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 | Translate: 번역 :               WHAT BANKS, ACADEMICS, THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT MONEY 무슨 은행, 학계, 언론과 정치인들이 돈을 안에 대해서 말씀 드릴 Wednesday, November 19th, 2008 수요일, 11 월, 2008 19
The privilege of creating and issuing money is not only the supreme prerogative of government, but is the government’s greatest creative opportunity. 생성과 돈을 발행의 권한뿐 아니라 정부의 최고의 특권,하지만 정부는 최고의 창의적인 기회입니다. By the adoption of these principles, the taxpayers will be saved immense sums of interest. — Abraham Lincoln 이러한 원칙의 채택함으로써, 납세자의 관심을 요약한 엄청난 저장됩니다. - 에이 브 라함 링컨 Most of what follows is the work of the extraordinary and admirable Stephen Zarlenga of the 무슨 다음의 대부분은 특별한과 감탄의 스티븐 Zarlenga의 작품입니다 American Monetary Institute 미국의 통화 연구소 . We have taken excerpts from various of his writings - including a 2003 speech to US Treasury staff - and blended it into one piece. 우리는 그의 저술 인용문의 다양한에서 찍은 - 미 재무부 직원에게 2003 년 연설 등 - 그리고 그것을 혼합 한 조각으로. Also included is an article we ran 1994 by Bob Blain and an excerpt from Sam Smith’s Great American Political Repair Manual, published by WW Norton in 1997. 우리가 밥도 포함 Blain과 샘 스미스의 그레이트 아메리칸 정치 복구 매뉴얼, 트면 노튼에 의해 1997 년에 출판에서 발췌한 1994 쳤 기사입니다. Some history 일부 역사 Stephen Zarlenga, American Monetary Institute - The money system is society’s greatest dispenser of justice or injustice. 스티븐 Zarlenga, 미국의 통화 연구소 - 돈은 시스템을 정의하거나 불의의 사회의 최고의 디스펜서입니다. A good one functions fairly, helping create values for life. 좋은 하나의 기능을 공정하게, 인생에 대한 가치를 만들 수 있도록했다. A bad, unjust one obstructs the creation of values; gives special privileges to some and disadvantage to others causing unfair concentrations of wealth and power; leading to social strife and eventually warfare and a thousand unforeseen bad consequences - physical and spiritual. 나쁜, 부당한 한 가치의 창조 obstructs; 일부와 다른 부와 권력의 농도가 발생하는 단점이 불공 정한 특별 권한을 부여; 사회적 투쟁과 전쟁과 1000 예기치 결국 나쁜 결말로 이어지는 - 육체적, 정신적. . . One reason economists have failed mankind so badly is their poor methodology - an over-reliance on theoretical reasoning. 이코노미 스트들은 너무나도 참혹 인류 실패한 이유 중 하나는 가난한 방법론 - 이상의 이론적 근거에 - 의존하고있다. Alexander Del Mar the world’s greatest monetary historian noted: “As a rule economists. 알렉산더 Del Mar가 세계 최고의 통화 내역을 언급했다 : "규칙이 경제. . . don’t take the trouble to study the history of money; it is much easier to imagine it and to deduce the principles of this imaginary knowledge.”. 화폐의 역사를 배우는 수고를 받으 려고만하지 말고, 그것을 훨씬 쉽게 상상이 상상과 지식의 원리를 추론할. ". . . In England the struggle became the goldsmiths vs the monarchy representing society. 영국에서는 투쟁 금 세공 인이 된 군주제 사회를 대표하는 대. Later it was the Bank of England vs. society. 나중에 영국 은행 대 사회였다. Until then England’s money power was in the monarch’s hands. 그때까지 영국의 돈을 군주 권력의 손아귀에 들어갔다. But from that point, Bank of England credits would be substituted in place of public money. 하지만 그 시점에서, 영국 은행의 크레딧을 공적 자금의 장소에 교체된다. This promoted a confusion between credit and money to this day. 이 크레딧이 돈을 하루 사이에 혼란이 승진했다. But they are different things. 하지만 그들은 여러 가지입니다. Credit depends on the creditor remaining solvent. 신용 나머지 채권자 용매에 따라 달라집니다. Real money does not promise to pay something else. 실제 현금으로 뭔가 다른 지불하겠다고 약속하지 않습니다. Money is on a higher order than credit. 돈을 신용보다 높은 순서에있다. Those behind the Bank of England obscured the real source of the bank’s power - its legal privilege. 이들 은행은 영국의 뒤에 - 법적 권한 은행의 전력의 실제 소스 경우일 수있습니다. Its notes were accepted in payments to the government. 메모는 정부가 지불을 허용했다. Recovering the science of money for the private profit of a small group produced harmful results: 120 years of continuous warfare spawned an unpayable national debt leading to excessive taxation leading to horrors like the Irish potato famine. 작은 집단의 이익을 위해 민간 자금의 과학 복구에 유해한 결과 : unpayable 지속적인 전쟁의 한 국가 채무 120 년 생산 과잉 과세 아일랜드 감자 기근과 같은 공포를 선도하는 선도하고 있던중. Before then, when a nation’s money system was used for taxation, the revenue generally aided the society. 그 전에 우리 민족의 돈을 때 시스템이 과세에 대한 수익은 일반적으로 사회를 등진 사용되었다. But the Bank of England concentrated society’s resources in the wrong hands, crippling the possibility for government to function properly, leading to a growing contempt of government. 엉뚱한 사람 손에 집중하지만 은행은 영국의 사회의 자원을 정부가 제대로 성장하고 경멸하는 정부의 주요 기능에 대한 가능성을 망칠 수있다. Today it’s still the bankers versus the society. 오늘도 여전히 은행 사회 대. At base, the battle remains private money vs. public money. 공적 자금을 대 기지에서, 전쟁은 개인 남아 돈. The outcome determines whether the money system operates to serve the few in control, or the whole society. 결과 여부에 돈을 시스템 제어, 또는 사회 전체의 몇 가지의 서브 동작을 결정합니다. . . Mankind can live under various forms of government from dictatorship to republic, but the best systems are those in harmony with human nature. 인류는 공화국 정부가 독재에서 다양한 형태의 아래,하지만 살 수있는 최선의 시스템은 이러한 인간의 본성과 조화를 이루고있습니다. Likewise many things can be made into money, but the best will be the ones in harmony with the nature of money. 마찬가지로 돈이 많은 것들로 만들 수 있지만, 가장 돈도의 자연과의 조화에 든 것입니다. Remember: don’t confuse money with tangible wealth. 주의 사항 : 확실한 재산과 돈을 혼동하지 마십시오. Yes, commodities can be improperly monetized by law. 네, 원자재 부적절하게 법률에 의해 수익이 창출 될 수있습니다. The result will make the money system hostage to the commodities situation; hostage to the people, companies, countries that control the commodity. 결과는 상황 돈 시스템을 인질로 만들 것이다 물자; 인질 국민, 기업, 국가가 컨트롤하고있다. Ultimately it removes the monetary power from society and places it into the hands of the wealthy. 궁극적으로 그 사회에서 금전적 전원을 제거하고 부유층의 손에 그것을 남깁니다. And don’t confuse money with credit - either private or public credit. 돈, 신용과 혼동하지 마십시오 - 중 개인 또는 공용 신용. Yes private credits can be improperly monetized by law. 네 개인 크레딧을 부적절하게 법에 의해 수익이 창출 될 수있습니다. But that gives great privilege to those whose credits have been monetized, to the detriment of the whole society. 하지만 그 누구의 크레딧에 수익이 창출되고, 전체 사회의 해가 큰 특권을 준다. The money system then becomes an engine of injustice - as it is now. 돈을 시스템 불의의 엔진이된다 - 지금입니다. . . How private central banking started in America 민간 중앙 은행은 미국에서 시작하는 방법 First Step: Our Constitutional Convention, considered two grand themes on humanity: First whether mankind could be self-governing. 첫 단계 : 우리 헌법 컨벤션, 인류에 두 그랜드 주제 : 우선 여부를 인류가 스스로 - 통치 간주 될 수있다. This American experiment is still in doubt because the Convention mishandled the other grand theme over the nature of money. 돈 때문에 대회의 테마는 자연의 섭리를 극복한 다른 그랜드 처리한이 미국의 실험은 여전히 의문이다. They met from May to September 1787 but the money subject didn’t came up til August 16. 그들이 1787년 9월하지만 돈을 주제 그렇지 않다 전까지 8월 16일 온에서 만났다. Jefferson and Paine weren’t there. 제퍼슨과 Paine이 거기에 있었다. Franklin was too old to speak. 프랭클린 너무 오래된 얘기했다. A curious book on money appeared, written anonymously by Calvinist clergyman John Witherspoon. 돈이 어서, 익명으로 칼뱅파 존 위더스푼은 본교회에서 작성한 호기심이 책에 등장했다. The book attacked government money and promoted Adam Smith’s primitive view that only gold and silver are money. 이 책은 정부가 돈을 공격하고, 아담 스미스의 원시적인 견해를 금은 돈이있다만이 승진했다. . . . The power for government to create money, long considered a necessary part of sovereignty was already in the articles of Confederation, but the Federalists fought to exclude this crucial power from the new government, arguing that it could not be trusted with it. 정부에 대한 전력, 긴 주권의 필수적인 부분으로 간주 그건 믿을 수없는 주장은 이미 연맹의 기사 였지만 Federalists 새 정부에서이 중요한 전원을 제외 싸웠고, 돈을 만듭니다. Some of them intended to get hold of the power privately as had been done in England. 그들 중 일부는 전원을 개인적으로 영국에서 의도를 잡아 다왔다. The supreme importance of understanding the nature of money now becomes evident: For if money obtains its value from “intrinsic” qualities, it could be viewed more as a creature of merchants and bankers than of governments. 자금의 성격을 이제 증거가 이해의 중요성 최고 : 돈 가치를 얻는 경우 본질 "자질"에서, 그것보다는 정부의 상인과 은행의 생물로 더 볼 수있다. But if money’s essence is an abstract social institution obtaining value through law, then its a creature of government and the Constitution had better deal with it adequately. 하지만 만약의 본질은 추상적인 돈을 사회 교육 기관을 통해 가치를 얻는 법, 그리고 정부의 생물과 함께 적절하게 헌법 나은 거래를했다. Describing how a uniform currency is to be provided, controlled and kept reasonably stable, in a just manner. 묘사하는 방법 유니폼 통화가 제공되고 통제하고 합리적으로 안정 유지, 막 방식이다. The Constitutional Convention faltered on this crucial question. 헌법 조약이 중요한 질문에 19 위. The delegates accepted Smith’s primitive concept of money and didn’t firmly place the money power into government’s hands, leaving it ambiguous. 대의원과 비용의 개념을 허용 굳게 스미스의 원시적인 정부의 수중에 돈이 권력을 올려 놓지 않았다, 모호한 떠난다. But the power would still exist. 하지만 권력은 여전히 존재하는 것이다. What I’m suggesting is that human affairs require government to have four branches, not three; the fourth branch to administer the money power. 내가 제안하는 건 인간 관계 정부는 4 가지, 아니 세; 4 가지 전원 관리를 위해 돈이 필요해진다. The Constitution left the money power up for grabs. 헌법 회장직을 위해 돈을 쓰고 남은 전원. Alexander Hamilton wasted no time in grabbing. 알렉산더 해밀턴 만져도에 시간을 허비했다. Second Step: The Constitution went into effect in late 1789. 2 단계 : 1789 년 헌법 발효 늦게 갔다. Hamilton’s first move as Secretary of the Treasury, was to assume $15 million of the state debts. 