By 由 Fred Kaplan 弗雷德卡普蘭 In the National Intelligence Estimate titled “ 在國家情報評估報告，題為" The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland 恐怖威脅家園 ,” which was released Tuesday, there’s an intriguing section that suggests an impending push for more domestic surveillance. " ，這是週二公佈，有一個耐人尋味的第暗示即將發生，推動更多的國內監視。

Most of the report (which I analyzed 報告的大部分內容（我的分析 here 這裡 ) concerns an alleged resurgence of al-Qaida. ）的關注，被指控死灰復燃基地組織。 But toward the end, the authors mention a small but expanding number of “violent Islamic extremists inside the United States” who are “becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the global extremist movement.” 但對完中，作者提到一個規模雖小但越來越多的"暴力的伊斯蘭極端分子在美國境內 " 誰是"越來越連通思想上，實際上，和/或在一個物理意義上向全球極端運動" 。

The report also notes dangers posed by “non-Muslim terrorist groups,” “single-issue groups,” and “even small numbers of alienated people” who might “find and connect with one another, justify and intensify their anger, and mobilize resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.” 報告還指出，所造成的危險， " 非穆斯林恐怖集團" ， "單一問題群體" ， "即使是很小的數目疏離的人" ，他們可能 " 找到並互相聯繫，自圓其說，並加強他們的憤怒，並調動資源以攻擊一切，而不需要集中式的恐怖組織，訓練營，或領袖" 。

Then comes the point: 那麼，隨之而來的一點：

The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. 能夠檢測到更廣泛和更多樣化的恐怖陰謀，在這種環境下，將挑戰美國目前的防禦的努力和工具，我們用來偵察和破壞的圖謀。 It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions. 它也將需要更多地了解如何嫌疑人的活動，在地方層面涉及到戰略威脅的信息，以及如何最好地確定指標的恐怖活動，在複雜多變的合法互動。

One aspect of this is uncontroversial—the need to integrate city and state law enforcement (”suspect activities at the local level”) to national watch lists and other databases (”strategic threat information”). 一個方面，這是沒有爭議的-需要把紐約市和紐約州執法（ "嫌疑人的活動是在地方一級" ） ，以國家黑名單，以及其他數據庫（下稱"戰略威脅信息" ） 。 This effort falls under the Department of Homeland Security, and it’sa disgrace that, with such a large budget, nobody has yet devised a systematic method of doing this. 這一努力瀑布下的國土安全部，這是恥辱，這樣的一個大的預算，沒有人尚未制定了一套有系統的方法，這樣做的。

However, the other part of this passage (”how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions”) pushes a very hot button. 然而，其他部分的通道（ "如何最好地確定指標的恐怖活動，在複雜多變的合法互動" ） ，把一個非常熱門按鈕。

A year and a half ago, passionate arguments broke out over reports about the National Security Agency’s “ 一年半前，有激情的論據打破了過去以報導有關美國國家安全局的" data-mining 數據挖掘 ” technologies. "技術。 A couple of years earlier, the Pentagon attempted to fund a still-more intrusive program called the “ 兩三年前，五角大樓企圖基金的一個仍然侵擾程度較高的節目，叫做" Total Information Awareness 共有信息意識 ” network. "網絡。 (The latter effort failed, but the concept was almost certainly re-routed to the NSA or elsewhere.) Concerns were raised about privacy rights, the abuse of power, and the （後者的努力失敗了，不過，這個概念是幾乎可以肯定，改為以國家安全局或其他地方）的關注，提出了關於隱私的權利，濫用權力，並 worth of such networks 值得這類網絡 to begin with. 首先。

Judging from the NIE (not just from these key passages but from its general assessment of a “persistent and evolving terrorist threat”), the debate over these vast surveillance systems will soon be renewed. 從聶（不只是從這些重點段落，但其總體評估的"持續性和不斷變化的恐怖威脅" ） ，爭論這些龐大的監視系統，將很快續約。 So, it’s worth making some distinctions that tended not to be made the last time around, at least in much of the public discussion. 所以，它的價值，使一些區別，往往不被列作最後一次靠近，至少在大部分的公眾討論。

The key distinction is the one between data-mining and wiretapping. 關鍵的區別是一個與數據挖掘和電話監聽。

In data-mining, the NSA casts a vast “net” across the global communications system, encompassing, at least in theory, every phone call, e-mail, electronic signal, and so forth. 在數據挖掘，國家安全局是一個龐大的"網" ，跨越全球的通訊系統，無所不包，至少在理論上，每一個電話，電子郵件，電子信號，等等。 The idea is not to monitor all these calls (there’s not enough time or manpower to do that, in any case) but rather to detect patterns. 想法是不是監測所有這些電話（有沒有足夠的時間或人力要做到這一點，在任何情況下） ，而是偵查模式。 If someone makes or receives a number of calls to or from, say, Pakistan, Iraq, or Syria—or if someone is in frequent contact with someone else who makes or receives such calls—this pattern would set off alarm bells. 如果有人或接到的電話次數或從，說，巴基斯坦，伊拉克，或敘利亞-如果這個人是在接觸到別人的人，或收到這樣的呼籲-這種模式將引發警鐘。 At that point, an intelligence officer might want to start monitoring that person or those people to see who they are, what they’re doing, and whether anything about them or their behavior seems ominous. 在這一點上，一個情報人員可能想開始監控此人或這些人看到他們是誰，他們是怎麼做的，以及有否任何關於他們或他們的行為似乎是不祥的。

