By 由 Fred Kaplan 弗雷德卡普兰 In the National Intelligence Estimate titled “ 在国家情报评估报告，题为" The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland 恐怖威胁家园 ,” which was released Tuesday, there’s an intriguing section that suggests an impending push for more domestic surveillance. " ，这是周二公布，有一个耐人寻味的第暗示即将发生，推动更多的国内监视。

Most of the report (which I analyzed 报告的大部分内容（我的分析 here 这里 ) concerns an alleged resurgence of al-Qaida. ）的关注，被指控死灰复燃基地组织。 But toward the end, the authors mention a small but expanding number of “violent Islamic extremists inside the United States” who are “becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the global extremist movement.” 但对完中，作者提到一个规模虽小但越来越多的"暴力的伊斯兰极端分子在美国境内 " 谁是"越来越连通思想上，实际上，和/或在一个物理意义上向全球极端运动" 。

The report also notes dangers posed by “non-Muslim terrorist groups,” “single-issue groups,” and “even small numbers of alienated people” who might “find and connect with one another, justify and intensify their anger, and mobilize resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.” 报告还指出，所造成的危险， " 非穆斯林恐怖集团" ， "单一问题群体" ， "即使是很小的数目疏离的人" ，他们可能 " 找到并互相联系，自圆其说，并加强他们的愤怒，并调动资源以攻击一切，而不需要集中式的恐怖组织，训练营，或领袖" 。

Then comes the point: 那么，随之而来的一点：

The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. 能够检测到更广泛和更多样化的恐怖阴谋，在这种环境下，将挑战美国目前的防御的努力和工具，我们用来侦察和破坏的图谋。 It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions. 它也将需要更多地了解如何嫌疑人的活动，在地方层面涉及到战略威胁的信息，以及如何最好地确定指标的恐怖活动，在复杂多变的合法互动。

One aspect of this is uncontroversial—the need to integrate city and state law enforcement (”suspect activities at the local level”) to national watch lists and other databases (”strategic threat information”). 一个方面，这是没有争议的-需要把纽约市和纽约州执法（ "嫌疑人的活动是在地方一级" ） ，以国家黑名单，以及其他数据库（下称"战略威胁信息" ） 。 This effort falls under the Department of Homeland Security, and it’sa disgrace that, with such a large budget, nobody has yet devised a systematic method of doing this. 这一努力瀑布下的国土安全部，这是耻辱，这样的一个大的预算，没有人尚未制定了一套有系统的方法，这样做的。

However, the other part of this passage (”how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions”) pushes a very hot button. 然而，其他部分的通道（ "如何最好地确定指标的恐怖活动，在复杂多变的合法互动" ） ，把一个非常热门按钮。

A year and a half ago, passionate arguments broke out over reports about the National Security Agency’s “ 一年半前，有激情的论据打破了过去以报导有关美国国家安全局的" data-mining 数据挖掘 ” technologies. "技术。 A couple of years earlier, the Pentagon attempted to fund a still-more intrusive program called the “ 两三年前，五角大楼企图基金的一个仍然侵扰程度较高的节目，叫做" Total Information Awareness 共有信息意识 ” network. "网络。 (The latter effort failed, but the concept was almost certainly re-routed to the NSA or elsewhere.) Concerns were raised about privacy rights, the abuse of power, and the （后者的努力失败了，不过，这个概念是几乎可以肯定，改为以国家安全局或其他地方）的关注，提出了关于隐私的权利，滥用权力，并 worth of such networks 值得这类网络 to begin with. 首先。

Judging from the NIE (not just from these key passages but from its general assessment of a “persistent and evolving terrorist threat”), the debate over these vast surveillance systems will soon be renewed. 从聂（不只是从这些重点段落，但其总体评估的"持续性和不断变化的恐怖威胁" ） ，争论这些庞大的监视系统，将很快续约。 So, it’s worth making some distinctions that tended not to be made the last time around, at least in much of the public discussion. 所以，它的价值，使一些区别，往往不被列作最后一次靠近，至少在大部分的公众讨论。

The key distinction is the one between data-mining and wiretapping. 关键的区别是一个与数据挖掘和电话监听。

In data-mining, the NSA casts a vast “net” across the global communications system, encompassing, at least in theory, every phone call, e-mail, electronic signal, and so forth. 在数据挖掘，国家安全局是一个庞大的"网" ，跨越全球的通讯系统，无所不包，至少在理论上，每一个电话，电子邮件，电子信号，等等。 The idea is not to monitor all these calls (there’s not enough time or manpower to do that, in any case) but rather to detect patterns. 想法是不是监测所有这些电话（有没有足够的时间或人力要做到这一点，在任何情况下） ，而是侦查模式。 If someone makes or receives a number of calls to or from, say, Pakistan, Iraq, or Syria—or if someone is in frequent contact with someone else who makes or receives such calls—this pattern would set off alarm bells. 如果有人或接到的电话次数或从，说，巴基斯坦，伊拉克，或叙利亚-如果这个人是在接触到别人的人，或收到这样的呼吁-这种模式将引发警钟。 At that point, an intelligence officer might want to start monitoring that person or those people to see who they are, what they’re doing, and whether anything about them or their behavior seems ominous. 在这一点上，一个情报人员可能想开始监控此人或这些人看到他们是谁，他们是怎么做的，以及有否任何关于他们或他们的行为似乎是不祥的。

