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Wednesday, November 19th, 2008 水曜日、 11月、 2008年の第19回

The privilege of creating and issuing money is not only the supreme prerogative of government, but is the government’s greatest creative opportunity. を作成し、お金を発行するのは、権限だけでなく、政府の最高の特権ですが、政府の最大の機会を創造しています。 By the adoption of these principles, the taxpayers will be saved immense sums of interest. — Abraham Lincoln これらの原則の採択では、納税者の関心の莫大な金額に保存されます 。 -エイブラハムリンカーン

Most of what follows is the work of the extraordinary and admirable Stephen Zarlenga of the以下のほとんどは、臨時と見事Zarlengaのスティーブンの仕事です American Monetary Institute米国の金融機関 . 。 We have taken excerpts from various of his writings - including a 2003 speech to US Treasury staff - and blended it into one piece.我々は彼のさまざまな文章から抜粋している-米財務スタッフには、 2 003年のスピーチなど- 、それを1つにブレンド。 Also included is an article we ran 1994 by Bob Blain and an excerpt from Sam Smith’s Great American Political Repair Manual, published by WW Norton in 1997.我々も含ま膿疱ボブとサムスミス氏のグレートアメリカン政治修理マニュアル、見てなかったノートンによって1997年に公開さからの抜粋で走った1994年の記事です。

Some historyいくつかの歴史

Stephen Zarlenga, American Monetary Institute - The money system is society’s greatest dispenser of justice or injustice.スティーブンZarlenga 、米国の通貨研究所-金制度正義や不公平社会の最大のディスペンサーです。 A good one functions fairly, helping create values for life. 1つの機能はかなり良い、生命の値の作成を支援します。 A bad, unjust one obstructs the creation of values; gives special privileges to some and disadvantage to others causing unfair concentrations of wealth and power; leading to social strife and eventually warfare and a thousand unforeseen bad consequences - physical and spiritual.悪い、不当な1つの値の作成を阻害;一部と他の富と権力の不当な濃度の原因に不利に特別な権限を与え、社会的な争い、最終戦とは1000不測の悪い結果につながる-物理的および精神的。 . 。 . 。

One reason economists have failed mankind so badly is their poor methodology - an over-reliance on theoretical reasoning.人類のエコノミストはひどい失敗している理由の一つは貧しい人々の方法論-一以上の理論的な推論に依存している。 Alexander Del Mar the world’s greatest monetary historian noted: “As a rule economists.アレクサンダーデルマルは、世界最大の金融史家メモ： "ルールのエコノミスト。 . 。 . 。 don’t take the trouble to study the history of money; it is much easier to imagine it and to deduce the principles of this imaginary knowledge.”.お金の歴史を学ぶのに苦労することはありません。それくらいのことを想像し、そしてより簡単には、この架空の知識の原理を推測する。 " 。 . 。 . 。

In England the struggle became the goldsmiths vs the monarchy representing society.イングランドでは、必死で金になったの君主制社会を代表vs名古屋グランパスエイト。 Later it was the Bank of England vs. society.後で銀行イングランド対社会のだった。 Until then England’s money power was in the monarch’s hands.それまではイングランドの資金力は、君主の手にした。 But from that point, Bank of England credits would be substituted in place of public money.しかし、その時点から、銀行クレジットイングランドの公的資金の代わりに置換される。 This promoted a confusion between credit and money to this day.このクレジットとこの日にお金の間に混乱を推進している。 But they are different things.しかし、別のものだ。 Credit depends on the creditor remaining solvent.残りのクレジット債権溶媒に依存します。 Real money does not promise to pay something else.本物のお金を、何か他の支払いを約束するものではありません。 Money is on a higher order than credit.お金よりも高い信用秩序にである。

Those behind the Bank of England obscured the real source of the bank’s power - its legal privilege.イングランドが背後には、銀行-その法的権限は、銀行の真の力の源隠さ。 Its notes were accepted in payments to the government.そのメモは、政府へのお支払いが承認された。 Recovering the science of money for the private profit of a small group produced harmful results: 120 years of continuous warfare spawned an unpayable national debt leading to excessive taxation leading to horrors like the Irish potato famine.小さなグループの利益のためには、民間資金の科学の回復有害な結果： 120年戦争の連続生産は割に合わない国家債務の過剰課税は、アイルランドのジャガイモ飢饉のような恐怖につながるにつながる生み出した。

Before then, when a nation’s money system was used for taxation, the revenue generally aided the society.を前に、一国の通貨制度に課税は、売上高は、一般的に、社会の支援使用されていた。 But the Bank of England concentrated society’s resources in the wrong hands, crippling the possibility for government to function properly, leading to a growing contempt of government.悪の手にだが、イングランド銀行は、社会の資源を集中し、政府が適切に、政府の成長につながる機能を侮辱するための可能性を壊滅。

Today it’s still the bankers versus the society.今日でも、銀行は、社会の対だ。 At base, the battle remains private money vs. public money.公的資金を対ベースでは、民間のままにお金の戦い。 The outcome determines whether the money system operates to serve the few in control, or the whole society.その結果かどうかは、お金のシステムの制御で、またはいくつかの社会全体に動作が決定されます。 . 。 . 。

Mankind can live under various forms of government from dictatorship to republic, but the best systems are those in harmony with human nature.人類共和国を独裁政権からの政府のさまざまな形態の下では、生活できるよう最高のシステムは人間の自然と調和しています。 Likewise many things can be made into money, but the best will be the ones in harmony with the nature of money.同様に多くのことをお金には作られていることが最善の資金の自然と調和したものになります。

Remember: don’t confuse money with tangible wealth.注意：目に見える富とお金を混同しないでください。 Yes, commodities can be improperly monetized by law.はい、商品が不正に法律によって収益することができます。 The result will make the money system hostage to the commodities situation; hostage to the people, companies, countries that control the commodity.その結果、商品の状況には、お金のシステムを人質になる;人質の人々 、企業、国を制御する商品にします。 Ultimately it removes the monetary power from society and places it into the hands of the wealthy.最終的には社会からの金融力を削除し、裕福な者の手に配置されます。

And don’t confuse money with credit - either private or public credit.と信用で金を混同しないでください-のいずれかの民間や公共の信用。 Yes private credits can be improperly monetized by law.はい民間不適切クレジット法律によって収益することができます。 But that gives great privilege to those whose credits have been monetized, to the detriment of the whole society.しかし、これらの者のクレジットを収益化されており、社会全体を台無しにするほど大きな権限を与える。 The money system then becomes an engine of injustice - as it is now.金システムのエンジンを不正になる-現在のです。 . 。 . 。

How private central banking started in Americaどのように民間の中央銀行はアメリカで始まった

First Step: Our Constitutional Convention, considered two grand themes on humanity: First whether mankind could be self-governing.最初のステップ：私たちの憲法条約は、人類の2大テーマ：最初の人類自己統治される可能性があるかどうかを考えている。 This American experiment is still in doubt because the Convention mishandled the other grand theme over the nature of money.これは、条約の資金の性質上、他の大テーマmishandledこれはアメリカの実験はまだ疑っている。

They met from May to September 1787 but the money subject didn’t came up til August 16.彼らは5月1787年9月にはお金がないアジをフィードバックしたから8月16日に会った。 Jefferson and Paine weren’t there.ジェファーソンペインがないとされた。 Franklin was too old to speak.フランクリンも昔の話をした。

A curious book on money appeared, written anonymously by Calvinist clergyman John Witherspoon.お金で、匿名でカルビン派の牧師ジョンウィザースプーンが書いたように好奇心旺盛予約する。 The book attacked government money and promoted Adam Smith’s primitive view that only gold and silver are money.この本は政府の資金を攻撃し、アダムスミスの原始の表示のみが金と銀金が推進している。 . 。 . 。 . 。

The power for government to create money, long considered a necessary part of sovereignty was already in the articles of Confederation, but the Federalists fought to exclude this crucial power from the new government, arguing that it could not be trusted with it.政府のための電力、長い主権のに必要な一部と見なさはそれに信頼されていない可能性があると主張連盟の記事をすでにだったが、連邦主義は、新政府からこの重要な電力を除外することを戦った、お金を作成します。 Some of them intended to get hold of the power privately as had been done in England.いくつかの力を個人としてイングランドで行われていたのを入手することを目的。

The supreme importance of understanding the nature of money now becomes evident: For if money obtains its value from “intrinsic” qualities, it could be viewed more as a creature of merchants and bankers than of governments.お金の性質を明らかになり、現在を理解する上で極めて重要：お金の値を取得する場合に固有の"資質"から、それよりも政府の商店主や銀行の生き物として表示される可能性がある。

But if money’s essence is an abstract social institution obtaining value through law, then its a creature of government and the Constitution had better deal with it adequately.しかし、もしお金の本質は、抽象的な社会制度の法律によって値を取得すると、政府の憲法は、生き物とそれを十分もっと良い取引していた。 Describing how a uniform currency is to be provided, controlled and kept reasonably stable, in a just manner.記述方法を統一通貨供給する制御と合理的に安定を維持、公正な方法でされています。 The Constitutional Convention faltered on this crucial question.憲法条約は、この重要な問題で行き詰まっている。

