文書はイラク戦争によって先行されるIntelの調査結果のためのPR押しを明らかにする
ニックJuliano著 | および米国の情報機関からのイラクの侵入への値上りの間のブッシュ政権内の新しい文書は表面上にその場合の基礎を形作ったIntelを編集した前にホワイトハウスが戦争のための言い分を組み立て始めたことを明らかにする。
A 文書の新しいレポート ジョージ・ワシントン大学の国家安全保障からアーカイブはまた侵入するバックアップブッシュの欲求にレポートを合わせるためにブッシュ政権がCIAおよび他の情報機関に圧力をかけたという有力な証拠を示す。 レポートはこの努力の大部分が使い果たされた副大統領のDick Cheneyバックアップオフィス、Saddam Husseinを追い払うために計画の首謀者としてCheneyを見た侵入に道の他の戦後の検査多数のバックアップだったことを提案する。
アーカイブはイラクの大量破壊兵器のCIA 「白書」の7月2002日の草案を出版した。 草案は月最終的な「白書」がそれを非常に要約された10月に称するところによるとNIE解放したが、議会が9月まで要求しなかったサダムの政体の国家情報の見積もりの前の準備された。
アーカイブの最近得られた文書に加えて、先生。 レポートを編集したジョンPradosは前のホワイトハウスのスポークスマンスコットMcClellanの回顧録のような主題の最近完了された上院の諜報特別委員会のような戦前の知性の処理の前の調査を「段階II」の政府関係者ののレポート」戦前の修辞そして本検査した。
彼はことそれらを与えるために管理図-特にCheney -が戦争のための言い分の価格を下げる知性は管理の確信を支持したより少なく確かな筋を支持して無視されたことほしいと思った何がCIAに、そして圧力をかけたことトニー・ブレアーのイギリスの政府がサダムのWMDsことをの不安定な知性の作成でcomplicitだったことブッシュ政権のチェリーが侵入を正当化する知性を選んだ、本質的に完了した。
• イラクの主張された大量破壊兵器のSSCIの元の7月2004日のレポートと共のブッシュ政権の公共の声明の段階IIのレポートは、政治処理がブッシュ政権のその情報の使用と同様、イラクの知性の失敗の影響の調査に知性自体を越えて伸びたことを示す。
• 他の最近公開された材料と共に、段階IIのレポートはブッシュ政権が知性を懇請したりそして「立証する」公共の要求を使用されたことを示す。
• A recently declassified draft of the CIA’s October 2002 white paper on Iraqi WMD programs demonstrates that that paper long pre-dated the compilation of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi capabilities.
• The timing of the CIA’s draft white paper coincides with a previously available draft of the British Government’s white paper on Iraqi WMD, demonstrating that the Bush administration and the Tony Blair government began acting in concert to build support for an invasion of Iraq two to three months earlier than previously understood.
• A comparison of the CIA draft white paper with its publicly released edition shows that all the changes made were in the nature of strengthening its charges against Iraq by inserting additional alarming claims, in the manner of an advocacy, or public relations document. The draft and final papers show no evidence of intelligence analysis applied to the information contained. Similar comparison of the British white paper shows the same phenomenon at work.
• Declassified Pentagon documents demonstrate that the CIA white paper was modified in ways that conformed to the desires of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and his office, in much the same way that British documents indicate that country’s white paper was changed to conform to the desires of the Blair government.
The CIA was under enormous pressure, which resulted in its production of a White Paper that did not conform to the facts, according to the report.
“Under the circumstances, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the CIA and other intelligence agencies defended themselves against the dangers of attack from the Bush administration through a process of self-censorship,” Prados writes. “That is the very essence of politicization in intelligence.”
He goes on to report that CIA reports had “the character of rhetoric” and did not reflect “the kind of approach characteristic of intelligence analysis.”
The Archive’s report backs up similar contentions that first came to light with release of the Downing Street memo in 2005 and have been reinforced in scores of books and investigative articles. Most recently, investigative journalist Ron Suskind reported in his new book The Way of the World that the British government was secretly in contact before the invasion with the chief of Iraq’s intelligence services who told them unequivocally that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons stockpiles. That revelation ― received in plenty of time to delay the invasion ― was ignored, Suskind wrote.
Prados reports on other sources the CIA had developed among scientists in Iraq and within Saddam’s foreign minister. Information they provided was ignored in favor of what was later revealed to be untrue exaggerations passed along by Iraqi exiles.
The White Paper went through several drafts, Prados writes, and it is clear to see the administration’s influence in its preparation.
“The net impression is that the CIA white paper was rewritten to conform to administration preferences. If so, U.S. intelligence a priori made itself a tool of a political effort, vitiating the intelligence function and confirming the presence of a politicized process,” he writes. “The specific analytic failures on Iraq intelligence become much less significant in such a climate, especially in that they all yielded intelligence predictions of exactly the kind the Bush administration wanted to hear.”
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