other hand, a growing number of critics, including a parade of former government officials, have publicly — and in some cases vociferously — accused the president and his inner circle of ignoring or distorting the available intelligence. In the end, these critics say, it was the calculated drumbeat of false information and public pronouncements that ultimately misled the American people and this nation’s allies on their way to war.

Bush and the top officials of his administration have so far largely avoided the harsh, sustained glare of formal scrutiny about their personal responsibility for the litany of repeated, false statements in the run-up to the war in Iraq. There has been no congressional investigation, for example, into what exactly was going on inside the Bush White House in that period. Congressional oversight has focused almost entirely on the quality of the US government’s pre-war intelligence — not the judgment, public statements, or public accountability of its highest officials. And, of course, only four of the officials — Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz — have testified before Congress about Iraq.

Short of such review, this project provides a heretofore unavailable framework for examining how the US war in Iraq came to pass. Clearly, it calls into question the repeated assertions of Bush administration officials that they were the unwitting victims of bad intelligence.

Above all, the 935 false statements painstakingly presented here finally help to answer two all-too-familiar questions as they apply to Bush and his top advisers: What did they know, and when did they know it?

Time magazine Managing Editor Richard Stengel discussed a new Pentagon report that says “1 in 5 American servicemen and women who have been in Iraq are coming back with brain injuries.” Stengel called it the “real toll” of the war, adding that “the legacy of that will last all of our lifetimes and it’s incalculable.” Time magazine Managing Editor Richard Stengel discussed a new Pentagon report that says “1 in 5 American servicemen and women who have been in Iraq are coming back with brain injuries.” Stengel called it the “real toll” of the war, adding that “the legacy of that will last all of our lifetimes and it’s incalculable.”

In total, according to Stengel, “more than 250,000 people” are affected by “mild traumatic brain injuries” sustained in Iraq. In total, according to Stengel, “more than 250000 people” are affected by “mild traumatic brain injuries” sustained in Iraq.

John Tirman

The warmongers who got us into Iraq are blaming everyone but themselves for the humanitarian disaster they created.

Now I know what Hillary Clinton meant, first hand, by that “vast right-wing conspiracy.” When the Wall Street Journal editorial page and the Sunday Times in London are going after you — along with about 100 right-wing bloggers — rest assured you’ve hit a nerve. Now I know what Hillary Clinton meant, first hand, by that “vast right-wing conspiracy.” When the Wall Street Journal editorial page and the Sunday Times in London are going after you — along with about 100 right-wing bloggers — rest assured you’ve hit a nerve.

Or is it just Soros Derangement Syndrome at work?

More than two years ago, I commissioned a household survey of Iraq to learn how many people had died in the war. This topic had been virtually ignored by the news media and the US government. It was important to know for at least three reasons. The first was to try to understand the nature of the violence there, which was steadily growing and creating a humanitarian crisis, possibly a regional conflagration. Second, it might tell us something about how and when to exit. Third, we needed to know for the sake of our national soul. What had we wrought?

So I contacted the people who had done a previous, largely ignored survey-top public health professionals at Johns Hopkins University. They had published a survey in October 2004 that showed 98,000 had died in the first 18 months of the war, which was greeted with disbelief and charges of politicizing science, and quickly dismissed. They had published a survey in October 2004 that showed 98000 had died in the first 18 months of the war, which was greeted with disbelief and charges of politicizing science, and quickly dismissed.

I said: ‘do a bigger survey to improve the accuracy, and I will make sure it gets the proper attention in the news media.’ They did do a bigger survey, and I managed a public education campaign that permitted the results to be considered more broadly, results that estimated total deaths at 600,000 by violence after 40 months of war. I said: ‘do a bigger survey to improve the accuracy, and I will make sure it gets the proper attention in the news media.’ They did do a bigger survey, and I managed a public education campaign that permitted the results to be considered more broadly, results that estimated total deaths at 600000 by violence after 40 months of war. The survey was published in The Lancet, the British medical journal. And get attention it did, roundly disbelieved and scorned by war supporters, but spurring a brief but intense debate about the human cost of the war.

