Brekend Nieuws | Forum | Brits Nieuws | Het Nieuws van de V.S. | Het Nieuws van de wereld | Politiek Nieuws | Nieuws sc.i-technologie | Het Nieuws van de oorlog & van het Terrorisme | Het Nieuws van sporten | Multimedia | Vastgestelde Homepage

Vertaal:

Maandag, 13 Oktober, 2008

Door Andy Worthington - andyworthington.co.uk |

Andy Worthington, auteur van De dossiers Guantánamo, zet zijn analyse van de corrupte bevelstructuur van de Militaire Commissie in Guantánamo, met nieuwe informatie van Maj voort. David Frakt, één militaire de defensieadvocaten van van de Commissie'.

In de laatste drie weken, zijn twee gebeurtenissen voorgekomen die hebben behandeld wat een knockoutslag zou moeten geweest zijn aan de Militaire Commissie in Guantánamo, het systeem van proeven voor „verschrikkingsverdachten“ - buiten het het hofsysteem van de V.S. en het systeem van de militairen van de V.S. eigen gerechtelijke - dat door Ondervoorzitter werd gecre�ërd Dick Cheney en zijn dichte adviseurs (in het bijzonder, zijn wettelijk advies David Addington) in November 2001.

Op 24 September, Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld, de eiser in het geval van Mohamed Jawad (een Afghaan beschuldigde van het werpen van een granaat bij jeep die twee militairen van de V.S. en een Afghaanse tolk bevat die), gelaten, zijn frustratie en teleurstelling uitdrukt dat het „potentieel verontschuldigende bewijs“ „niet“ aan de defensieteam van Jawad, en op 19 September Brigadegeneraal was geleverd. Gen. Hartmann, rechtskundige adviseur van de Commissie de', werd „opnieuw toegewezen“ nadat drie rechters van de Commissie - alle militaire ambtenaren van de V.S., die door de overheid worden benoemd - hem van twee proeven (en één post-proefoverzicht) wegens zijn transparante pro-vervolgingsbias hadden gediskwalificeerd. Dit was bijzonder zich ongerust maakt, omdat zijn baanbeschrijving - zoals bepaald in het Militaire Akte van de Commissie van 2006, dat de Commissie deed herleven nadat het Opperste Hof onwettig hen besliste - bepaalde dat hij was vereist „neutraal en onbevooroordeeld blijven.“

Vorige week, na verdere analyse - met inbegrip van het belangrijke werk door wetsprofessor Scott Horton - - ik schreef een gedetailleerd artikel, Het donkere Hart van de Proeven Guantánamo, waarin ik op voorbeelden van pro-vervolgingsbias namens de werkgever van Hartmann, Susan Crawford trok, de Commissie' Bijeenroepend Instantie, en omhoog dit systemische bias de ketting van bevel, via het Algemene Advies van het Pentagoon, aan Dick Cheney en David Addington, de scheppers van het volledige proces van de Commissie vond. Cheney en de ijver van Addington voor bevrijde uitvoerende macht wezen, in geen onzekere termen, erop dat de onpartijdigheid van zowel Hartmann als Crawford niets meer dan een mantel was om naakte politieke doelstellingen van de Commissie de' te vermommen: beveiligend overtuigingen in een gemonteerd systeem dat wordt ontworpen om acquittals te verhinderen.

Als Washinton Post recently explained, the Convening Authority is “required to exercise a neutral role in the commissions, overseeing but not dictating the work of prosecutors and allocating resources to both the prosecution and defense,” but a clear example of Crawford’s pro-prosecution bias was revealed by Col. Morris Davis, the Commissions’ former chief prosecutor, who resigned in October 2007, primarily because of political interference in the process.

Writing in the Los Angeles Times last December, Davis wrote that Crawford, unlike her predecessor Maj. Gen. John Altenburg, whose staff had “kept its distance from the prosecution to preserve its impartiality,” had overstepped her administrative role, and “had her staff assessing evidence before the filing of charges, directing the prosecution’s pre-trial preparation of cases” and “drafting charges against those who were accused and assigning prosecutors to cases.” Davis’ stark conclusion — that “Intermingling convening authority and prosecutor roles perpetuates the perception of a rigged process stacked against the accused” — was unerringly accurate, but with Hartmann shielding her from criticism (and taking all the flak himself), Crawford has so far avoided calls for her resignation, even though, as Scott Horton pointed out in February, she is “a Cheney protégée,” and is, moreover, “particularly close to Cheney’s chief of staff David Addington.”