I don’t think anyone, other than libertarians, should have a problem with this sort of data-mining. 我不認為任何人，除了自由論，應該有一個問題，這樣的數據挖掘。 Nor do I think there should be a problem with the idea of monitoring people whose calling patterns set off alarm bells. 同樣，我也不認為應該有一個問題的想法監測人的通話模式設置敲響警鐘。 I say this even though I have probably set off some alarm bells myself. 我這樣說，即使我有可能引發一些警鐘自己了。 For instance, I have been in e-mail correspondence with a friend and former professor who is helping to set up a Western-style liberal-arts college in Pakistan. 舉例來說，我已經在電子郵件信件與朋友和前任教授，誰是幫助建立一個西方式的自由-藝術學院在巴基斯坦。 (I should apologize to other friends who could have been caught up in this hypothetical sweep if I phoned or e-mailed them shortly after communicating with my old professor.) （我要道歉，向其他朋友們可能會被趕上了，在這個假設掃，如果我打電話或發來電子郵件，然後在短期內溝通後，與我的老教授） 。

However, let me add a caveat: I have no problem with extending the probe from data-mining to monitoring if certain lawful procedures are followed. 不過，讓我補充買者：我沒有問題，延長探針，從數據挖掘，以監控，如果某些合法程序得到遵守。

Now, here’s the catch: I don’t know—and I don’t think anybody else without a specially compartmentalized security clearance knows—whether the NSA or other intelligence agencies are currently following lawful procedures. 現在，這裡的漁獲：我不知道-我不認為任何人都沒有一個專門條塊分割安全檢查不知是否有國家安全局或其他情報機構目前正在以下法定程序產生。 More to the point, I don’t know whether there are lawful procedures. 還有一點，我不知道他是否有合法的程序。

When the New York Times revealed in late 2005 that the NSA was data-mining inside US territory, some critics demanded an end to the practice unless it had been approved in advance by the “FISA courts.” These are highly classified panels of judges, set up under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, who approve (or decline, though they almost always approve) warrants to place foreign powers or their suspected agents under surveillance. 當紐約時報透露，在2005年年底表示，美國國家安全局是數據挖掘內美國領土，一些批評者要求結束這種做法，除非它已事先批准，由" fisa法院， "這是高度機密的法官小組，下設立的外國情報監視法從1978年起，誰批准（或跌幅，但它們幾乎總是核准）權證把外國勢力或其代理人涉嫌監視。

Bush administration officials responded, at the time, that warrants did not—and could not—apply to data-mining. 布什政府官員回應時，在時間，即認股權證不和，可以不適用數據挖掘。 And they were right. 他們是正確的。 Warrants apply to specific individuals, entities, locations, or phone numbers. 認股權證適用於特定的個人，實體，地點或電話號碼。 It’s not possible to request a warrant to track the calling patterns of an entire country’s population. 它的不可能要求一個值得追踪通話模式對整個國家的人口。

What was never settled in that controversy, at least not publicly, was whether FISA warrants apply to any subsequent monitoring that takes place as a result of these vast sweeps. 什麼是永遠定居在這爭論，但至少不會公開，是否fisa認股權證適用於任何其後的監測是發生由於這些龐大的彩票。 If someone wants to monitor my calls because of the e-mails with my friend in Pakistan, does a FISA court have to give permission first? 如果有人想監控我的電話，因為該電子郵件與我的朋友在巴基斯坦，難道一個fisa法院必須給予許可第一？ And are there limits to which of my calls can be monitored, what can and cannot be done with the resulting “intelligence,” or how long it can be stored? 以及是否有限制，而我的電話都被監控，哪些不可以做，與由此產生的"情報" ，或有多長，它可以儲存？

Again, I don’t know the answers, nor do I know anyone who does (and I’ve asked around). 再次，我不知道答案，我也不認識任何人，誰做（我問過周圍） 。

This isn’ta trivial matter. 這不是小事。 Whatever the justification for this sort of surveillance in theory, the opportunity for abuse in practice is enormous—and even likely, as long as the current bunch is in power. 無論理由，這種監視在理論上，有機會濫用，在實踐中是巨大的，甚至有可能，只要目前的一大堆是怎樣上台的。 The congressional leaders and intelligence committees can find out where these matters stand. 美國國會領導人和情報委員會能找出哪裡這些問題的立場。 They should ask and legislate new safeguards before the next “surge”—a surge in domestic spying—gets under way, because, by all indications, it’s coming soon. 他們要問，並立法新的保障之前，下一個"潮 " -激增國內監聽-獲得正在進行之中，因為，種種跡象表明，它的即將上市。

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