The delegates accepted Smith’s primitive concept of money and didn’t firmly place the money power into government’s hands, leaving it ambiguous.その代表とお金のスミス氏の原始的概念を受け入れしっかりと政府の資金力を手にしていない場所は、あいまいなまま。

But the power would still exist.しかし、電力は依然として存在している。 What I’m suggesting is that human affairs require government to have four branches, not three; the fourth branch to administer the money power.私が言おうとしている4つの支店は、政府の人事ではなく、 3人が、 4番目の支店が、資金力の管理に必要とされています。

The Constitution left the money power up for grabs.憲法の資金力を手にした。 Alexander Hamilton wasted no time in grabbing.アレクサンダーハミルトンの時間を無駄を掴んではない。

Second Step: The Constitution went into effect in late 1789. 2番目のステップ： 1789年以降の憲法施行した。 Hamilton’s first move as Secretary of the Treasury, was to assume $15 million of the state debts.長官は、財務省のハミルトンの最初の移動、国家千五百万ドルの負債を引き受けることだった。 . 。 . 。 an extremely unpopular act.非常に人気のない行為。 Why?なぜ？

The worthless debt was held by the revolutionary soldiers, farmers, manufacturers and merchants who furnished its supplies.は、価値のない債務は、革命的な兵士、農民、メーカーや小売業者の供給者は、家具付きで開催されました。 As Congress secretly passed the bill behind closed doors, the country was overrun by speculators, buying up the certificates for pennies on the dollar.議会として密かに密室で法案を可決、国が投機筋によるオーバーラン、ドルのペニーのための証明書を購入。

Third step: Next Hamilton and associates, having kept the monetary power out of government, moved to assume it themselves.第3段階：次のハミルトンと仲間、政府のうち、金融力を維持すること自体は想定に引っ越した。 . 。 . 。

Hamilton’s Federalists quickly put through legislation chartering the First Bank of The United States, as a privately owned central bank on the Bank of England model.ハミルトンの連邦主義迅速に法案の第一銀行は、米国のチャーターでは、イングランド銀行に私有の中央銀行としてのモデルを入れた。 The Bank would be issuing paper notes not really backed by metal, but pretending to be redeemable in coinage, on the one condition that not a lot of people asked for redemption.銀行は、紙のメモは本当に金属に受けていないふりを貨幣の発行となるが償還され、 1つの条件では、人々交換を求めたのは、多くの。 They never had enough coinage.彼らは十分な硬貨鋳造していたことはない。

Thus the real question was whether it would be private banks or the government that would issue paper money.したがって、実際の問題かどうかを民間銀行や政府紙幣を発行するということだ。 Will the immense power and profit of issuing currency go to the benefit of the whole nation, or to the private bankers?は、巨大なパワーとは、民間銀行には、全国民の利益、通貨発行の利益になるか？ That’s always been the real monetary question in America.アメリカでは、常に現実の金融問題になっている。

Gold and silver served as a smoke-screen.金と銀の煙の画面となっている。 What the bankers counted on were the legal considerations of the money.の銀行では何を数え、金の法的考慮された。 They knew that all that was needed to give their paper notes value, was for the government to accept them in payment for taxes.彼らは、紙のメモは、すべての値を与えるために必要だ、政府の税金の支払いに同意して知っていた。 That, and not issuing too excessive a quantity.つまり、過度の発行量ともされていません。 Under those conditions, the paper notes they printed out of thin air, would be a claim on any wealth existing in the society.これらの条件下では、空気の薄い紙は、すべての富は、社会の中で、既存の上に請求される印刷指摘している。

Just where did the money for first bank of the US came from?ただここでは、米国の最初の銀行のためのお金でしたから来たの？ . 。 . 。 . 。 The $10 million subscription for the banks’ shares, was oversubscribed within two hours.銀行の株式1000万ドルの購読料は、 2時間以内に超過した。 Only 1/10 of it was ever paid in gold.わずか10分の1はこれまで金で支払われた。 The rest was accepted in the form of bonds - the government bonds that Hamilton had turned from pennies on the dollar to full value.残りの社債の形で受理された-は、政府債は、ハミルトンペニーからの完全な値には、ドルが有効になっていた。 The money for the private bank actually came from the American people.民間銀行のためのお金を実際にはアメリカの人々から来た。

Thanks to Jefferson’s efforts, the bank was liquidated in 1811.ジェファーソンの努力のおかげで、銀行1811に清算された。 Three quarters of it was found to be owned by English and Dutch.の4分の3は英語、オランダ語によって所有されていることがわかった。

AMI’s proposed reforms AMIの改革の提案

- Nationalize the Federal Reserve System. -国有化は、連邦準備制度。 Reconstitute it in the US Treasury, to evolve into a fourth branch of government.米財務省は、政府の4分の1枝へと進化して再構成。 Only the government would create money.唯一の政府資金を作成していた。

- Remove the privilege which banks presently have to create money. -現在は、銀行がお金を作成する権限を削除します。 This is done through an elegant and gentle process which automatically turns all the previously issued bank credit into real American money.これは本当のアメリカのお金を自動的にすべての既発行銀行信用ターンは、エレガントで穏やかなプロセスを通じて行われます。 100% reserves are reached not by calling in loans but by increasing reserves. 100 ％準備金の融資を呼び出す準備が増加することではないに達している。 This would be neither inflationary or deflationary.これも、インフレやデフレになる。

- Institute programs for automatic, constitutionally determined government money creation, starting with the $2 trillion which the civil engineers need to bring our infrastructure up to acceptable levels.自動、憲法上決定された政府資金を創出-研究所のプログラムは、 2 000000000000ドルは、民間の技術者受け入れ可能なレベルに我々のインフラを持参する必要があるから開始されます。 From there we go forward carefully determining how to best run the monetary system.そこから我々は慎重に最高の金融システムを実行する方法を決定する。 . 。 . 。

What difference would reconstituting the money power in government make?どのような違い政府への資金力を再構成しますか？ Government money goes into infrastructure; better life; better jobs; education, safer roads, cleaner water; better health care; social security, etc. Society is empowered by being able to direct the money power to solve pressing problems rather than into useless speculation.政府資金をインフラにかかわってくる、より良い生活、より良い仕事を、教育、安全な道路、クリーンな水、より良い医療を、社会保障などの資金力ではなく、社会に役に立たないを押す推測問題を解決するために直接できることによって力を与えている。 We no longer have to say we can’t afford it, when so many people and resources are unemployed!.我々はもはや我々は、多くの人々と資源失業している余裕はないと言っている！ 。

These three reforms can be closer than we think; and in a crisis situation if only 5% of the citizenry has an awareness of the societal/legal nature of money, they could be enacted.これら3つの改革よりも近づくことができると思うと、危機的状況の場合は、市民のわずか5 ％の資金の社会的/法的性質を意識している、彼らが制定される可能性がある。

The need for monetary reform金融改革の必要性

The power to create money is an awesome power - at times stronger than the executive, legislative or judicial powers combined.電源お金を作成するには最高の力だ-倍力を合わせ、役員は、立法や司法よりも強い。 It’s like having a “magic checkbook,” where checks can’t bounce.これは"魔法の小切手帳を持つようなものだ"ここでチェックバウンスすることはできません。 When controlled privately it can be used to gain riches, but more importantly it determines the direction of our society by deciding where the money goes - what gets funded and what does not.それが個人の富を得るために使用することができますが、より重要なことは何に対して料金を支払う決定-資金を提供されるものではない、何が私たちの社会の方向性を決定する制御されます。 Will it be used to build and repair vital infrastructure such as levees to protect major cities?それを構築し、堤防などの主要都市を守るために不可欠なインフラの修復使用されるのだろうか？ Or will it go into warfare or real estate loans, creating asset price inflation - the real estate bubble.それとも、戦争や不動産融資には、資産価格インフレを作成する-不動産バブル。

Thus the money issuing power should never be alienated from democratically elected government and placed ambiguously into private hands as it is in America in the Federal Reserve system today.そのための資金力を発行する民主的に選ばれた政府から疎外されることはありませんし、あいまいに民間の手に置かとしてアメリカでは、米連邦準備制度で、今日です。

Indeed most people would be surprised to learn that the bulk of our money supply is not created by our government, but by private banks when they make loans.実際、ほとんどの人は、我々の貨幣供給の大部分が政府によって作成されていないですが、民間銀行が融資をするときに学ぶことに驚いている。 Most of our money is issued as interest-bearing debt.我々のお金のほとんどは利息として発行される債権軸受。

