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Thursday, August 14th, 2008 週四， 2008年8月14日

TomDispatch tomdispatch | To the problem of an overstretched, over-toured military, there is but one answer in Washington. |的問題，一過度，過度參觀軍事，有一個答案，但在華盛頓舉行。 Both presidential candidates (along with just about every other politician in our nation’s capital) are on record wanting to significantly expand the Army and the Marines.雙方總統候選人（連同剛才其他每一個政治家在我們國家的首都）是在紀錄上要顯著擴大陸軍和海軍陸戰隊員。 In part two of his series at TomDispatch, adapted from his remarkable new book, The Limits of Power, The End of American Exceptionalism, historian and retired colonel Andrew Bacevich suggests a solution to the American military crisis that might seem obvious enough, if only both parties weren’t so blinded by the idea of our “global reach,” by a belief, however wrapped in euphemisms, in our imperial role on this planet, and by the imperial Pentagon and presidency that go with it: reduce the mission.在一部分，他的兩個系列tomdispatch ，改編自他的了不起的新著，限制權力，去年底美國例外，歷史學家和退役上校安德魯巴切維奇提出了解決美國的軍事危機可能似乎顯而易見不夠的，如果只有兩各方沒有那麼蒙蔽的思想，我們的“全球到達” ，由一個信仰，但是裹在委婉的說法，在我們帝國的角色，在這個星球上，由帝國五角大樓和總統表示，去與它：減少的使命。

That is the heart of his latest piece.這是心的他的最新作品。 As he writes: “America doesn’t need a bigger army.他寫道： “美國並不需要一個更大的軍隊。 It needs a smaller — that is, more modest — foreign policy, one that assigns soldiers missions that are consistent with their capabilities.它需要一個較小-即是較溫和的-的外交政策，一指派士兵的任務是一致的，與他們的能力。 Modesty implies giving up on the illusions of grandeur to which the end of the Cold War and then 9/11 gave rise.謙虛意味著放棄對幻想宏偉而冷戰的結束，然後9 / 11產生了。 It also means reining in the imperial presidents who expect the army to make good on those illusions.這也意味著遏制在帝國總統誰期望軍隊好好對那些心存幻想。 When it comes to supporting the troops, here lies the essence of a citizen’s obligation.”當談到支持部隊，在這裡，關鍵的本質，公民的義務“ 。

In this striking post, Bacevich also lays out the wrong lessons that our leaders have drawn from Bush’s wars and they all spell trouble: first, that the challenges posed by Iraq and Afghanistan define not only the military’s present but also its future, the “next war”; second, that the corrective to civilian arrogance and misjudgment is obvious — that the civil-military balance should be tilted back in favor of the generals, untying the hands of senior commanders; and third, that the All-Volunteer Force needs to be junked altogether.在這引人注目的職位，巴切維奇也提出了錯誤的教訓，我們的領導人已制訂從布什的戰爭和他們都帶來麻煩：第一，所帶來的挑戰伊拉克和阿富汗的定義不只是軍事的，但目前還其未來， “下一場戰爭” ;第二，糾正，以平民的囂張氣焰和誤判是顯而易見的-即民間的軍事平衡，應傾斜早在主張將軍，開放市場之手的高級指揮官;第三，認為所有-義工的力量，必須破共有。

Bacevich’s latest piece represents an incisive analysis of the way lessons drawn will determine our future.巴切維奇的最新作品，代表了一個精闢的分析方法中吸取的教訓，將決定我們的未來。 This post is a warning against “lessons” of the Bush era that will lead to perpetual war — from a man who knows his business.這個職位是一個警告， “教訓”的文章認為，布什時代，這將導致永久的戰爭-從一名男子誰知道他的業務。

Note: Andrew Bacevich will discuss his new book — and the limits of American power in the Bush era — for a full hour on “Bill Moyers Journal,” Friday, August 15th. 注：安德魯巴切維奇將討論他的新書-和限制美國的力量在布什時代-一個充分小時就“條例草案莫耶斯日報”週五， 8月1 5日。 Don’t miss it.千萬不要錯過。 Go離去 here這裡 to check broadcasts and times in your area.檢查的廣播節目和時間在您的地區。 If you’re watching the Olympics, TIVO it or look for a repeat.如果您在觀看奧運會， TiVo公司，或尋找一種重複。

Is Perpetual War Our Future?是永久的戰爭，我們的未來？
Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Bush Era學習了錯誤的教訓，布什時代
By Andrew Bacevich安德魯巴切維奇