Dozens of statisticians and other professionals scoured the study and its data to see if the methods and implementation were proper; a special committee at the World Health Organization was convened to review it, and the Lancet had also subjected it to rigorous peer review. The survey held up to this scrutiny, with quibbles and some lingering “should have done this” and “might have done that.” But virtually every competent person agreed that the study provided the best estimate we have.

Then, earlier this month, the National Journal , a Capitol Hill “insider” weekly, ran a cover story titled “Data Bomb” by Neil Munro and Carl Cannon. In a note by Munro published by the National Review blog, he asserts:

George Soros funded the survey. The US authors played no role in data-collection, and did not apply standard anti-fraud measures. The chief Iraqi data-collector had earlier produced medical articles to help Saddam’s anti-sanctions campaign in the 1990s, and said Allah guided the prior 2004 Lancet/Johns Hopkins death-survey. Some of the field surveyors were employed by Moqtada Sadr’s Ministry of Health. The Iraqis’ numbers contain evidence of fakery, and the Lancet did not check for fakery.

It’sa neat summary of their allegations, which include dozens of unfounded charges, promiscuous innuendo, misquoting of the principals, and misunderstanding statistics, and relies on two disgruntled critics. It was a hatchet job, pure and simple. Not a sentence of Munro’s summary is truthful, and that goes for much of the NJ article, too, which I have demolished elsewhere ( PDF ). The principal author, Gilbert Burnham, MD, Ph.D., and his colleagues have taken time from their clinics in Afghanistan and Jordan and Africa to answer the charges on the John Hopkins website, too ( with a letter here , and a FAQ here ).

But lies have a way of proliferating on the Internet, and so it was with this set of schoolyard bully brickbats. What seemed most to get under the skin of the right-wing media was a small grant for public education funded by the Open Society Institute, a foundation created by George Soros.

The charges of fraud that NJ clumsily made but never came close to proving were of course a tonic to the war supporters who were shamed by the estimate of 600,000 fatalities. The charges of fraud that NJ clumsily made but never came close to proving were of course a tonic to the war supporters who were shamed by the estimate of 600000 fatalities. There is nothing as devastating to the increasingly discredited case for war as the specter of the US invasion having caused, directly and indirectly, more deaths than were attributed to the bloody reign of Saddam Hussein.

But it was news that “Soros” was a donor, and the wingnuts went berserk. The line that Munro and Cannon took was that “Soros” was somehow behind the survey from the start, which was timed to affect the 2006 elections. It was not only fraud, they contend, but the perversion of science for political ends backed by the disgruntled, Bush-hating billionaire.

It’s classic right-wing defamation, and of course none of it is true. Munro and Cannon were painstakingly walked through the chronology and donors, but deliberately ignored it to fashion their paranoid fairy tale, and the Wall Street Journal et al lapped it up.

We commissioned the survey on October 25, 2005, hoping to get it done as quickly as it could be done professionally, and perhaps have the results out in the spring. Why wait? But Iraq quickly became too violent to permit teams of questioners go out to 1,000 randomly chosen households. But Iraq quickly became too violent to permit teams of questioners go out to 1000 randomly chosen households. So it was not until late spring that they did begin the door-to-door work-still very perilous-and completed the survey in early July. It took another two months to enter the data, have biostatisticians at Johns Hopkins analyze it, and write up the article. The Lancet then took weeks to peer review. It was released when ready. There was no political agenda; there didn’t need to be. The results spoke for themselves.