재무 장관 해밀턴은 첫 번째로 이동, 국가 채무의 1천5백만달러 가정이었다. . . an extremely unpopular act. 매우 인기가 연기했다. Why? 왜? The worthless debt was held by the revolutionary soldiers, farmers, manufacturers and merchants who furnished its supplies. 혁명적 군인은 쓸모없는 채무, 농민, 제조 업체 및 상인 사람은 소모품을 완비하여 개최되었다. As Congress secretly passed the bill behind closed doors, the country was overrun by speculators, buying up the certificates for pennies on the dollar. 의회로 비밀리에 밀실에서 법안을 통과, 국가였다 투기꾼에 의해 오버런, 달러 동전에 대한 인증서를 구입했다. Third step: Next Hamilton and associates, having kept the monetary power out of government, moved to assume it themselves. 3 단계 : 다음 해밀턴과 동료, 정부의, 권력을 유지하는 데 금전적 직접 가정을 옮겼다. . . Hamilton’s Federalists quickly put through legislation chartering the First Bank of The United States, as a privately owned central bank on the Bank of England model. 해밀턴의 Federalists 신속하게 법안 제일 은행의 결성을 통해 미국, 영국 은행에있는 개인 소유의 중앙 은행 모델. The Bank would be issuing paper notes not really backed by metal, but pretending to be redeemable in coinage, on the one condition that not a lot of people asked for redemption. 은행, 종이 노트를 정말 금속에 의해 뒷받침되지 발행이 될 것이지만, 척 냄에 상환되며, 상환을 요구 한 상태에있는 사람이별로 없어요. They never had enough coinage. 그들은 충분히 만들어 냄이 없었어요. Thus the real question was whether it would be private banks or the government that would issue paper money. 따라서 진짜 문제는 민간 은행이나 정부가 될 것이라고 신문은 돈 문제였다. Will the immense power and profit of issuing currency go to the benefit of the whole nation, or to the private bankers? 예정 엄청난 파워와 민간 은행에 온 국민의 이익, 또는에 가서 화폐 발행의 이익? That’s always been the real monetary question in America. 항상 미국에서 실제 통화 의문되었습니다. Gold and silver served as a smoke-screen. 금색과 은색 담배 - 화면으로 재직했습니다. What the bankers counted on were the legal considerations of the money. 은행에 돈을 어떻게 계산의 법적 고려했다. They knew that all that was needed to give their paper notes value, was for the government to accept them in payment for taxes. 그들은 그 모든 것이 자신의 가치를 부여하는 데 필요한 종이 노트, 정부에 대한 세금에 대한 지불에 동의하는 걸 알고 있었어. That, and not issuing too excessive a quantity. 즉, 너무 과도한 발행 수량없습니다. Under those conditions, the paper notes they printed out of thin air, would be a claim on any wealth existing in the society. 이러한 조건 하에서, 종이들이 허공에서, 사회에서 기존에있는 모든 재산이 될 것이라고 주장 아웃 인쇄된 메모. Just where did the money for first bank of the US came from? 단지 미국 최초의 은행에 돈을 어디에서 나온 거죠? . . . The $10 million subscription for the banks’ shares, was oversubscribed within two hours. 은행은 '주식에 대한 10,000,000달러 구독, 2 시간 이내에 oversubscribed했다. Only 1/10 of it was ever paid in gold. 불과 1 / 10 그것도 금메달을 지급했다. The rest was accepted in the form of bonds - the government bonds that Hamilton had turned from pennies on the dollar to full value. 나머지는 채권의 형태로 받아들여졌다 - 정부가 채권 해밀턴의 전체 가치를 달러 동전에서이 켜져있다. The money for the private bank actually came from the American people. 민간 은행에 돈을 실제로 미국 사람들이 온. Thanks to Jefferson’s efforts, the bank was liquidated in 1811. 제퍼슨의 노력 덕분에, 은행은 1811 년 청산됐다. Three quarters of it was found to be owned by English and Dutch. 그것의 4 분의 3은 영어와 네덜란드 소유가된다는 것을 발견했다. AMI’s proposed reforms AMI가 제안한 개혁 - Nationalize the Federal Reserve System. - 국유 연방 준비 제도 이사회 시스템. Reconstitute it in the US Treasury, to evolve into a fourth branch of government. 미 재무부에, 정부의 4 가지로 진화에 Reconstitute. Only the government would create money. 오직 정부가 돈을 만들 것이다. - Remove the privilege which banks presently have to create money. - 현재는 은행 돈을 만들어야 할 특권을 제거합니다. This is done through an elegant and gentle process which automatically turns all the previously issued bank credit into real American money. 이것은 진정한 미국의 돈을로 자동으로 이전에 발행된 모든 은행의 신용 밝혀졌 우아하고 부드러운 과정을 통해 이루어집니다. 100% reserves are reached not by calling in loans but by increasing reserves. 대출에 전화를했지만 100 %를 보유 매장량 증가에 의해 도달하지됩니다. This would be neither inflationary or deflationary. 이 역시 물가 상승이나 deflationary 것이다. - Institute programs for automatic, constitutionally determined government money creation, starting with the $2 trillion which the civil engineers need to bring our infrastructure up to acceptable levels. 자동, 헌법 결정 돈을 만들기위한 정부 - 연구소의 프로그램, 토목 2,000,000,000,000달러은 받아들일만한 수준으로 우리의 인프라를 가져다 줘야과 함께 시작했다. From there we go forward carefully determining how to best run the monetary system. 거기에서 우리는 조심스럽게 앞으로 최고의 화폐 제도를 실행하는 방법을 결정하는가. . . What difference would reconstituting the money power in government make? 정부에서 돈을 무슨 차이 전력을 reconstituting까요? Government money goes into infrastructure; better life; better jobs; education, safer roads, cleaner water; better health care; social security, etc. Society is empowered by being able to direct the money power to solve pressing problems rather than into useless speculation. 정부가 돈을 인프라에 쓰여집니다; 더 나은 삶을; 더 좋은 일자리, 교육, 안전한 도로, 청소기 물; 더 나은 건강 보험, 사회 보장 등 사회에 쓸모없는 돈을 권력보다는 투기 문제를 해결하기 위해 직접적인 압박으로 힘을 수있다. We no longer have to say we can’t afford it, when so many people and resources are unemployed!. 우리는 더 이상 우리가 이렇게 많은 사람과 자원을 실업자들이 그것을 감당할 수 없다 '라고해야!. These three reforms can be closer than we think; and in a crisis situation if only 5% of the citizenry has an awareness of the societal/legal nature of money, they could be enacted. 이 세 가지 개혁은 우리가 생각보다 더 가까이있을 수있다;과 위기 상황에서 시민의 경우 5 %만이 돈을의 사회 / 법률의 본성을 인식하고있다, 그들이 제정 될 수있다. The need for monetary reform 화폐 개혁의 필요성 The power to create money is an awesome power - at times stronger than the executive, legislative or judicial powers combined. 전원 돈을 만들 수있는 굉장한 능력이있다 - 배 능력을 결합 행정, 입법 또는 사법보다 강해. It’s like having a “magic checkbook,” where checks can’t bounce. 그것은 "마법의 수표가 같은 거지,"어디에 수표를 돌려줄 수없습니다. When controlled privately it can be used to gain riches, but more importantly it determines the direction of our society by deciding where the money goes - what gets funded and what does not. 개인적으로 그것을 사용하면 재물 얻을 수 있지만, 더 중요한 것은 돈이 어디가는 결정 - 어떻게 자금을 얻고, 무엇을하지 않음으로써 우리 사회의 방향을 결정한다. Will it be used to build and repair vital infrastructure such as levees to protect major cities? 그것을 만들기 제방과 같은 주요 도시를 보호하기 위해 필수적인 인프라를 복구하는 데 사용되고 있을까요? Or will it go into warfare or real estate loans, creating asset price inflation - the real estate bubble. 또는 그것을 전쟁이나 부동산 대출로 자산 가격이 인플레이션을 만들어 갈 것입니다 - 부동산 거품. Thus the money issuing power should never be alienated from democratically elected government and placed ambiguously into private hands as it is in America in the Federal Reserve system today. 돈은 권력을 민주적으로 선출된 정부로부터 소외를 발행해서는 안와 민간 ambiguously 손에 넣은으로 미국에서 연방 준비 제도 이사회 시스템에 오늘이다. Indeed most people would be surprised to learn that the bulk of our money supply is not created by our government, but by private banks when they make loans. 실제로 대부분의 사람들은 우리가 돈을 공급의 대부분은 우리 정부에 의해 만들어 아니라 민간 은행들은 대출을 할 때 놀라시는 것이다. Most of our money is issued as interest-bearing debt. 우리 돈의 대부분은이자로 발급됩니다 - 부채 베어링. We are borrowing this money system from private banks when instead we should own the system, not rent it. 우리가 민간 은행에서 대신에 우리 시스템을 스스로해야 할 때이 돈을 빌려 주진 시스템, 차입있다. Our government has the sovereign power to issue money (Art.1, Sect.8) and spend it into circulation to promote the general welfare through the creation and repair of infrastructure, including human infrastructure - health and education - rather than misusing the money system for speculation as banking has historically done. 우리 정부는 문제가 돈 (Art.1, Sect.8)의 주권과 권력의 창출 및 인프라의 정비, 인적 인프라를 포함한 일반적인 복지 증진을 통해 유통 - 건강과 교육에 지출 -보다 오히려 돈을 시스템을 남용 은행으로 투기에 대한 역사적으로 일을하고있다. Our lawmakers must now reclaim that power. 이제 우리의 국회 의원 전원을 받으러합니다. . . Unhappily, mankind’s experience with private money creation has undeniably been a long history of fraud, mismanagement and even villainy. 불행, 개인 돈을 창조와 인류의 경험들의 사기의 오랜 역사, 그릇된 심지어 훔친왔다. Banking abuses are pervasive and self-evident. 은행 및 self - 뚜렷하지 유린이 만연하고있다. Major companies focus on misusing the money system instead of production. 돈 대신 생산 시스템의 남용에 대한 주요 기업의 초점을 맞추고있습니다. For example, in June 2005, Citibank and Merrill Lynch paid over $1.2 Billion to Enron pensioners to settle fraud charges. 예를 들어, 2005 년 6 월 씨티 은행과 메릴린치에 엔론의 연금을 사기 혐의로 12 억달러 이상을 지불했다. Private money creation through fractional reserve banking fosters an unprecedented concentration of wealth which destroys the democratic process and ultimately promotes imperialism. 분수를 보유 금융 자산의 육성과 민주적 절차를 파괴하는 사상 초유의 집중을 통해 궁극적으로 제국주의를 촉진 개인 돈을 만들기. Less than 1% of the population claims ownership of almost 50% of the wealth, but vital infrastructure is ignored. 인구의 1 % 미만이지만 재산의 거의 50 %의 소유권을 주장하고 필수적인 인프라는 무시됩니다. The American Society of Civil Engineers gives a D grade to our infrastructure and estimates that $1.6 trillion is needed to bring it to acceptable levels. 미국 토목 학회의 인프라 및 견적에 대한 D 그레이드 그 1,600,000,000,000달러 허용되는 수준에 가져다주는 필요하다. That fact alone shows the world’s dominant money system to be a major failure crying for reform. 그 사실을 혼자 울고 개혁을위한 주요 실패가되기 위해서는 세계의 돈을 지배 체제를 보여줍니다. Infrastructure repair would provide quality employment throughout the nation. 인프라를 복구하는 전국 품질 일자리도 제공하고있다. There is a pretense that government must either borrow or tax to get the money for such projects. 