To appreciate the full extent of the military crisis into which the United States has been plunged requires understanding what the Iraq War and, to a lesser extent, the Afghan War have to teach.欣賞最大限度的軍事危機到其中美國一直陷入需要了解什麼，伊拉克戰爭以及在較小的程度上，阿富汗戰爭已任教。 These two conflicts, along with the attacks of September 11, 2001, will form the centerpiece of George W. Bush’s legacy.這兩個衝突，隨襲擊2001年9月11日，將形成的核心喬治W布什奇摩的遺產。 Their lessons ought to constitute the basis of a new, more realistic military policy.他們的教訓，應該構成的基礎上一個新的，更切合實際的軍事政策。

In some respects, the effort to divine those lessons is well under way, spurred by critics of President Bush’s policies on the left and the right as well as by reform-minded members of the officer corps.在某些方面，努力神聖的這些經驗教訓正在順利進行，帶動批評布什總統的政策對左和右，以及由具有改革意識的成員，軍官團。 Broadly speaking, this effort has thus far yielded three distinct conclusions.大致來說，這方面的努力至今已取得了三個截然不同的結論。 Whether taken singly or together, they invert the post-Cold War military illusions that provided the foundation for the president’s Global War on Terror.是否採取單獨或合計，他們反轉冷戰後的軍事幻想提供了基礎，總統的全球反恐戰爭。 In exchange for these received illusions, they propound new ones, which are equally misguided.在換取這些收到的幻想，他們propound新的定居點，這是同樣的錯誤。 Thus far, that is, the lessons drawn from America’s post-9/11 military experience are the wrong ones.因此，到目前為止，那就是，吸取的經驗教訓，從美國的9.11軍事活動的經驗是錯誤的。

According to the first lesson, the armed services — and above all the Army — need to recognize that the challenges posed by Iraq and Afghanistan define not only the military’s present but also its future, the “next war,” as enthusiasts like to say.根據第一次的教訓，軍種-及以上的所有軍隊-必須承認，所帶來的挑戰伊拉克和阿富汗的定義不只是軍事的，但目前還其未來，“未來戰爭”，作為愛好者想說。 Rooting out insurgents, nation-building, training and advising “host nation” forces, population security and control, winning hearts and minds — these promise to be ongoing priorities, preoccupying US troops for decades to come, all across the Islamic world.剷除叛亂分子，民族的建設，培訓和提供諮詢意見“主辦國”勢力，人口安全和管制，贏得人心-這些承諾提供持續的優先次序，令人擔憂，美軍幾十年來，全國各地伊斯蘭世界。

Rather than brief interventions ending in decisive victory, sustained presence will be the norm.而不是簡單的干預措施結束在決定性的勝利，持續存在，將成為規範。 Large-scale conventional conflict like 1991’s Operation Desert Storm becomes the least likely contingency.大規模常規衝突一樣， 1991年的沙漠風暴行動中成為最有可能的應變。 The future will be one of small wars, expected to be frequent, protracted, perhaps perpetual.未來將是一個小型的戰爭，預計會有頻繁，長期的，也許是永久的。

Although advanced technology will retain an important place in such conflicts, it will not be decisive.雖然先進的技術將保留重要的地位，在這種衝突中，它不會是決定性的。 Wherever possible, the warrior will rely on “nonkinetic” methods, functioning as diplomat, mediator, and relief worker.只要有可能，勇士將依靠“ nonkinetic ”的方法，運作，作為外交官，調停，和救濟工作。 No doubt American soldiers will engage in combat, but, drawing on the latest findings of social science, they will also demonstrate cultural sensitivity, not to speak of mastering local languages and customs.毫無疑問，美國士兵將參與在戰鬥中，但，汲取最新的結果，社會科學，他們也會表現出文化敏感性，不要說掌握當地語言和風俗習慣。 As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it in October 2007, “Reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure and promoting good governance” had now become soldiers’ business.作為國務卿，國防部長羅伯特蓋茨把它在2007年10月， “振興公共服務，重建基礎設施和促進善政和”現在已經成為官兵的業務。 “All these so-called nontraditional capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy — where they must stay.” “所有這些所謂的非傳統的能力，已經進入了該領域的主流軍事思想，規劃和戰略-在這裡他們必須留” 。

This prospect implies a rigorous integration of military action with political purpose.這一前景意味著嚴格的一體化的軍事行動與政治目的。 Hard power and soft power will merge.硬實力和軟實力將合併。 The soldier on the ground will serve as both cop and social worker.這名士兵在地面將作為雙方締約方會議和社會工作者。 This prospect also implies shedding the sort of utopian expectations that produced so much confident talk of “transformation,” “shock-and-awe,” and “networkcentric warfare” — all of which had tended to segregate war and politics into separate compartments.這一前景也意味著脫落的那種烏托邦式的期望，產生了這麼多有信心，談“轉型” ， “休克和敬畏， ”和“ networkcentric戰” -所有這些傾向以分隔戰爭和政治獨立的隔間。