The Open Society Institute came late to the process, announcing to me that a grant had been made for public education on May 4, 2006. That is six and a half months after the survey process began. We had already paid for the survey out of internal funds. Less than half of the cash needs of the survey, the analysis, and the public education effort was paid for by OSI. (If the real cost of the effort were totaled-to include salaries of Burnham, myself, and many others who were not compensated directly-then the OSI contribution would have offset about 10 percent of the cost.) I doubt very much whether George Soros himself was ever aware of the grant. (If the real cost of the effort were totaled-to include salaries of Burnham, myself, and many others who were not compensated directly-then the OSI contribution would have offset about 10 percent of the cost.) I doubt very much whether George Soros himself was ever aware of the grant. OSI is a very large, humanitarian foundation, and their $46,000 grant to MIT is small by their standards. OSI is a very large, humanitarian foundation, and their $46000 grant to MIT is small by their standards.

And, needless to say, OSI and “Soros” had no influence over the initiation, conduct, or findings of the survey. Neither Burnham and his colleagues nor the Lancet editors knew OSI was one of the donors. The contract was with MIT.

I carefully told this to Munro on the telephone, and Burnham’s colleague Les Roberts emailed the same information to Cannon last autumn. Munro had asked, among other hostile questions, whether any Muslims or Arabs were supporting the survey, a racism reflected in his remark about Allah above and a charge in the NJ piece that the survey teams lacked American oversight and were thereby suspect. But he was emotionally fixated on Soros, and asked about his role repeatedly. When I tried to offer corroborating evidence for the survey, he screamed at me that none of that mattered. I could see where this was going.

Of course, Munro himself has been a rabid supporter of the war from the start. In the tradition of former NJ editor Michael Kelly, who called opponents of the war traitors, Munro agitated for the “destruction of Iraq” as early as November 2001. He had elsewhere insisted that the peace in Northern Ireland was the result of the British Army’s iron fist. His sentiments were on display through the hatchet job on us, not least in alleging that The Lancet article was a spur to jihadists.

So the headlines-”Soros Underwrites Osama’s Talking Points,” and “$oros Iraq Death Claim was a Sham” are typical. The Soros Derangement Syndrome derives, I suspect, from his special status as a traitor to his class, as the right used to refer to FDR. Someone so intelligent, articulate, actively compassionate, and rich cannot be tolerated.

In an odd twist, a new mortality survey-approvingly mentioned by the NJ piece-appeared earlier this month in the New England Journal of Medicine . Conducted by the Iraqi Ministry of Health, it found 151,000 deaths by violence as of June 2006, about the same period as the Lancet article. Conducted by the Iraqi Ministry of Health, it found 151000 deaths by violence as of June 2006, about the same period as the Lancet article. Newspaper coverage duly noted that their estimate was only one-quarter that of the Lancet. But a little digging would have revealed much more: the total deaths attributable to the war, non-violent as well as violent, was about 400,000 for that period, now 19 months ago. But a little digging would have revealed much more: the total deaths attributable to the war, non-violent as well as violent, was about 400000 for that period, now 19 months ago. If the same trends continued, that total today would be more than 600,000. If the same trends continued, that total today would be more than 600000.

The deaths-by-violence in that latter survey remained the same from year-to-year, however, which is not plausible-all observers agree that violent deaths were rising sharply in 2005 and 2006. The discrepancy is found in how the survey was conducted: interviewers identified themselves as employees of the Ministry of Health, then under the control of Shiite cleric Moktada al Sadr. Those interviewed, therefore, would be wary of saying a brother or son or husband had been killed by violence, fearing retribution. And, indeed, there are non-violent categories in the survey that suggest just such equivocation: “Unintentional injuries” would equal about 40 percent of the death-by-violence toll, for example. Road accidents were ten times their pre-war totals-if someone is run off a highway by a US convoy, is that a “non-violent” death?

The researchers, to their credit, acknowledge that their estimate is likely too low due to several factors. They did not go into dangerous neighborhoods, which made up 11 percent of the sample, and could not accurately estimate the death toll in those, which would of course have been high. Still, the survey is revealing on the non-violent mortality, too: deaths by kidney failure, cancer, diabetes, and others rose by several times, signaling the near-collapse of the health care system.