We are borrowing this money system from private banks when instead we should own the system, not rent it.私たちは民間銀行からではなく、我々のシステムの所有する必要がありますが、このお金を借りるていないシステムでは、借入している。 Our government has the sovereign power to issue money (Art.1, Sect.8) and spend it into circulation to promote the general welfare through the creation and repair of infrastructure, including human infrastructure - health and education - rather than misusing the money system for speculation as banking has historically done.私たちの政府は、金銭的な問題（ Art.1 、 Sect.8 ）に主権があり、作成やインフラの修復、人間のインフラなどを通じて、一般の福祉を増進する循環-健康と教育に過ごす-というよりは、金制度を悪用銀行との憶測を歴史的に発生しています。 Our lawmakers must now reclaim that power.我々の議員が力を取り戻す必要があります。 . 。 . 。

Unhappily, mankind’s experience with private money creation has undeniably been a long history of fraud, mismanagement and even villainy.惨め、民間資金創出と人類の経験紛れ詐欺の長い歴史、失敗しても非道されています。 Banking abuses are pervasive and self-evident.銀行侵害を普及され、自明。 Major companies focus on misusing the money system instead of production.お金の代わりに生産システムを悪用上での主要な企業の焦点。 For example, in June 2005, Citibank and Merrill Lynch paid over $1.2 Billion to Enron pensioners to settle fraud charges.たとえば、 2005年6月、シティバンク、メリルリンチのエンロン年金を不正請求の解決に12億ドル以上を支払っている。

Private money creation through fractional reserve banking fosters an unprecedented concentration of wealth which destroys the democratic process and ultimately promotes imperialism.部分準備銀行育てる富のは、民主的なプロセスを破壊する帝国主義を推進し、最終的に前例のない濃度を通じて民間資金を創出。 Less than 1% of the population claims ownership of almost 50% of the wealth, but vital infrastructure is ignored.人口の1 ％未満が、富のほぼ50 ％の所有権を主張する重要なインフラは無視されます。 The American Society of Civil Engineers gives a D grade to our infrastructure and estimates that $1.6 trillion is needed to bring it to acceptable levels.米国土木学会は、当社のインフラストラクチャとの見積もりにはDグレード1600000000000ドルを許容するために必要なレベルに持ってきているすることができます。

That fact alone shows the world’s dominant money system to be a major failure crying for reform.その事実だけでも大泣きする改革の失敗は、世界の支配的資金制度を示しています。

Infrastructure repair would provide quality employment throughout the nation.インフラの修復は、全国に質の雇用を提供するだろう。 There is a pretense that government must either borrow or tax to get the money for such projects.政府のいずれかがあるふりを借りる必要がありますまたは税このようなプロジェクトのためのお金を得ることです。 But the government can directly create the money needed and spend it into circulation for such projects, without inflationary results.しかし、政府が直接作成することができますお金が必要なプロジェクトのための循環に費やし、インフレの結果。

The false specter of inflation is usually raised against suggestions that our government fulfill its responsibility to furnish the nation’s money supply.インフレのは、虚偽の妖怪通常の提案に対しては、我々の政府は、国の資金供給を提供することにその責任を果たす高くなっています。 But that is a knee jerk reaction - the result of decades, even centuries of propaganda against government.しかし、それは、ひざの反射反応だ-十年の結果、政府に対しても、宣伝の世紀。 When one actually examines the monetary record, it becomes clear that government has a superior record issuing and controlling money than the private issuers have. 1つのレコードを検証するとき、実際には金融は、政府と制御金は、優れた記録を発行しているが明らかになるよりも、民間発行している。 Inflation is avoided because real material wealth has been created in the process.実際の物質的な豊かさのためにそのプロセスで作成され、インフレは回避されています。

From Stephen Zarlenga’s 2003 speech at the US Treasury米財務省のスティーブンZarlengaの2003年のスピーチから

Perhaps the chief failure of economics is its inability, from Adam Smith to the present, to define or discover a concept of money consistent with logic and history.おそらく経済学の主な失敗はできない、アダムスミスは、現在まで、お金を定義したり、ロジックや歴史と整合性の概念を発見されています。 Economists rarely define money, assuming an understanding of it.ほとんどのエコノミスト、それについての理解を前提とお金を定義します。 It’s still being argued whether the nature of money is a concrete power, embodied in a commodity like gold; or whether it’sa credit/debit issued by private banks.金の性質かどうかはまだ具体的なパワー、金のような商品に組込ましている場合が備わっているかどうかのクレジット/デビット民間銀行が発行したと主張している。 Does its value come from the material of which it’s made?その値は、材料から来ることが出来たのか？ Or is it, as we have concluded, an abstract social power - an institution of the law, having value because its accepted in exchanges due to the sponsorship of government?私たちは、抽象的な社会的な力-法の一機関、値を持つと判断しているまたは、その交流のためには政府のスポンサーのために受け入れたか？ The correct answer leads to conclusions on the proper monetary role of government; whether the power to create and control money should be lodged, as at present in a somewhat ambiguous private issuer - the Federal Reserve System and its member banks - or should be wholly reconstituted within government.正しい答えを結論に政府の適切な金融役割をリード;かどうかは、電源を作成し、お金をコントロール提出しなければならない、現在はややあいまいな民間の発行で-米連邦準備制度とそのメンバー金融機関-または完全に再構成する必要があります政府内で。 An accurate concept of money will light the way to solving the present fiscal crisis.お金のある正確なコンセプトは、現在の財政危機を解決するための方法に点灯します。

We have two basic approaches to understanding money: A theoretical method based on logic; and an empirical approach based on experience or history.私たちはお金を理解する2つの基本的なアプローチ：理論的方法のロジックに基づいている、と経験的アプローチの経験や履歴に基づいている。 Practitioners of the two methods arrive at very different conclusions.師は、 2つの方法の非常に異なる結論に達する。 Theoreticians usually support private commodity money and private credit money.理論通常民間の商品お金と民間信用金サポートしています。 Historians normally want a much larger role for government.政府の多くの歴史家は通常より大きな役割を果たしている。

Let’s start with Aristotle who gave the culmination of Greek thought and experiment on money around 330 BC: “All goods must therefore be measured by some one thing.アリストテレスから始めましょう紀元前330人前後ギリシャの思想とお金の実験の集大成を与えた： "そのためいくつかの一つのことで測定する必要があります全ての商品。 . 。 . 。 now this unit is in truth, demand, which holds all things together.現在、このユニット真実では、需要は、一緒にいろんなことを保持しています。 . 。 . 。 but money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand; and this is why it has the name nomisma - because it exists not by nature, but by law (which in Greek was nomos) and it is in our power to change it and make it useless.” So Aristotle calls money a creature of the law.資金需要が大会での代表のようなものとなっていると、この理由は、名nomismaしている-が存在するため、自然ではないが、法律で（このギリシアn omosされた）であり、我々の力で、それを変更することですそれ無駄にする。 "だからアリストテレスは、法の生き物お金を呼び出します。 Not a commodity from nature but an abstract social institution.商品がしない自然から抽象的な社会的機関。 Its essence is not tangible wealth in itself, but a power to obtain wealth.その本質そのものに有形財産ではありませんが、パワー富を入手してください。

Plato agreed with Aristotle and advocated fiat money for his Republic: “The law enjoins that no private individual shall possess or hoard gold or silver bullion, but have money only fit for domestic use.プラトンアリストテレスと提唱不換紙幣彼の共和国の合意： "この法律は民間の個人や貯蔵enjoins金や銀の地金を保有しなければならないが、国内の使用に適合しているお金だけ。 . 。 . 。 . 。 wherefore our citizens should have a money current among themselves but not acceptable to the rest of mankind.何のために我々の市民自身が、人類の休息することは許されないの間でお金を現在している必要があります。 . 。 . 。 ” And: “Then they will need a market place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.” " ： "それから、彼らはお金と交換の目的のためにトークンは、市場の場所が必要になります。 "

So both Aristotle and Plato noted the paramount principle - that the nature of money is a fiat of the law, an invention or creation of mankind.だから両方のアリストテレスやプラトンは、至上の原則を指摘した-そのお金の性質は、法律は、発明やフィアット人類の創造のです。 This principle, part of a lost science of money, must now be relearned in the Third Millennium in order to achieve the monetary reforms needed to move back from the brink of nuclear disaster, to move away from a future dominated by fraud and ugliness, toward a world of justice and beauty.将来のために詐欺や醜さ、向かっによって支配から離れて移動するには、金融改革原子力災害の危機を回避するために必要な動きは、この原理を達成するために、お金を失った科学の一環として、現在、第3ミレニアムのrelearnedする必要があります正義と美の世界。

This “private vs. public” battle for the control of the money power is part of a great ongoing social battle recurring throughout history to this day.資金力の制御のためこの"民間対国民"の戦いは素晴らしい継続的な社会的な戦い今日に至るまでの歴史の中で定期的なの一部です。 This factor shapes the most important outcomes determining how well a money system works.この要因は、最も重要な成果をどのようにもお金のシステムの動作を決定する形。 A good system functions fairly; helping the society create values for living.かなり良いシステム機能、社会生活のために値を作成できます。 A bad one obstructs the creation of values; places special privileges in the hands of some to the disadvantage of others, and promotes unfair concentrations of wealth and power, and disharmony and social strife.悪い1つの値の作成を阻害する、いくつかの手に他人の欠点に特別な権限を配置し、富と権力の不当な濃度を推進し、不調和、社会的紛争。