Local conditions will dictate technique, dooming the Pentagon’s effort to devise a single preconceived, technologically determined template applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict.因地制宜，將決定技術， dooming五角大樓的努力，制定一個單一的成見，在技術上確定範本適用於在整個頻譜的衝突。 When it comes to low-intensity wars, the armed services will embrace a style owing less to the traditions of the Civil War, World War II, or even Gulf War I than to the nearly forgotten American experiences in the Philippines after 1898 and in Central America during the 1920s.當談到低強度戰爭中，武裝服務將樹立一種風格，由於少的傳統，內戰，第二次世界大戰，或什至海灣一戰，比近忘記了美國的經驗，在菲律賓後，於1898年在中環美國在20世紀20年代。 Instead of looking for inspiration at the campaigns of US Grant, George Patton, or H. Norman Schwarzkopf, officers will study postwar British and French involvement in places like Palestine and Malaya, Indochina and Algeria.而不是尋找靈感，在運動的美國贈款，喬治巴頓，或每小時諾曼施瓦茨科普夫，研究人員將二戰後的英國和法國參與的地方，像巴勒斯坦和馬來亞，印度支那和阿爾及利亞。

In sum, an officer corps bloodied in Iraq and Afghanistan has seen the future and it points to many more Iraqs and Afghanistans.總括而言，一軍官團血淋淋的在伊拉克和阿富汗已經看到了未來和它點多iraqs和afghanistans 。 Whereas the architects of full spectrum dominance had expected the unprecedented lethality, range, accuracy, and responsiveness of high-tech striking power to perpetuate military dominion, the veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan know better.而建築師的全譜優勢的預期前所未有的殺傷力，射程，準確性和反應能力的高科技打擊的權力，永久的軍事統治，退伍軍人，伊拉克和阿富汗的更清楚知道。 They remain committed to global dominance while believing that its pursuit will require not only advanced weaponry but also the ability to put boots on the ground and keep them there.他們仍然致力於在全球的統治地位，而認為其追求將不僅需要先進的武器裝備，而且有能力把靴子在地面上，並讓他們有。 This, in turn, implies a plentiful supply of soldiers and loads of patience on the home front.這反過來又意味著豐富的供應，士兵和負荷的耐性，對民政戰線。

Were the Civilians of the Defense Department Responsible? 被平民國防部負責呢？

Viewed from another perspective, however, the post-9/11 wars teach an altogether different lesson.從另一個角度看，不過， 9.11戰爭，教導一完全不同的教訓。 According to this alternative view, echoing a similar complaint during the Vietnam era, the shortcomings of US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan have little to do with the actual performance of American forces in the field and everything to do with the meddling of bumbling civilians back in Washington.根據這個辦法的看法，呼應了類似的投訴在越南的時代，缺點，美國的政策在伊拉克和阿富汗的關係不大，與實際的表現，美國軍隊在該領域的一切事都與插手的bumbling平民早在華盛頓。 In its simplest form, fault lies not with the troops themselves, nor with their commanders, but with the likes of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, who prevented the troops from doing their jobs.在其最簡單的形式，故障不在於與自己的部隊，也不符合他們的指揮官，但與喜歡的國務卿，國防部長拉姆斯菲爾德，國防部副部長保羅沃爾福威茨和副國防部長道格拉斯費思，誰妨礙了部隊做他們的就業機會。

The charges leveled by Major General John Batiste, who served in Rumsfeld’s Pentagon but subsequently retired in disgust and became one of the defense secretary’s loudest military critics, are representative of this view.收費為平地少將約翰蒂斯特，誰服務，在拉姆斯菲爾德的五角大樓，但後來在退休的厭惡和反感，並成為其中的國防部長的最響的軍事評論家，是代表這個看法。 “Rumsfeld’s dismal strategic decisions resulted in the unnecessary deaths of American servicemen and women,” Batiste declared in September 2006. “拉姆斯菲爾德的令人沮喪的戰略決策，造成不必要的死亡的美國軍人和婦女， ”正在緊鑼密鼓地宣布在2006年9月。 The former general held Rumsfeld personally “responsible for America and her allies going to war with the wrong plan.” But that was just for starters.前者一般舉行，拉姆斯菲爾德親自“負責美國和她的盟友前往戰爭與錯誤的計劃” ，但當時只是個開始。 Rumsfeld also “violated fundamental principles of war, dismissed deliberate military planning, ignored the hard work to build the peace after the fall of Saddam Hussein, set the conditions for Abu Ghraib and other atrocities that further ignited the insurgency, disbanded Iraqi security force institutions when we needed them most, [and] constrained our commanders with an overly restrictive de-Ba’athification policy.”拉姆斯菲爾德還“違反基本原則的戰爭，被解僱的蓄意軍事規劃，忽略了辛勤工作，以建設和平後，薩達姆政權倒台後，設定的條件，阿布格萊布和其他暴行，進一步點燃了叛亂，解散伊拉克安全部隊院校當我們最需要的， [和]約束我們的指揮官與1過度限制德- ba'athification政策“ 。