거기이라는 정부 프로젝트 중 하나를 빌려야합니다이나 세금 등에 대한 돈을받을 것입니다. But the government can directly create the money needed and spend it into circulation for such projects, without inflationary results. 그러나 정부는 돈이 필요해서 직접 만들 수와 같은 프로젝트에 대한 순환에 보내고, 인플레 결과를하지 않고있다. The false specter of inflation is usually raised against suggestions that our government fulfill its responsibility to furnish the nation’s money supply. 인플레이션의 망령이 대개 거짓 제안을 상대로 우리 정부가 국민의 돈을 공급을 갖추다에게 책임을 완수했다. But that is a knee jerk reaction - the result of decades, even centuries of propaganda against government. 하지만 그런 무릎 반사 반응이다 - 수십년의 결과, 정부를 상대로 선전의 세기도했다. When one actually examines the monetary record, it becomes clear that government has a superior record issuing and controlling money than the private issuers have. 하나의 통화 기록을 검사했을 때 실제로 그것을 제어하는 돈은 정부와 뛰어난 기록을 발행하고있다 민간 발행보다 분명해진다. Inflation is avoided because real material wealth has been created in the process. 진짜 소재 때문에 재산이 과정에서 인플레이션이 만들어졌습니다 피할 수있다. From Stephen Zarlenga’s 2003 speech at the US Treasury 미 재무부에서 2003 년 연설에서 스티븐 Zarlenga Perhaps the chief failure of economics is its inability, from Adam Smith to the present, to define or discover a concept of money consistent with logic and history. 아마도 수석 경제학의 실패는 무능, 아담 스미스는 현재로부터 돈을 정의하거나 논리와 역사를 가진 일관성의 개념을 발견하는 것입니다. Economists rarely define money, assuming an understanding of it. 이코노미 스트는 거의 다 이해하고 있으리라 믿고 돈을 정의합니다. It’s still being argued whether the nature of money is a concrete power, embodied in a commodity like gold; or whether it’sa credit/debit issued by private banks. 아직 구체적으로 전원 여부를 돈의 성격, 황금과 같은 일반에 합체이다; 또는 신용 하느냐 여부 / 민간 은행이 발행한 직불카드 주장되고있다. Does its value come from the material of which it’s made? 그 가치는 그것을 만들었는 소재부터 나오나요? Or is it, as we have concluded, an abstract social power - an institution of the law, having value because its accepted in exchanges due to the sponsorship of government? 우리는 추상적인 사회적 권력 - 법을 집행하는 기관, 가치가 결론이 아니면, 그것은 교류가 있기 때문에 정부의 후원으로 인해 허용? The correct answer leads to conclusions on the proper monetary role of government; whether the power to create and control money should be lodged, as at present in a somewhat ambiguous private issuer - the Federal Reserve System and its member banks - or should be wholly reconstituted within government. 정답은 결론에 대해 정부의 적절한 통화의 역할에 대한 단서; 여부에 전력을 생성하고 돈을 통제 박혀 있어야로 현재 민간 발급에 다소 모호한 - 연방 준비 제도 이사회 시스템과 자사의 회원 은행 - 또는 완전히 재구성해야한다 정부 내에있다. An accurate concept of money will light the way to solving the present fiscal crisis. 자금의 정확한 개념은 현재의 재정 위기를 해결하는 방법은 빛이됩니다. We have two basic approaches to understanding money: A theoretical method based on logic; and an empirical approach based on experience or history. 우리가 돈을 두 가지 기본 접근 방식을 이해 : 이론적 방법은 논리에 기초해야;과 경험적 접근을 경험이나 역사를 바탕으로했다. Practitioners of the two methods arrive at very different conclusions. 두 방법 중 Practitioners 매우 다른 결론에 도달했다. Theoreticians usually support private commodity money and private credit money. 이론가 일반적으로 민간 자금과 민간 신용 자금을 지원하고있다. Historians normally want a much larger role for government. 역사가 정상적으로 정부를 위해 더 큰 역할을 싶어요. Let’s start with Aristotle who gave the culmination of Greek thought and experiment on money around 330 BC: “All goods must therefore be measured by some one thing. 아리스토 텔레스부터 시작하자 주위 사람은 기원전 330 그리스어 생각과 실험에의 극치 돈을 준 : "그러므로 어떤 한 가지로 측정해야합니다 모든 물건들. . . now this unit is in truth, demand, which holds all things together. 이제 진실이 단위이며, 수요는 모든 것을 함께 보유하고있다. . . but money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand; and this is why it has the name nomisma - because it exists not by nature, but by law (which in Greek was nomos) and it is in our power to change it and make it useless.” So Aristotle calls money a creature of the law. 돈을 요구하지만 전당 대회에 의해 대표의 일종되고있다; nomisma이 왜 이름이다 -이 존재하기 때문에 자연이 아니라지만, 법에 의해 (그리스어로 nomos)과 우리의 능력과 그것을 바꿀 수있다 소용하다. "그래서 아리스토 텔레스는 율법의 생물 돈을 호출합니다. Not a commodity from nature but an abstract social institution. 자연 안에서 일반지만 추상적인 사회 교육 기관. Its essence is not tangible wealth in itself, but a power to obtain wealth. 유형 자산의 본질은 그 자체가 아니라 부와 권력을 구하십시오. Plato agreed with Aristotle and advocated fiat money for his Republic: “The law enjoins that no private individual shall possess or hoard gold or silver bullion, but have money only fit for domestic use. 아리스토 텔레스와 플라톤은 그의 공화국에 대한 합의 주창 돈을 피아트 : "율법이없는 개인 enjoins 금색이나 은색 또는 보물을 차지 지금형 보유하여야한다,하지만이 돈을 사용하기 위해 국내에만 적합합니다. . . . wherefore our citizens should have a money current among themselves but not acceptable to the rest of mankind. 하지만 우리 시민 스스로 까닭은 인류의 나머지를 받아들일 수 없다 돈 가운데 현재도한다. . . ” And: “Then they will need a market place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.” "그리고 :"그렇다면 그들이, 그리고 돈이 - 교류의 목적을 위해 토큰 시장의 장소가 필요합니다. " So both Aristotle and Plato noted the paramount principle - that the nature of money is a fiat of the law, an invention or creation of mankind. 그래서 아리스토 텔레스와 플라톤 파라마운트 두 원칙을 설명했다 - 그 자금의 성격은 법을 발명 또는 인류의 창조의 피아트입니다. This principle, part of a lost science of money, must now be relearned in the Third Millennium in order to achieve the monetary reforms needed to move back from the brink of nuclear disaster, to move away from a future dominated by fraud and ugliness, toward a world of justice and beauty. 미래를 위해서는 사기와 추함, 방향에 의해 지배에서 벗어나서 화폐 개혁의 핵 재앙의 벼랑에서 다시 이동하는 데 필요한, 달성하기 위해 이러한 원칙은 돈을 잃은 과학의 일부로, 지금은 제 3 밀레니엄에 relearned되어야합니다 정의와 아름다움의 세계. This “private vs. public” battle for the control of the money power is part of a great ongoing social battle recurring throughout history to this day. 돈은 권력의 통제를 위해이 "민간 대 공공"위대한 전투를 통해 지속적인 사회 전쟁이 하루가 반복되는 역사의 일부입니다. This factor shapes the most important outcomes determining how well a money system works. 이 요소가 가장 중요한 결과를 얼마나 잘 돈을 시스템의 작동 방식을 결정하는 모양. A good system functions fairly; helping the society create values for living. 좋은 시스템 기능이 상당히 있으며, 사회 생활에 대한 가치를 만들 수 있도록했다. A bad one obstructs the creation of values; places special privileges in the hands of some to the disadvantage of others, and promotes unfair concentrations of wealth and power, and disharmony and social strife. 나쁜 한 가치의 창조 obstructs; 일부의 손에서 다른 사람의 단점에 특별한 권한이 장소 및 부당한 부와 권력의 집중을 촉진, 그리고 불일치와 사회 투쟁. Now it may be surprising, but the historical record actually shows that publicly controlled systems function much better than private ones. 지금 그것은 놀라운 일이 될 수도 있지만 역사적 기록이 사실을 공개적으로 제어 시스템이 민간 사람들보다 훨씬 더 나은 기능을 보여줍니다. Furthermore, it shows that the concept of money - how money is defined - usually determines whether the system will be publicly or privately controlled. 더욱이, 그 돈을의 개념 - 돈을 어떻게 정의됩니다 - 대개 여부를 결정하는 시스템을 공개 또는 비공개로 통제됩니다 보여줍니다. . . Our American experience contains many of the best case studies for understanding money. 미국의 경험을 이해하고 우리의 돈을위한 최상의 사례 연구의 많은 포함되어있습니다. We have been a great monetary laboratory - every conceivable solution was tried at some time, and we’ve been a paper money nation from colonial days. 우리 - 상상할 수있는 모든 솔루션 훌륭한 통화 실험실왔다 약간의 시간에 시도했다, 우리는 식민지 시대부터 지폐 국가 있었어. Our development was inseparable from it - without it there’d be no United States. 우리의 개발에서 떼어 놓을 수 - 그것없이는 미국이 될 거라고 없다. English and Dutch laws forbade sending coinage to the colonies, placing them in continual distress. 영어와 네덜란드어 법률에 식민지를 만들어 냄 보내고, 지속 조난에 넣어 금했다. The intent was to extract raw materials, not for the colonists to trade with each other. 의도, 식민지에 대한 서로 거래를하려고하지 원료를 추출했다. An early form of globalization. 세계화의 초기 형태. The colonies had to devise monetary innovations. 식민지 통화 혁신을 고안했다. In the period 1632 - 92, seventeen different commodities were monetized by law at specified prices. 기간 1632 - 92, 17 법에 의해 지정된 다른 원자재의 가격으로 수익이 창출됐다. It didn’t work - everyone wanted to pay with the least desirable commodity, in the worst condition. 그것은 작동하지 않았다 - 모두가 최소한의 바람직한 사회와 최악의 조건으로 지불하는 싶었어요. . . Private land banks were set up but were shunned by the colonists, who considered money a prerogative of government, as it was in England until 1694. 사유지 은행을 설정했지만 돈을받은 정부의 특권으로 간주 식민지, 기피, 영국에서 1694까지로했다. Then in 1690, four years before the Bank of England, Massachusetts embarked on a radical course and issued paper bills of credit, spending them into circulation. 그렇다면 1690, 영국 은행은 4 년 전에, 매사 추세츠는 급진적인 코스와 신용의 종이 청구서 발행 부수로 지출을 착수했다. Rather than a promise to pay anything, they were a promise to receive them back for all payments to the commonwealth. 아무것도 지불 약속보다는, 그들은 매사 추세츠 주에 대한 모든 지불을 위해 그들을 돌려 받기 약속했다. The colony thrived. 식민지는 번성했다. Other colonies copied them and infrastructure arose. 다른 식민지 그들과 인프라를 복사 올라오네. In 1723 Pennsylvania’s system loaned the bills into circulation, charging interest on them and using it to pay colonial expenses. 1723 년 펜실베니아의 시스템 순환에, 그들에 대한 관심을 부과 법안을 빌려과 식민지 비용을 지불에 사용했다. Ben Franklin wrote: 벤 프랭클린이 쓴 : “Experience, more prevalent than all the logic in the World, has fully convinced us all, that paper money has been, and is now of the greatest advantages to the country.” . "체험, 세계의 모든 논리보다 더 널리, 전적으로 우리 모두를 확신하고있다, 그 종이 돈을 해왔으며 지금이 나라의 가장 큰 장점이다.". . . Some long lost principles of the science of money quickly resurfaced: 자금의 일부는 오랫동안 잃어버린 과학의 원리를 신속하게 재부 상 : - Money need not have intrinsic value; its nature is more of an abstract legal power than a commodity. - 돈이 필요하지 않은 본래의 가치;는 자연의 상용화보다 추상적인 법적 권한에 가깝습니다. - Accepting the government paper back in taxes was the key feature needed to give it circulating value. - 다시 세금을 정부가 신문을 수락하는 데 필요한 핵심 기능을 가치를 순환주고있다. - The quantity of money in circulation had to be regulated to maintain its value. 