Shortly after my article about the corrupt command structure of the Commissions was published, I received an enlightening email from Maj. David Frakt, Mohamed Jawad’s military defense lawyer, which provided additional details confirming the bias of both Brig. Gen. Hartmann and Susan Crawford.

More criticism of Brig. Gen. Hartmann

Maj. Frakt was kind enough to point out that “Hartmann was fired,” and that “his claim that he was promoted is nonsense.” He cited testimony by Hartmann in Jawad’s case on June 19, and in a subsequent affidavit, in which he stated that he had three different duties as legal adviser: he was responsible for logistics, planning and resources, he was the supervisor of the prosecution, and he was the legal adviser. As Maj. Frakt explained, “His promotion consisted of removing two of those three duties. He is now responsible only for logistics, planning and resources.”

He added that most of this work is done by the Commissions Support Group (CSG) at Guantánamo, headed by Brig. Gen. Zanetti, who testified in a hearing on Jawad’s case in August that “Hartmann had tried to have the CSG assigned to his ‘command’ even though he was in Washington and lawyers do not generally command anything,” and confirmed that Hartmann “was definitely trying to take charge of the whole process.” I found Zanetti’s comment that “lawyers do not generally command anything” (as paraphrased by Maj. Frakt) to be particularly telling, as it reflects the way in which lawyers (Addington, John Yoo, Alberto Gonzales) have actually played crucial roles in driving the cruelest manifestations of the administration’s “War on Terror” policies.

Maj. Frakt also drew my attention to other examples of Hartmann’s overreach: in particular, a timeline for the trials that he created in November 2007, and reports about the ways in which he had briefed commanders at Guantánamo on his plans, both of which exceeded his remit as an impartial adviser.

According to Capt. Patrick McCarthy, the Staff Judge Advocate of Joint Task Force Guantánamo, who made a deposition in Jawad’s case on June 30 at Maj. Frakt’s request, Hartmann (who, he said, was “remarkably aggressive” to him during meetings at Guantánamo) briefed him in November 2007 on “a plan for a way forward on the number of cases that would be charged in each month.” He explained, “He has a large foldout chart that’s probably three or three and a half, four feet long. It’s a well-known chart and it has on that chart the kind of lay down of how many cases will be proceeding and sort of monthly times as they will proceed.”

Hartmann admitted the existence of this timeline during the hearing on June 19, and as Maj. Frakt demonstrated in a motion to dismiss in August, when he compared the dates on Hartmann’s chart with the dates the prisoners were actually charged he realized that they were remarkably similar. “It is easy to come up with a sinister explanation for the congruence of the chart and the scheduling order,” he wrote, adding, “It is hard to come up with an innocent one.”

Capt. McCarthy also testified that, as well as being bullying and dismissive to himself and, it seemed, every other officer below the rank of General or Admiral at Guantánamo, Hartmann had held several secure video teleconferences with the commanders at Guantánamo, and two face-to-face meetings, which, it appeared, were also part of his mission to “brief” commanders on how and when the trials would proceed, rather than allowing these issues to be developed by the prosecutors. As McCarthy described it, Hartmann “would closely identify himself with prosecutorial efforts,” was “involved at a level of detail that no other general or flag officer that I’ve ever worked for or with has ever been involved at,” and gave the impression that he was “responsible for moving forward with military commissions in all respects.”

More disturbing revelations about the Convening Authority

Maj. Frakt also revealed more disturbing details about Susan Crawford’s role. After revisiting the August ruling of Col. Stephen Henley, the judge in Jawad’s case, who disqualified Hartmann for a second time, and “ordered that the defense be given an opportunity to submit matters in extenuation and mitigation, and that Crawford reconsider her referral decision and either ratify the earlier decision or take other appropriate action without further input from Hartmann,” Maj. Frakt explained that in early September “the prosecutors sought reconsideration of the judge’s ruling, filing a brief which included an affidavit from Hartmann and an affidavit from Crawford herself.”