Nor was the problem limited to Rumsfeld himself.也不是問題，只限於拉姆斯菲爾德本人。 It included his chief lieutenants.它包括他的首席助手。 According to Batiste, Rumsfeld surrounded himself “with like-minded and compliant subordinates who [did] not grasp the importance of the principles of war, the complexities of Iraq, or the human dimension of warfare.” The overall effect was tantamount to murder: Rumsfeld “tied the hands of commanders while our troops were in contact with the enemy.”據蒂斯特，拉姆斯菲爾德的周圍都是他的“與志同道合的和兼容的下屬誰[並]不把握原則的重要性戰爭中，伊拉克的複雜性，或人的層面戰爭”的總體效果等同於謀殺：拉姆斯菲爾德“綁手的指揮官，而我們的部隊在與敵人” 。

Here lies the second preliminary lesson drawn from Iraq and Afghanistan, one that appeals to disgruntled military officers like Batiste, but also to Democrats eager to blame the Bush administration for any and all sins and to neoconservatives looking to absolve themselves of responsibility for botched wars that they had once cavalierly promoted.在這裡，關鍵的第二個初步的教訓，從伊拉克和阿富汗，一個呼籲心懷不滿的軍官一樣，正在緊鑼密鼓地，而且還同盟急於歸咎於布什政府的任何及所有的罪孽和新保守派尋找開脫自己的責任，拙劣的戰爭他們曾經cavalierly晉升。 The corrective to civilian arrogance and misjudgment is obvious: It requires tilting the civil-military balance back in favor of the generals, untying the hands of senior commanders.糾正，以平民的囂張氣焰和誤判是很明顯的：它需要擺式民間的軍事平衡，早在有利於將領，不附帶條件的手中，高級指揮員。

From this perspective, the most important lesson to take away from Iraq and Afghanistan is the imperative to empower military professionals.從這個角度來看，最重要的教訓，採取遠離伊拉克和阿富汗的是，必須賦予軍事人才。 The Petraeus moment of 2007, when all of official Washington from President Bush to the lowest-ranking congressional staffer waited with bated breath for General David Petraeus to formulate basic policy for Iraq, offers a preview of how this lesson might play itself out.該彼得雷烏斯的時刻， 2007年，當所有的官方華盛頓，從布什總統到最低級別的國會工作人員等與bated呼氣一般大衛彼得雷烏斯制定的基本政策，為伊拉克提供了預覽如何這個教訓，可能發揮的本身。

Is a Draft the Answer? 是一個草案的答案？

There is also a third perspective, which blames the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan on a problematic relationship between soldiers and society.也有三分之一的角度來看，這歸咎於失敗的伊拉克和阿富汗對有問題的關係，士兵和社會。 According to this view, the All-Volunteer Force itself is the problem.根據這一觀點，所有義工的力量本身就是問題所在。 As the military historian Adrian Lewis observed, “The most significant transformation in the American conduct of war since World War II and the invention of the atomic bomb was not technological, but cultural, social, and political — the removal of the American people from the conduct of war.” Only after 9/11, with the Bush administration waging war on multiple fronts, have the implications of this transformation become fully evident.作為軍事歷史學家阿德里安劉易斯指出， “最重要的轉型，在美國進行的戰爭是第二次世界大戰以來和發明原子彈的不是技術，而是文化，社會和政治-取消對美國人民從戰爭行為“後，才9 / 11 ，與布什政府發動戰爭在多個領域，都有影響，這種轉變成為完全可見一斑。

A reliance on volunteer-professionals places a de facto cap on the army’s overall size.一，依靠義工專業學位一種事實上的上限，軍隊的總體規模。 The pool of willing recruits is necessarily limited.濟濟願意新兵必然是有限的。 Given a choice, most young Americans will opt for opportunities other than military service, with protracted war diminishing rather than enhancing any collective propensity to volunteer.作出選擇，最年輕的美國人會選擇的機會以外的其他兵役，與曠日持久的戰爭逐漸減少，而非增加任何集體傾向，以義工。 It is virtually inconceivable that any presidential call to the colors, however impassioned, any PR campaign, however cleverly designed, or any package of pay and bonuses, however generous, could reverse this disinclination.它幾乎是不可想像的，任何總統呼籲顏色，但慷慨激昂的，任何公關活動，但巧妙的設計，或任何的一攬子薪酬及花紅，但慷慨的，可以扭轉這種不願。