그 가치를 유지하기 위해 규제해야 - 유통 화폐의 수량을했다. - They observed that paper money helped build real infrastructure. - 그들은 진짜 지폐 관찰 인프라 구축을 도왔습니다. - Most importantly, the colonies did not issue more money than their legislatures authorized. 보다 자신의 의회 승인 - 가장 중요한 것은, 식민지 돈을 더 문제가되지 않았다. They have an outstanding record issuing currency. 그들은 뛰어난 기록을 화폐를 발행했습니다. Of over a hundred colonial issues I found only one case of fraud. 100 식민지 문제를 놓고 난 사기의 경우 단 하나를 발견했다. In Virginia, a Mr. Robertson who was supposed to be burning the old notes as new ones were printed, was giving them to friends instead. 버지니아에서, 로버트슨 씨는 메모를 타는 사람, 새로운 것들로 이전해야했다 인쇄, 친구에게주는 대신했다. But in the battle for monetary dominance, the colonial monetary experience has been miscast as irresponsible inflation money. 하지만 무책임한 인플레이션으로 화폐 돈을 지배에 대한 전투에서 식민지 경험이 통화 miscast. This was the result of 18th century Boston’s medical Dr. William Douglas’ inaccurate writings. 보스턴이 18 세기의 의학 박사 윌리엄 더글러스 '부정 확한 글을의 결과였다. The error was corrected by Alexander Del Mar in 1900 in The History of Money in America, but was ignored. 오류 알렉산더 Del Mar가에 의해 1900 년에 미국에서 화폐의 역사에서,하지만 수정되었습니다 무시되었습니다. It was authoritatively cleared up again by Professor Leslie Brock in 1976 and again ignored. 그것은 다시 정식 교수와 레슬리 브록에 의해 1976 년에 다시 정리 무시했다. Many economists, and especially the libertarians, still haven’t got the message that colonial government paper money was crucial in building the colonies. 많은 이코노미 스트, 그리고 특히 자유주의, 아직 안 메시지가 식민지 식민 정부의 지폐와 건물에있어 결정적이었다. In 1764, England’s Lords of Trade and Plantations prohibited all colonial legal tender issues, and that became the underlying cause of the American Revolution, not some tax on tea. 1764 년, 영국의 지배자는 무역과 식민지 법화 인공림의 모든 문제를 금지하고 미국 독립 전쟁의 근본 원인은, 홍차에없는 일부 세금되었다. The continental currency became the lifeblood of the revolution. 대륙 통화 혁명의 삶의 활력소가됐다. $200 million was authorized and $200 million issued. 이억달러 및 승인했다 이억달러했다. The currency functioned well. 통화는 물론 작용했다. In late 1776 the notes were only at a 5% discount against coinage, when General Howe took over New York City and made it a center for British counterfeiting. 늦은 1776 년 노트를 만들어 냄, 일반 하우 때 뉴욕시의 취임과 영국의 중심지로 만든 위조 지폐를 위해 다시 5 %의 할인 혜택이 유일했다. The Brits counterfeited billions; newspaper ads openly offered the forgeries. 영국군이 위조 수십억; 공개 위조를 제공하는 신문 광고를 게재합니다. . . In March 1778 after 3 years of war, it was $2.01 Continental for $1 of coinage. 1778년 3월 전쟁의 3 년 후 2.01 달러로 1 달러 주화의 콘티넨탈했다. The continentals carried us over 5 1/2 years of Revolution to within 6 months of its final victory. 이 continentals 1월 5일 우리를 실시 / 혁명의 2 년간의 6 개월 이내에 최종 승리했다. Thomas Paine wrote: “Every stone in the Bridge, that has carried us over, seems to have a claim upon our esteem. 토마스 Paine이 쓴 : "교량의 돌들은, 우리를 실시하고있다, 우리의 존중을 기반으로 주장하는 것 같다. But this was a corner stone, and its usefulness cannot be forgotten.” 하지만이 코너 돌, 그리고 자사의 유용성을 잊어버린 수없습니다. " Our constitutional convention considered two grand themes of humanity: First whether mankind could be self-governing or had to be ruled by authority. 우리 헌법은 인류의 두 그랜드 컨벤션 주제 : 우선 인류 여부 자체가 될 수있을 - 통치 간주이나 권위에 의해 통치되고있다. Often referred to as the American experiment. 종종 미국의 실험이라고도했다. We are still learning the outcome, and one of the reasons it’s still in doubt is because of the way the convention mishandled the other grand theme - the nature of money. 아직 결과를 학습하고 여전히 의심의 이유 중 하나는 다른 그랜드 컨벤션 테마 - 자금의 성격을 처리한 방식 때문입니다. By the time of the convention, the great benefits of the continentals was nearly ignored; along with much of the rest of our hard won monetary experiences. 전당 대회의 시간으로, continentals의 큰 혜택을 거의 무시했다; 함께 우리의 하드 통화 원의 휴식을 많이 경험했다. Some wanted to emphasize that the continentals became worthless and rejected the idea of paper money altogether. 일부는 그 continentals 쓸모가 강조하고 싶었과 아예 지폐의 생각을 거부했다. They ignored that paper money was crucial in giving us a nation; that abstract money requires an advanced legal system in place; that the normal method of assuring its acceptability is to allow the taxes to be paid in it. 그들이 우리 나라에 중요한주고 그 지폐를 무시; 그 추상적인 장소에서 돈을 고급 법적 시스템이 필요; 그것은 수락할 추청의 정상적인 방법은 세금 지불을 받으실 수 있도록하는 것입니다. . . The convention met from May to September 1787 but the money subject didn’t come up until August 16. 전당 대회를 5 월 1787년 9월지만 돈은 16 일까지 대상으로 올라오지 않았어요에서 만났다. Remember, Jefferson and Paine were not there. 제퍼슨과 Paine이 거기에없는 기억. Franklin was too old to speak. 프랭클린 너무 오래된 얘기했다. A curious book on money appeared just then, written anonymously by Calvinist Minister John Witherspoon, - the only clergyman signer of the declaration of Independence. 돈이에 대한 호기심이 책은 이제 막 다음, 익명 칼뱅파 장관이 작성한 존 위더스푼, 출연 - 독립 선언서의 서명자 유일한 본교회. The book attacked government money and promoted Adam Smith’s view that only gold and silver are money. 이 책은 정부가 돈을 공격하고, 아담 스미스의 견해를 금은 돈이있다만이 승진했다. . . The power for government to properly create money, long considered as a necessary part of sovereignty, was contained in five magic words - to emit bills of credit. 정부의 전력을 제대로 긴 필요한 주권의 일부로 간주, 다섯을 만드는 마법의 단어에 포함된 돈이 - 신용의 법안을 방출합니다. This provision was already in the Articles of Confederation, but the Federalists - the merchant/commercial interest, largely responsible for calling the Constitutional Convention in order to strengthen the national government, fought to exclude this monetary power from the new government, arguing that it could not be trusted with it. 이 규정을 크게 강화하기 위해 정부가 헌법 컨벤션 전화에 대한 새 정부에서이 통화 전원을 제외 싸웠고, 그 책임 논쟁 수 규약에 이미지만 Federalists - 상인 / 상업적 관심, 그것으로 신뢰할 수없습니다. Some of them intended to get hold of the power privately as had been done in England. 그들 중 일부는 전원을 개인적으로 영국에서 의도를 잡아 다왔다. The supreme importance of the concept of money now becomes evident: For if money is primarily a commodity, convenient for making trades, which obtains its value out of “intrinsic” qualities, then it could be viewed more as a creature of merchants and bankers than of governments. 돈을의 개념의 중요성이 지금 최고의 증거가 : 돈이 들어있다면, 어떤 본질 "의 그것보다 더 많은 가맹점과 은행의 생물로 볼 수있다"자질, 다음의 값을 얻습니다 거래를 위해 주로하고, 편리하다 정부. But if the true nature of money is an abstract social institution embodied in law - obtaining its value largely through legal sanctions, then its more a creature of governments, and the Constitution had better deal with it adequately - describing how a uniform currency is to be provided, controlled and kept reasonably stable, in a just manner. 하지만 자금의 본질을 추상적인 형태를 부여하는 사회 기관은 법률에 - 주로 법적 제재를 통해 그 가치를 획득, 다음 정부의 더 많은 생물, 그리고 헌법은 그것을 적절하게 나은 거래를했다 - 어떻게 유니폼 통화가 될 것입니다 설명 제공 통제하고 합리적으로 안정 유지, 막 방식이다. It was on this crucial question that the Constitutional Convention faltered. 그것은 헌법 대회가 19 위 질문이 중요했다. The delegates accepted Adam Smith’s primitive commodity definition of money as gold and silver and didn’t firmly place the monetary power into government, leaving it ambiguous. 대의원, 금색과 은색과 굳게 모호한 떠나 정부에 권력을 올려 놓지 않았다 화폐로 돈을 아담 스미스의 원시 사회 정의를 허용했다. Later they’d argue over what they had done. 나중에 그들이 무슨 짓을하고 있었던 시대는 끝났다 거라고 주장한다. But the power would still exist, since it is as important as the legislative, judicial and executive powers. 이후로, 사법 입법과 행정 능력이 중요하다고하지만, 권력은 여전히 존재할 것이다. I am suggesting that the nature of human affairs requires government to have four branches, not three; the fourth branch to embody and administer the monetary power. 나는 인간 관계의 성격을 4 가지, 아니 세 정부의 제안이 필요 오전 4 가지로 구체화하고 통화 전력 관리. The Constitution trusted the people with the political power; but didn’t firmly place the monetary power in their government. 헌법은 정치 권력을 가진 사람을 신뢰할;지만 단호하게 자신의 정부에서 권력의 통화 장소하지 않았다. This (along with slavery) is the original sin of American politics. 이 (노예와 함께) 미국 정치의 원죄이다. As a result the power was left up for grabs. 결과적으로 전력을 잡고 위해 남아 있지 않았다. Alexander Hamilton wasted no time in “grabbing.” 알렉산더 해밀턴에 시간이 없어 "잡아 버렸네요." The Constitution went into effect in late 1789; Van Buren described Hamilton’s first move as Secretary of the Treasury, in 1790: “Hamilton assumed some $15 million of the state debts. 1789 년 헌법 발효 늦게 간; 밴 뷰런 1790 년 재무 장관, 최초의 이동 해밀턴 설명 : "국가 채무 중 해밀턴 일부 15,000,000달러 생각했습니다. . . an act. 행위. . . neither asked nor desired by the states, unconstitutional and inexpedient. 질문도 마찬가지 상태, 위헌과 부적으로 원하는. . . ” " What was so bad about it? 그것에 대해 왜 그렇게 나쁘다고? “A large proportion of the domestic debt (was held by) the soldiers who fought our battles, and the farmers, manufacturers and merchants who furnished supplies for their support. 국내 부채의 "큰 비율 (의해)는 우리의 전투에 참전했던 군인들의 지원을 위해 농민, 가구 용품 제조 업체와 상인 사람이 열렸다. . . .When it became known to members of Congress, which sat behind closed doors, that the bill would pass. .