World News 世界新闻 | | Forum 论坛 | | UK News 英国新闻 | | USA News 美国新闻 | | Global News 环球财经 | | Political News 政治新闻 | | Sci-Tech News 科技新闻 | | War & Terrorism News 战争与恐怖主义的新闻 | | Sports News 体育新闻 | | Multimedia 多媒体 | | Set Homepage 设为首页

Translate: 翻译：

Wednesday, November 19th, 2008 星期三， 2008年11月十九日

The privilege of creating and issuing money is not only the supreme prerogative of government, but is the government’s greatest creative opportunity. 有幸创造和发行货币不仅是最高特权的政府，但政府是最大的创造性的机会。 By the adoption of these principles, the taxpayers will be saved immense sums of interest. — Abraham Lincoln 通过这些原则，纳税人将被保存数额巨大的利益 。 -亚伯拉罕林肯

Most of what follows is the work of the extraordinary and admirable Stephen Zarlenga of the大多数如下是什么工作的特殊和令人钦佩的斯蒂芬Zarlenga的 American Monetary Institute美国金融研究所 . 。 We have taken excerpts from various of his writings - including a 2003 speech to US Treasury staff - and blended it into one piece.我们已采取各种摘录他的著作-包括2 003年的演讲美国财政部的工作人员-和混合成一件。 Also included is an article we ran 1994 by Bob Blain and an excerpt from Sam Smith’s Great American Political Repair Manual, published by WW Norton in 1997.其中还包括了一篇文章，我们跑1994年由Bob布莱恩和摘自山姆史密斯的美国大政治维修手册，出版了二战诺顿于1997年。

Some history一些历史

Stephen Zarlenga, American Monetary Institute - The money system is society’s greatest dispenser of justice or injustice.斯蒂芬Zarlenga ，美国金融研究所-钱制度是社会最大的饮水机的司法或不公正。 A good one functions fairly, helping create values for life.一个很好的一个功能相当，帮助创造价值的生活。 A bad, unjust one obstructs the creation of values; gives special privileges to some and disadvantage to others causing unfair concentrations of wealth and power; leading to social strife and eventually warfare and a thousand unforeseen bad consequences - physical and spiritual.一个糟糕的，不公正的一个阻碍创造价值;给予特别优惠的一些缺点和他人造成不公平的浓度的财富和权力;导致社会动乱，并最终战和1000意外不良后果-身体和精神。 . 。 . 。

One reason economists have failed mankind so badly is their poor methodology - an over-reliance on theoretical reasoning.其中一个原因未能经济学家人类是如此糟糕的方法-过度依赖理论推理。 Alexander Del Mar the world’s greatest monetary historian noted: “As a rule economists.亚历山大德尔玛世界上最大的货币历史学家指出： “作为一项规则的经济学家。 . 。 . 。 don’t take the trouble to study the history of money; it is much easier to imagine it and to deduce the principles of this imaginary knowledge.”.不麻烦，研究历史上的钱，这是很容易想象，并推断的原则，这一虚构的知识。 “ 。 . 。 . 。

In England the struggle became the goldsmiths vs the monarchy representing society.在英格兰的斗争，成为金饰与王室代表的社会。 Later it was the Bank of England vs. society.后来，这是英格兰银行与社会。 Until then England’s money power was in the monarch’s hands.在此之前，英格兰的金钱权力在国王手中。 But from that point, Bank of England credits would be substituted in place of public money.但是，从这一点上，英国央行信贷将取代在公共资金。 This promoted a confusion between credit and money to this day.这促进了信贷之间的混淆和金钱来这一天。 But they are different things.但他们不同的事情。 Credit depends on the creditor remaining solvent.信用取决于债权人剩余的溶剂。 Real money does not promise to pay something else.真正的金钱不答应支付别的东西。 Money is on a higher order than credit.金钱是一个更高层次的比信贷。

Those behind the Bank of England obscured the real source of the bank’s power - its legal privilege.这些背后的英格兰银行掩盖了真正来源的银行的权力-法律的特权。 Its notes were accepted in payments to the government.它说明已被接受的付款给政府。 Recovering the science of money for the private profit of a small group produced harmful results: 120 years of continuous warfare spawned an unpayable national debt leading to excessive taxation leading to horrors like the Irish potato famine.科学回收的资金为私人利润的一小群产生有害的结果： 120多年不断的战争造成了无法偿还国家债务，导致税收过多，导致恐怖像爱尔兰马铃薯饥荒。

Before then, when a nation’s money system was used for taxation, the revenue generally aided the society.在此之前，当一个国家的货币系统是用于征税，收入一般的社会资助。 But the Bank of England concentrated society’s resources in the wrong hands, crippling the possibility for government to function properly, leading to a growing contempt of government.但是，英格兰银行集中社会资源的不法分子手中，瘫痪的可能性为政府正常运作，导致了越来越多的政府蔑视。

Today it’s still the bankers versus the society.今天，它仍是银行与社会。 At base, the battle remains private money vs. public money.在基地的战斗仍然是私人资金对公共资金。 The outcome determines whether the money system operates to serve the few in control, or the whole society.结果决定是否货币制度的运作服务的几个控制，或整个社会。 . 。 . 。

Mankind can live under various forms of government from dictatorship to republic, but the best systems are those in harmony with human nature.人类可以生活在各种形式的政府从专制向共和，但最好的系统是在和谐与人类的本性。 Likewise many things can be made into money, but the best will be the ones in harmony with the nature of money.同样很多事情可以做成钱，而是最好的将是在和谐与自然的金钱。

Remember: don’t confuse money with tangible wealth.请记住：不要混淆钱有形的财富。 Yes, commodities can be improperly monetized by law.是的，商品可以不当货币由法律规定。 The result will make the money system hostage to the commodities situation; hostage to the people, companies, countries that control the commodity.其结果将使货币体系人质的商品情况;人质的人，公司，国家控制的商品。 Ultimately it removes the monetary power from society and places it into the hands of the wealthy.最终它消除了货币权力从社会和地方把手中的富裕。

And don’t confuse money with credit - either private or public credit.不要混淆货币与信贷-无论是私人或公共信贷。 Yes private credits can be improperly monetized by law.私人信贷是可以不当的货币由法律规定。 But that gives great privilege to those whose credits have been monetized, to the detriment of the whole society.但是，让非常荣幸那些信用货币已，不利于整个社会的。 The money system then becomes an engine of injustice - as it is now.这笔钱，然后系统成为一个引擎的不公正-因为它是现在。 . 。 . 。

How private central banking started in America如何私营中央银行开始在美国

First Step: Our Constitutional Convention, considered two grand themes on humanity: First whether mankind could be self-governing.第一步：我们的制宪会议，审议了两个大的主题对人类：一是人类是否可以自治。 This American experiment is still in doubt because the Convention mishandled the other grand theme over the nature of money.美国的这一实验仍是疑问，因为该公约的其他处理不当大主题性质的资金。

They met from May to September 1787 but the money subject didn’t came up til August 16.他们会见了5月至1787年9月，但资金问题没有来到了无菌8月16日。 Jefferson and Paine weren’t there.杰弗森和潘恩并不存在一样。 Franklin was too old to speak.富兰克林是太老了发言。

A curious book on money appeared, written anonymously by Calvinist clergyman John Witherspoon.一个奇怪的书钱出现了，匿名的书面加尔文主义的牧师约翰威瑟斯庞。 The book attacked government money and promoted Adam Smith’s primitive view that only gold and silver are money.这本书攻击政府的金钱和促进亚当斯密的原始认为，只有黄金和白银的钱。 . 。 . 。 . 。

The power for government to create money, long considered a necessary part of sovereignty was already in the articles of Confederation, but the Federalists fought to exclude this crucial power from the new government, arguing that it could not be trusted with it.功率为政府创造金钱，只要认为是必要的组成部分主权已经在联合会的条款，但联邦党人战斗排除这一重要权力的新政府，认为这不能信任它。 Some of them intended to get hold of the power privately as had been done in England.其中有些旨在掌握的权力作为私有做了英格兰。

The supreme importance of understanding the nature of money now becomes evident: For if money obtains its value from “intrinsic” qualities, it could be viewed more as a creature of merchants and bankers than of governments.最高重要性的认识的性质，资金已成为显而易见的：因为，如果钱获得它的价值从“内在”品质，可以更多地被视为生物的商人和银行家，而不是政府。

But if money’s essence is an abstract social institution obtaining value through law, then its a creature of government and the Constitution had better deal with it adequately.但是，如果货币的本质是一个抽象的社会制度获得通过的法律价值，那么它的产物，政府和宪法更好地处理它充分。 Describing how a uniform currency is to be provided, controlled and kept reasonably stable, in a just manner.如何描述一个统一的货币是必须提供，控制和保持合理稳定，以公正的方式。 The Constitutional Convention faltered on this crucial question.在制宪会议上动摇这一关键问题。