Furthermore, to the extent that an army composed of regulars is no longer a people’s army, the people have little say in its use.此外，為了程度的一名陸軍組成的常客不再是一個人民的軍隊，人民沒有多大的發言權，其使用。 In effect, the professional military has become an extension of the imperial presidency.在實際上，職業化軍隊已成為延長帝國總統。 The troops fight when and where the commander in chief determines.部隊撲滅何時及何地的指揮官在行政決定。

Finally, a reliance on professional soldiers eviscerates the concept of civic duty, relieving citizens at large of any obligation to contribute to the nation’s defense.最後，依賴於職業軍人eviscerates的概念，公民責任，紓緩市民在大型的任何義務作出貢獻，向全國的國防。 Ending the draft during the waning days of the Vietnam War did nothing to heal the divisions created by that conflict; instead, it ratified the separation of army from society.截至草案在減弱天的越南戰爭並沒有癒合的分歧所造成的衝突，而是批准了分離軍隊從社會。 Like mowing lawns and bussing tables, fighting and perhaps dying to sustain the American way of life became something that Americans pay others to do.像刈割草坪和總線表，戰鬥和死亡的，也許，以維持美國的生活方式，成為一些美國人的薪酬其他國家也這樣做。

So the third lesson of the Iraq War focuses on the need to repair the relationship between army and society.因此，第三點啟示，對伊拉克戰爭的主要集中在需要修復之間的關係，軍隊和社會。 One way to do this is to junk the All-Volunteer Force altogether.方法之一，這樣做是垃圾全義工隊共有。 Rather than rely on professionals, perhaps it makes sense to revive the tradition of the citizen-soldier.而不是僅僅依靠專業人士，或許它使意識恢復傳統的公民兵。

Proposals to restore this hallowed tradition invariably conjure up images of reinstituting some form of conscription.建議恢復這一神聖的傳統，總是conjure形象重新某種形式的徵兵制度。 In place of a system based on the principle of individual choice, those unhappy with the AVF advocate a system based on the principle of state compulsion.在地方，一個制度的原則基礎上的個人選擇，那些不愉快的與aVF導聯主張制度的原則基礎上的國家強制。

The advantages offered by such a system are hardly trivial.的優勢，所提供的這樣一個系統是難以微不足道。 To the extent that Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the operational, political, and moral problems produced by relying on a small professional force, a draft seems to offer one obvious way to alleviate those problems.向程度伊拉克和阿富汗，暴露了業務，政治和道德問題的產生是靠一個小型的專業力量，草案似乎提供了一個明顯的方式，以減輕這些問題。

For those who worry that the existing army is overextended, conscription provides a mechanism for expansion.對於那些誰擔心，現有的軍隊是過度，徵兵提供了一種機制，擴大。 Triple the size of the army — in essence restoring the structure that existed during much of the Cold War — and the personnel shortages that constrain the prosecution of ground campaigns will disappear.三重的大小軍隊-在本質上恢復結構存在的期間，大部分的冷戰-和人員短缺，制約了檢察機關的地面運動將會消失。 Sustaining the military commitment to Iraq for ten or twenty years, or even a century as Senator John McCain and many neoconservatives are willing to contemplate, then becomes a viable proposition.維持軍事對伊拉克的承諾，為十或二十年，或什至一個世紀，作為參議員麥凱恩和許多新保守派都願意爭議，然後成為一個可行的主張。

War planners will no longer find themselves obliged to give short shrift to Contingency A (Afghanistan) in order to support Contingency B (Iraq).戰爭策劃者將不再覺得自己有責任給予短期shrift應變一（阿富汗） ，以支持應急乙（伊拉克） 。 The concept of “surge” will take on a whole new meaning with the Pentagon able to dispatch not a measly 30,000 reinforcements to Iraq or another few thousand to Afghanistan, but 100,000 or more additional troops wherever they might be needed.的概念， “風”將採取對整個新的意義與五角大樓可以派遣不是一個measly 30000增援伊拉克或另一幾千元到阿富汗，但十萬或更多的額外部隊的情況下，他們可能需要。 Was the problem with Operation Iraqi Freedom too few “boots on the ground” for occupation and reconstruction?是的問題與伊拉克自由行動太少“靴子在地面上”佔領和重建？ Reconstitute the draft, and that problem goes away.重組草案，並表示，問題消失了。

Creating a mass army might even permit the United States to resuscitate the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine with its emphasis on “overwhelming force.”建立一個大規模軍隊，甚至可能允許美國復甦•溫伯格-鮑威爾學說其重點是“壓倒性的力量” 。