되면 의회의 밀실에 앉아 회원, 그 법안을 통과 것이라고 알려졌다. . . every part of the country was overrun by speculators, by horse, and boat, buying up large portions of the certificates for (pennies on the dollar).” Madison, attempted to have the law pay speculators less than the original holders, but was voted down. 이 나라의 모든 부분 목마에 의해 투기꾼에 의해 오버런, 보트, 달러 (동전)에 대한 인증서의 큰 부분을 사들이고있다. "매디슨, 법이 투기꾼 원래 소유자보다 적은 금액을 지불할 필요를 시도했으나 부결됐다 아래로. Next Hamilton and associates, having kept the monetary power out of government hands, moved to assume it themselves. 다음 해밀턴과 동료, 정부가 손을 밖으로 권력을 유지하는 데 금전적 직접 가정을 옮겼다. The Bank of North America was the only bank in the US, formed in Pennsylvania on Tom Paine’s initiative to assist the revolution. 북 아메리카 은행은 미국에서 유일하게 은행, 펜실베니아에서 Tom Paine이의 이니셔티브에 혁명을 돕기 위해 설립되었다. Arguing that it was only a state bank, Hamilton suggested it come forward if it wanted to alter itself for the national purpose. 그것이 유일한 상태 주장 은행이었는데, 해밀턴 앞으로 국가 목적을 위해 자체를 변경할 경우하려고 온 제안했다. Curiously, the bank took no steps toward this obvious increase in profit and power. 호기심, 은행 이익과 권력이없는 단계에 대한 확실한 인상했다. Hamilton’s Federalists quickly put through legislation to charter the First Bank of The United States, as a privately owned central bank on the Bank of England model. 해밀턴은 입법을 통해 신속하게 Federalists 헌장 제일 은행은 미국, 영국 은행에있는 개인 소유의 중앙 은행 모델. The Bank would be issuing paper notes not really backed by metal, but pretending to be redeemable in coinage, on the one condition that not a lot of people asked for redemption. 은행, 종이 노트를 정말 금속에 의해 뒷받침되지 발행이 될 것이지만, 척 냄에 상환되며, 상환을 요구 한 상태에있는 사람이별로 없어요. They really did not have the coinage. 그들이 정말로 조어도하지 않았다. The bank would do what they had blocked the government from doing. 은행들은 정부가하는 무엇을 차단했다 할 것이다. Print paper money. 인쇄 용지 돈. While gold and silver served as a smoke-screen what the bankers really counted on, were the legal considerations of the money. 반면 금, 담배 - 은행 정말 무슨 계산 화면으로 재직 돈의 법적 고려했다. They knew that all that was needed to give their paper notes value, was for the government to accept them in payment for taxes. 그들은 그 모든 것이 자신의 가치를 부여하는 데 필요한 종이 노트, 정부에 대한 세금에 대한 지불에 동의하는 걸 알고 있었어. That, and not issuing too excessive a quantity of them. 즉, 너무 그들의 수량이 과도한 발행하지. Under those conditions, the paper notes they printed out of thin air, would be a claim on any wealth existing in the society. 이러한 조건 하에서, 종이들이 허공에서, 사회에서 기존에있는 모든 재산이 될 것이라고 주장 아웃 인쇄된 메모. And we see why the Bank of North America was not put forward for this purpose: the US government had owned 60% of it. 그리고 우리는 왜 북한이 미국의 은행은 앞으로이 목적을 위해 만들어지지 않았어 참조 : 미국 정부의 60 %를 소유했다. . . . The government would only own 20% of the new bank. 정부는 새 은행의 20 %를 자신의 것이라고. Just where did the money for first Bank of the US came from? 방금 첫 번째 은행은 미국의 돈이 어디에서 나온 거죠? The $10 million share subscription for the banks shares, was oversubscribed within 2 hours. 은행 주식에 대한 달러 구독 천만주, 2 시간 이내에 oversubscribed했다. Less than 1/10 of it was ever paid in gold. 1보다 덜 / 10 그것도 금메달을 지급했다. The rest of the payment was accepted in the form of bonds - the very government bonds that Hamilton had turned from pennies on the dollar to full value. 지불의 나머지 채권의 형태로 받아들여졌다 - 아주 정부는 채권 해밀턴의 전체 가치를 달러 동전에서이 켜져있다. So you see where the money for the bank actually came from - from the American people. 만나서 정말 은행이 실제로는 어디에서 온 - 미국 사람을 위해 돈을. That’s how private central banking started in America. 민간 중앙 은행의 미국에서 시작하는 방법. Thanks in large part to Jefferson’s efforts, the bank was liquidated in 1811. 제퍼슨의 노력으로 상당 부분 감사, 은행은 1811 년 청산됐다. Three quarters of it was found to be owned by Europeans - English and Dutch. 그것의 4 분의 3 유럽인에 의해 소유되고 - 발견됐다 영어와 네덜란드어를 지원합니다. The 2nd Bank of the US - the bank from hell - operated illegally from inception, accepting IOU’s instead of the required gold in payment for its shares. 2 은행은 미국의 - 지옥에서 은행 - 불법 설계부터, 차용 증서 대신에 필요한 금 보유 지분에 대한 지불에있어 수락 운영하고있습니다. So again the banker’s gold “requirement” turned out to be a masquerade. 그러니 다시 은행 골드 "요구 사항"바뀐 가면된다. This private central bank immediately embarked on a wild monetary expansion. 중앙 은행이 민간 야생의 금전적 즉각 확장에 나섰다. Beginning operations in April 1817, by July it had 19 branch offices and had created $52 million in loans on its books and an additional 9 million in circulating currency, based on gold and silver coin reserves of only $2.5 million. 1817년 4월 월부터 7 월까지 운영 및 19 개 출장소, 기반으로 통화 순환에 자사의 도서 대출과 52,000,000달러 추가 9,000,000 만들었다는 금과 은을에만 2백50만달러의 동전을 보유하고있습니다. This tremendous expansion caused a wild speculative boom. 이 엄청난 확장 야생 투기 열풍의 원인. Then in August 1818, the bank turned abruptly and began an insane contraction, causing the panic of 1819. 다음 1818년 8월에서, 은행이 갑자기 방향을 틀고 제정신이 수축하기 시작 1819의 공포를 일으키고있다. It cut its outstanding loans and advances from a high of $52 million, down to $12 million in I819. 그것에서 뛰어난 대출과 발전을 인하 5천2백만달러의 다운 1천2백만달러로 높은 I819. Its circulating notes dropped from $10 million to $3.5 million in 1820. 메모는 순환 1천만달러에서 3백50만달러로 1820 년에 떨어졌다. A massive wave of bankruptcies swept the nation. 파산의 거대한 파도가 전국을 휩쓸었다. The subsequent history of this bank and its fight to the death with President Jackson reads like a financial soap opera. 이 은행의 후속 역사 잭슨 대통령이 금융 읽습 멜로드라마처럼 함께 죽음의 싸움. The story of various state chartered banks is similar. 다양한 상태 차터 은행의 이야기는 비슷합니다. Meanwhile the US government acted responsibly In the aftermath of liquidation of the first and second bank; US Treasury notes were substituted in place of banknotes. 한편 미국 정부는 책임감 첫 번째와 두 번째 은행의 청산 여파로 행동; 미 재무부의 지폐 노트 장소에 교체됐다. About $65 million were authorized and only $37 million actually issued. 에 대해서만 65,000,000달러 및 승인했다 37,000,000달러 사실이다. The US Treasury spent them into circulation. 미 재무부 발행 부수로 보냈다. Initially they were all large denomination, paid interest; were redeemable in gold and required formalities to transfer. 처음에 그들은 모두 대형 교단, 관심을 지불했다; 금에 상환하고 필요한 수속을 전송합니다. By 1815 they became bearer certificates with no redemption date, paid no interest and were in smaller denominations. 그들은 1815 년까지 상환 날짜로 받드는 인증서가 전혀 관심이 적은 돈을 지불했다. Thus they were nearly a true money form. 그러므로 그들은 거의 사실이 돈을 양식. The fact is that the US government has always acted responsibly in creating money. 사실 미국 정부는 항상 돈이 책임감을 만드는 행동이다. Not so the private banks. 그리 민간 은행. Greenbacks were on balance our best money system to date Thanks to 100 years of misreporting, the image of the greenbacks coming down to us is as inflated or worthless paper money. 돈, 돈 우리가 내려갈의 이미지로 비정상적이다 날짜를 감사하는 오보의 100 년을 위해 최선을 돈을 시스템의 균형에 있었거나 돈을 쓸모없는 종이. In fact, $450 million were authorized and $450 million were printed. 사실, 있었다 450,000,000달러 승인 및 사억오천만달러 인쇄했다. Counterfeiters couldn’t duplicate the Greenbacks. 위조 the 그린 백스 중복하지 못했습니다. Every Greenback was eventually exchangeable one for one with gold coin. 결국 교환을위한 모든 Greenback 금화 하나 하나였다. But greenbacks were not promises to pay money later - they were the money. 하지만 돈이 아니라 나중에 돈을 지불 약속 - 그들은 돈을했다. Since they were not borrowed, they did not give rise to interest payments and did not add to any national debt. 이후 그들이 빌린하지 않았다면, 그들이 관심을 지불하고 상승을하지 않은 국가 채무에 추가하지 않았다. The US Treasury printed them and spent them into circulation. 미국 재무부는 그들을 인쇄하고 발행 부수로 보냈다. Economists usually harp on the Greenbacks dropping to 36 cents in gold, and they leave it at that. 이코노미 스트는 대개 그린 백스에 떨어뜨리고 금색에서 36 센트로 하프, 그리고 그들이 그것을두고있다. While that happened, its highly misleading. 반면 일어난는 매우 오해의 소지가있다. . . What did happen was that in June 1864, Congress limited the amount of Greenbacks to $450 million. 그랬냐니 1864 년 6 월 의회 4억5천만달러을 그린 백스의 양을 제한했다. There was inflation, but remember 13% of the population was fighting a terrible war. 이미 물가는 작았지만, 전체 인구의 13 %를 기억 끔찍한 전쟁이었다. 625,000 died. 625000 사망했다. Greenbacks performed well despite being spent on destruction. 그럼에도 불구하고 수행 파괴에 지출되는 돈. They were also being abused by the bankers. 이들은 또 은행에 의해 학대를 당하고 있었다. For every greenback created by Congress, the banking system created $1.49 in bank notes. 의회가 만든 모든 그린백 들어, 금융 시스템의 1.49 달러 지폐에 만들었습니다. What if instead of being spent on destruction, they went into building infrastructure, and canals and roads? 대신에 보냈다면 어떻게 파괴되고, 그들은 건물 인프라에 들어가서 운하와 도로? Spending such money on infrastructure need not be inflationary. 인프라에 돈을 지출 등 인플레이션 걱정하실 필요가없습니다. For example the Erie Canal lowered freight prices from $114 a ton down to $9 a ton. 예를 들어 에리 운하 1백14달러 $ 9 톤을에게화물 톤에서 가격 하향 조정했다. The great lesson of greenbacks is that in times of crisis - and other times too - our nation has power to do what is financially necessary, through our government. 