The delegates accepted Smith’s primitive concept of money and didn’t firmly place the money power into government’s hands, leaving it ambiguous.代表们接受了史密斯的原始概念的资金并没有坚定地把金钱权力纳入政府的手里，让含糊不清。

But the power would still exist.但是，权力仍然存在。 What I’m suggesting is that human affairs require government to have four branches, not three; the fourth branch to administer the money power.我什么暗示的是，人类的事务需要政府有四个分支机构，而不是3个;第四分行管理的资金力量。

The Constitution left the money power up for grabs.宪法的钱离开了权力争夺。 Alexander Hamilton wasted no time in grabbing.亚历山大汉密尔顿不失时机抢夺。

Second Step: The Constitution went into effect in late 1789.第二步：宪法开始生效1789年年底。 Hamilton’s first move as Secretary of the Treasury, was to assume $15 million of the state debts.汉密尔顿的第一个举动是财政部长，是要承担1500万美元的国家债务。 . 。 . 。 an extremely unpopular act.一个极其不得人心的行为。 Why?为什么？

The worthless debt was held by the revolutionary soldiers, farmers, manufacturers and merchants who furnished its supplies.该债务是毫无价值举行的革命军人，农民，制造商和商家提供其谁用品。 As Congress secretly passed the bill behind closed doors, the country was overrun by speculators, buying up the certificates for pennies on the dollar.作为秘密国会通过该法案关起门来，该国超支的投机者，买了证书便士美元。

Third step: Next Hamilton and associates, having kept the monetary power out of government, moved to assume it themselves.第三步：接下来汉密尔顿和同伙，在保持货币权力的政府，搬到自己承担。 . 。 . 。

Hamilton’s Federalists quickly put through legislation chartering the First Bank of The United States, as a privately owned central bank on the Bank of England model.汉密尔顿的联邦党人迅速通过立法包租的第一银行，美国作为一个私人拥有的中央银行英格兰银行的模式。 The Bank would be issuing paper notes not really backed by metal, but pretending to be redeemable in coinage, on the one condition that not a lot of people asked for redemption.该银行将发行文件指出没有真正支持的金属，但假装是赎回的硬币，在一个条件，并不是很多人要求赎回。 They never had enough coinage.他们从来没有足够的硬币。

Thus the real question was whether it would be private banks or the government that would issue paper money.因此，真正的问题是，它是否将私人银行或政府将发行纸币。 Will the immense power and profit of issuing currency go to the benefit of the whole nation, or to the private bankers?将巨大的权力和利润的发行货币去，造福于整个国家，或者私人银行家？ That’s always been the real monetary question in America.这始终是真正的货币问题在美国。

Gold and silver served as a smoke-screen.黄金和白银作为烟幕。 What the bankers counted on were the legal considerations of the money.银行家什么指望的法律因素的钱。 They knew that all that was needed to give their paper notes value, was for the government to accept them in payment for taxes.他们知道，这是所有需要给他们的论文指出价值，是政府接受他们的支付税款。 That, and not issuing too excessive a quantity.这，不是太过分的发行数量。 Under those conditions, the paper notes they printed out of thin air, would be a claim on any wealth existing in the society.在这种情况下，该文件指出，他们印制了稀薄的空气，将是一个索赔的任何现有的财富在社会中。

Just where did the money for first bank of the US came from?只是在没有钱的第一家银行在美国而来的呢？ . 。 . 。 . 。 The $10 million subscription for the banks’ shares, was oversubscribed within two hours. 1000万美元订购的银行股，超额认购是在两个小时内。 Only 1/10 of it was ever paid in gold.只有1 / 10是有史以来的黄金。 The rest was accepted in the form of bonds - the government bonds that Hamilton had turned from pennies on the dollar to full value.其余的已被接受的形式，债券-政府债券，汉密尔顿拒绝从便士对美元的全面价值。 The money for the private bank actually came from the American people.这笔钱用于私人银行实际上来自美国人民。

Thanks to Jefferson’s efforts, the bank was liquidated in 1811.由于杰弗逊的努力，清算银行在1811年。 Three quarters of it was found to be owned by English and Dutch.四分之三的它被认为是拥有英语和荷兰语。

AMI’s proposed reforms急性心肌梗死改革建议

- Nationalize the Federal Reserve System. -国有化联邦储备系统。 Reconstitute it in the US Treasury, to evolve into a fourth branch of government.重组它在美国财政部，发展成为第四个政府部门。 Only the government would create money.只有政府将创造金钱。

- Remove the privilege which banks presently have to create money. -删除有幸银行目前已经创造金钱。 This is done through an elegant and gentle process which automatically turns all the previously issued bank credit into real American money.这是通过一个优雅和柔和的过程，会自动将所有先前发出的银行信用变成真正的美国人钱。 100% reserves are reached not by calling in loans but by increasing reserves. 100 ％的储量没有达到要求的贷款，但通过增加储备。 This would be neither inflationary or deflationary.这将是既没有通货膨胀或通货紧缩。

- Institute programs for automatic, constitutionally determined government money creation, starting with the $2 trillion which the civil engineers need to bring our infrastructure up to acceptable levels. -研究所的自动程序，宪法确定的政府货币创造，从2万亿美元的土木工程师必须使我们的基础设施达到可接受的水平。 From there we go forward carefully determining how to best run the monetary system.从这里我们前进仔细确定如何以最佳方式运行的货币制度。 . 。 . 。

What difference would reconstituting the money power in government make?什么区别重建的资金在政府权力呢？ Government money goes into infrastructure; better life; better jobs; education, safer roads, cleaner water; better health care; social security, etc. Society is empowered by being able to direct the money power to solve pressing problems rather than into useless speculation.政府资金进入基础设施;更美好的生活;更好的就业机会;教育，道路安全，更清洁的水;更好的卫生保健，社会保障等社会赋权能够直接的金钱权力，解决紧迫的问题，而不是变成无用的猜测。 We no longer have to say we can’t afford it, when so many people and resources are unemployed!.我们不再说我们支付不起，当这么多人和资源是失业！ 。

These three reforms can be closer than we think; and in a crisis situation if only 5% of the citizenry has an awareness of the societal/legal nature of money, they could be enacted.这三项改革可以接近我们认为，在危机形势下，如果只有5 ％的公民有一个认识的社会/法律性质的钱，就可以颁布。

The need for monetary reform需要货币改革

The power to create money is an awesome power - at times stronger than the executive, legislative or judicial powers combined.权力创造钱是一个可怕的力量-在时代强于行政，立法或司法权力的总和。 It’s like having a “magic checkbook,” where checks can’t bounce.这就像一个“神奇支票簿， ”在检查不能反弹。 When controlled privately it can be used to gain riches, but more importantly it determines the direction of our society by deciding where the money goes - what gets funded and what does not.当控制私人它可以用来获得财富，但更重要的它决定了方向，我们的社会，决定在那里的钱不用-什么得到资助，哪些行不通。 Will it be used to build and repair vital infrastructure such as levees to protect major cities?它将被用来制造和修理至关重要的基础设施，如堤坝，以保护主要城市？ Or will it go into warfare or real estate loans, creating asset price inflation - the real estate bubble.或将它进入战争或房地产贷款，建立资产价格膨胀-房地产泡沫。

Thus the money issuing power should never be alienated from democratically elected government and placed ambiguously into private hands as it is in America in the Federal Reserve system today.因此，货币发行权力绝不应脱离民选政府，并置于含糊落入私人手中，因为它是在美国联邦储备系统的今天。

Indeed most people would be surprised to learn that the bulk of our money supply is not created by our government, but by private banks when they make loans.实际上大多数人会感到惊讶地得知，大部分的货币供应量是没有创造我们的政府，而是由私人银行时，他们贷款。 Most of our money is issued as interest-bearing debt.我们大部分的钱是作为利息的债务。

We are borrowing this money system from private banks when instead we should own the system, not rent it.我们这笔钱的借贷制度时，私人银行不是我们应该自己的系统，而不是租金。 Our government has the sovereign power to issue money (Art.1, Sect.8) and spend it into circulation to promote the general welfare through the creation and repair of infrastructure, including human infrastructure - health and education - rather than misusing the money system for speculation as banking has historically done.我们的政府有主权权力，金钱问题（了第， Sect.8 ）和花钱进入流通，促进普遍福利的正当需要通过建立和修复基础设施，包括人力基础设施-保健和教育-而不是滥用金钱系统投机银行历来工作要做。 Our lawmakers must now reclaim that power.我们的议员们现在必须收回这种权力。 . 。 . 。

