Los documentos revelan el empuje de la banda para los resultados precedidos guerra de Iraq Intel
Por Nick Juliano | Los nuevos documentos dentro de la comunidad de la administración de Bush y de la inteligencia de los E.E.U.U. durante el punto fijo a la invasión de Iraq revelan que la casa blanca comenzó a montar un caso para la guerra antes de que hubiera compilado la Intel que aparentemente formó la base de ese caso.
A nuevo informe sobre los documentos de George Washington de la universidad de la seguridad nacional del archivo de los presentes también que obligan evidencia que la administración de Bush ejerciera presión sobre la Cia y otras agencias de inteligencia para adaptar sus informes al deseo de reserva de Bush de invadir. El informe sugiere que el bulto de este esfuerzo fuera funcionado de la oficina de vice presidente Dick Cheney, el sostener numeroso otras examinaciones de la posguerra de la trayectoria a la invasión que vio Cheney como el genio del plan para expulsar Saddam Hussein.
El archivo publicó un bosquejo del julio de 2002 de una Cia “documento blanco” sobre las armas de Iraq de la destrucción total. El bosquejo fue preparado los meses antes de una estimación nacional de la inteligencia en el régimen de Saddam, que el congreso no exigió hasta septiembre, aunque el “papel blanco final” lanzó en octubre presumiblemente resumido eso mismo NIE.
Además de los documentos nuevamente obtenidos del archivo, el Dr. Juan Prados, que compiló el informe, examinó investigaciones anteriores de la manipulación de la preguerra de la inteligencia tales como retórico de la preguerra y los libros de los funcionarios de la administración de la “fase II” del senado del comité recientemente terminado de la inteligencia informe sobre' en el tema tal como memoria blanca anterior de Scott McClellan del portavoz de la casa.
Él concluyó, esencialmente, que la cereza de la administración de Bush escogió inteligencia de justificar una invasión, que el gobierno británico de Tony Blair era complicit en producir inteligencia inestable en WMDs de Saddam, que las figuras de la administración - especialmente Cheney - ejercieron presión sobre la Cia para darlos qué desearon, y que la inteligencia que socavaba el caso para la guerra fue no hecha caso a favor de las fuentes menos confiables que movieron hacia atrás creencia de la administración.
• El informe de la fase II sobre declaraciones públicas de la administración de Bush, conjuntamente con el informe original del julio de 2004 del SSCI sobre las armas alegadas de Iraq de la destrucción total, indica que manipulación política ampliada más allá de la inteligencia sí mismo de afectar la investigación de las faltas de la inteligencia en Iraq así como el uso de la administración de Bush de esa información.
• Conjuntamente con otros materiales recientemente declassified, el informe de la fase II demuestra que la administración de Bush solicitó inteligencia después usada “verifica” sus demandas públicas.
• A recently declassified draft of the CIA’s October 2002 white paper on Iraqi WMD programs demonstrates that that paper long pre-dated the compilation of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi capabilities.
• The timing of the CIA’s draft white paper coincides with a previously available draft of the British Government’s white paper on Iraqi WMD, demonstrating that the Bush administration and the Tony Blair government began acting in concert to build support for an invasion of Iraq two to three months earlier than previously understood.
• A comparison of the CIA draft white paper with its publicly released edition shows that all the changes made were in the nature of strengthening its charges against Iraq by inserting additional alarming claims, in the manner of an advocacy, or public relations document. The draft and final papers show no evidence of intelligence analysis applied to the information contained. Similar comparison of the British white paper shows the same phenomenon at work.
• Declassified Pentagon documents demonstrate that the CIA white paper was modified in ways that conformed to the desires of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and his office, in much the same way that British documents indicate that country’s white paper was changed to conform to the desires of the Blair government.
The CIA was under enormous pressure, which resulted in its production of a White Paper that did not conform to the facts, according to the report.
“Under the circumstances, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the CIA and other intelligence agencies defended themselves against the dangers of attack from the Bush administration through a process of self-censorship,” Prados writes. “That is the very essence of politicization in intelligence.”
He goes on to report that CIA reports had “the character of rhetoric” and did not reflect “the kind of approach characteristic of intelligence analysis.”
The Archive’s report backs up similar contentions that first came to light with release of the Downing Street memo in 2005 and have been reinforced in scores of books and investigative articles. Most recently, investigative journalist Ron Suskind reported in his new book The Way of the World that the British government was secretly in contact before the invasion with the chief of Iraq’s intelligence services who told them unequivocally that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons stockpiles. That revelation — received in plenty of time to delay the invasion — was ignored, Suskind wrote.
Prados reports on other sources the CIA had developed among scientists in Iraq and within Saddam’s foreign minister. Information they provided was ignored in favor of what was later revealed to be untrue exaggerations passed along by Iraqi exiles.
The White Paper went through several drafts, Prados writes, and it is clear to see the administration’s influence in its preparation.
“The net impression is that the CIA white paper was rewritten to conform to administration preferences. If so, U.S. intelligence a priori made itself a tool of a political effort, vitiating the intelligence function and confirming the presence of a politicized process,” he writes. “The specific analytic failures on Iraq intelligence become much less significant in such a climate, especially in that they all yielded intelligence predictions of exactly the kind the Bush administration wanted to hear.”
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This entry was posted on Monday, August 25th, 2008 at 7:19 pm and is filed under Political News . You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
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