For those distressed by the absence of a politically meaningful antiwar movement despite the Iraq War’s manifest unpopularity, the appeal of conscription differs somewhat.對於那些痛心沒有一個在政治上有意義的反戰運動，儘管伊拉克戰爭的表現不受歡迎，上訴徵兵有點不同。 Some political activists look to an Iraq-era draft to do what the Vietnam-era draft did: animate large-scale protest, alter the political dynamic, and eventually shut down any conflict that lacks widespread popular support.一些政治活動家期待一伊拉克時代的草案做什麼，越南-時代草案做過的事：動畫的大型抗議活動，改變了政治動態，並最終關閉任何衝突，缺乏廣泛的民意支持。 The prospect of involuntary service will pry the kids out of the shopping malls and send them into the streets.前景自願服務將刺探孩子們出於對商場和發送他們到街上巡邏。 It will prod the parents of draft-eligible offspring to see politics as something other than a mechanism for doling out entitlements.它將產品的家長草案符合資格的後代看到政治以外的其他機制doling出來的權利。 As a consequence, members of Congress keen to retain their seats will define their wartime responsibilities as something more than simply rubber-stamping spending bills proposed by the White House.作為一個後果，國會議員，熱衷於保留在其座位上，將界定其戰時的責任更比單純橡皮圖章開支法案所提出的白宮。 In this way, a draft could reinvigorate American democracy, restore the governmental system of checks and balances, and constrain the warmongers inhabiting the executive branch.就這樣，草案可以重振美國的民主，恢復政府的制衡制度，以及制約戰爭販子棲息行政部門。

For those moved by moral considerations, a draft promises to ensure a more equitable distribution of sacrifice in war time.對於所提出的道德的考慮，草案的承諾，以確保更公平地分配在戰爭中犧牲的時間。 No longer will rural Americans, people of color, recent immigrants, and members of the working class fill the ranks of the armed forces in disproportionate numbers.將不再是美國人的農村，人們的顏色，最近的移民，工作組成員階層填補職級的武裝部隊在不相稱的號碼。 With conscription, the children of the political elite and of the well-to-do will once again bear their fair share of the load.徵兵，孩子們的政治精英和井到這樣做將再次承擔其公平地分擔負載。 Those reaping the benefits of the American way of life will contribute to its defense, helping to garrison the more distant precincts of empire.這些獲得的好處，美國的生活方式，將有助於其國防，幫助駐軍更遙遠的選區的帝國。 Perhaps even the editorial staffs of the Weekly Standard, National Review, and the New Republic might have the opportunity to serve, a salutary prospect given the propensity of those magazines to argue on behalf of military intervention.甚至編輯的工作人員每週的標準，國家審查，以及新的共和國可能有機會服務，一個有益的前景鑑於傾向那些雜誌爭辯的名義進行軍事干預。

Reconfigure the armed services to fight “small wars”; empower the generals; reconnect soldiering to citizenship — on the surface each of these has a certain appeal.重新武裝服務，以爭取“小戰爭” ;授權將領;重新當兵的，以公民身份-表面上每個這些具有一定的吸引力。 But upon closer examination, each also has large defects.但仔細檢查，每個也有大的缺陷。 They are the wrong lessons to take from Iraq and Afghanistan.他們是錯誤的教訓，採取從伊拉克和阿富汗。

Drawing the Right Lessons from the Bush Era 制定正確的教訓，從布什時代

If gearing up to fight “small wars,” deferring to the brass, and scrapping the All-Volunteer Force are the wrong lessons to be drawn from our recent military experience, then what are the right ones?如果準備打“小戰爭” ，推遲到銅管，並取消所有義工的力量是錯誤的吸取的教訓，從我們最近的軍事活動的經驗，那麼，什麼是正確的呢？

The events of the recent past offer several lessons that illuminate these questions.事件最近提供的幾個教訓，照亮了這些問題。 The first concerns the nature of war.第一個問題是戰爭性質。 Iraq and Afghanistan remind us that war is not subject to reinvention, whatever George W. Bush and Pentagon proponents of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs may contend.伊拉克和阿富汗的提醒我們，戰爭是不受改造，無論布什總統和五角大樓的倡議者，即所謂軍事變革，可能會。

War’s essential nature is fixed, permanent, intractable, and irrepressible.戰爭的本質是固定的，永久性的，頑固性，是無法。 War’s constant companions are uncertainty and risk.戰爭的不斷同伴是不確定性和風險。 “War is the realm of chance,” wrote the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz nearly two centuries ago. “戰爭是境界的機會， ”寫軍事理論家卡爾克勞塞維茨近兩個世紀前。 “No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder…” — a judgment that the invention of the computer, the Internet, and precision-guided munitions has done nothing to overturn. “沒有其他的人類活動賦予它更大的範圍：沒有其他有這樣不斷的和不同的交易與這入侵者… … ” -一個判斷的發明，計算機，互聯網和精確制導彈藥已做過任何推翻。