Unhappily, mankind’s experience with private money creation has undeniably been a long history of fraud, mismanagement and even villainy.不幸的是，人类经验的私人资金创造一个不可否认的历史悠久的舞弊行为，管理不善，甚至坏事。 Banking abuses are pervasive and self-evident.银行业普遍存在的虐待和不言自明的。 Major companies focus on misusing the money system instead of production.大企业专注于滥用金钱系统，而非生产。 For example, in June 2005, Citibank and Merrill Lynch paid over $1.2 Billion to Enron pensioners to settle fraud charges.例如，在2005年6月，花旗银行和美林证券公司支付了12亿美元，以安然公司解决养恤金领取诈骗案。

Private money creation through fractional reserve banking fosters an unprecedented concentration of wealth which destroys the democratic process and ultimately promotes imperialism.私人资金通过分数建立储备银行助长了前所未有的财富集中摧毁的民主进程，并最终促进帝国主义。 Less than 1% of the population claims ownership of almost 50% of the wealth, but vital infrastructure is ignored.不到1 ％的人口拥有索赔近50 ％的财富，但重要的基础设施将被忽略。 The American Society of Civil Engineers gives a D grade to our infrastructure and estimates that $1.6 trillion is needed to bring it to acceptable levels.美国土木工程师学会提供一个D级的基础设施和估计， 1.6万亿美元需要，使其可以接受的水平。

That fact alone shows the world’s dominant money system to be a major failure crying for reform.这一事实本身表明，世界上的主导货币体系是一个重大失败哭泣的改革。

Infrastructure repair would provide quality employment throughout the nation.基础设施修复将提供高质量的就业机会在全国各地。 There is a pretense that government must either borrow or tax to get the money for such projects.有一个幌子，政府必须借款或税收得到的钱用于这类项目。 But the government can directly create the money needed and spend it into circulation for such projects, without inflationary results.但是，政府可以直接建立需要的钱和花钱进入流通等项目，没有通货膨胀的结果。

The false specter of inflation is usually raised against suggestions that our government fulfill its responsibility to furnish the nation’s money supply.虚假幽灵的通货膨胀通常是提出建议，对我国政府履行其责任，提供国家的货币供应量。 But that is a knee jerk reaction - the result of decades, even centuries of propaganda against government.但是，这是一个膝跳反应-由于几十年，甚至数百年的宣传反对政府。 When one actually examines the monetary record, it becomes clear that government has a superior record issuing and controlling money than the private issuers have.当一个人真正研究了货币记录，显然，政府有一个卓越的记录和控制发放的钱比私人发行的。 Inflation is avoided because real material wealth has been created in the process.通货膨胀是可以避免的，因为真正的物质财富已经建立的过程中。

From Stephen Zarlenga’s 2003 speech at the US Treasury斯蒂芬Zarlenga从2003年的讲话，美国财政部

Perhaps the chief failure of economics is its inability, from Adam Smith to the present, to define or discover a concept of money consistent with logic and history.也许是失败的首席经济学是无法从亚当斯密到现在，界定或发现一个钱的概念符合逻辑和历史。 Economists rarely define money, assuming an understanding of it.经济学家很少界定钱，假设的理解。 It’s still being argued whether the nature of money is a concrete power, embodied in a commodity like gold; or whether it’sa credit/debit issued by private banks.它仍被认为是性质的钱是一个具体的权力，体现在商品如金;还是这是信用卡/借记发出的私人银行。 Does its value come from the material of which it’s made?难道它的价值来自于物质，它的进展？ Or is it, as we have concluded, an abstract social power - an institution of the law, having value because its accepted in exchanges due to the sponsorship of government?抑或是，我们已经得出结论，一个抽象的社会力量-一个机构的法律，具有价值，因为它接受的交流由于赞助商的政府？ The correct answer leads to conclusions on the proper monetary role of government; whether the power to create and control money should be lodged, as at present in a somewhat ambiguous private issuer - the Federal Reserve System and its member banks - or should be wholly reconstituted within government.正确的答案会导致结论的适当的货币政府的作用;是否有权建立和控制洗钱应当提出，因为目前在有些模棱两可私人发行-联邦储备系统及其成员国银行-或应该完全改组在政府内。 An accurate concept of money will light the way to solving the present fiscal crisis.准确的概念，这笔钱将轻的方式来解决目前的财政危机。

We have two basic approaches to understanding money: A theoretical method based on logic; and an empirical approach based on experience or history.我们有两个基本方法的理解金钱：一种理论方法的基础上逻辑;和经验做法的基础上的经验或历史。 Practitioners of the two methods arrive at very different conclusions.从业者的两种方法得出非常不同的结论。 Theoreticians usually support private commodity money and private credit money.理论家通常支持私营商品货币和私人信贷资金。 Historians normally want a much larger role for government.历史学家通常要大得多政府的作用。

Let’s start with Aristotle who gave the culmination of Greek thought and experiment on money around 330 BC: “All goods must therefore be measured by some one thing.让我们先以亚里士多德是谁给的高潮希腊思想和实验资金约公元前330 ： “所有的货物因此必须衡量一个人的事。 . 。 . 。 now this unit is in truth, demand, which holds all things together.现在这个单位是真理，需求，拥有所有的东西在一起。 . 。 . 。 but money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand; and this is why it has the name nomisma - because it exists not by nature, but by law (which in Greek was nomos) and it is in our power to change it and make it useless.” So Aristotle calls money a creature of the law.但钱已经成为了公约的某种代表的需求;这就是为什么它的名字诺米斯玛-因为它不存在的性质，而是由法律规定（这在希腊是亚州） ，它是我们的力量改变它和使之无用。 “因此，亚里士多德要求金钱的产物，法律。 Not a commodity from nature but an abstract social institution.不是一种商品的性质，但一个抽象的社会制度。 Its essence is not tangible wealth in itself, but a power to obtain wealth.其实质是不是有形的财富本身，而是权力获取财富。

Plato agreed with Aristotle and advocated fiat money for his Republic: “The law enjoins that no private individual shall possess or hoard gold or silver bullion, but have money only fit for domestic use.柏拉图与亚里士多德的同意，并主张菲亚特他的钱共和国： “法律没有责成个人不得拥有或囤积金或银的黄金，但资金只有适合家庭使用。 . 。 . 。 . 。 wherefore our citizens should have a money current among themselves but not acceptable to the rest of mankind.何故我们的公民应该有一个钱目前，但它们之间不能接受的，其余的人类。 . 。 . 。 ” And: “Then they will need a market place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.” “和： ”然后，他们将需要一个市场，和洗钱的目的象征性的交流。 “

So both Aristotle and Plato noted the paramount principle - that the nature of money is a fiat of the law, an invention or creation of mankind.因此，这两个亚里士多德和柏拉图指出的首要原则-的性质，钱是一个扁平的法律，一项发明或创造人类。 This principle, part of a lost science of money, must now be relearned in the Third Millennium in order to achieve the monetary reforms needed to move back from the brink of nuclear disaster, to move away from a future dominated by fraud and ugliness, toward a world of justice and beauty.这一原则的一部分，失去科学的钱，现在必须relearned在第三个千年，以实现货币改革需要搬回从濒临核灾难，摆脱主导未来的欺诈和丑陋，走向世界的正义和美感。

This “private vs. public” battle for the control of the money power is part of a great ongoing social battle recurring throughout history to this day.这种“私人与公共”争夺控制权的资金是一个伟大的社会斗争不断反复出现的整个历史上这一天。 This factor shapes the most important outcomes determining how well a money system works.这一因素的形状最重要的成果以及如何确定货币制度的运作方式。 A good system functions fairly; helping the society create values for living.一个良好的系统功能相当;帮助社会创造价值的生活。 A bad one obstructs the creation of values; places special privileges in the hands of some to the disadvantage of others, and promotes unfair concentrations of wealth and power, and disharmony and social strife.不好的阻碍创造价值;地方特权手中的一些不利他人，并促进公平浓度的财富和权力，和不协调和社会动乱。

Now it may be surprising, but the historical record actually shows that publicly controlled systems function much better than private ones.现在它可能是令人惊讶，但实际上历史记录显示，公开控制系统的功能大大优于私立的。 Furthermore, it shows that the concept of money - how money is defined - usually determines whether the system will be publicly or privately controlled.此外，它表明，这一概念的金钱-金钱的定义-通常是决定是否该系统将公开或私下的控制。 . 。 . 。

Our American experience contains many of the best case studies for understanding money.我们的经验包含了许多最好的案例研究为了解钱。 We have been a great monetary laboratory - every conceivable solution was tried at some time, and we’ve been a paper money nation from colonial days.我们一直在一个伟大的货币实验室-每一个可以想象的解决办法是试图在一段时间内，我们一直是纸币的国家摆脱殖民天。 Our development was inseparable from it - without it there’d be no United States.我们的发展是分不开的它-它有没有希望就没有美国。

