Syria – What Is the Cost of ‘Victory’?

A deep contradiction lies at the heart of US policy towards the present horrifying
conflict in Syria. Which is better? To now reluctantly accept continuation of
Bashar al- Assad in power in Damascus for the foreseeable future, thereby hastening
the end of the war and the killing? Or to fight till the last Syrian in the
belief that an indefinite prolongation of the civil war will somehow bring about
a much brighter future for Syria and deal a rebuff to the position of Russia
and Iran in Syria?


The Syrian war represents one of the darkest moments in civil conflicts anywhere
in the world in recent years. At this juncture its locus is now in Aleppo, Syria’s
second largest city, and an ancient center of Middle Eastern high culture. And
this is where the human level of suffering particularly cries out for relief.
The number of people who have been killed by bombing – in recent weeks
especially by Syrian government forces and Russian air attacks – is horrendous.
Fear, starvation, and death haunt this once magnificent city.


But there is a decision to be made. Back in 2011 in the midst of the Arab Spring
revolutions, there was reason to believe that the Assad regime too, would quickly
bite the dust, as did Mubarak in Egypt, Qaddafi in Libya, and Bin Ali in Tunisia.
But as an early uprising emerged against Assad, the regime reacted
swiftly with harsh reprisals in the belief that a quick putdown would nip it
in the bud.


If Syria had just been left to its own devices, Assad’s cynical
calculations for maintaining power – typical of most authoritarian rulers
who fight to the bitter end – might have quickly ended with a regime victory.
But unlike Egypt or Libya, Syria itself was indeed divided over his rule: although
Assad was never popular, much of the Sunni economic, military
and governing elite had become de facto aligned with the minority Alawite Assad
regime. Other minorities such as Christian, Jews, Druze, and others believed
that while they didn’t like Assad, he was far preferable to a scenario of overthrow
by jihadists or a long civil war. That belief considerably explains why Assad
has not fallen.


But of course Syria was not left to its own devices but rather became the magnet
of regional power-struggles, the cockpit of proxy wars rapidly involving Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the US on one side, with Iran, Iraq (to some extent)
and Russia on the other. Now, the US for over forty years has viewed the
Assad family regime as a thorn in its side against US dominance in the
Middle East; it intermittently sought to overthrow it, with little success.
This time around the US now saw Syria as offering a great venue to strike back
at Iranian and Russian influence in the region as well. It therefore became
willing to support “moderate” jihadis in the…

Read more