Now it may be surprising, but the historical record actually shows that publicly controlled systems function much better than private ones.今では、驚くべきことがありますが、実際には歴史的な記録を公開制御システムは民間のものよりも機能が表示されます。 Furthermore, it shows that the concept of money - how money is defined - usually determines whether the system will be publicly or privately controlled.さらに、そのお金の概念-お金をどのように定義されている-通常かどうかは、システム公的にも私的に制御されるされると判断を示しています。 . 。 . 。

Our American experience contains many of the best case studies for understanding money.我々のアメリカの経験を理解するお金のための最高のケーススタディの多くが含まれています。 We have been a great monetary laboratory - every conceivable solution was tried at some time, and we’ve been a paper money nation from colonial days.私たちは-ソリューションありとあらゆる偉大な金融検査されているいくつか試していた時に、我々の植民地時代から全国紙のお金をしている。 Our development was inseparable from it - without it there’d be no United States.当社の開発から切り離せないものだった-それなしに米国がないですね。

English and Dutch laws forbade sending coinage to the colonies, placing them in continual distress.英語、オランダの植民地への硬貨鋳造法を送信すると、継続的苦痛に置い禁じた。 The intent was to extract raw materials, not for the colonists to trade with each other.その意図は、植民地の各他との貿易に原料を抽出することだった。 An early form of globalization.グローバル化の初期形成しています。 The colonies had to devise monetary innovations.植民地金融の技術革新を考案しなければならなかった。

In the period 1632 - 92, seventeen different commodities were monetized by law at specified prices.期間1632から92 、 17の商品別の法律で指定された価格で収益した。 It didn’t work - everyone wanted to pay with the least desirable commodity, in the worst condition.それは動作していない-誰もが最も望ましい商品では、最悪の状態での支払いを望んでいた。 . 。 . 。

Private land banks were set up but were shunned by the colonists, who considered money a prerogative of government, as it was in England until 1694.民間銀行が設立された土地だったが政府の特権はお金と考え、入植、敬遠、イングランドでは、 1694年までだった。

Then in 1690, four years before the Bank of England, Massachusetts embarked on a radical course and issued paper bills of credit, spending them into circulation.そして1690年、イングランドの4年前に銀行では、マサチューセッツ州は、過激なコースで、信用状の発行紙の請求書、支出の循環に乗り出した。 Rather than a promise to pay anything, they were a promise to receive them back for all payments to the commonwealth.支払うことを約束するものではなく、彼らは連邦すべてのお支払いのためにバックを受け取るには、約束された。 The colony thrived.コロニー成功。 Other colonies copied them and infrastructure arose.他の植民地とインフラコピーを除きます。

In 1723 Pennsylvania’s system loaned the bills into circulation, charging interest on them and using it to pay colonial expenses.ペンシルベニア州では1723のシステム循環に、それらの利子融資充電法案植民地の費用を負担することとしている。 Ben Franklin wrote:ベンフランクリン書いている：

“Experience, more prevalent than all the logic in the World, has fully convinced us all, that paper money has been, and is now of the greatest advantages to the country.” . "経験は、世界のすべての論理よりも普及し、完全に確信している私たちすべては、紙のお金を、されており、現在の最大の利点のある国にしています。 " 。 . 。 . 。

Some long lost principles of the science of money quickly resurfaced:金の科学のいくつかの長い間行方不明の原則をすばやく再舗装：

- Money need not have intrinsic value; its nature is more of an abstract legal power than a commodity. -マネー必要はありませんが本来の価値、その性質は、商品よりも抽象的な法的権力のです。

- Accepting the government paper back in taxes was the key feature needed to give it circulating value. -戻る税の紙は、政府の承認は重要な機能価値を循環させるために必要だ。

- The quantity of money in circulation had to be regulated to maintain its value.その値を維持するために規制される-流通しているお金の量をしていた。

- They observed that paper money helped build real infrastructure. -彼らは本物の紙幣観測されたインフラストラクチャの構築に寄与しました。

- Most importantly, the colonies did not issue more money than their legislatures authorized.よりも立法府承認-最も重要なのは、もっとお金を植民地問題はなかった。 They have an outstanding record issuing currency.彼らは抜群の成績を通貨を発行している。 Of over a hundred colonial issues I found only one case of fraud.植民地問題は、 100以上の私は詐欺の場合は1つだけが見つかりました。 In Virginia, a Mr. Robertson who was supposed to be burning the old notes as new ones were printed, was giving them to friends instead.バージニア州では、ロバートソン氏は、新しいものと古いノートを燃焼されることになっていた印刷され、友達に代わりに彼らに与えていました。

But in the battle for monetary dominance, the colonial monetary experience has been miscast as irresponsible inflation money.しかし、無責任なインフレ資金として金融支配のための戦いでは、植民地時代の金融経験があるがミスキャスト。 This was the result of 18th century Boston’s medical Dr. William Douglas’ inaccurate writings.この18世紀のボストンの医学博士ウィリアムダグラス'不正確な文章の結果だった。 The error was corrected by Alexander Del Mar in 1900 in The History of Money in America, but was ignored.このエラーアレクサンダーデルマルによって1900年にアメリカでマネーの歴史では修正されて無視されました。 It was authoritatively cleared up again by Professor Leslie Brock in 1976 and again ignored.権威をもって、再びレスリー教授は1976年にブロックがクリアされたと、再び無視されます。 Many economists, and especially the libertarians, still haven’t got the message that colonial government paper money was crucial in building the colonies.多くのエコノミストは、特に自由の擁護派は、まだないメッセージは、植民地政府紙幣は、植民地を持っている建物内に重要だった。

In 1764, England’s Lords of Trade and Plantations prohibited all colonial legal tender issues, and that became the underlying cause of the American Revolution, not some tax on tea. 1764年、イギリスの植民地時代の貴族貿易とプランテーションのすべての法的問題の入札を禁止し、アメリカ革命の根本的な原因、紅茶にはいくつかの税となった。

The continental currency became the lifeblood of the revolution.大陸の通貨は革命の活力源となった。 $200 million was authorized and $200 million issued. 200000000ドルと認定された200000000ドルを発行した。 The currency functioned well.通貨うまく機能した。 In late 1776 the notes were only at a 5% discount against coinage, when General Howe took over New York City and made it a center for British counterfeiting. 1776年後半には硬貨鋳造音符が、一般的なハウニューヨーク市を引き継いだや英国の偽造を中心にした相手に5 ％割引でのみでした。 The Brits counterfeited billions; newspaper ads openly offered the forgeries.は、英国の偽造億;公然と新聞広告は、偽造を提供します。 . 。 . 。 In March 1778 after 3 years of war, it was $2.01 Continental for $1 of coinage. 1778年3月には戦争の3年後には、コンチネンタル1ドル硬貨の2.01ドルだった。

The continentals carried us over 5 1/2 years of Revolution to within 6 months of its final victory.私たちは、大陸5月1日に実施/革命の2年の最終的な勝利の6ヶ月以内にしてください。 Thomas Paine wrote: “Every stone in the Bridge, that has carried us over, seems to have a claim upon our esteem.トマスペイン書いている： "は、ブリッジにあるすべての石は、我々引き継がしている、私たちの尊敬に要求しているように思える。 But this was a corner stone, and its usefulness cannot be forgotten.”しかし、この隅石、およびその有用性を忘れたことはできませんでした。 "

Our constitutional convention considered two grand themes of humanity: First whether mankind could be self-governing or had to be ruled by authority.我々の憲法条約人類の二大テーマ：まず自己される可能性があるかどうかを人類を支配していたと考えや権威に支配されます。 Often referred to as the American experiment.アメリカの実験として、しばしば言及している。 We are still learning the outcome, and one of the reasons it’s still in doubt is because of the way the convention mishandled the other grand theme - the nature of money.我々はまだ、結果を学習され、 1つはまだ疑問があるのは、理由の大会は、他の大テーマ-金の性質m ishandled方法が原因の一つです。 By the time of the convention, the great benefits of the continentals was nearly ignored; along with much of the rest of our hard won monetary experiences.大会の時では、大陸の大きな利点をほぼ無視されました;に沿って我々のハード金融経験ウォンの残りの大部分と。 Some wanted to emphasize that the continentals became worthless and rejected the idea of paper money altogether.一部は、大陸性を強調したかったと全く無価値になった紙幣のアイデアを拒否した。

They ignored that paper money was crucial in giving us a nation; that abstract money requires an advanced legal system in place; that the normal method of assuring its acceptability is to allow the taxes to be paid in it.彼らは私たちの重要な国家を与えている紙幣は無視さ;は、抽象的なお金な場所には高度な法的なシステムが必要です;は、受容性確保の通常の方法では、税金を支払うことができるようにすることです。 . 。 . 。

