Jacqui Smith said that accredited businesses would have a strong competitive reason to ensure that the biometric transfers they perform are secure, as failure to do so would have an impact on their reputation. Err, doesn’t that go without saying? However, so far the Home Office has given no precise information as to how fingerprints would be linked to biographical data, or any details about how the National Identity Scheme would be implemented.傑葵史密斯說，認可的企業將會有一個強有力的競爭原因，以確保生物技術的轉讓他們的表現是安全的，因為不這樣做會影響他們的聲譽。 錯誤，沒有這不用說？但是，到目前為止內政部並沒有確切的資料，如何將指紋與履歷資料，或任何細節如何國民身份證計劃將得到執行。 All you can be guaranteed is that once your personal information is on a national database, it’ll be hacked and held to ransom in the public domain in a matter of months.所有你可以得到保證是，一旦你的個人信息是一個國家數據庫，它會侵入並舉行了贖金在公共領域在幾個月內。 The biggest form of crime in the future will be digital, you mark my words…最大的犯罪形式在未來將是數字，你記住我的話...

Handing over the keys to public identity data to organisations such as Royal Mail will open up a whole new can of worms.的鑰匙交給市民的身份數據，以組織，如英國皇家郵政將開闢一個全新的蠕蟲可以。 It seems preposterous to put our personal data into the hands of a third party when data loss is as commonplace as it is.看來荒謬的把我們的個人資料落入第三方時的數據丟失是司空見慣的，因為它是。 It’s clear now that our Government has intended to link the ID card scheme into its other services.很明顯，現在，我國政府已打算聯繫的ID卡計劃納入其其他服務。 I’ve been concerned about such an extension of ID card use since they were very first announced.我一直在關注這種延長身份證使用，因為他們第一次公佈。 The big concern with ID verification is impersonation.大關注，身份證核查是冒名頂替。 Unfortunately, the Government’s ID card scheme does not go far enough to address this problem, and opening up a photo kiosk-style fingerprinting service at a Post Office with data made accessible to employees will further exacerbate the problem.不幸的是，政府的身分證計劃還遠遠不夠解決這個問題，並開闢了照片亭式指紋識別服務，郵政局的數據提供給僱員將進一步加劇這一問題。

The two main weaknesses are an over-reliance on biometric security, and secondly, the preference for centralised data storage.兩個主要弱點是過度依賴的生物安全性，其次，傾向於集中數據存儲。 Together these leave the ID card system vulnerable to cloning.加上這些假身份證制度容易克隆。 Stronger verification technology needs to be in place.更強有力的核查技術必須到位。 Biometric technology alone does not suffice to prevent fraud - despite strong encryption the Dutch biometric passports were cracked soon after launching.生物識別技術本身不足以防止欺詐-儘管強大的加密功能，荷蘭護照被震裂發射後不久。 The passports were read remotely (thanks to the RFID chip they can be read from 10 meters) and then the security cracked using flaws built into the system, whereupon all of the biometric data could be read.護照閱讀遠程（感謝RFID芯片可以讀取10米） ，然後破獲的安全漏洞建成使用該系統，屆時所有的生物數據可以讀取。

What’s needed if the ID card scheme is to work is a belt and braces approach.需要什麼，如果身份證計劃的工作是一個帶括號的辦法。 Storing the biometric data as an algorithmic encryption makes it impossible for even the most sophisticated fraudster to read or substitute.存儲生物數據的加密算法使得即使是最複雜的欺詐讀取或替代品。 Even authorised personnel - and therefore any successful hackers or corrupt employees - would only be able to view binary code, and not the finger, iris or facial data itself.即使授權的人員-因此，任何成功的黑客或腐敗的僱員-只可以查看二進制代碼，而不是手指，虹膜或面部的數據本身。 They would also be unable to replicate the algorithm to clone the card.他們也將是無法複製克隆算法的信用卡。 Furthermore, centralised data storage is a security concern.此外，中央數據存儲是一個安全問題。 The way the information is stored and structured needs to be carefully implemented to avoid sowing the seeds of disaster.的方式，信息儲存和結構需要認真加以實施，以避免播下種子的災難。

Storing this data centrally and then linking into a variety of databases is a security concern.這個數據存儲中心，然後連接到各種數據庫，是一個安全問題。 Other countries such as France and Italy have stipulated that biometric information is stored only on the cards themselves - thus still within the possession of the individual.其他國家如法國和意大利的規定，生物信息是只會儲存在卡本身-因此，仍然在擁有個人。 If it is stored centrally, then the biometric data must be stored separately from other personal data.如果是中央儲存，然後生物數據必須分開存放從其他個人資料。 This would make it harder for any hacker to join up the dots and steal someone’s identity or clone a card.這將使更難任何黑客加入了點，竊取別人的身份證或克隆卡。 Back-end systems should enable an audit trail of those personnel who have accessed individual records on those back-end systems.後端系統應使審計線索這些人員已經進入誰的個人記錄，這些後端系統。 Even so, I still believe it’s all going to end in tears.即便如此，我仍然認為這是所有去年底在流淚。