돈의 가장 큰 교훈은 위기의시기에 - 그리고 다른시기도 - 우리 나라, 우리 정부를 통해 권력을 어떻게 재정적으로 필요하다 할 수있다. We don’t have to beg or borrow money from the wealthy and, create an astronomical national debt. We don’t have to tax the middle class into oblivion, or cancel necessary programs. We can carefully use the nations’ sovereign money power far more than we presently have been allowed to realize. At the time of the greenbacks there were those who fully understood. Senator Howe said: “We must rely mainly upon a paper circulation; and . . . that the paper, whoever issues it, must be irredeemable. All paper currencies have been and ever will be irredeemable. It is a pleasant fiction to call them redeemable. . . I would not expose that fiction only that the great emergency which is upon us seems to me to render it more than usually proper that the nation should begin to speak the truth to itself; to have done with shams, and to deal with realities.” The struggle between private versus public control of money continued throughout the 19th century. The greenbacks continued to constitute about a third of our money supply. Generally the private money power dominated. But in periods when the government exercised control, an excellent record was established- superior to that of private control. The bankers continued their pretense that gold was the basis of the system, and even the Federal Reserve in 1913 appeared to be a gold-based system. But immediately upon inception, we were pushed into warfare. Within 20 years Americas farms, cities, exchanges and money system were all wrecked, ending in the great depression. It was again left to our government to rescue the nation. It’s forgotten today, but the Thomas Amendment passed with legislation in 1933, gave the President the power to create $3 billion in greenbacks if the banking system didn’t co-operate. . . The de-funding of government at the local, state and federal levels, arises out of this disease of attacking government as the enemy. This attack on government starts with Adam Smith. His purpose in smearing the English government was to keep the monetary power in the hands of the privately owned Bank of England. . . To summarize the argument: The nature of the money power is societally derived, not one originating in the activities of private corporations. Because of its great importance to all, control over the process belongs under public authority. Both logic and history show that its not safe to delegate this power, and certainly not acceptable to allow its usurpation. The current bailout The demand for immediate action to avoid a meltdown is misplaced. Immediate and wrong action will accelerate the meltdown. There is only one thing Congress can do to inspire confidence and avoid a meltdown - that is to take deliberate and careful and good workable action to help resolve the crisis. In other words to fulfill its congressional duty to America. . . Getting it right means requiring several conditions to protect the American people from the gang that’s been financially raping the nation; that gave us the unnecessary Iraqi war. It means facing the facts on where the banking crisis is and how it got there. It means examining the monetary and economic reforms of the Federal Reserve System that will assure that such thievery or foolishness won’t happen again; and taking back from those who improperly benefited from the tragedy and prosecuting them. At the heart of the problem is that our money system has been privatized. Naturally it’s being run for the benefit of the “privates” in control, with minimal concern for the public interest. . . Rather than borrowing the $700 billion being demanded, and ending up paying back about 3 times that amount after interest charges, The US government could issue the money the same way the banks do, instead of borrowing it from them. But while the banks issue credit that substitutes for money, the US would issue actual money. Our government has the power to create the money, in an account, or by simply printing it as greenbacks. There would not be inflationary effects, because it was already believed that those moneys existed in the form of the real estate values and loans. In effect this would stop a deflation which would follow from writing down those assets and loans to their present market values. Some conditions would be needed to assure that the banking system did not use those greenback dollars for further credit creation, as that would be inflationary. In essence the greenbacks would not be “re-discountable” by the banking system to create more loans, but would be legal tender for all debts public and private. . . What the administrations proposal is doing is almost identical to what Keynes did during the Great Depression. He insisted that the bailout be in terms of government going into more debt to the banking system, whereas the Chicago Plan by the greatest economists in the nation at that time, was promoting the government to create money (greenback equivalents) instead of debt. . . Keynes won the argument but his program did not work and it was only WW2 and [with] wartime employment, creating tanks to be blown up, airplanes to be shot out of the sky, and ships to be sunk, that Americans went back to work and we worked our way out of the depression, and into more debt. That’s where this proposal leads. Keynes answer was that “in the long run we are all dead,” but not our posterity. Based on what happened following his program before, our descendants, and society that survives become enslaved. Unless monetary reform is in the mix now, it could take a tremendous worsening of the situation to come up again soon. One articulate friend, George Romero, summed it up for me: “The private sector has failed. The public sector is expected to rescue them, and it will. Therefore the public sector should be in control of the money system to benefit the country.” The Chicago Plan of the 1930s Henry Simons from the University of Chicago created the proposal and prominent economists from other universities joined him in what became known as the “Chicago Plan.”Economists like Paul Douglas of the U of C.; Frank Graham and Charles Whittlesley of Princeton; Irving Fisher of Yale; Earl Hamilton of Duke; and Willford King of NYU, to name a few. One version was sent to all the academic economists – about a thousand total. Of those responding, 235 from 157 universities agreed with the proposal; another 40 approved it with reservations and only 45 disapproved. So the plan had broad professional support. Variants of the Chicago Plan usually started by condemning the banking structure as foolish and harmful: “If the purpose of money and credit were to discourage the exchange of goods and services, to destroy periodically the wealth produced, to frustrate and trip those who save, our present monetary system (does that) most effectively!” They dispensed with the gold standard as not a real standard, because the value of gold had changed violently up and down against commodities. From 1914 to 1917 wholesale prices rose 65% and, then increased another 55% to May 1920, So Gold coins lost over 75 % of their value against wholesale prices in the Fed’s first six years. Then by June 1921wholesale prices fell 56% against gold. “Hard money” advocates who believe that gold money has been stable should study these facts. One version of the plan quoted Roosevelt’s referring to gold as an “old fetish of so-called international bankers.” The main features of the Chicago Plan were: - Only the government would create money. The Federal Reserve banks would be nationalized, but not the individual member banks. The power to create money was to be removed from private banks by abolishing fractional reserves – the mechanism through which the banking system creates money. So the plan called for 100% reserves on checking accounts which simply meant banks would be warehousing and transferring the money and charging fees for their services. - The Plan separated the loan-making function, which can belong in private banks, from the money-creation function, which belongs in government. Lending was still to be a private banking function, but by lending deposited long-term savings money, not created credits. In this way they’d restrict an unstable practice known as borrowing short and lending long – making long term loans with short term deposits. - The proposal recognized the distinction between money and credit, which had been confused through fractional reserves and what was called the “real bills doctrine.” The confusion was seen as one of the causes of the depression, because when businesses reduced their borrowings on commercial bills which occurs during any downturn, parts of the money supply had been automatically liquidated. The Chicago Plan saw the instability of this – that it aggravates a downturn. Simon made this grand observation: “The mistake. . . lies in fearing money and trusting debt. Money itself is highly amenable to democratic, legislative control, for no community wants a markedly appreciating or depreciating currency. . . but money is not easily manageable alongside a mass of private debt and private near-moneys. . . or alongside a mountain of public debt.” Some variations of the plan had the US government lending banks all or part of newly printed cash needed to achieve 100% reserves. This was a crucial part of the plan, because depositors were going to the banks and withdrawing their accounts, deflating the system. This loaning of reserves feature also elegantly converted all the previously monetized bank credits