The convention met from May to September 1787 but the money subject didn’t come up until August 16.大会5月1787年9月には金アジ8月16日までではないから会った。 Remember, Jefferson and Paine were not there. 、ジェファーソン、ペインがされていないのでご注意ください。 Franklin was too old to speak.フランクリンも昔の話をした。

A curious book on money appeared just then, written anonymously by Calvinist Minister John Witherspoon, - the only clergyman signer of the declaration of Independence.お金に関する本は、単なる好奇心の強いし、匿名でカルビン派の大臣ジョンウィザースプーンによって書かれた、登場-独立宣言署名者の唯一の牧師。 The book attacked government money and promoted Adam Smith’s view that only gold and silver are money.この本は政府の資金を攻撃し、アダムスミスの見解は、金と銀だけお金が推進している。 . 。 . 。

The power for government to properly create money, long considered as a necessary part of sovereignty, was contained in five magic words - to emit bills of credit.政府の電源が正常には長い間、主権の一部として必要と考え、 5つの魔法の言葉に含まれていたお金を作成する-クレジットの法案を放出してください。 This provision was already in the Articles of Confederation, but the Federalists - the merchant/commercial interest, largely responsible for calling the Constitutional Convention in order to strengthen the national government, fought to exclude this monetary power from the new government, arguing that it could not be trusted with it.主にこの条項のための中央政府を強化するための憲法条約をコールするため、新政府からこの金融力を除外することを戦った、その可能性があると主張責任との記事はすでに連盟内では、連邦主義-商人/商業的関心だった。それに信頼されていない。 Some of them intended to get hold of the power privately as had been done in England.いくつかの力を個人としてイングランドで行われていたのを入手することを目的。

The supreme importance of the concept of money now becomes evident: For if money is primarily a commodity, convenient for making trades, which obtains its value out of “intrinsic” qualities, then it could be viewed more as a creature of merchants and bankers than of governments.お金の概念の最高の重要性を今明らかになる：お金の場合は、固有"のそれよりも加盟店や銀行の生き物として表示される可能性がある"資質、その値を取得し、取引の際の主に商品がとても便利です。政府の。

But if the true nature of money is an abstract social institution embodied in law - obtaining its value largely through legal sanctions, then its more a creature of governments, and the Constitution had better deal with it adequately - describing how a uniform currency is to be provided, controlled and kept reasonably stable, in a just manner.しかし、もしお金の本質は、抽象的な社会的機関法に組込まです-法的制裁を通じて、その値を取得し、政府の他の生き物、憲法それを十分もっと良い取引していた-どのように統一される通貨を記述する提供制御と合理的に安定を維持、公正な方法で。 It was on this crucial question that the Constitutional Convention faltered.これは、憲法条約は、この重要な問題で行き詰まっていた。

The delegates accepted Adam Smith’s primitive commodity definition of money as gold and silver and didn’t firmly place the monetary power into government, leaving it ambiguous.代表団は、あいまいなまま金や銀、政府にしっかりしていないとして、金融力の場所お金のアダムスミス氏の原始的商品の定義を受け入れた。 Later they’d argue over what they had done.その後彼らは何をしていたことを議論します。 But the power would still exist, since it is as important as the legislative, judicial and executive powers.これは、司法立法、行政権限として重要ですが、力は依然として存在する。

I am suggesting that the nature of human affairs requires government to have four branches, not three; the fourth branch to embody and administer the monetary power.私は、人間の問題の性質を4つの支店ではなく、政府の3つが必要と示唆している、 4番目のブランチに具現化し、金融力を投与する。

The Constitution trusted the people with the political power; but didn’t firmly place the monetary power in their government.憲法は政治権力との信頼関係の人々が、しっかりとその政府の金融力の場所はなかった。 This (along with slavery) is the original sin of American politics.この（奴隷）に沿って米国の政治の元の罪です。 As a result the power was left up for grabs.その結果、電源チャンスが巡って残された。 Alexander Hamilton wasted no time in “grabbing.”アレクサンダーハミルトンには時間"を無駄を掴ん。 "

The Constitution went into effect in late 1789; Van Buren described Hamilton’s first move as Secretary of the Treasury, in 1790: “Hamilton assumed some $15 million of the state debts.それ以降の1789年の憲法施行した;バンビューレン1790で長官は、財務省のは、ハミルトンの最初の移動説明： "ハミルトンいくつかの国家債務の1500万ドルと想定。 . 。 . 。 an act.行為。 . 。 . 。 neither asked nor desired by the states, unconstitutional and inexpedient.どちらも質問も、州が希望を違憲とまずい。 . 。 . 。 ” "

What was so bad about it?何をそんなに悪いことだったのですか？ “A large proportion of the domestic debt (was held by) the soldiers who fought our battles, and the farmers, manufacturers and merchants who furnished supplies for their support.国内債務の"大部分（が）私たちの戦いを戦った兵士たち、その支援のための農民は、メーカーや小売業者は、家具付きの供給が開催されました。 . 。 . 。 .When it became known to members of Congress, which sat behind closed doors, that the bill would pass.時は議会のメンバーは、秘密裏に座って、その法案を可決すると知られるようになった。 . 。 . 。 every part of the country was overrun by speculators, by horse, and boat, buying up large portions of the certificates for (pennies on the dollar).” Madison, attempted to have the law pay speculators less than the original holders, but was voted down.その国のあらゆる部分を馬で投機筋は、オーバーラン、ボート、ドル（ペニー）の証明書の大部分を購入した。 "マディソン、この法律の投機筋は、元の所有者よりも低い賃金を試みたが、選ばれた下に。

Next Hamilton and associates, having kept the monetary power out of government hands, moved to assume it themselves.次のハミルトンと仲間、政府の手のうち、金融力を維持すること自体は想定に引っ越した。 The Bank of North America was the only bank in the US, formed in Pennsylvania on Tom Paine’s initiative to assist the revolution.北アメリカの銀行は、米国で唯一の銀行、ペンシルベニア州のトムペインのイニシアチブは、革命を支援するために結成された。 Arguing that it was only a state bank, Hamilton suggested it come forward if it wanted to alter itself for the national purpose.それだけで銀行の状態だったと主張し、ハミルトンが進む場合には、国家目的のためにそれ自体を変更してくると提案した。 Curiously, the bank took no steps toward this obvious increase in profit and power.不思議なことに、銀行の利益とパワーでは明らかな増加へのない措置を取った。

Hamilton’s Federalists quickly put through legislation to charter the First Bank of The United States, as a privately owned central bank on the Bank of England model.ハミルトンの連邦主義迅速に法案をチャーターは、第一銀行、米国には、イングランド銀行に私有の中央銀行としてのモデルを入れた。 The Bank would be issuing paper notes not really backed by metal, but pretending to be redeemable in coinage, on the one condition that not a lot of people asked for redemption.銀行は、紙のメモは本当に金属に受けていないふりを貨幣の発行となるが償還され、 1つの条件では、人々交換を求めたのは、多くの。 They really did not have the coinage.彼らは実際に硬貨を持っていなかった。 The bank would do what they had blocked the government from doing.銀行は、政府がブロックしていたことから何をするだろう。 Print paper money.紙幣を印刷する。

While gold and silver served as a smoke-screen what the bankers really counted on, were the legal considerations of the money.は、金と銀の煙には、銀行は本当に何カウント画面として提供し、資金の法的考慮された。 They knew that all that was needed to give their paper notes value, was for the government to accept them in payment for taxes.彼らは、紙のメモは、すべての値を与えるために必要だ、政府の税金の支払いに同意して知っていた。 That, and not issuing too excessive a quantity of them.が、それらもの量の過剰発行されていません。 Under those conditions, the paper notes they printed out of thin air, would be a claim on any wealth existing in the society.これらの条件下では、空気の薄い紙は、すべての富は、社会の中で、既存の上に請求される印刷指摘している。

And we see why the Bank of North America was not put forward for this purpose: the US government had owned 60% of it.そして、なぜ銀行は北アメリカの進むこの目的のために入れるはなかった参照してください：政府は、米国の60 ％を所有していた。 . 。 . 。 . 。 The government would only own 20% of the new bank.政府は、新銀行の20 ％を保有することになる。

Just where did the money for first Bank of the US came from?ただここで最初の銀行は米国のためのお金でしたから来たの？ The $10 million share subscription for the banks shares, was oversubscribed within 2 hours.銀行の株式1000万ドルの新株予約、 2時間以内に超過した。 Less than 1/10 of it was ever paid in gold.より少ない1 / 10は今まで金で支払われた。 The rest of the payment was accepted in the form of bonds - the very government bonds that Hamilton had turned from pennies on the dollar to full value.支払いの残りの社債の形で受理された-は、非常に国債は、ハミルトンペニーからの完全な値には、ドルが有効になっていた。 So you see where the money for the bank actually came from - from the American people.ので、参照してください実際には、銀行から来た-アメリカの人々からのお金。 That’s how private central banking started in America.それはどのように民間の中央銀行のアメリカで始まりました。