English and Dutch laws forbade sending coinage to the colonies, placing them in continual distress.英国和荷兰的法律禁止发送的硬币的殖民地，使他们在不断的痛苦。 The intent was to extract raw materials, not for the colonists to trade with each other.其意图是提取原料，而不是为殖民者的贸易与对方。 An early form of globalization.早期的全球化形式。 The colonies had to devise monetary innovations.在殖民地制定货币创新。

In the period 1632 - 92, seventeen different commodities were monetized by law at specified prices.期间1632年至1692年， 17个不同的商品货币在法律规定的价格。 It didn’t work - everyone wanted to pay with the least desirable commodity, in the worst condition.它没有工作-每个人都希望支付的最不理想的商品，在最坏的条件。 . 。 . 。

Private land banks were set up but were shunned by the colonists, who considered money a prerogative of government, as it was in England until 1694.私人土地银行成立，但回避了殖民者，钱谁考虑的一项特权的政府，因为它是在英格兰，直到1694年。

Then in 1690, four years before the Bank of England, Massachusetts embarked on a radical course and issued paper bills of credit, spending them into circulation.接着于1690年，四年前英格兰银行，马萨诸塞州走上了激进的课程，并发表论文汇票的信用，消费他们进入流通领域。 Rather than a promise to pay anything, they were a promise to receive them back for all payments to the commonwealth.而不是许诺支付任何东西，他们承诺要接收他们回来的所有支付给英联邦。 The colony thrived.蓬勃发展的殖民地。 Other colonies copied them and infrastructure arose.其他殖民地复制他们和基础设施产生的。

In 1723 Pennsylvania’s system loaned the bills into circulation, charging interest on them and using it to pay colonial expenses.在1723年宾夕法尼亚州的系统租借法案进入流通，收取利息和他们用它来支付费用的殖民地。 Ben Franklin wrote:本富兰克林写道：

“Experience, more prevalent than all the logic in the World, has fully convinced us all, that paper money has been, and is now of the greatest advantages to the country.” .他说： “经验，更普遍高于一切的逻辑世界，也充分相信我们所有人，即纸币一直是，而且现在是最大的优势，该国。 ” 。 . 。 . 。

Some long lost principles of the science of money quickly resurfaced:一些早已失去原则的科学的资金迅速浮现：

- Money need not have intrinsic value; its nature is more of an abstract legal power than a commodity. -货币不必具有内在的价值;其性质更是一个抽象的法律权力不是商品。

- Accepting the government paper back in taxes was the key feature needed to give it circulating value. -接受政府的文件早在税收的主要功能需要给它循环的价值。

- The quantity of money in circulation had to be regulated to maintain its value. -数量流通中的货币必须加以规范，以保持其价值。

- They observed that paper money helped build real infrastructure. -根据他们的观察，纸币有助于建立真正的基础设施。

- Most importantly, the colonies did not issue more money than their legislatures authorized. -最重要的是，殖民地问题没有更多的钱比他们的立法授权。 They have an outstanding record issuing currency.他们有杰出的创纪录发行货币。 Of over a hundred colonial issues I found only one case of fraud.对100多个殖民地问题，我只发现一宗欺诈行为。 In Virginia, a Mr. Robertson who was supposed to be burning the old notes as new ones were printed, was giving them to friends instead.在弗吉尼亚州，一个罗伯逊先生谁应该是燃烧的旧钞票了新的印刷，是让他们的朋友而不是。

But in the battle for monetary dominance, the colonial monetary experience has been miscast as irresponsible inflation money.但在争夺主导地位的货币，殖民地货币的经验一直miscast是不负责任的通货膨胀钱。 This was the result of 18th century Boston’s medical Dr. William Douglas’ inaccurate writings.这是由于18世纪波士顿的医学博士威廉道格拉斯'不准确的著作。 The error was corrected by Alexander Del Mar in 1900 in The History of Money in America, but was ignored.错误是纠正亚历山大德尔玛在1900年历史上的金钱在美国，但被忽略。 It was authoritatively cleared up again by Professor Leslie Brock in 1976 and again ignored.据权威清理再次布罗克教授在1976年再次被忽略。 Many economists, and especially the libertarians, still haven’t got the message that colonial government paper money was crucial in building the colonies.许多经济学家，特别是窃听，仍然没有得到的信息是殖民政府纸币是至关重要的建设殖民地。

In 1764, England’s Lords of Trade and Plantations prohibited all colonial legal tender issues, and that became the underlying cause of the American Revolution, not some tax on tea.在1764年，英国的上议院贸易和人工林禁止一切殖民地的法定货币问题，并且成为根本原因美国革命，而不是一些税务上茶。

The continental currency became the lifeblood of the revolution.大陆货币成为生命线的革命。 $200 million was authorized and $200 million issued. 2亿美元，并授权二零零零零零零零零美元印发。 The currency functioned well.货币运作良好。 In late 1776 the notes were only at a 5% discount against coinage, when General Howe took over New York City and made it a center for British counterfeiting.在1776年年底的说明，只有在5 ％的折扣对硬币时，一般豪接管纽约市，并使它成为中心的英国伪造。 The Brits counterfeited billions; newspaper ads openly offered the forgeries.英国人伪造数十亿;报纸广告公开提供了伪造的。 . 。 . 。 In March 1778 after 3 years of war, it was $2.01 Continental for $1 of coinage.在1778年3月后3年的战争，这是大陆2.01美元为1美元的硬币。

The continentals carried us over 5 1/2 years of Revolution to within 6 months of its final victory.该continentals我们进行了5 1 / 2年的革命到6个月内的最后胜利。 Thomas Paine wrote: “Every stone in the Bridge, that has carried us over, seems to have a claim upon our esteem.托马斯潘恩写道： “每一块石头中的大桥，这对我们进行的，似乎已经要求我们的自尊。 But this was a corner stone, and its usefulness cannot be forgotten.”但是，这是一个基石，它的效用不能忘记的。 “

Our constitutional convention considered two grand themes of humanity: First whether mankind could be self-governing or had to be ruled by authority.我们的制宪会议审议了两个大的主题人类：一是人类是否可以自治领土或者要统治的权威。 Often referred to as the American experiment.通常被称为美国的实验。 We are still learning the outcome, and one of the reasons it’s still in doubt is because of the way the convention mishandled the other grand theme - the nature of money.我们仍在学习的成果，其中重要的一个原因仍然在怀疑，是因为该公约的方式处理不当的其他大的主题-性质的资金。 By the time of the convention, the great benefits of the continentals was nearly ignored; along with much of the rest of our hard won monetary experiences.到时，该公约的国家，伟大的好处continentals几乎忽视;连同其余大部分时间我们来之不易货币的经验。 Some wanted to emphasize that the continentals became worthless and rejected the idea of paper money altogether.一些想强调的是， continentals成为毫无价值和拒绝的想法完全纸币。

They ignored that paper money was crucial in giving us a nation; that abstract money requires an advanced legal system in place; that the normal method of assuring its acceptability is to allow the taxes to be paid in it.他们忽略了金钱是至关重要的给我们一个民族，这抽象的钱，需要一个先进的法律制度到位;的正常方法，确保它的可接受性，是为使税收来支付它。 . 。 . 。

The convention met from May to September 1787 but the money subject didn’t come up until August 16.该公约会见了5月至1787年9月，但资金问题没有来，直到8月16日。 Remember, Jefferson and Paine were not there.请记住，杰弗森和潘恩并不存在一样。 Franklin was too old to speak.富兰克林是太老了发言。

A curious book on money appeared just then, written anonymously by Calvinist Minister John Witherspoon, - the only clergyman signer of the declaration of Independence.一个奇怪的书钱似乎只是那么，书面匿名加尔文主义部长约翰威瑟斯庞， -唯一的牧师签字的独立宣言。 The book attacked government money and promoted Adam Smith’s view that only gold and silver are money.这本书攻击政府的金钱和促进亚当斯密认为，只有黄金和白银的钱。 . 。 . 。

The power for government to properly create money, long considered as a necessary part of sovereignty, was contained in five magic words - to emit bills of credit.功率为政府正确创造金钱，长期被视为一个必要部分主权，载于5个神奇的词-发出帐单的信贷。 This provision was already in the Articles of Confederation, but the Federalists - the merchant/commercial interest, largely responsible for calling the Constitutional Convention in order to strengthen the national government, fought to exclude this monetary power from the new government, arguing that it could not be trusted with it.这一规定已经在邦联，但联邦党人-商人/商业利益，主要负责呼叫制宪会议，以加强各国政府，试图排除这种货币权力的新政府，认为它可以不能信任它。 Some of them intended to get hold of the power privately as had been done in England.其中有些旨在掌握的权力作为私有做了英格兰。