This is enormously significant, as it provides another concrete example of Crawford’s interference, to add to Col. Davis’ account, and it is made all the more disturbing by Maj. Frakt’s subsequent explanation of how Hartmann and Crawford seemed to connive to sway the judge’s opinion. Their argument, he wrote, centered on claims that Crawford “had not been misled by Hartmann’s recommendation that the case against Jawad be referred as non-capital,” which, as he pointed out, “was misleading because it suggested that capital punishment was an option, when it was not an authorized punishment for the offenses with which Jawad is charged.” The end result, he noted, was that “The brief filed by the government severely distorted the facts.”

Despite this, Col. Henley amended his ruling the next day, authorizing Hartmann to review the matters submitted by the defense and to supplement his original pre-trial advice. Maj. Frakt was appalled. He had been denied the opportunity to respond (as he stated, he was “supposed to get one week to respond to filings from the opposing party”), and he immediately filed a motion “pointing out the factual errors in the government brief and protesting this action, including the fact that the judge acted without input from the defense.” Most importantly, he “requested that Crawford be disqualified since she had made herself a witness in a contested matter before the commission.” He noted, however, that “The judge never responded.”

In addition, Maj. Frakt explained that, although he knew that it was “completely futile” to submit a request for reconsideration, he nevertheless “put together a detailed memorandum explaining the evidentiary, factual and legal deficiencies in the case and detailing the extensive mitigating and extenuating circumstances,” which he submitted on September 15. He also included letters from concerned citizens, a petition urging Crawford to drop the case, and various legal documents, but explained that, although he “repeatedly requested a personal audience” with Crawford, “she refused to meet with me, citing a policy of not having ex parte communications with either party.” Cutting once more to the heart of the problem — Crawford’s thinly-veiled bias — Maj. Frakt added, “This is utter nonsense. She is not a judge and is specifically authorized to discuss matters with either party.”

Mohamed Jawad and the fog of “war crimes”

Moreover, Hartmann’s departure has clearly done nothing to stem Crawford’s enthusiasm for referring charges without paying any heed to arguments made by the defense, and in this she seems to have the full support of Hartmann’s replacement, Col. Mike Chapman. Maj. Frakt explained that on September 22 (Chapman’s first day as legal adviser) he issued a new pre-trial advice to Crawford — “chock full of misleading characterizations of the facts and misstatements of the law,” as Maj. Frakt put it — in response to his submissions, in which he stated that there was “no merit to the defense arguments.” The following day, as Maj. Frakt proceeded to explain, “Crawford ‘ratified’ her referral decision and confirmed that she wanted the case to go forward.” However, while this appears to be another example of Crawford’s predetermined inflexibility, which leads me to wonder if anything could persuade her not to go forward with the cases before her, Jawad, at least, appears to have some support from the judge in his case.

On September 24, Col. Henley issued three rulings on motions to dismiss that were filed in May and June, and Maj. Frakt explained that, although he “declined to dismiss the charges,” he “came very close.” Essentially, as Maj. Frakt described it, Col. Henley “ruled that the government had offered no persuasive authority for their legal position on the meaning of the elements of ‘murder in violation of the law of war’” (the offense Jawad is accused of committing, even though no one died in the grenade attack). According to the government, Jawad’s status as an “unlawful combatant” or “unprivileged belligerent” (variants on the familiar label of “enemy combatant”) is all that is required to prove that his acts were “in violation of the law of war.”

This is actually nonsense, and Maj. Frakt proceeded to explain that a violation of the law of war should actually mean that there was “something in the nature of the act allegedly committed by Jawad that violated the law of war (e.g. an illegal weapon was used, or protected persons were targeted).” He added, “Because Jawad is accused of using a lawful weapon to attack lawful targets (uniformed enemy soldiers) there is no independent violation of the law of war.”

Col. Henley seemed to agree, but he “declined to dismiss the case because he said he did not know what evidence the government had and would give them a chance to prove their case,” although he added that if the prosecution “didn’t have any facts that would tend to prove a violation of the law of war, then they had an independent ethical obligation to go to the Convening Authority and ask her to dismiss the charges.”