The MoH survey is the fifth trying to measure mortality during the war, and there is significant congruence among all. (The Lancet estimate is not actually the highest; that belongs to the private British polling firm, Opinion Research Business, which found that as of August 2007, 1.2 million Iraqis were dead due to the war.) But all the surveys point to one thing: a colossal amount of killing and dying has been going on, far more than numbers used in most discussions of the issue in the fleeting instances when concern for Iraqis appears. (The Lancet estimate is not actually the highest; that belongs to the private British polling firm, Opinion Research Business, which found that as of August 2007, 1.2 million Iraqis were dead due to the war.) But all the surveys point to one thing : a colossal amount of killing and dying has been going on, far more than numbers used in most discussions of the issue in the fleeting instances when concern for Iraqis appears.

And that, of course, should be the real issue here, not whether George Soros is interested in the issue. The NJ calumny and the many gleeful references to it are a sign that the pro-war legions are really at wit’s end. The catastrophe they created and supported must be blamed on others-the conveyors of bad news, the quisling liberals, and the Iraqis themselves.

But the dead in Iraq cannot be silenced as long as we have courageous researchers who will go into the warzone to gather data and tell us the truth. That’s what five surveys-against perilous of odds-have done, and the findings should haunt us every day.

Sen. John McCain may have stunned some Americans with his projection that the US occupation of Iraq could last 100 years or more. But the political pressures in Washington sometimes make ending a war more difficult than starting one.

In this guest essay, the Independent Institute’s Robert Higgs discusses what it might take to bring the troops home:

By Robert Higgs

On Oct. 19, 2001, in speaking about the new government controls and heightened surveillance already being clamped on the American people in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Vice President Dick Cheney said that the new war “may never end. At least not in our lifetime. . . .  The way I think of it is, it’sa new normalcy.”

We should have taken his grim forecast more seriously.

The US attack on and occupation of Iraq, represented by the Bush administration as a critical element in the larger Global War on Terror, began nearly five years ago, and it shows no signs of ending soon.

Indeed, if John McCain is elected president and (with help from his successors) carries out the not-so-veiled threat to keep US troops in Iraq for a hundred years, then we can confidently expect that the war will not end in our lifetime. Indeed, if John McCain is elected president and (with help from his successors) carries out the not-so-veiled threat to keep US troops in Iraq for a hundred years, then we can confidently expect that the war will not end in our lifetime . Such a prospect is so seemingly preposterous, however, that one’s mind does not readily assimilate it.

It is difficult enough to absorb the reality that the United States has now been at war against the Iraqis for almost five years. An engagement sold to the public as a “cakewalk” and represented just six weeks after it began as a “mission accomplished” has now (as I write) continued for 1,760 days. An engagement sold to the public as a “cakewalk” and represented just six weeks after it began as a “mission accomplished” has now (as I write) continued for 1760 days.

Compare this duration with the time the United States was formally engaged in World War I (589 days) or World War II (1,365 days). Compare this duration with the time the United States was formally engaged in World War I (589 days) or World War II (1365 days). In the 1940s, the US forces (with important allies, to be sure) defeated two major economic and military powers in a globe-circling war in less time than the US forces have been engaged in Iraq.

And after all this time, where does the US venture stand? Evidently it is no closer to the “victory” the president has repeatedly said he seeks than it was immediately after the occupation began.

The 901 US troops who lost their lives in Iraq during 2007 were the largest number in any calendar year since the war began.

As 2008 begins, we read reports of a US air strike on the outskirts of Baghdad in which B-1 bombers and F-16 fighters dropped 40,000 pounds of explosives, an attack described by Major Alayne Conway as “one of the largest airstrikes since the onset of the war.” As 2008 begins, we read reports of a US air strike on the outskirts of Baghdad in which B-1 bombers and F-16 fighters dropped 40000 pounds of explosives, an attack described by Major Alayne Conway as “one of the largest airstrikes since the onset of the war.”