The supreme importance of the concept of money now becomes evident: For if money is primarily a commodity, convenient for making trades, which obtains its value out of “intrinsic” qualities, then it could be viewed more as a creature of merchants and bankers than of governments.最高的概念很重要的金钱已成为显而易见的：因为，如果钱主要是一种商品，方便的决策行业，其中获得其价值的“内在”品质，那么它可以被认为更象是一个造物的商人和银行家比政府。

But if the true nature of money is an abstract social institution embodied in law - obtaining its value largely through legal sanctions, then its more a creature of governments, and the Constitution had better deal with it adequately - describing how a uniform currency is to be provided, controlled and kept reasonably stable, in a just manner.但是，如果真正性质的资金是一个抽象的社会制度所体现的法律-获得其价值主要是通过法律制裁，那么它更多的产物，政府和宪法更好地处理它充分-描述如何统一的货币是提供，控制和保持合理稳定，以公正的方式。 It was on this crucial question that the Constitutional Convention faltered.正是在这个关键问题，宪法公约动摇。

The delegates accepted Adam Smith’s primitive commodity definition of money as gold and silver and didn’t firmly place the monetary power into government, leaving it ambiguous.代表们接受了亚当斯密的原始定义的商品货币，黄金和白银，并没有坚定地把货币纳入政府的权力，让含糊不清。 Later they’d argue over what they had done.后来他们想争论他们所做的事。 But the power would still exist, since it is as important as the legislative, judicial and executive powers.但是，权力仍然存在，因为它是一样重要的立法，司法和行政权力。

I am suggesting that the nature of human affairs requires government to have four branches, not three; the fourth branch to embody and administer the monetary power.我建议的性质，人权事务需要政府有四个分支机构，而不是3个;第四分公司体现和管理的货币权力。

The Constitution trusted the people with the political power; but didn’t firmly place the monetary power in their government.值得信赖的宪法与人民的政治权力; ，但没有坚定地把货币权力的政府。 This (along with slavery) is the original sin of American politics.这（连同奴隶制）是原罪美国政治。 As a result the power was left up for grabs.由于电力是离开了争夺。 Alexander Hamilton wasted no time in “grabbing.”亚历山大汉密尔顿没有时间浪费在“掠夺” 。

The Constitution went into effect in late 1789; Van Buren described Hamilton’s first move as Secretary of the Treasury, in 1790: “Hamilton assumed some $15 million of the state debts.宪法开始生效1789年年底;范布伦描述汉密尔顿的第一个举动是财政部长，在1790年： “汉密尔顿承担一些1500万美元的国家债务。 . 。 . 。 an act.行为。 . 。 . 。 neither asked nor desired by the states, unconstitutional and inexpedient.既不问，也不理想的状态，不符合宪法和失策。 . 。 . 。 ” “

What was so bad about it?是什么如此糟糕呢？ “A large proportion of the domestic debt (was held by) the soldiers who fought our battles, and the farmers, manufacturers and merchants who furnished supplies for their support. “很大比例的国内债务（举办）的士兵谁打我们的战斗，与农民，制造商和商家谁家具用品的支持。 . 。 . 。 .When it became known to members of Congress, which sat behind closed doors, that the bill would pass. 。当它成为已知的国会议员，其中坐在关起门来，该法案将通过。 . 。 . 。 every part of the country was overrun by speculators, by horse, and boat, buying up large portions of the certificates for (pennies on the dollar).” Madison, attempted to have the law pay speculators less than the original holders, but was voted down.每一部分的国家被占领的投机者，由马，船，买了大部分的证书（便士美元） 。 “麦迪逊，企图已支付的法律投机者不到原来的持有人，但投票向下的。

Next Hamilton and associates, having kept the monetary power out of government hands, moved to assume it themselves.下一步汉密尔顿和同伙，在保持货币权力的政府手中，转移到自己承担。 The Bank of North America was the only bank in the US, formed in Pennsylvania on Tom Paine’s initiative to assist the revolution.银行北美洲是唯一的一家银行在美国，成立于宾夕法尼亚州汤姆潘恩的倡议，以协助革命。 Arguing that it was only a state bank, Hamilton suggested it come forward if it wanted to alter itself for the national purpose.认为这只是一个国有银行，汉密尔顿建议，挺身而出，如果它希望改变自己国家的目的。 Curiously, the bank took no steps toward this obvious increase in profit and power.奇怪的是，银行没有采取步骤实现这一明显增加的利润和权力。

Hamilton’s Federalists quickly put through legislation to charter the First Bank of The United States, as a privately owned central bank on the Bank of England model.汉密尔顿的联邦党人迅速通过立法，以包租的第一银行，美国作为一个私人拥有的中央银行英格兰银行的模式。 The Bank would be issuing paper notes not really backed by metal, but pretending to be redeemable in coinage, on the one condition that not a lot of people asked for redemption.该银行将发行文件指出没有真正支持的金属，但假装是赎回的硬币，在一个条件，并不是很多人要求赎回。 They really did not have the coinage.他们真的没有硬币。 The bank would do what they had blocked the government from doing.该银行将做他们已封锁了政府做的事情。 Print paper money.打印纸钱。

While gold and silver served as a smoke-screen what the bankers really counted on, were the legal considerations of the money.虽然黄金和白银作为烟幕什么银行家真的指望，是法律因素的钱。 They knew that all that was needed to give their paper notes value, was for the government to accept them in payment for taxes.他们知道，这是所有需要给他们的论文指出价值，是政府接受他们的支付税款。 That, and not issuing too excessive a quantity of them.这，不是太过分发行了一定数量的他们。 Under those conditions, the paper notes they printed out of thin air, would be a claim on any wealth existing in the society.在这种情况下，该文件指出，他们印制了稀薄的空气，将是一个索赔的任何现有的财富在社会中。

And we see why the Bank of North America was not put forward for this purpose: the US government had owned 60% of it.我们看到，为什么银行北美没有提出这一目的：美国政府拥有60 ％的。 . 。 . 。 . 。 The government would only own 20% of the new bank.政府只会自己20 ％的新银行。

Just where did the money for first Bank of the US came from?只是在没有钱的第一银行的美国而来的呢？ The $10 million share subscription for the banks shares, was oversubscribed within 2 hours. 1000万美元认购股份的银行股，超额认购是在2小时内。 Less than 1/10 of it was ever paid in gold.不到1 / 10是有史以来的黄金。 The rest of the payment was accepted in the form of bonds - the very government bonds that Hamilton had turned from pennies on the dollar to full value.其余的款项已被接受的形式，债券-十分政府债券，汉密尔顿拒绝从便士对美元的全面价值。 So you see where the money for the bank actually came from - from the American people.所以你看到钱的银行实际上来自-从美国人民。 That’s how private central banking started in America.这就是私人银行中心在美国开始。

Thanks in large part to Jefferson’s efforts, the bank was liquidated in 1811.这在很大程度上是杰弗逊的努力，清算银行在1811年。 Three quarters of it was found to be owned by Europeans - English and Dutch.四分之三的它被认为是由欧洲人-英语和荷兰语。

The 2nd Bank of the US - the bank from hell - operated illegally from inception, accepting IOU’s instead of the required gold in payment for its shares.第二银行的美国-银行从地狱-经营非法从一开始，接受期票的不是金牌，需要支付其股票。 So again the banker’s gold “requirement” turned out to be a masquerade.因此，再次银行家的黄金“要求”被证明是一种掩饰。

This private central bank immediately embarked on a wild monetary expansion.这私营央行立即开始了野生货币扩张。 Beginning operations in April 1817, by July it had 19 branch offices and had created $52 million in loans on its books and an additional 9 million in circulating currency, based on gold and silver coin reserves of only $2.5 million.开始行动1817年4月， 7月19日它已分支机构和创造了5200万美元的贷款在其书籍和额外的900万美元在货币循环的基础上，金银纪念币的储量只有250万美元。 This tremendous expansion caused a wild speculative boom.这巨大的扩张造成了野生的投机热潮。 Then in August 1818, the bank turned abruptly and began an insane contraction, causing the panic of 1819.然后在1818年8月，该银行突然转向，并开始了疯狂的收缩，造成恐慌的1819年。 It cut its outstanding loans and advances from a high of $52 million, down to $12 million in I819.这将其未偿还贷款和垫款从一个高的5200万美元，下降到1200万美元的I819 。 Its circulating notes dropped from $10 million to $3.5 million in 1820.其循环注意到下降到1000万美元到350万美元，在1820年。 A massive wave of bankruptcies swept the nation.大规模的破产浪潮席卷全国。

The subsequent history of this bank and its fight to the death with President Jackson reads like a financial soap opera.随后，这一历史的银行和其斗争的死亡与总统杰克逊读起来就像一个金融肥皂剧。 The story of various state chartered banks is similar.这个故事的各个国家特许银行是类似的。