So the first lesson to be taken away from the Bush administration’s two military adventures is simply this: War remains today what it has always been — elusive, untamed, costly, difficult to control, fraught with surprise, and sure to give rise to unexpected consequences.因此，第一課將要採取的遠離，布什政府的兩個軍事冒險是：戰爭的今天仍然是什麼，一直是-難以捉摸的，野蠻，成本高昂，難以控制，充滿驚喜，請務必引起意想不到的後果。 Only the truly demented will imagine otherwise.只有真正的癡呆症患者會想像，否則。

The second lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan derives from the first.第二個教訓伊拉克和阿富汗來自第一。 As has been the case throughout history, the utility of armed force remains finite.作為一直案件在整個歷史上，公用事業武力仍然有限。 Even in the information age, to the extent that force “works,” it does so with respect to a limited range of contingencies.即使在信息時代，以至於武力“工程， ”它這樣做是與尊重，範圍有限的突發事件。

Although die-hard supporters of the Global War on Terror will insist otherwise, events in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated definitively that further reliance on coercive methods will not enable the United States to achieve its objectives.雖然模具整治的支持者，全球反恐戰爭將堅持，否則，事件在伊拉克和阿富汗已表明明確指出，進一步依賴於強制的方法將不會使美國實現其目標。 Whether the actual aim is to democratize the Islamic world or subdue it, the military “option” is not the answer.是否實際目的是要民主化，伊斯蘭世界或征服它，軍事上的“選項” ，是不是問題的答案。

The Bush Doctrine itself provides the basis for a third lesson.布什主義本身就提供了一個基礎的第三個教訓。 For centuries, the Western moral tradition has categorically rejected the concept of preventive war.數百年來，西方的道德傳統，斷然拒絕的概念，預防性戰爭。 The events of 9/11 convinced some that this tradition no longer applied: old constraints had to give way.事件9 / 11深信，一些人認為，這一傳統已不再適用：舊的限制，不得不放棄的方式。 Yet our actual experience with preventive war suggests that, even setting moral considerations aside, to launch a war today to eliminate a danger that might pose a threat at some future date is just plain stupid.然而，我們的實際經驗，與預防性戰爭表明，即使設置從道義上考慮之外，以發動戰爭的今天，以消除一種危險，即可能構成威脅，在今後的某一天，只是平原愚蠢的。 It doesn’t work.它是行不通的。

History has repeatedly demonstrated the irrationality of preventive war.歷史一再表明，非理性的預防性戰爭。 If the world needed a further demonstration, President Bush provided it.如果世界需要一個進一步證明，布什總統向它提供。 Iraq shows us why the Bush Doctrine was a bad idea in the first place and why its abrogation has become essential.伊拉克向我們表明，為什麼布什主義是一個壞主意擺在首位，為什麼它的廢除已成為必不可少的。 For principled guidance in determining when the use of force is appropriate, the country should conform to the Just War tradition — not only because that tradition is consistent with our professed moral values, but also because its provisions provide an eminently useful guide for sound statecraft.為指導原則，在決定何時使用武力是適當的情況下，國家應符合正義戰爭的傳統-這不僅是因為這一傳統是一致的，與我們的p rofessed道德價值觀，而且還因為其條款提供了一個非常有用的指導，健全的治國之。

Finally, there is a fourth lesson, relating to the formulation of strategy.最後，是有四分之一的教訓，有關制訂策略。 The results of US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that in the upper echelons of the government and among the senior ranks of the officer corps, this has become a lost art.結果，美國的政策在伊拉克和阿富汗表明，在上層政府之間的高級職級的軍官團，這已成為失去的藝術。

Since the end of the Cold War, the tendency among civilians — with President Bush a prime example — has been to confuse strategy with ideology.自冷戰結束後，傾向平民-同美國總統布什的一個主要例子-已混淆視聽的策略與思想。 The president’s freedom agenda, which supposedly provided a blueprint for how to prosecute the Global War on Terror, expressed grandiose aspirations without serious effort to assess the means required to achieve them.總統的自由議程，其中理應提供了一個藍圖，如何起訴的全球反恐戰爭，表達了宏偉的願望沒有認真的努力，以評估所需的手段來實現這些目標。 Meanwhile, ever since the Vietnam War ended, the tendency among military officers has been to confuse strategy with operations.同時，自從越南戰爭結束，傾向之間的軍官已被混淆的策略與行動。