Thanks in large part to Jefferson’s efforts, the bank was liquidated in 1811.ジェファーソンの努力に大部分のおかげで、銀行1811に清算された。 Three quarters of it was found to be owned by Europeans - English and Dutch.それの4分の3が所有するヨーロッパ-発見された英語、オランダ語。

The 2nd Bank of the US - the bank from hell - operated illegally from inception, accepting IOU’s instead of the required gold in payment for its shares.第2回銀行は、米国の-地獄からの銀行-違法開始から、借用書の代わりに自社株のために必要な金のお支払いでの受け入れ運航します。 So again the banker’s gold “requirement” turned out to be a masquerade.だから、再び銀行の金"要件"を有効に仮装する。

This private central bank immediately embarked on a wild monetary expansion.これは民間の中央銀行すぐに野生の通貨供給量の増加に乗り出した。 Beginning operations in April 1817, by July it had 19 branch offices and had created $52 million in loans on its books and an additional 9 million in circulating currency, based on gold and silver coin reserves of only $2.5 million. 1817年4月から7月までに操作すると、 19の支店が、通貨の循環をベースにその本に52000000ドルの融資を作成していたとすると、さらに900万人しか2500000ドルの金と銀のコインを有します。 This tremendous expansion caused a wild speculative boom.この驚異的拡大は、野生の投機ブームを引き起こしました。 Then in August 1818, the bank turned abruptly and began an insane contraction, causing the panic of 1819.その後1818年8月には、銀行が突然有効にして非常識な収縮を開始し、 1819年のパニックを引き起こしている。 It cut its outstanding loans and advances from a high of $52 million, down to $12 million in I819.それからの貸付金および貸付金残高は52000000ドルの削減、 1200万ドルにI819が高い。 Its circulating notes dropped from $10 million to $3.5 million in 1820.その循環メモ10000000ドルから350万ドルを1820年に下落した。 A massive wave of bankruptcies swept the nation.倒産の巨大な波は、国を総なめにした。

The subsequent history of this bank and its fight to the death with President Jackson reads like a financial soap opera.この銀行は、その後の歴史や大統領ジャクソン金融メロドラマのように思えるとの死への戦い。 The story of various state chartered banks is similar.様々な状態チャーター銀行の話をよく似ています。

Meanwhile the US government acted responsibly In the aftermath of liquidation of the first and second bank; US Treasury notes were substituted in place of banknotes.一方、米国政府が責任を持って、最初と2番目の銀行の清算の後で行動;米財務省のメモ銀行券の代わりに置換された。 About $65 million were authorized and only $37 million actually issued.約6500万ドルと認定された唯一の37000000ドルが実際に発行した。 The US Treasury spent them into circulation.米財務省循環に過ごした。 Initially they were all large denomination, paid interest; were redeemable in gold and required formalities to transfer.当初はすべての大規模な宗派、利息が支払われていました;金の償還され、必要な手続きを転送する。 By 1815 they became bearer certificates with no redemption date, paid no interest and were in smaller denominations.償還日は1815年に無記名では、証明書、無関心になったと小規模な宗派で支払われた。 Thus they were nearly a true money form.こうして彼らは近くの真のお金を形成しています。 The fact is that the US government has always acted responsibly in creating money.その事実は、米国政府は常にお金の作成に責任を持って行動している。 Not so the private banks.しないため、民間銀行。

Greenbacks were on balance our best money system to date Thanks to 100 years of misreporting, the image of the greenbacks coming down to us is as inflated or worthless paper money. Greenbacks 、 greenbacks我々にダウン誇張来るのイメージとしては感謝する日misreportingの100年間に私たちの最高のお金システムのバランスを、または価値のない紙幣。 In fact, $450 million were authorized and $450 million were printed.実際には、 4億5000万ドル承認され、 4億5000万ドルに印刷された。 Counterfeiters couldn’t duplicate the Greenbacks.偽造のGreenbacks重複することができませんでした。 Every Greenback was eventually exchangeable one for one with gold coin.すべてのグリーン一金貨との交換も1つだった。

But greenbacks were not promises to pay money later - they were the money.しかしgreenbacksて保存金を支払うことを約束していた-彼らはお金だった。 Since they were not borrowed, they did not give rise to interest payments and did not add to any national debt.借りたされていないので、利子の支払いに上昇するとしていないすべての国家債務に追加していない。 The US Treasury printed them and spent them into circulation.彼らは、米財務省印刷や流通に過ごした。

Economists usually harp on the Greenbacks dropping to 36 cents in gold, and they leave it at that.エコノミストは通常、 Greenbacksに金の36セントに下落ハープ、彼らまでにしておきましょう。 While that happened, its highly misleading.中に起こった、非常に誤解を招く。 . 。 . 。

What did happen was that in June 1864, Congress limited the amount of Greenbacks to $450 million.何が起こったんだよ、 1864年6月には、 4億5000万ドルを議会Greenbacksの量を制限された。

There was inflation, but remember 13% of the population was fighting a terrible war.がインフレだったが、人口の13 ％を覚えてひどい戦争を戦っていた。 625,000 died. 625000死亡している。 Greenbacks performed well despite being spent on destruction. Greenbacks破壊に費やしているにもかかわらず、よく演じている。 They were also being abused by the bankers.また、銀行によって虐待されていた。 For every greenback created by Congress, the banking system created $1.49 in bank notes.すべてのドル議会によって作成については、金融システム1.49ドル紙幣で作成。

What if instead of being spent on destruction, they went into building infrastructure, and canals and roads?の代わりに使う場合はどうすれば破壊され、建物のインフラストラクチャに入っており、運河や道路？ Spending such money on infrastructure need not be inflationary.このようなインフラにお金を使うのインフレである必要はありません。 For example the Erie Canal lowered freight prices from $114 a ton down to $9 a ton.たとえば、エリー運河$ 114 $ 9トンから1トンに貨物の価格を引き下げた。

The great lesson of greenbacks is that in times of crisis - and other times too - our nation has power to do what is financially necessary, through our government. greenbacksの偉大な教訓は、危機の時代に-と、他の回も-私たちの国、我々の政府による財政力何をするにしている必要があります。 We don’t have to beg or borrow money from the wealthy and, create an astronomical national debt. We don’t have to tax the middle class into oblivion, or cancel necessary programs. We can carefully use the nations’ sovereign money power far more than we presently have been allowed to realize.

At the time of the greenbacks there were those who fully understood. Senator Howe said: “We must rely mainly upon a paper circulation; and . . . that the paper, whoever issues it, must be irredeemable. All paper currencies have been and ever will be irredeemable. It is a pleasant fiction to call them redeemable. . . I would not expose that fiction only that the great emergency which is upon us seems to me to render it more than usually proper that the nation should begin to speak the truth to itself; to have done with shams, and to deal with realities.”

The struggle between private versus public control of money continued throughout the 19th century. The greenbacks continued to constitute about a third of our money supply. Generally the private money power dominated. But in periods when the government exercised control, an excellent record was established- superior to that of private control. The bankers continued their pretense that gold was the basis of the system, and even the Federal Reserve in 1913 appeared to be a gold-based system. But immediately upon inception, we were pushed into warfare. Within 20 years Americas farms, cities, exchanges and money system were all wrecked, ending in the great depression. It was again left to our government to rescue the nation.

It’s forgotten today, but the Thomas Amendment passed with legislation in 1933, gave the President the power to create $3 billion in greenbacks if the banking system didn’t co-operate. . .

The de-funding of government at the local, state and federal levels, arises out of this disease of attacking government as the enemy.

This attack on government starts with Adam Smith. His purpose in smearing the English government was to keep the monetary power in the hands of the privately owned Bank of England. . .

To summarize the argument: The nature of the money power is societally derived, not one originating in the activities of private corporations. Because of its great importance to all, control over the process belongs under public authority. Both logic and history show that its not safe to delegate this power, and certainly not acceptable to allow its usurpation.

The current bailout

The demand for immediate action to avoid a meltdown is misplaced. Immediate and wrong action will accelerate the meltdown. There is only one thing Congress can do to inspire confidence and avoid a meltdown - that is to take deliberate and careful and good workable action to help resolve the crisis. In other words to fulfill its congressional duty to America. . .

Getting it right means requiring several conditions to protect the American people from the gang that’s been financially raping the nation; that gave us the unnecessary Iraqi war. It means facing the facts on where the banking crisis is and how it got there. It means examining the monetary and economic reforms of the Federal Reserve System that will assure that such thievery or foolishness won’t happen again; and taking back from those who improperly benefited from the tragedy and prosecuting them.

At the heart of the problem is that our money system has been privatized. Naturally it’s being run for the benefit of the “privates” in control, with minimal concern for the public interest. . .

Rather than borrowing the $700 billion being demanded, and ending up paying back about 3 times that amount after interest charges, The US government could issue the money the same way the banks do, instead of borrowing it from them. But while the banks issue credit that substitutes for money, the US would issue actual money. Our government has the power to create the money, in an account, or by simply printing it as greenbacks.