Meanwhile the US government acted responsibly In the aftermath of liquidation of the first and second bank; US Treasury notes were substituted in place of banknotes.与此同时，美国政府采取负责任的在清理后的第一和第二银行;美国国债所取代，取代纸币。 About $65 million were authorized and only $37 million actually issued.约6500万美元的授权，只有3700万美元实际上印发。 The US Treasury spent them into circulation.美国财政部花费他们进入流通领域。 Initially they were all large denomination, paid interest; were redeemable in gold and required formalities to transfer.最初他们都是大面额支付利息;被赎回黄金，并要求转让手续。 By 1815 they became bearer certificates with no redemption date, paid no interest and were in smaller denominations.到1815年，他们成为无记名证书，没有赎回日期，支付不感兴趣，并在较小的教派。 Thus they were nearly a true money form.因此，他们几乎一个真正的货币形式。 The fact is that the US government has always acted responsibly in creating money.事实是，美国政府一直采取负责任的创造金钱。 Not so the private banks.并非如此的私人银行。

Greenbacks were on balance our best money system to date Thanks to 100 years of misreporting, the image of the greenbacks coming down to us is as inflated or worthless paper money.钞票上的平衡我们最好的货币制度，迄今由于100多年的误报，形象的钞票下来，我们是夸大的或毫无价值的纸币。 In fact, $450 million were authorized and $450 million were printed.事实上， 4.5亿美元的授权和4.5亿美元的印刷。 Counterfeiters couldn’t duplicate the Greenbacks.造假者无法重复钞票。 Every Greenback was eventually exchangeable one for one with gold coin.每汇价最终交换一个一个金币。

But greenbacks were not promises to pay money later - they were the money.但是，钞票没有承诺付钱后-他们的钱。 Since they were not borrowed, they did not give rise to interest payments and did not add to any national debt.因为它们不是借来的，他们并没有引起支付利息，并没有加入任何国家的债务。 The US Treasury printed them and spent them into circulation.美国财政部印制并用他们进入流通领域。

Economists usually harp on the Greenbacks dropping to 36 cents in gold, and they leave it at that.经济学家通常竖琴的钞票下降到36美分的黄金，他们停留在这一点上。 While that happened, its highly misleading.虽然这种情况发生，其高度误导。 . 。 . 。

What did happen was that in June 1864, Congress limited the amount of Greenbacks to $450 million.什么情况是，在1864年6月，美国国会的数额有限的钞票，以4.5亿美元。

There was inflation, but remember 13% of the population was fighting a terrible war.有通货膨胀，但请记住13 ％的人口是一场可怕的战争。 625,000 died. 625,000人死亡。 Greenbacks performed well despite being spent on destruction.钞票表现良好，尽管用于销毁。 They were also being abused by the bankers.他们也被滥用的银行家。 For every greenback created by Congress, the banking system created $1.49 in bank notes.对于每一个美元由美国国会创办的，银行体系创造1.49美元的钞票。

What if instead of being spent on destruction, they went into building infrastructure, and canals and roads?如果不是用于破坏，它们进入基础设施建设，以及运河和道路？ Spending such money on infrastructure need not be inflationary.这些资金支出的基础设施不必通货膨胀。 For example the Erie Canal lowered freight prices from $114 a ton down to $9 a ton.例如，伊利运河降低货运价格从一一四美元一吨下降到9美元一吨。

The great lesson of greenbacks is that in times of crisis - and other times too - our nation has power to do what is financially necessary, through our government.伟大的教训钞票是，在危机时刻-和其他倍太-我们的国家权力，这样做是必要的财政，通过我们的政府。 We don’t have to beg or borrow money from the wealthy and, create an astronomical national debt. We don’t have to tax the middle class into oblivion, or cancel necessary programs. We can carefully use the nations’ sovereign money power far more than we presently have been allowed to realize.

At the time of the greenbacks there were those who fully understood. Senator Howe said: “We must rely mainly upon a paper circulation; and . . . that the paper, whoever issues it, must be irredeemable. All paper currencies have been and ever will be irredeemable. It is a pleasant fiction to call them redeemable. . . I would not expose that fiction only that the great emergency which is upon us seems to me to render it more than usually proper that the nation should begin to speak the truth to itself; to have done with shams, and to deal with realities.”

The struggle between private versus public control of money continued throughout the 19th century. The greenbacks continued to constitute about a third of our money supply. Generally the private money power dominated. But in periods when the government exercised control, an excellent record was established- superior to that of private control. The bankers continued their pretense that gold was the basis of the system, and even the Federal Reserve in 1913 appeared to be a gold-based system. But immediately upon inception, we were pushed into warfare. Within 20 years Americas farms, cities, exchanges and money system were all wrecked, ending in the great depression. It was again left to our government to rescue the nation.

It’s forgotten today, but the Thomas Amendment passed with legislation in 1933, gave the President the power to create $3 billion in greenbacks if the banking system didn’t co-operate. . .

The de-funding of government at the local, state and federal levels, arises out of this disease of attacking government as the enemy.

This attack on government starts with Adam Smith. His purpose in smearing the English government was to keep the monetary power in the hands of the privately owned Bank of England. . .

To summarize the argument: The nature of the money power is societally derived, not one originating in the activities of private corporations. Because of its great importance to all, control over the process belongs under public authority. Both logic and history show that its not safe to delegate this power, and certainly not acceptable to allow its usurpation.

The current bailout

The demand for immediate action to avoid a meltdown is misplaced. Immediate and wrong action will accelerate the meltdown. There is only one thing Congress can do to inspire confidence and avoid a meltdown - that is to take deliberate and careful and good workable action to help resolve the crisis. In other words to fulfill its congressional duty to America. . .

Getting it right means requiring several conditions to protect the American people from the gang that’s been financially raping the nation; that gave us the unnecessary Iraqi war. It means facing the facts on where the banking crisis is and how it got there. It means examining the monetary and economic reforms of the Federal Reserve System that will assure that such thievery or foolishness won’t happen again; and taking back from those who improperly benefited from the tragedy and prosecuting them.

At the heart of the problem is that our money system has been privatized. Naturally it’s being run for the benefit of the “privates” in control, with minimal concern for the public interest. . .

Rather than borrowing the $700 billion being demanded, and ending up paying back about 3 times that amount after interest charges, The US government could issue the money the same way the banks do, instead of borrowing it from them. But while the banks issue credit that substitutes for money, the US would issue actual money. Our government has the power to create the money, in an account, or by simply printing it as greenbacks.

There would not be inflationary effects, because it was already believed that those moneys existed in the form of the real estate values and loans. In effect this would stop a deflation which would follow from writing down those assets and loans to their present market values. Some conditions would be needed to assure that the banking system did not use those greenback dollars for further credit creation, as that would be inflationary. In essence the greenbacks would not be “re-discountable” by the banking system to create more loans, but would be legal tender for all debts public and private. . .

What the administrations proposal is doing is almost identical to what Keynes did during the Great Depression. He insisted that the bailout be in terms of government going into more debt to the banking system, whereas the Chicago Plan by the greatest economists in the nation at that time, was promoting the government to create money (greenback equivalents) instead of debt. . .

Keynes won the argument but his program did not work and it was only WW2 and [with] wartime employment, creating tanks to be blown up, airplanes to be shot out of the sky, and ships to be sunk, that Americans went back to work and we worked our way out of the depression, and into more debt. That’s where this proposal leads. Keynes answer was that “in the long run we are all dead,” but not our posterity. Based on what happened following his program before, our descendants, and society that survives become enslaved.

Unless monetary reform is in the mix now, it could take a tremendous worsening of the situation to come up again soon. One articulate friend, George Romero, summed it up for me: “The private sector has failed. The public sector is expected to rescue them, and it will. Therefore the public sector should be in control of the money system to benefit the country.”

The Chicago Plan of the 1930s

Henry Simons from the University of Chicago created the proposal and prominent economists from other universities joined him in what became known as the “Chicago Plan.”Economists like Paul Douglas of the U of C.; Frank Graham and Charles Whittlesley of Princeton; Irving Fisher of Yale; Earl Hamilton of Duke; and Willford King of NYU, to name a few. One version was sent to all the academic economists – about a thousand total. Of those responding, 235 from 157 universities agreed with the proposal; another 40 approved it with reservations and only 45 disapproved. So the plan had broad professional support. Variants of the Chicago Plan usually started by condemning the banking structure as foolish and harmful: “If the purpose of money and credit were to discourage the exchange of goods and services, to destroy periodically the wealth produced, to frustrate and trip those who save, our present monetary system (does that) most effectively!”