Here we come face-to-face with the essential dilemma with which the United States has unsuccessfully wrestled since the Soviets deprived us of a stabilizing adversary.在這裡，我們來面對面的與必要的困境與美國已成功wrestled以來，蘇聯使我們失去了穩定的對手。 The political elite that ought to bear the chief responsibility for crafting grand strategy instead nurses fantasies of either achieving permanent global hegemony or remaking the world in America’s image.政治精英，應該承擔行政責任，為工藝的宏偉戰略，而不是護士的幻想，無論是實現永久的全球霸權或重塑世界上在美國的形象。 Meanwhile, the military elite that could puncture those fantasies and help restore a modicum of realism to US policy fixates on campaigns and battles, with generalship largely a business of organizing and coordinating matériel.與此同時，軍事精英，可以穿刺那些幻想和幫助恢復一點點現實，美國的政策fixates對戰役戰鬥，與generalship主要業務的組織和協調物資。

The four lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan boil down to this: Events have exposed as illusory American pretensions to having mastered war.四個教訓，伊拉克和阿富汗的歸結到一點：事件暴露了美國作為虛幻的偽裝有掌握戰爭。 Even today, war is hardly more subject to human control than the tides or the weather.即使到了今天，戰爭是難以更受人控制，比潮汐或天氣。 Simply trying harder — investing ever larger sums in even more advanced technology, devising novel techniques, or even improving the quality of American generalship — will not enable the United States to evade that reality.簡單地試圖努力-投資越來越大的款項，在更先進的技術，設計新穎的技術，或什至提高質量，美國g eneralship-將不會使美國迴避這一現實。

As measured by results achieved, the performance of the military since the end of the Cold War and especially since 9/11 has been unimpressive.作為衡量所取得的成果，表現軍隊自冷戰結束以來，特別是9 / 11已unimpressive 。 This indifferent record of success leads some observers to argue that we need a bigger army or a different army.這漠不關心的成功紀錄，導致一些觀察家認為我們需要一個更大的軍隊或不同的軍隊。

But the problem lies less with the army that we have — a very fine one, which every citizen should wish to preserve — than with the requirements that we have imposed on our soldiers.但問題在於少與軍隊，我們有-一個很好的一個，每個公民都應該希望保留-比符合我們強加給我們的士兵。 Rather than expanding or reconfiguring that army, we need to treat it with the respect that it deserves.而非擴大或重組，軍隊，我們需要把它與尊重，這是值得的。 That means protecting it from further abuse of the sort that it has endured since 2001.這意味著，保護它免受進一步濫用排序，它已經歷了自2001年以來。

America doesn’t need a bigger army.美國並不需要一個更大的軍隊。 It needs a smaller — that is, more modest — foreign policy, one that assigns soldiers missions that are consistent with their capabilities.它需要一個較小-即是較溫和的-的外交政策，一指派士兵的任務是一致的，與他們的能力。 Modesty implies giving up on the illusions of grandeur to which the end of the Cold War and then 9/11 gave rise.謙虛意味著放棄對幻想宏偉而冷戰的結束，然後9 / 11產生了。 It also means reining in the imperial presidents who expect the army to make good on those illusions.這也意味著遏制在帝國總統誰期望軍隊好好對那些心存幻想。 When it comes to supporting the troops, here lies the essence of a citizen’s obligation.當談到支持部隊，在這裡，關鍵的本質，公民的義務。

### ＃ ＃ ＃

Andrew Bacevich, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, retired from the US Army with the rank of colonel.安德魯巴切維奇，歷史學教授和國際關係在波士頓大學，退休，由美國陸軍與職級的上校。 This piece is adapted from his new book, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (Metropolitan Books, 2008).這片是改編自他的新著，限制權力：年底美國例外（大都會的書籍， 2008年） 。 He is also the author of The New American Militarism, among other books.他亦是作者美國新軍國主義，其中包括其他書籍。 His writing has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic Monthly, the Nation, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal.他的寫作出現了在外交事務中，大西洋月刊，民族，新的紐約時報，洛杉磯時報，華爾街日報。 A TomDispatch interview with him can be read by clicking here, and then here. 1 tomdispatch採訪時，他可以看到按一下這裡，然後在這裡。 For part one of Bacevich’s two-part series for TomDispatch, “Illusions of Victory,” click here部分之一，巴切維奇的兩部分系列tomdispatch ， “幻想的勝利， ”點擊這裡

From the book The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism by Andrew Bacevich, Copyright © 2008 by Andrew Bacevich.從預訂的範圍內的權力：年底美國例外安德魯巴切維奇，版權所有2008年由鄭家富巴切維奇。 Reprinted by arrangement with Metropolitan Books, an Imprint of Henry Holt and Company, LLC.重印安排與大都會的書籍，一出版的亨利霍爾特和公司，保留。 All Rights Reserved.保留所有權利。

Have Your Say: Is Perpetual War Our Future? 你說：是永久的戰爭，我們的未來？ Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Bush Era 學習了錯誤的教訓，布什時代
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