The attack came only a day after six US soldiers participating in a major ground offensive were reported killed in the “biggest one-day loss in Iraq since May.” These events do not epitomize minor “mopping up” activities. The war obviously has no end in sight.

Notwithstanding these inauspicious developments and Sen. McCain’s bizarre pronouncement, we might well think in a more focused way about what will ultimately bring the war to an end, because it almost certainly will end someday.

Given its nature, it cannot be ended as each of the world wars was ended, by the formal capitulation of an  enemy state. Loosely organized insurgents and guerrillas do not stop fighting in that fashion.

In view of the particulars on the ground in Iraq, it would seem that no complete cessation of armed hostilities can occur there until the United States withdraws its military forces. So the question becomes:  What will induce a future US president or a future US Congress to act decisively to bring the troops home?

In the abstract, the answer is easy:  US authorities will extract their occupation force when they perceive that doing so is in their interest. Note well that I said, “in their interest.”

Whether a US withdrawal serves my interest, or yours, or that of 95 percent of the American people is not necessarily important, because government leaders do not act to serve other people’s interests.

Anyone who has advanced beyond infancy in his understanding of political affairs knows that despite all the dutiful claptrap that political leaders and their functionaries spout in public, they invariably pursue their own interests. Those interests may be material, political, institutional, or ideological, but in any event they are their own interests, not yours or mine.

It follows directly that up to this point the continued prosecution of the war has served the leaders’ interests. They may say they are trying to end the war. They may have secured their election or reelection, as many of the Democrats now serving in Congress have, by promising to do whatever they can to end the war. Yet the truth is that they’ve sold the public a bill of goods.

When the leaders have considered all the personal consequences they expect to follow from acting to end the war, they have concluded that, all things being considered, doing so does not serve their interest, and therefore they have refrained from doing so.

After all, it’s not as though the US war effort has a mind of its own. Whenever the president wants to remove the troops, he can do so; he has the power. Whenever the members of the majority in Congress want to remove the troops, by stopping the funding to support them there, they can do so; they have the power.

The posture of powerlessness that our leaders often affect―my goodness, what can I do? my hands are tied―is a disingenuous pose. They can stop the US engagement in the war whenever they want to do so. Thus far, they simply have not wanted to do so.

What might cause them to reach a new conclusion about what serves their personal interest? Several developments might turn the trick. Nearly all of them work by heightening the public’s anger with their leaders’ decisions.

Historically, the decisive development in similar instances has been the cumulation of public costs, especially the costs in life and limb. In both the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the public’s disfavor of the engagement closely tracked the cumulation of casualties.

As political scientist John Mueller showed in his book War, Presidents, and Public Opinion , “every time American casualties increased by a factor of 10, support for the war dropped by about 15 percentage points” in the polls.

One reason the public has continued to tolerate their leaders’ continued prosecution of the war in Iraq is that the casualties have not been nearly so great, by an order of magnitude, as they were in Korea and Vietnam.

So far, not quite 4,000 US military personnel have been killed in Iraq. So far, not quite 4000 US military personnel have been killed in Iraq. That’s only one death for every 75,000 persons living in the United States, and therefore the loss of life has not cut deeply into the public psyche―most Americans have not been personally acquainted with anyone killed in the war. That’s only one death for every 75000 persons living in the United States, and therefore the loss of life has not cut deeply into the public psyche―most Americans have not been personally acquainted with anyone killed in the war.

(The vastly greater loss of Iraqi lives seems to have made even less impression.)

Sad to say, the public may not turn decisively against their leaders’ continued prosecution of the war until many more American soldiers have died.

Economic costs have also mounted, and they have loomed relatively much larger in this war than in the earlier wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Who says the military leaders never learn? They’ve certainly learned how to increase hugely the financial costs of fighting a war.