They dispensed with the gold standard as not a real standard, because the value of gold had changed violently up and down against commodities. From 1914 to 1917 wholesale prices rose 65% and, then increased another 55% to May 1920, So Gold coins lost over 75 % of their value against wholesale prices in the Fed’s first six years. Then by June 1921wholesale prices fell 56% against gold. “Hard money” advocates who believe that gold money has been stable should study these facts. One version of the plan quoted Roosevelt’s referring to gold as an “old fetish of so-called international bankers.”

The main features of the Chicago Plan were:

- Only the government would create money. The Federal Reserve banks would be nationalized, but not the individual member banks. The power to create money was to be removed from private banks by abolishing fractional reserves – the mechanism through which the banking system creates money. So the plan called for 100% reserves on checking accounts which simply meant banks would be warehousing and transferring the money and charging fees for their services.

- The Plan separated the loan-making function, which can belong in private banks, from the money-creation function, which belongs in government. Lending was still to be a private banking function, but by lending deposited long-term savings money, not created credits. In this way they’d restrict an unstable practice known as borrowing short and lending long – making long term loans with short term deposits.

- The proposal recognized the distinction between money and credit, which had been confused through fractional reserves and what was called the “real bills doctrine.” The confusion was seen as one of the causes of the depression, because when businesses reduced their borrowings on commercial bills which occurs during any downturn, parts of the money supply had been automatically liquidated. The Chicago Plan saw the instability of this – that it aggravates a downturn.

Simon made this grand observation: “The mistake. . . lies in fearing money and trusting debt. Money itself is highly amenable to democratic, legislative control, for no community wants a markedly appreciating or depreciating currency. . . but money is not easily manageable alongside a mass of private debt and private near-moneys. . . or alongside a mountain of public debt.”

Some variations of the plan had the US government lending banks all or part of newly printed cash needed to achieve 100% reserves. This was a crucial part of the plan, because depositors were going to the banks and withdrawing their accounts, deflating the system.

This loaning of reserves feature also elegantly converted all the previously monetized bank credits into real US money on which the banks paid interest to our government. It post facto made them intermediaries, earning some reasonable spread for their loaning work.

Paul Douglas wrote: “This proposal will of course be opposed by the bankers from whom it takes the lucrative privilege of creating purchasing power. It would however insure the safety of deposits, give large revenues to the government, provide complete social control over monetary matters and prevent abnormal fluctuations in the capital market. At the same time it would permit the allocation of productive resources. . . to remain primarily in private hands. All in all it seems the most promising program for the reform of our monetary and credit system. . . ”

Marinner Eccles, who became Fed Chairman under Roosevelt, testified that the best course would be for the government to nationalize the Federal Reserve banks.

Congressman Jerry Voorhis made the case for hundred percent reserves and putting money into circulation by paying pensions and disabled persons. As late as 1945 Voorhis introduced legislation for a US Monetary Authority as our sole creator of money.

Maurice Allais, the great French economist, backed the plan and published a book on it in 1948.

Irving Fisher of Yale, wrote on it extensively and popularly well into the 1940s. . .

There was no understanding or support for the proposal among the electorate. Only Irving Fisher seems to have understood the necessity for popularizing the matter.

Simons himself got cold feet and shied away from promoting the plan, desiring to remain on a level of professorial discussion. He even threw a wet towel on Fisher who was promoting the reform suggesting that Fisher avoid popularizing the idea!

The Plan was mishandled politically. . . The last attempt at 100% reserves was when Senator Nye of North Dakota tried to place it in part of the administration’s 1935 banking reform legislation, but his amendment was defeated.

The FDR administration had its own banking reform bill and remained ambiguous on the Chicago Plan, never commenting on it even though the political climate and professional support for the plan was sufficient to get it passed, had they made some effort. Instead his Treasury Secretary Morganthau was trying to make minor adjustments without fundamentally challenging the banking system. . .

Can we learn from what John Maynard Keynes was doing during all this? He was squarely behind the bankers and against such real reform. Yet he knew that he had to break out of orthodox economics or the whole system was in danger of being overturned. Keynesianism was a way to allow banks not government to keep control over the money-creation process, and while the more narrow minded economists fought Roosevelt’s attempts to create money and jobs as inflationary, during the nations worst deflation, Keynes knew better.

The New York Times in December 1933. . . got Keynes to write an open letter to Roosevelt, which they published. Keynes wisely advised Roosevelt that “Only the expenditures of public authority” could turn the tide of depression. . .

However, Keynes inappropriately warned Roosevelt not to create the money for this, but only to borrow it, and wrongly advised him that there was already enough money in circulation, and that: “increasing the quantity of money. . . is like trying to get fat by buying a larger belt.”

Keynes was therefore not “revolutionary” except in relation to the utter backwardness of the financial establishment. He didn’t come close to a real solution, but essentially protected his class. The real question has always been whether the nation’s money should be created under law, by government, or under the private caprice of bankers.

DEALING WITH THE NATIONAL DEBT

Bob Blain, Progressive Review, 1994 - From 1790 to 1993, taxpayers were charged $3.2 trillion in interest on federal debt. . . . The original debt at 5.53 percent interest compounded for 204 years equals $4.4 trillion. The present federal debt is arguably the original debt enlarged by 204 years of compounding interest.

According to the Federal Reserve Bulletin, the total money supply (currency, travelers checks, demand deposits, and savings accounts) in the US economy in March 1993 was $4 trillion. The total debt of the federal government, state and local governments, corporations, farmers, home buyers, and consumers was in excess of $15 trillion. If the total money supply is $4 trillion, where is the other $11 trillion of borrowed money?

Here is another curious fact. We have been told for years that government borrowing to cover hundreds of billions of dollars of deficits would drive interest rates through the roof. Instead, interest rates have fallen dramatically. In March, 1993 they were between 4.9 and 2.2 percent, far below what they were in the early 1980s when federal debt was a small fraction of what it is now.

The explanation for these anomalies is that the missing money never existed. We never borrowed it, in the normal sense that it was turned over to us and spent. Most debt is not the result of people borrowing money; it is the result of people not being able to repay what they owed at some earlier time. Instead of declaring them bankrupt, creditors just add more to their debt.

The federal government has been adding interest to its debt for 204 years. James Jackson, Congressman from Georgia, predicted that this would happen in a speech he made to the First Congress on February 9, 1790. Jackson warned that passing Alexander Hamilton’s plan to base the country’s money supply on the existing federal debt of $75 million would “settle upon our posterity a burden which they can neither bear nor relieve themselves from.” He predicted: “In the course of a single century it would be multiplied to an extent we dare not think of,” He clearly saw that Hamilton’s plan would put in place an exponential process of debt growth. To support his warning he cited the experience of Florence, Genoa, Venice, Spain, France, and England.

Hamilton’s plan was for Congress to commit the country to pay interest on the debt until the debt was paid. In the meantime the debt certificates would circulate as money. He argued that this would turn a $75 million debt into a $75 million money supply. The problem was that interest payments would have come out of the money supply. This would reduce the quantity of money that remained in circulation — and cause recession — until new loans returned the interest money back into circulation. The history of federal government finance shows such periodic swings between debt reduction and recession to debt increase and recovery.

The power to deal with this problem that Congress has neglected all these years is the power “to coin money and regulate the value thereof.” It has overused its power “to borrow money on the credit of the United States.” According to the Federal Reserve, 98 percent of the US money supply is borrowed. Only 2 percent is coined.

The First Congress set the wrong precedent. It should have created $75 million in money and paid off the debt. With a population of 4 million people and an economy starved for a medium of exchange, that would have increased the money supply by $18.75 per person.

Why did the First Congress borrow instead of coin money? Newspapers at the time accused members of Congress of acting to serve their own interests. They sent agents into the countryside to buy up debt certificates that the general public thought were worthless. They then passed the Funding Act knowing that it would give themselves and their heirs a source of income that would grow exponentially with the debt. For every debtor there is a creditor. What is a $4 trillion debt for debtors is $4 trillion in claims for creditors.

To get out of this trap Congress has a range of options:

First, it could stop paying interest on the debt. Interest is the fuel that is exploding the debt. Cut off the fuel; stop the explosion. Since 1790 over $3 trillion in interest has been added to the original $75 million. Cutting interest would immediately cut the annual deficit by about $300 billion. Experience shows that all other conventional actions, no matter how painful, do no more than slow slightly the rate of debt growth. Then Congress could begin the process of paying off the debt.

A political problem with stopping the payment of interest is that people with money control politics. And many of them would have their interest income stopped. Insurance companies and pension funds are invested in federal debt and foreign holders would also be upset. Economically, however, we cannot continue to add compounding interest to existing debt. The biggest debtor is not the federal government. It is business corporations. It is impossible for them to increase the physical production of goods and services in order to keep up with exponential debt growth that is limited by nothing but arithmetic. Unlike the debt, the physical economy has limits.

