The death of Lieutenant General Valery Asapov and two Russian colonels who were with him in Syria highlights the fundamentally different military command philosophies of the US and Russian militaries.
Putting aside the question of whether or not General Asapov was deliberately targeted, the key point about his death is that he was a high ranking general (commander at the time of his death of Russia’s 5th Red Banner Army) who was killed whilst carrying out personal reconnaissance on the front line in Deir Ezzor in Syria, where he exposed himself to shelling.
Though his death was big news in Russia, it has been received there calmly, with none of the displays of dismay or panic, or the feverish post-mortems, or the angry cries for vengeance, which would assuredly have happened if a US officer of similar rank had been killed in the same way.
Nor is there the slightest sign of General Asapov’s death having caused any change in the battlefield strategy followed by the Russians in Syria.
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Thus offensive military operations by the Syrian army as advised and directed by the Russians in the area where General Asapov was killed continue with undiminished vigour, with – as reported by The Duran – Russian engineers just completing a road bridge across the Euphrates to enable the Syrian army to get across.
All this highlights a key point about the Russian army’s system of command: Russian commanders – including the most senior commanders – are expected to lead from the front, making themselves visible to their men, whilst at the same through direct observation gaining a ‘feel’ for the battle.
By contrast US military practice prefers to keep commanders out of harm’s way, expecting them to control the…