I don’t think anyone, other than libertarians, should have a problem with this sort of data-mining. 我不认为任何人，除了自由论，应该有一个问题，这样的数据挖掘。 Nor do I think there should be a problem with the idea of monitoring people whose calling patterns set off alarm bells. 同样，我也不认为应该有一个问题的想法监测人的通话模式设置敲响警钟。 I say this even though I have probably set off some alarm bells myself. 我这样说，即使我有可能引发一些警钟自己了。 For instance, I have been in e-mail correspondence with a friend and former professor who is helping to set up a Western-style liberal-arts college in Pakistan. 举例来说，我已经在电子邮件信件与朋友和前任教授，谁是帮助建立一个西方式的自由-艺术学院在巴基斯坦。 (I should apologize to other friends who could have been caught up in this hypothetical sweep if I phoned or e-mailed them shortly after communicating with my old professor.) （我要道歉，向其他朋友们可能会被赶上了，在这个假设扫，如果我打电话或发来电子邮件，然后在短期内沟通后，与我的老教授） 。

However, let me add a caveat: I have no problem with extending the probe from data-mining to monitoring if certain lawful procedures are followed. 不过，让我补充买者：我没有问题，延长探针，从数据挖掘，以监控，如果某些合法程序得到遵守。

Now, here’s the catch: I don’t know—and I don’t think anybody else without a specially compartmentalized security clearance knows—whether the NSA or other intelligence agencies are currently following lawful procedures. 现在，这里的渔获：我不知道-我不认为任何人都没有一个专门条块分割安全检查不知是否有国家安全局或其他情报机构目前正在以下法定程序产生。 More to the point, I don’t know whether there are lawful procedures. 还有一点，我不知道他是否有合法的程序。

When the New York Times revealed in late 2005 that the NSA was data-mining inside US territory, some critics demanded an end to the practice unless it had been approved in advance by the “FISA courts.” These are highly classified panels of judges, set up under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, who approve (or decline, though they almost always approve) warrants to place foreign powers or their suspected agents under surveillance. 当纽约时报透露，在2005年年底表示，美国国家安全局是数据挖掘内美国领土，一些批评者要求结束这种做法，除非它已事先批准，由" fisa法院， "这是高度机密的法官小组，下设立的外国情报监视法从1978年起，谁批准（或跌幅，但它们几乎总是核准）权证把外国势力或其代理人涉嫌监视。

Bush administration officials responded, at the time, that warrants did not—and could not—apply to data-mining. 布什政府官员回应时，在时间，即认股权证不和，可以不适用数据挖掘。 And they were right. 他们是正确的。 Warrants apply to specific individuals, entities, locations, or phone numbers. 认股权证适用于特定的个人，实体，地点或电话号码。 It’s not possible to request a warrant to track the calling patterns of an entire country’s population. 它的不可能要求一个值得追踪通话模式对整个国家的人口。

What was never settled in that controversy, at least not publicly, was whether FISA warrants apply to any subsequent monitoring that takes place as a result of these vast sweeps. 什么是永远定居在这争论，但至少不会公开，是否fisa认股权证适用于任何其后的监测是发生由于这些庞大的彩票。 If someone wants to monitor my calls because of the e-mails with my friend in Pakistan, does a FISA court have to give permission first? 如果有人想监控我的电话，因为该电子邮件与我的朋友在巴基斯坦，难道一个fisa法院必须给予许可第一？ And are there limits to which of my calls can be monitored, what can and cannot be done with the resulting “intelligence,” or how long it can be stored? 以及是否有限制，而我的电话都被监控，哪些不可以做，与由此产生的"情报" ，或有多长，它可以储存？

Again, I don’t know the answers, nor do I know anyone who does (and I’ve asked around). 再次，我不知道答案，我也不认识任何人，谁做（我问过周围） 。

This isn’ta trivial matter. 这不是小事。 Whatever the justification for this sort of surveillance in theory, the opportunity for abuse in practice is enormous—and even likely, as long as the current bunch is in power. 无论理由，这种监视在理论上，有机会滥用，在实践中是巨大的，甚至有可能，只要目前的一大堆是怎样上台的。 The congressional leaders and intelligence committees can find out where these matters stand. 美国国会领导人和情报委员会能找出哪里这些问题的立场。 They should ask and legislate new safeguards before the next “surge”—a surge in domestic spying—gets under way, because, by all indications, it’s coming soon. 他们要问，并立法新的保障之前，下一个"潮 " -激增国内监听-获得正在进行之中，因为，种种迹象表明，它的即将上市。

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