The question holders of federal debt must ask themselves is this: Do we want to insist on more interest that will add debt to existing debt until the only option is debt repudiation and we lose everything? Or are we willing to stop where we are while we may still be able to recover our original investment plus a reasonable profit?

A second option is for Congress to create the money necessary to fund public works. As a sovereign government, Congress’ power is unique. It can create money debt-free and interest-free. Congress needs to stop thinking of itself as the same as other organizations that must take money in before they can spend it. Money does not grow on trees. It must be created. The only choice is whether to have it created as loans at interest from private banks or to have it created by Congress debt-free and interest-free.

How can Congress create money without causing inflation? Congress must regulate its value. The power to create money includes this regulatory power.

A good way for Congress to regulate the value of money is by funding projects at the current national price level. The current national price level can be calculated by dividing the most recent gross domestic product by the number of hours of work that produced it. For example, in 1991 the total gross domestic product was $5.6 trillion. The employed labor force produced it with 237 billion hours of work. So the GDP was produced at the rate of $23.95 per hour of work. By now the price level per hour is probably $25.00. So let Congress fund projects at $25 per hour. How this amount is allocated among labor, land, and capital can be negotiated.

How much money should Congress create? How about enough to reach full employment? We have about 9.5 million people actively looking for work. That includes a million managers and professionals; two and a quarter million technical, sales, and clerical people; a million and a quarter precision production, craft and repair people; over two million operators, fabricators and laborers; and 305,000 framers, foresters and fishermen. That’sa skilled labor force as big as many nations — all now idle. Employed at an average $25 per hour, ($50,000 per year), they would add $475 billion to the nation’s gross domestic product and reduce spending for unemployment compensation. The pie would grow as unemployment went down. Congress could start by creating, say, $50 billion, or $200 per person, in debt-free interest-free money, then fund $50 billion worth of works projects, monitor the results, and make adjustments as needed. Meanwhile the Fed could raise bank reserve rates, not interest rates, to make checking accounts more secure.

A third more conservative option is being proposed by an organization called Sovereignty, which believes that a country that borrows money loses its sovereignty to its creditors. Their proposal is intended to restore US sovereignty by reducing our dependence on borrowed money.

The Guernsey experience. . .

Guernsey is an island state located among the British Channel Islands about 75 miles south of Great Britain. In 1816 its sea walls were crumbling, its roads were muddy and only 4 1/2 feet wide. Guernsey’s debt was 19,000 pounds. The island’s annual income was 3,000 pounds of which 2,400 had to be used to pay interest on its debt. Not surprisingly, people were leaving Guernsey and there was little employment.

Then the government created and loaned new, interest-free state notes worth 6,000 pounds. Some 4,000 pounds were used to start the repairs of the sea walls. In 1820, another 4,500 pounds was issued, again interest-free. In 1821, another 10,000; 1824, 5,000; 1826, 20,000. By 1837, 50,000 pounds had been issued interest free for the primary use of projects like sea walls, roads, the marketplace, churches, and colleges. This sum more than doubled the island’s money supply during this thirteen year period, but there was no inflation. In the year 1914, as the British restricted the expansion of their money supply due to World War I, the people of Guernsey commenced to issue another 142,000 pounds over the next four years and never looked back. By 1958, over 542,000 pounds had been issued, all without inflation.

In 1990 there was $13 million in interest-free state issued notes. A visitor to the island that year later wrote:

“I returned from Guernsey last weekend. It is a fascinating little island. There are about 60,000 permanent residents on the island. The average family owns 3.3 cars, their unemployment rate is zero and their standard of living is very high. There is no public debt. There is a surplus of public funds which earn interest. The Guernsey Treasury increased the Ml of the island by 40 percent in the last three-year period, and this increase did not do anything to inflation. The price for a gallon of gasoline in England translates to about $5US whereas, the price in Guernsey is about $2US. Contrary to the teachings of current economics in all higher institutions, inflation is not related to the volume of money but rather to the size of the commercial debt.”

Sovereignty proposes that Congress create money and lend it interest-free on a per capita formula to tax-supported bodies for capital projects and to convert existing debt to non-interest-bearing debt. Since first proposed in January 1989, the Sovereignty loan plan has been endorsed by over 1,814 city, town, and county governments and school boards, as well as by the US conference of Mayors, the Michigan state legislature and the Community Bankers Association of Illinois, which represents 515 banks.

As loans, the money would be repaid, so money injected into communities would fund projects, then be removed. Of the three methods for putting money into circulation available to Congress, giving, paying, and lending, lending is the most cautious.

Benjamin Franklin attributed the economic success of the colonies to their creation of all the money they needed. He said that the root cause of the Revolution was the act of Parliament that prohibited the colonies from continuing to issue their own money. The moneylenders of England thought it more profitable that the colonies borrow their money.

We hear from Washington that we need to sacrifice to bring the deficits under control — cut consumption, save, and invest. When that slows the economy, we will be told to spend more to stimulate the economy. We have heard it all before. Neither method works. We need debt-free interest-free money to fund the work that needs to be done. It’s not sacrifice we need; it’s productive employment. Let Congress use its unique power to coin money and regulate its value to fund that employment.

Money is no more than an accounting device, a system of notes certifying that the bearer has done a share of the work and deserves a share of the wealth. Money’s backing is the goods and services produced by the labor force. By creating money Congress can activate the idle productive power of our people. And what they produce will add real wealth to the US Treasury and add nothing to the federal debt.

Sam Smith’s Great American Political Repair Manual, 1997 - A report of Guernsey’s States Office in June 1946 notes that island leaders frequently commented that these public works could not have been carried out without the issues, that they had been accomplished without interest costs, and that as a result “the influx of visitors was increased, commerce was stimulated, and the prosperity of the Island vastly improved.” By 1943, nearly a half million pounds worth of notes belonged to the public and was so valued that much of it was being hoarded in people’s homes, awaiting the island’s liberation from the Germans. About the same time that Guernsey started to fix its sea walls the town of Glasgow, Scotland, borrowed 60,000 pounds to build a fruit market. The Guernsey sea walls were repaid in ten years, the fruit market loan took 139. In the first part of the the 20th century, Glasgow paid over a quarter million pounds in interest alone on this ancient project.

How did Guernsey avoid the fiscal disaster that conventional economics prescribed for it? First and foremost by understanding that when you build roads or sea walls or colleges or houses, you are not reducing your society’s wealth. In fact, if you do it right, you are creating something that will add to its wealth. The money that was created was simply backed by public works rather than gold or “full faith and credit.” It was, in fact, based on something more solid than the dollar bills in our wallets today. In contrast, tacking on an interest charge to public works — as we do in the US — creates no new wealth, but merely transfers claims on existing wealth from debtors to creditors.

Have Your Say: WHAT BANKS, ACADEMICS, THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT MONEY
Please read our posting guidelines before posting .
Alternatively you can discuss this report here .

RSS TrackBack URL

Name (required)

Mail (will not be published) (required)

Website

Related News

• Unpaid tax ‘to be taken from banks’
• Bet your bottom dollar tensions will follow
• The Shrinking Influence of the US Federal Reserve
• Banks guilty as charged
• Does the US fund energy projects in Iran?

This entry was posted on Wednesday, November 19th, 2008 at 8:20 pm and is filed under Contributions & Guests . You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response , or trackback from your own site.

Loading ...

TOP NEWS DISCUSSIONS

LATEST NEWS DISCUSSIONS

Activism & Protest News | Business News | Civil & Human Rights News | Environmental News | Media News | Globalisation News | Web Development News

ADVERTISEMENTS

SITE MAPS

7/7 Activism News Afghanistan Alternative-Energy Art Barack Obama BBC Big-Brother Bilderberg Biometrics Bush CCTV Censorship CIA Climate-Change Cover-Up Cults Culture Database-State David-Hicks David-Ray-Griffin Debt债务 Democrats Demos Drugs Education教育 Entertainment Environmental News EU False-Flag FBI Fraud Free-Speech Freemasons G8 Global-News Global-News Globalization Guantanamo Health-News History ID-Cards Internet Iran Iraq Israel John McCain Law Marches Media News MI5 MI6 Microsoft Military MoD Money Music音乐 NASA Neocons New World Order NSA Oil Pakistan Podcast Police-State Political News Propaganda Reviews RFID RINF Rumsfeld Science科学 Science & Technology News Secrecy Security Slavery Space Sports Spy Spying Stephen-Lendman Technology Terrorism恐怖主义 Tony-Blair Torture TV UK-News UN USA- USA-News Video Voting war War & Terrorism News Warfare Web Development News White-House Wolfowitz World_News Yahoo
2003 - 2005 Archives | 2005 - 2007 Archives | 2007 - 2008 Archives | Current Archives | Past Version

About | DVD Store | Opinion | Reviews | Special Guests | Webmasters