into real US money on which the banks paid interest to our government. It post facto made them intermediaries, earning some reasonable spread for their loaning work. Paul Douglas wrote: “This proposal will of course be opposed by the bankers from whom it takes the lucrative privilege of creating purchasing power. It would however insure the safety of deposits, give large revenues to the government, provide complete social control over monetary matters and prevent abnormal fluctuations in the capital market. At the same time it would permit the allocation of productive resources. . . to remain primarily in private hands. All in all it seems the most promising program for the reform of our monetary and credit system. . . ” Marinner Eccles, who became Fed Chairman under Roosevelt, testified that the best course would be for the government to nationalize the Federal Reserve banks. Congressman Jerry Voorhis made the case for hundred percent reserves and putting money into circulation by paying pensions and disabled persons. As late as 1945 Voorhis introduced legislation for a US Monetary Authority as our sole creator of money. Maurice Allais, the great French economist, backed the plan and published a book on it in 1948. Irving Fisher of Yale, wrote on it extensively and popularly well into the 1940s. . . There was no understanding or support for the proposal among the electorate. Only Irving Fisher seems to have understood the necessity for popularizing the matter. Simons himself got cold feet and shied away from promoting the plan, desiring to remain on a level of professorial discussion. He even threw a wet towel on Fisher who was promoting the reform suggesting that Fisher avoid popularizing the idea! The Plan was mishandled politically. . . The last attempt at 100% reserves was when Senator Nye of North Dakota tried to place it in part of the administration’s 1935 banking reform legislation, but his amendment was defeated. The FDR administration had its own banking reform bill and remained ambiguous on the Chicago Plan, never commenting on it even though the political climate and professional support for the plan was sufficient to get it passed, had they made some effort. Instead his Treasury Secretary Morganthau was trying to make minor adjustments without fundamentally challenging the banking system. . . Can we learn from what John Maynard Keynes was doing during all this? He was squarely behind the bankers and against such real reform. Yet he knew that he had to break out of orthodox economics or the whole system was in danger of being overturned. Keynesianism was a way to allow banks not government to keep control over the money-creation process, and while the more narrow minded economists fought Roosevelt’s attempts to create money and jobs as inflationary, during the nations worst deflation, Keynes knew better. The New York Times in December 1933. . . got Keynes to write an open letter to Roosevelt, which they published. Keynes wisely advised Roosevelt that “Only the expenditures of public authority” could turn the tide of depression. . . However, Keynes inappropriately warned Roosevelt not to create the money for this, but only to borrow it, and wrongly advised him that there was already enough money in circulation, and that: “increasing the quantity of money. . . is like trying to get fat by buying a larger belt.” Keynes was therefore not “revolutionary” except in relation to the utter backwardness of the financial establishment. He didn’t come close to a real solution, but essentially protected his class. The real question has always been whether the nation’s money should be created under law, by government, or under the private caprice of bankers. DEALING WITH THE NATIONAL DEBT Bob Blain, Progressive Review, 1994 - From 1790 to 1993, taxpayers were charged $3.2 trillion in interest on federal debt. . . . The original debt at 5.53 percent interest compounded for 204 years equals $4.4 trillion. The present federal debt is arguably the original debt enlarged by 204 years of compounding interest. According to the Federal Reserve Bulletin, the total money supply (currency, travelers checks, demand deposits, and savings accounts) in the US economy in March 1993 was $4 trillion. The total debt of the federal government, state and local governments, corporations, farmers, home buyers, and consumers was in excess of $15 trillion. If the total money supply is $4 trillion, where is the other $11 trillion of borrowed money? Here is another curious fact. We have been told for years that government borrowing to cover hundreds of billions of dollars of deficits would drive interest rates through the roof. Instead, interest rates have fallen dramatically. In March, 1993 they were between 4.9 and 2.2 percent, far below what they were in the early 1980s when federal debt was a small fraction of what it is now. The explanation for these anomalies is that the missing money never existed. We never borrowed it, in the normal sense that it was turned over to us and spent. Most debt is not the result of people borrowing money; it is the result of people not being able to repay what they owed at some earlier time. Instead of declaring them bankrupt, creditors just add more to their debt. The federal government has been adding interest to its debt for 204 years. James Jackson, Congressman from Georgia, predicted that this would happen in a speech he made to the First Congress on February 9, 1790. Jackson warned that passing Alexander Hamilton’s plan to base the country’s money supply on the existing federal debt of $75 million would “settle upon our posterity a burden which they can neither bear nor relieve themselves from.” He predicted: “In the course of a single century it would be multiplied to an extent we dare not think of,” He clearly saw that Hamilton’s plan would put in place an exponential process of debt growth. To support his warning he cited the experience of Florence, Genoa, Venice, Spain, France, and England. Hamilton’s plan was for Congress to commit the country to pay interest on the debt until the debt was paid. In the meantime the debt certificates would circulate as money. He argued that this would turn a $75 million debt into a $75 million money supply. The problem was that interest payments would have come out of the money supply. This would reduce the quantity of money that remained in circulation — and cause recession — until new loans returned the interest money back into circulation. The history of federal government finance shows such periodic swings between debt reduction and recession to debt increase and recovery. The power to deal with this problem that Congress has neglected all these years is the power “to coin money and regulate the value thereof.” It has overused its power “to borrow money on the credit of the United States.” According to the Federal Reserve, 98 percent of the US money supply is borrowed. Only 2 percent is coined. The First Congress set the wrong precedent. It should have created $75 million in money and paid off the debt. With a population of 4 million people and an economy starved for a medium of exchange, that would have increased the money supply by $18.75 per person. Why did the First Congress borrow instead of coin money? Newspapers at the time accused members of Congress of acting to serve their own interests. They sent agents into the countryside to buy up debt certificates that the general public thought were worthless. They then passed the Funding Act knowing that it would give themselves and their heirs a source of income that would grow exponentially with the debt. For every debtor there is a creditor. What is a $4 trillion debt for debtors is $4 trillion in claims for creditors. To get out of this trap Congress has a range of options: First, it could stop paying interest on the debt. Interest is the fuel that is exploding the debt. Cut off the fuel; stop the explosion. Since 1790 over $3 trillion in interest has been added to the original $75 million. Cutting interest would immediately cut the annual deficit by about $300 billion. Experience shows that all other conventional actions, no matter how painful, do no more than slow slightly the rate of debt growth. Then Congress could begin the process of paying off the debt. A political problem with stopping the payment of interest is that people with money control politics. And many of them would have their interest income stopped. Insurance companies and pension funds are invested in federal debt and foreign holders would also be upset. Economically, however, we cannot continue to add compounding interest to existing debt. The biggest debtor is not the federal government. It is business corporations. It is impossible for them to increase the physical production of goods and services in order to keep up with exponential debt growth that is limited by nothing but arithmetic. Unlike the debt, the physical economy has limits. The question