There would not be inflationary effects, because it was already believed that those moneys existed in the form of the real estate values and loans. In effect this would stop a deflation which would follow from writing down those assets and loans to their present market values. Some conditions would be needed to assure that the banking system did not use those greenback dollars for further credit creation, as that would be inflationary. In essence the greenbacks would not be “re-discountable” by the banking system to create more loans, but would be legal tender for all debts public and private. . .

What the administrations proposal is doing is almost identical to what Keynes did during the Great Depression. He insisted that the bailout be in terms of government going into more debt to the banking system, whereas the Chicago Plan by the greatest economists in the nation at that time, was promoting the government to create money (greenback equivalents) instead of debt. . .

Keynes won the argument but his program did not work and it was only WW2 and [with] wartime employment, creating tanks to be blown up, airplanes to be shot out of the sky, and ships to be sunk, that Americans went back to work and we worked our way out of the depression, and into more debt. That’s where this proposal leads. Keynes answer was that “in the long run we are all dead,” but not our posterity. Based on what happened following his program before, our descendants, and society that survives become enslaved.

Unless monetary reform is in the mix now, it could take a tremendous worsening of the situation to come up again soon. One articulate friend, George Romero, summed it up for me: “The private sector has failed. The public sector is expected to rescue them, and it will. Therefore the public sector should be in control of the money system to benefit the country.”

The Chicago Plan of the 1930s

Henry Simons from the University of Chicago created the proposal and prominent economists from other universities joined him in what became known as the “Chicago Plan.”Economists like Paul Douglas of the U of C.; Frank Graham and Charles Whittlesley of Princeton; Irving Fisher of Yale; Earl Hamilton of Duke; and Willford King of NYU, to name a few. One version was sent to all the academic economists – about a thousand total. Of those responding, 235 from 157 universities agreed with the proposal; another 40 approved it with reservations and only 45 disapproved. So the plan had broad professional support. Variants of the Chicago Plan usually started by condemning the banking structure as foolish and harmful: “If the purpose of money and credit were to discourage the exchange of goods and services, to destroy periodically the wealth produced, to frustrate and trip those who save, our present monetary system (does that) most effectively!”

They dispensed with the gold standard as not a real standard, because the value of gold had changed violently up and down against commodities. From 1914 to 1917 wholesale prices rose 65% and, then increased another 55% to May 1920, So Gold coins lost over 75 % of their value against wholesale prices in the Fed’s first six years. Then by June 1921wholesale prices fell 56% against gold. “Hard money” advocates who believe that gold money has been stable should study these facts. One version of the plan quoted Roosevelt’s referring to gold as an “old fetish of so-called international bankers.”

The main features of the Chicago Plan were:

- Only the government would create money. The Federal Reserve banks would be nationalized, but not the individual member banks. The power to create money was to be removed from private banks by abolishing fractional reserves – the mechanism through which the banking system creates money. So the plan called for 100% reserves on checking accounts which simply meant banks would be warehousing and transferring the money and charging fees for their services.

- The Plan separated the loan-making function, which can belong in private banks, from the money-creation function, which belongs in government. Lending was still to be a private banking function, but by lending deposited long-term savings money, not created credits. In this way they’d restrict an unstable practice known as borrowing short and lending long – making long term loans with short term deposits.

- The proposal recognized the distinction between money and credit, which had been confused through fractional reserves and what was called the “real bills doctrine.” The confusion was seen as one of the causes of the depression, because when businesses reduced their borrowings on commercial bills which occurs during any downturn, parts of the money supply had been automatically liquidated. The Chicago Plan saw the instability of this – that it aggravates a downturn.

Simon made this grand observation: “The mistake. . . lies in fearing money and trusting debt. Money itself is highly amenable to democratic, legislative control, for no community wants a markedly appreciating or depreciating currency. . . but money is not easily manageable alongside a mass of private debt and private near-moneys. . . or alongside a mountain of public debt.”

Some variations of the plan had the US government lending banks all or part of newly printed cash needed to achieve 100% reserves. This was a crucial part of the plan, because depositors were going to the banks and withdrawing their accounts, deflating the system.

This loaning of reserves feature also elegantly converted all the previously monetized bank credits into real US money on which the banks paid interest to our government. It post facto made them intermediaries, earning some reasonable spread for their loaning work.

Paul Douglas wrote: “This proposal will of course be opposed by the bankers from whom it takes the lucrative privilege of creating purchasing power. It would however insure the safety of deposits, give large revenues to the government, provide complete social control over monetary matters and prevent abnormal fluctuations in the capital market. At the same time it would permit the allocation of productive resources. . . to remain primarily in private hands. All in all it seems the most promising program for the reform of our monetary and credit system. . . ”

Marinner Eccles, who became Fed Chairman under Roosevelt, testified that the best course would be for the government to nationalize the Federal Reserve banks.

Congressman Jerry Voorhis made the case for hundred percent reserves and putting money into circulation by paying pensions and disabled persons. As late as 1945 Voorhis introduced legislation for a US Monetary Authority as our sole creator of money.

Maurice Allais, the great French economist, backed the plan and published a book on it in 1948.

Irving Fisher of Yale, wrote on it extensively and popularly well into the 1940s. . .

There was no understanding or support for the proposal among the electorate. Only Irving Fisher seems to have understood the necessity for popularizing the matter.

Simons himself got cold feet and shied away from promoting the plan, desiring to remain on a level of professorial discussion. He even threw a wet towel on Fisher who was promoting the reform suggesting that Fisher avoid popularizing the idea!

The Plan was mishandled politically. . . The last attempt at 100% reserves was when Senator Nye of North Dakota tried to place it in part of the administration’s 1935 banking reform legislation, but his amendment was defeated.

The FDR administration had its own banking reform bill and remained ambiguous on the Chicago Plan, never commenting on it even though the political climate and professional support for the plan was sufficient to get it passed, had they made some effort. Instead his Treasury Secretary Morganthau was trying to make minor adjustments without fundamentally challenging the banking system. . .

Can we learn from what John Maynard Keynes was doing during all this? He was squarely behind the bankers and against such real reform. Yet he knew that he had to break out of orthodox economics or the whole system was in danger of being overturned. Keynesianism was a way to allow banks not government to keep control over the money-creation process, and while the more narrow minded economists fought Roosevelt’s attempts to create money and jobs as inflationary, during the nations worst deflation, Keynes knew better.

The New York Times in December 1933. . . got Keynes to write an open letter to Roosevelt, which they published. Keynes wisely advised Roosevelt that “Only the expenditures of public authority” could turn the tide of depression. . .

However, Keynes inappropriately warned Roosevelt not to create the money for this, but only to borrow it, and wrongly advised him that there was already enough money in circulation, and that: “increasing the quantity of money. . . is like trying to get fat by buying a larger belt.”

Keynes was therefore not “revolutionary” except in relation to the utter backwardness of the financial establishment. He didn’t come close to a real solution, but essentially protected his class. The real question has always been whether the nation’s money should be created under law, by government, or under the private caprice of bankers.

DEALING WITH THE NATIONAL DEBT

Bob Blain, Progressive Review, 1994 - From 1790 to 1993, taxpayers were charged $3.2 trillion in interest on federal debt. . . . The original debt at 5.53 percent interest compounded for 204 years equals $4.4 trillion. The present federal debt is arguably the original debt enlarged by 204 years of compounding interest.

According to the Federal Reserve Bulletin, the total money supply (currency, travelers checks, demand deposits, and savings accounts) in the US economy in March 1993 was $4 trillion. The total debt of the federal government, state and local governments, corporations, farmers, home buyers, and consumers was in excess of $15 trillion. If the total money supply is $4 trillion, where is the other $11 trillion of borrowed money?

Here is another curious fact. We have been told for years that government borrowing to cover hundreds of billions of dollars of deficits would drive interest rates through the roof. Instead, interest rates have fallen dramatically. In March, 1993 they were between 4.9 and 2.2 percent, far below what they were in the early 1980s when federal debt was a small fraction of what it is now.

The explanation for these anomalies is that the missing money never existed. We never borrowed it, in the normal sense that it was turned over to us and spent. Most debt is not the result of people borrowing money; it is the result of people not being able to repay what they owed at some earlier time. Instead of declaring them bankrupt, creditors just add more to their debt.

The federal government has been adding interest to its debt for 204 years. James Jackson, Congressman from Georgia, predicted that this would happen in a speech he made to the First Congress on February 9, 1790. Jackson warned that passing Alexander Hamilton’s plan to base the country’s money supply on the existing federal debt of $75 million would “settle upon our posterity a burden which they can neither bear nor relieve themselves from.” He predicted: “In the course of a single century it would be multiplied to an extent we dare not think of,” He clearly saw that Hamilton’s plan would put in place an exponential process of debt growth. To support his warning he cited the experience of Florence, Genoa, Venice, Spain, France, and England.

