Dokumente decken Fotorezeptor Stoß für der Irak Krieg vorangegangene Intel Entdeckungen auf
Durch Nick Juliano | Neue Dokumente innerhalb von der der Bush Leitung und US Intelligenzgemeinschaft während des Anflugs zur Invasion vom Irak decken auf, daß das Weiße Haus anfing, ein Argument für Krieg zusammenzubauen, bevor es das Intel kompiliert hatte, das anscheinend die Grundlage dieses Falles bildete.
A neuer Bericht über die Dokumente George Washington der Universität Staatssicherheit des Archivs von den Geschenken auch, die Beweis zwingen, daß die Bush Leitung den CIA und andere Nachrichtendienste drueckte, um ihre Reports zum Unterstützungswunsch bushs herzustellen einzudringen. Der Report schlägt vor, daß der Hauptteil dieser Bemühung aus Vizepräsident Dick Cheneys Büro laufen gelassen wurde, das Unterstützen heraus zahlreich andere Nachkriegsprüfungen des Weges zur Invasion, die Cheney als das Experte des Planes sah, um Saddam Hussein zu verdrängen.
Das Archiv veröffentlichte einen Juli 2002 Entwurf eines CIA „weißes Papier“ auf Waffen des Iraks der Massenzerstörung. Der Entwurf wurde Monate vor einer nationalen Intelligenz-Schätzung auf Regime Saddams vorbereitet, das Kongreß nicht bis September verlangte, obgleich das abschließende „weiße Papier“, das im Oktober freigegeben wurde purportedly, diesen sehr NIE zusammenfaßte.
Zusätzlich zu den erhaltenen Dokumenten des Archivs eben Dr. John Prados, der den Report kompilierte, überprüfte vorhergehende Untersuchungen der Vorkriegsintelligenzhandhabung wie der vor kurzem abgeschlossene Senat-Intelligenz-Ausschuss-„Phase II“ Report über Leitung Beamte' Vorkriegsrhetorik und Bücher auf dem Thema wie ehemaliger Abhandlung Hauswortführer Scott McClellans.
Er folgerte im wesentlichen daß die Bush Leitung Kirsche Intelligenz auswählte, eine Invasion zu rechtfertigen, daß Tony Blairs britische Regierung complicit war, wenn sie wackelige Intelligenz auf WMDs Saddams produzierte, daß Leitung Abbildungen - besonders Cheney - den CIA drueckten, um sie zu geben was sie wünschten und daß die Intelligenz, die das Argument für Krieg unterschneidet, zugunsten der weniger zuverlässigen Quellen ignoriert wurde, die Leitung Glauben unterstützten.
• Der Phase II Bericht über Bush Leitung allgemeine Aussagen, in Verbindung mit dem ursprünglichen Report Juli 2004 des SSCIS über des Iraks behauptete Waffen der Massenzerstörung, zeigt an, daß politische Handhabung über der Intelligenz selbst hinaus, Untersuchung der Intelligenzausfälle auf dem Irak sowie den Gebrauch der Bush Leitung von diesen Informationen zu beeinflussen verlängerte.
• In Verbindung mit anderen vor kurzem deklassierten Materialien zeigt der Phase II Report, daß die Bush Leitung erbat, Intelligenz dann „bestätigen“ seine allgemeinen Ansprüche benutzt.
• A recently declassified draft of the CIA’s October 2002 white paper on Iraqi WMD programs demonstrates that that paper long pre-dated the compilation of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi capabilities.
• The timing of the CIA’s draft white paper coincides with a previously available draft of the British Government’s white paper on Iraqi WMD, demonstrating that the Bush administration and the Tony Blair government began acting in concert to build support for an invasion of Iraq two to three months earlier than previously understood.
• A comparison of the CIA draft white paper with its publicly released edition shows that all the changes made were in the nature of strengthening its charges against Iraq by inserting additional alarming claims, in the manner of an advocacy, or public relations document. The draft and final papers show no evidence of intelligence analysis applied to the information contained. Similar comparison of the British white paper shows the same phenomenon at work.
• Declassified Pentagon documents demonstrate that the CIA white paper was modified in ways that conformed to the desires of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and his office, in much the same way that British documents indicate that country’s white paper was changed to conform to the desires of the Blair government.
The CIA was under enormous pressure, which resulted in its production of a White Paper that did not conform to the facts, according to the report.
“Under the circumstances, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the CIA and other intelligence agencies defended themselves against the dangers of attack from the Bush administration through a process of self-censorship,” Prados writes. “That is the very essence of politicization in intelligence.”
He goes on to report that CIA reports had “the character of rhetoric” and did not reflect “the kind of approach characteristic of intelligence analysis.”
The Archive’s report backs up similar contentions that first came to light with release of the Downing Street memo in 2005 and have been reinforced in scores of books and investigative articles. Most recently, investigative journalist Ron Suskind reported in his new book The Way of the World that the British government was secretly in contact before the invasion with the chief of Iraq’s intelligence services who told them unequivocally that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons stockpiles. That revelation — received in plenty of time to delay the invasion — was ignored, Suskind wrote.
Prados reports on other sources the CIA had developed among scientists in Iraq and within Saddam’s foreign minister. Information they provided was ignored in favor of what was later revealed to be untrue exaggerations passed along by Iraqi exiles.
The White Paper went through several drafts, Prados writes, and it is clear to see the administration’s influence in its preparation.
“The net impression is that the CIA white paper was rewritten to conform to administration preferences. If so, U.S. intelligence a priori made itself a tool of a political effort, vitiating the intelligence function and confirming the presence of a politicized process,” he writes. “The specific analytic failures on Iraq intelligence become much less significant in such a climate, especially in that they all yielded intelligence predictions of exactly the kind the Bush administration wanted to hear.”
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This entry was posted on Monday, August 25th, 2008 at 7:19 pm and is filed under Political News . You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
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