holders of federal debt must ask themselves is this: Do we want to insist on more interest that will add debt to existing debt until the only option is debt repudiation and we lose everything? Or are we willing to stop where we are while we may still be able to recover our original investment plus a reasonable profit? A second option is for Congress to create the money necessary to fund public works. As a sovereign government, Congress’ power is unique. It can create money debt-free and interest-free. Congress needs to stop thinking of itself as the same as other organizations that must take money in before they can spend it. Money does not grow on trees. It must be created. The only choice is whether to have it created as loans at interest from private banks or to have it created by Congress debt-free and interest-free. How can Congress create money without causing inflation? Congress must regulate its value. The power to create money includes this regulatory power. A good way for Congress to regulate the value of money is by funding projects at the current national price level. The current national price level can be calculated by dividing the most recent gross domestic product by the number of hours of work that produced it. For example, in 1991 the total gross domestic product was $5.6 trillion. The employed labor force produced it with 237 billion hours of work. So the GDP was produced at the rate of $23.95 per hour of work. By now the price level per hour is probably $25.00. So let Congress fund projects at $25 per hour. How this amount is allocated among labor, land, and capital can be negotiated. How much money should Congress create? How about enough to reach full employment? We have about 9.5 million people actively looking for work. That includes a million managers and professionals; two and a quarter million technical, sales, and clerical people; a million and a quarter precision production, craft and repair people; over two million operators, fabricators and laborers; and 305,000 framers, foresters and fishermen. That’sa skilled labor force as big as many nations — all now idle. Employed at an average $25 per hour, ($50,000 per year), they would add $475 billion to the nation’s gross domestic product and reduce spending for unemployment compensation. The pie would grow as unemployment went down. Congress could start by creating, say, $50 billion, or $200 per person, in debt-free interest-free money, then fund $50 billion worth of works projects, monitor the results, and make adjustments as needed. Meanwhile the Fed could raise bank reserve rates, not interest rates, to make checking accounts more secure. A third more conservative option is being proposed by an organization called Sovereignty, which believes that a country that borrows money loses its sovereignty to its creditors. Their proposal is intended to restore US sovereignty by reducing our dependence on borrowed money. The Guernsey experience. . . Guernsey is an island state located among the British Channel Islands about 75 miles south of Great Britain. In 1816 its sea walls were crumbling, its roads were muddy and only 4 1/2 feet wide. Guernsey’s debt was 19,000 pounds. The island’s annual income was 3,000 pounds of which 2,400 had to be used to pay interest on its debt. Not surprisingly, people were leaving Guernsey and there was little employment. Then the government created and loaned new, interest-free state notes worth 6,000 pounds. Some 4,000 pounds were used to start the repairs of the sea walls. In 1820, another 4,500 pounds was issued, again interest-free. In 1821, another 10,000; 1824, 5,000; 1826, 20,000. By 1837, 50,000 pounds had been issued interest free for the primary use of projects like sea walls, roads, the marketplace, churches, and colleges. This sum more than doubled the island’s money supply during this thirteen year period, but there was no inflation. In the year 1914, as the British restricted the expansion of their money supply due to World War I, the people of Guernsey commenced to issue another 142,000 pounds over the next four years and never looked back. By 1958, over 542,000 pounds had been issued, all without inflation. In 1990 there was $13 million in interest-free state issued notes. A visitor to the island that year later wrote: “I returned from Guernsey last weekend. It is a fascinating little island. There are about 60,000 permanent residents on the island. The average family owns 3.3 cars, their unemployment rate is zero and their standard of living is very high. There is no public debt. There is a surplus of public funds which earn interest. The Guernsey Treasury increased the Ml of the island by 40 percent in the last three-year period, and this increase did not do anything to inflation. The price for a gallon of gasoline in England translates to about $5US whereas, the price in Guernsey is about $2US. Contrary to the teachings of current economics in all higher institutions, inflation is not related to the volume of money but rather to the size of the commercial debt.” Sovereignty proposes that Congress create money and lend it interest-free on a per capita formula to tax-supported bodies for capital projects and to convert existing debt to non-interest-bearing debt. Since first proposed in January 1989, the Sovereignty loan plan has been endorsed by over 1,814 city, town, and county governments and school boards, as well as by the US conference of Mayors, the Michigan state legislature and the Community Bankers Association of Illinois, which represents 515 banks. As loans, the money would be repaid, so money injected into communities would fund projects, then be removed. Of the three methods for putting money into circulation available to Congress, giving, paying, and lending, lending is the most cautious. Benjamin Franklin attributed the economic success of the colonies to their creation of all the money they needed. He said that the root cause of the Revolution was the act of Parliament that prohibited the colonies from continuing to issue their own money. The moneylenders of England thought it more profitable that the colonies borrow their money. We hear from Washington that we need to sacrifice to bring the deficits under control — cut consumption, save, and invest. When that slows the economy, we will be told to spend more to stimulate the economy. We have heard it all before. Neither method works. We need debt-free interest-free money to fund the work that needs to be done. It’s not sacrifice we need; it’s productive employment. Let Congress use its unique power to coin money and regulate its value to fund that employment. Money is no more than an accounting device, a system of notes certifying that the bearer has done a share of the work and deserves a share of the wealth. Money’s backing is the goods and services produced by the labor force. By creating money Congress can activate the idle productive power of our people. And what they produce will add real wealth to the US Treasury and add nothing to the federal debt. Sam Smith’s Great American Political Repair Manual, 1997 - A report of Guernsey’s States Office in June 1946 notes that island leaders frequently commented that these public works could not have been carried out without the issues, that they had been accomplished without interest costs, and that as a result “the influx of visitors was increased, commerce was stimulated, and the prosperity of the Island vastly improved.” By 1943, nearly a half million pounds worth of notes belonged to the public and was so valued that much of it was being hoarded in people’s homes, awaiting the island’s liberation from the Germans. About the same time that Guernsey started to fix its sea walls the town of Glasgow, Scotland, borrowed 60,000 pounds to build a fruit market. The Guernsey sea walls were repaid in ten years, the fruit market loan took 139. In the first part of the the 20th century, Glasgow paid over a quarter million pounds in interest alone on this ancient project. How did Guernsey avoid the fiscal disaster that conventional economics prescribed for it? First and foremost by understanding that when you build roads or sea walls or colleges or houses, you are not reducing your society’s wealth. In fact, if you do it right, you are creating something that will add to its wealth. The money that was created was simply backed by public works rather than gold or “full faith and credit.” It was, in fact, based on something more solid than the dollar bills in our wallets today. In contrast, tacking on an interest charge to public works — as we do in the US — creates no new wealth, but merely transfers claims on existing wealth from debtors to creditors. Have Your Say: WHAT BANKS, ACADEMICS, THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT MONEY Please read our posting guidelines before posting . Alternatively you can discuss this report here . Related News
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