Hamilton’s plan was for Congress to commit the country to pay interest on the debt until the debt was paid. In the meantime the debt certificates would circulate as money. He argued that this would turn a $75 million debt into a $75 million money supply. The problem was that interest payments would have come out of the money supply. This would reduce the quantity of money that remained in circulation — and cause recession — until new loans returned the interest money back into circulation. The history of federal government finance shows such periodic swings between debt reduction and recession to debt increase and recovery.

The power to deal with this problem that Congress has neglected all these years is the power “to coin money and regulate the value thereof.” It has overused its power “to borrow money on the credit of the United States.” According to the Federal Reserve, 98 percent of the US money supply is borrowed. Only 2 percent is coined.

The First Congress set the wrong precedent. It should have created $75 million in money and paid off the debt. With a population of 4 million people and an economy starved for a medium of exchange, that would have increased the money supply by $18.75 per person.

Why did the First Congress borrow instead of coin money? Newspapers at the time accused members of Congress of acting to serve their own interests. They sent agents into the countryside to buy up debt certificates that the general public thought were worthless. They then passed the Funding Act knowing that it would give themselves and their heirs a source of income that would grow exponentially with the debt. For every debtor there is a creditor. What is a $4 trillion debt for debtors is $4 trillion in claims for creditors.

To get out of this trap Congress has a range of options:

First, it could stop paying interest on the debt. Interest is the fuel that is exploding the debt. Cut off the fuel; stop the explosion. Since 1790 over $3 trillion in interest has been added to the original $75 million. Cutting interest would immediately cut the annual deficit by about $300 billion. Experience shows that all other conventional actions, no matter how painful, do no more than slow slightly the rate of debt growth. Then Congress could begin the process of paying off the debt.

A political problem with stopping the payment of interest is that people with money control politics. And many of them would have their interest income stopped. Insurance companies and pension funds are invested in federal debt and foreign holders would also be upset. Economically, however, we cannot continue to add compounding interest to existing debt. The biggest debtor is not the federal government. It is business corporations. It is impossible for them to increase the physical production of goods and services in order to keep up with exponential debt growth that is limited by nothing but arithmetic. Unlike the debt, the physical economy has limits.

The question holders of federal debt must ask themselves is this: Do we want to insist on more interest that will add debt to existing debt until the only option is debt repudiation and we lose everything? Or are we willing to stop where we are while we may still be able to recover our original investment plus a reasonable profit?

A second option is for Congress to create the money necessary to fund public works. As a sovereign government, Congress’ power is unique. It can create money debt-free and interest-free. Congress needs to stop thinking of itself as the same as other organizations that must take money in before they can spend it. Money does not grow on trees. It must be created. The only choice is whether to have it created as loans at interest from private banks or to have it created by Congress debt-free and interest-free.

How can Congress create money without causing inflation? Congress must regulate its value. The power to create money includes this regulatory power.

A good way for Congress to regulate the value of money is by funding projects at the current national price level. The current national price level can be calculated by dividing the most recent gross domestic product by the number of hours of work that produced it. For example, in 1991 the total gross domestic product was $5.6 trillion. The employed labor force produced it with 237 billion hours of work. So the GDP was produced at the rate of $23.95 per hour of work. By now the price level per hour is probably $25.00. So let Congress fund projects at $25 per hour. How this amount is allocated among labor, land, and capital can be negotiated.

How much money should Congress create? How about enough to reach full employment? We have about 9.5 million people actively looking for work. That includes a million managers and professionals; two and a quarter million technical, sales, and clerical people; a million and a quarter precision production, craft and repair people; over two million operators, fabricators and laborers; and 305,000 framers, foresters and fishermen. That’sa skilled labor force as big as many nations — all now idle. Employed at an average $25 per hour, ($50,000 per year), they would add $475 billion to the nation’s gross domestic product and reduce spending for unemployment compensation. The pie would grow as unemployment went down. Congress could start by creating, say, $50 billion, or $200 per person, in debt-free interest-free money, then fund $50 billion worth of works projects, monitor the results, and make adjustments as needed. Meanwhile the Fed could raise bank reserve rates, not interest rates, to make checking accounts more secure.

A third more conservative option is being proposed by an organization called Sovereignty, which believes that a country that borrows money loses its sovereignty to its creditors. Their proposal is intended to restore US sovereignty by reducing our dependence on borrowed money.

The Guernsey experience. . .

Guernsey is an island state located among the British Channel Islands about 75 miles south of Great Britain. In 1816 its sea walls were crumbling, its roads were muddy and only 4 1/2 feet wide. Guernsey’s debt was 19,000 pounds. The island’s annual income was 3,000 pounds of which 2,400 had to be used to pay interest on its debt. Not surprisingly, people were leaving Guernsey and there was little employment.

Then the government created and loaned new, interest-free state notes worth 6,000 pounds. Some 4,000 pounds were used to start the repairs of the sea walls. In 1820, another 4,500 pounds was issued, again interest-free. In 1821, another 10,000; 1824, 5,000; 1826, 20,000. By 1837, 50,000 pounds had been issued interest free for the primary use of projects like sea walls, roads, the marketplace, churches, and colleges. This sum more than doubled the island’s money supply during this thirteen year period, but there was no inflation. In the year 1914, as the British restricted the expansion of their money supply due to World War I, the people of Guernsey commenced to issue another 142,000 pounds over the next four years and never looked back. By 1958, over 542,000 pounds had been issued, all without inflation.

In 1990 there was $13 million in interest-free state issued notes. A visitor to the island that year later wrote:

“I returned from Guernsey last weekend. It is a fascinating little island. There are about 60,000 permanent residents on the island. The average family owns 3.3 cars, their unemployment rate is zero and their standard of living is very high. There is no public debt. There is a surplus of public funds which earn interest. The Guernsey Treasury increased the Ml of the island by 40 percent in the last three-year period, and this increase did not do anything to inflation. The price for a gallon of gasoline in England translates to about $5US whereas, the price in Guernsey is about $2US. Contrary to the teachings of current economics in all higher institutions, inflation is not related to the volume of money but rather to the size of the commercial debt.”

Sovereignty proposes that Congress create money and lend it interest-free on a per capita formula to tax-supported bodies for capital projects and to convert existing debt to non-interest-bearing debt. Since first proposed in January 1989, the Sovereignty loan plan has been endorsed by over 1,814 city, town, and county governments and school boards, as well as by the US conference of Mayors, the Michigan state legislature and the Community Bankers Association of Illinois, which represents 515 banks.

As loans, the money would be repaid, so money injected into communities would fund projects, then be removed. Of the three methods for putting money into circulation available to Congress, giving, paying, and lending, lending is the most cautious.

Benjamin Franklin attributed the economic success of the colonies to their creation of all the money they needed. He said that the root cause of the Revolution was the act of Parliament that prohibited the colonies from continuing to issue their own money. The moneylenders of England thought it more profitable that the colonies borrow their money.

We hear from Washington that we need to sacrifice to bring the deficits under control — cut consumption, save, and invest. When that slows the economy, we will be told to spend more to stimulate the economy. We have heard it all before. Neither method works. We need debt-free interest-free money to fund the work that needs to be done. It’s not sacrifice we need; it’s productive employment. Let Congress use its unique power to coin money and regulate its value to fund that employment.

Money is no more than an accounting device, a system of notes certifying that the bearer has done a share of the work and deserves a share of the wealth. Money’s backing is the goods and services produced by the labor force. By creating money Congress can activate the idle productive power of our people. And what they produce will add real wealth to the US Treasury and add nothing to the federal debt.

Sam Smith’s Great American Political Repair Manual, 1997 - A report of Guernsey’s States Office in June 1946 notes that island leaders frequently commented that these public works could not have been carried out without the issues, that they had been accomplished without interest costs, and that as a result “the influx of visitors was increased, commerce was stimulated, and the prosperity of the Island vastly improved.” By 1943, nearly a half million pounds worth of notes belonged to the public and was so valued that much of it was being hoarded in people’s homes, awaiting the island’s liberation from the Germans. About the same time that Guernsey started to fix its sea walls the town of Glasgow, Scotland, borrowed 60,000 pounds to build a fruit market. The Guernsey sea walls were repaid in ten years, the fruit market loan took 139. In the first part of the the 20th century, Glasgow paid over a quarter million pounds in interest alone on this ancient project.

How did Guernsey avoid the fiscal disaster that conventional economics prescribed for it? First and foremost by understanding that when you build roads or sea walls or colleges or houses, you are not reducing your society’s wealth. In fact, if you do it right, you are creating something that will add to its wealth. The money that was created was simply backed by public works rather than gold or “full faith and credit.” It was, in fact, based on something more solid than the dollar bills in our wallets today. In contrast, tacking on an interest charge to public works — as we do in the US — creates no new wealth, but merely transfers claims on existing wealth from debtors to creditors.

Have Your Say: WHAT BANKS, ACADEMICS, THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT MONEY
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