He then ordered the government to provide a “bill of particulars” (a statement of facts detailing how the prosecution would prove the elements of the offense), but as Maj. Frakt described it, this document “simply rehashed the government’s prior stance that the violation of the law of war consisted of not being a lawful combatant and wearing civilian clothes to blend in with the local population.” Pointing out the absurdity of this position, he explained, “The government states he is an unlawful combatant because he was not a member of a regular army in military uniform, but then claims his violation of the law of war was wearing civilian clothes.” He added, “I have noted several times that Jawad was part of the local population. He is an Afghan citizen.”

Quite how this absurd trial will pan out remains to be seen, but if there is hope for Mohamed Jawad, the same cannot be said for the Commissions in general, which are suffering from inbuilt problems that cannot be remedied by the dismissal of either the legal adviser to the Convening Authority or the Convening Authority herself — although the accumulating evidence certainly suggests that, like Brig. Gen. Hartmann, Susan Crawford should be removed from her post.

Enshrining political manipulation

Several legal scholars have been noting these problems for some time. In August, for example, Professor Gregory S. McNeal, a former academic consultant to the Commissions’ chief prosecutor, wrote that the structure and rules for the Commissions, as crafted by the Department of Defense, “allowed for political manipulation of nearly all aspects of the trials.”

One of the major flaws identified by McNeal was the nature of the Convening Authority’s role. In the courts-martial system, from which the Commissions are vaguely derived, the Convening Authority is a military commander, who is presumed to be capable of “unbiased and apolitical decision-making.” In the Military Commissions Act, however, it is stated that Military Commissions “may be convened by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or official of the United States designated by the Secretary for that purpose”; in other words, that civilians, like Susan Crawford, can be brought in to deliberately exert the “undue command influence” with which both she, and her legal adviser, have repeatedly been identified.

In my opinion, this is a crucial distinction, deliberately tailored by the administration to allow a puppet of the executive to fulfil her master’s commands, and it explains, I think, why there will be no justice at Guantánamo until the whole system is dismantled and the trials are moved to the US mainland, where judges are free to throw out risible and/or rigged charges like those against Mohamed Jawad, and to grapple, independently, with the problems they will undoubtedly face in prosecuting the handful of genuinely dangerous individuals at Guantánamo in a court that can claim legitimacy.

Until this time comes, I am thankful to Maj. Frakt for sharing his insights with me, and I will continue to expose the “undue command influence” that poisons Dick Cheney and David Addington’s ill-conceived, quasi-legal system of show trials.

Have Your Say: New Evidence of Systemic Bias in Guantánamo Trials
Please read our posting guidelines before posting.
Alternatively you can discuss this report here.

RSS TrackBack URL

Name (required)

Mail (will not be published) (required)

Website

Related News

• Guantanamo general calls 2nd general ‘bullying’
• Al Jazeera Cameraman Freed From Guantánamo
• Washington ordered destruction of Guantánamo interrogation records
• Guantanamo official says he’s not resigning
• Guantánamo torture records lost

This entry was posted on Monday, October 13th, 2008 at 8:03 pm and is filed under Surveillance, Civil Liberties & Human Rights News . You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

Loading ...

ADVERTISEMENTS

SITE MAPS

7/7 Afghanistan Alternative-Energy Art Barack Obama BBC Big-Brother Bilderberg Biometrics Bush CCTV Censorship CIA Climate-Change Cover-Up Cults Culture Database-State David-Hicks David-Ray-Griffin Debt Democrats Demos Drugs Education Entertainment Environmental News EU False-Flag FBI Fraud Free-Speech Freemasons G8 Globalization Guantanamo Health-News History ID-Cards Internet Iran Iraq Israel John McCain Law Marches Media News MI5 MI6 Microsoft Military MoD Money Music NASA Neocons New World Order NSA Oil Pakistan Podcast Police-State Propaganda Reviews RFID RINF Rumsfeld Science Science & Technology News Secrecy Security Slavery Space Sports Spy Spying Stephen-Lendman Technology Terrorism Tony-Blair Torture TV UK-News UN USA- USA-News Video Voting war War & Terrorism News Warfare White-House Wolfowitz World-News Yahoo
2003 - 2005 Archives | 2005 - 2007 Archives | 2007 - 2008 Archives | Current Archives | Past Version