Estimates of the costs to date vary widely, depending on how one accounts for various joint, indirect, and implied costs, but a total cost to date in the neighborhood of a trillion dollars is not implausible, and later costs, including those associated with decades of care for the war’s legions of physically and mentally disabled, will add enormously to the total. Estimates of the costs to date vary widely, depending on how one accounts for various joint, indirect, and implied costs, but a total cost to date in the neighborhood of a trillion dollars is not implausible, and later costs, including those associated with decades of care for the war’s legions of physically and mentally disabled, will add enormously to the total.

In earlier wars, even though the costs were relatively greater in blood than in dollars, the public eventually wearied of the economic sacrifices entailed by the financial expenses of continued fighting.

Economist Hugh Mosley concluded that the Johnson administration “was reluctant to resort to increased taxes to finance the war for fear of losing public support for its policy of military escalation.”

Historian Stephen Ambrose wrote that President Richard Nixon “realized that for economic reasons (the war was simply costing too much) and for the sake of domestic peace and tranquility he had to cut back on the American commitment to Vietnam”; the retrenchment was “forced on [him] by public opinion.” Historian Stephen Ambrose wrote that President Richard Nixon “realized that for economic reasons (the war was simply costing too much) and for the sake of domestic peace and tranquility he had to cut back on the American commitment to Vietnam”; the retrenchment was “forced on [him] by public opinion.”

As the recession that has just begun deepens, the public may well object more strenuously to the government’s squandering of such vast amounts of tax money on a senseless continuation of the war in Iraq.

When their purses are not so full, people may resent every additional dollar spent on the war more than they did previously. Ultimately, they may become so angry that they will take actions to punish severely the political leaders who continue to support the war.

Serious political challengers may attract a mass following by embracing the example of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who promised in the 1952 campaign to end the enormously unpopular war in Korea and, after he took office, kept his promise expeditiously.

When substantial negative feedback begins to jeopardize the personal job security, not to speak of the respect and fawning, the electorate affords incumbents, they will begin to take notice, and to discount more heavily the contributions from defense contractors, big financial establishments, petrochemical companies, and other high rollers who have encouraged them to stay the hopeless course―though not hopeless for these special interests, of course; for them it has been a bonanza. When substantial negative feedback begins to jeopardize the personal job security, not to speak of the respect and fawning, the electorate affords incumbents, they will begin to take notice, and to discount more heavily the contributions from defense contractors, big financial establishments, petrochemical companies , and other high rollers who have encouraged them to stay the hopeless course―though not hopeless for these special interests, of course; for them it has been a bonanza.

George W. Bush parlayed a campaign of fear-mongering into his reelection in 2004, but unless another major terrorist attack occurs in the United States, the public will grow increasingly resistant to such appeals and more eager to throw the rascals out as the war’s costs continue to mount. George W. Bush parlayed a campaign of fear-mongering into his reelection in 2004, but unless another major terrorist attack occurs in the United States, the public will grow increasingly resistant to such appeals and more eager to throw the rascals out as the war’ s costs continue to mount.

It is extremely unfortunate that escalating costs in blood and money are the only proven means of bringing the general public to resist strongly their political leaders who are committed to a continuation of unnecessary, unwise, and immoral war.

Some of us wish that rational argument, cogent evidence, and humane sentiment would persuade a preponderance of the public to demand an end to the war. History suggests, however, that only personal grief and economic pain will induce the American public to act against their perfidious leaders.

Needless to say, if the public remains as passive and as easily bamboozled as it has been during the past seven years, the war will continue, maybe even for the hundred years in which Senator McCain declares that a US occupation of Iraq would be “fine with me.” Needless to say, if the public remains as passive and as easily bamboozled as it has been during the past seven years, the war will continue, maybe even for the hundred years in which Senator McCain declares that a US occupation of Iraq would be “fine with me.”

Robert Higgs is a Senior Fellow in Political Economy for The Independent Institute. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins University, and he has taught at the University of Washington, Lafayette College, Seattle University, and the University of Economics, Prague. He is the author of many books, including Depression, War, and Cold War .

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