Fitch Managing Director David Weinfurter said the NCRC’s filing “is fully without merit, and Fitch intends to defend itself vigorously.” Moody’s had no immediate comment.惠誉董事总经理大卫Weinfurter说，宪法审议委员会提交的文件“是完全没有法律依据，以及惠誉打算积极地保卫自己。 ”穆迪公司没有立即发表评论。

The filing cites multiple studies that found that African Americans and Latinos received a disproportionate share of subprime loans during the housing boom years.这份文件列举多个研究发现，美国黑人和拉丁裔收到了不合比例的次级抵押贷款在房地产市场的繁荣年。 A Federal Reserve study in 2006 estimated that 45% of mortgages extended to Latinos and 55% of loans to African Americans were subprime — a utilization rate “three to four times that of non-Hispanic whites.”美国联邦储备银行在2006年的研究估计， 45 ％的抵押贷款扩大到拉美裔和55 ％的贷款，以非裔美国人优-一个使用率“ 3至4倍，非西班牙裔白人。 ”

“Had subprime loans been distributed equitably,” the complaint estimates, “losses for whites would be 44.5% higher and losses for people of color would be about 24% lower.” “如果次级抵押贷款被公平分配， ”投诉估计“ ，白人的损失将是44.5 ％更高，人民的损失颜色将约24 ％低得多。 ”

A third rating firm with heavy involvement in the subprime boom, Standard & Poor’s Corp., was not named in the complaint but has been “in discussions” with the NCRC, said David Berenbaum, the group’s executive vice president.第三个评级公司，重型参与优热潮，标准普尔公司，不点名的投诉，但一直是“讨论”与宪法审议委员会，大卫比伦包姆说，该集团的执行副总裁。 If the discussions with S&P prove “unsatisfactory,” he said, the company could be the subject of a separate action.如果讨论标准普尔证明“不满意， ”他说，该公司可能会受到一个单独的行动。

The NCRC filed its complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s fair housing and equal opportunity unit.该宪法审议委员会递交了申诉部与住房和城市发展的公平住房和平等机会单位。 After a review, HUD could either dismiss the allegations or refer the case to the Justice Department of the incoming Obama administration for litigation next year.经过审查，平视显示器可以撤销指控或将案件移交司法部新任奥巴马行政诉讼明年。 If HUD fails to respond adequately, the NCRC says it may file a federal civil lawsuit.如果平视显示器未能作出适当的反应，在宪法审议委员会表示，它可能文件联邦民事诉讼。

The civil rights complaint is the latest in a series of lawsuits, regulatory investigations and congressional criticism of the rating firms’ roles and conduct during the mortgage bond heyday years of 2003-05.公民权利的投诉是最新了一系列的法律诉讼，监管部门的调查和国会的批评，评级公司的作用和进行期间，抵押债券全盛时期的2003-05年。 In dollar terms, subprime and so-called Alt-A no-documentation loans accounted for 32% of all mortgage originations in 2005.以美元计算，次级和所谓的老无文件贷款占32 ％的所有抵押贷款在2005年。 Their share had been 10% two years before.其份额已经10 ％的前两年。 Virtually all of those high-risk loans were sold to Wall Street firms for inclusion in complex bond structures that were resold, often in bits and pieces, to pension funds and financial institutions.几乎所有的这些高风险贷款出售给华尔街公司列入复杂的债券结构，转售，往往是在位和作品，以养老基金和金融机构。

The traditional function of the rating firms has been that of Wall Street’s “gatekeepers,” evaluating the risks involved in the collateral backing bonds.传统功能的评级公司一直是华尔街的“看门人” ，评估所涉及的风险抵押支持债券。 Their assignment of investment-grade ratings to securities based on high-risk mortgages — and their subsequent mass lowering of those ratings as default losses piled up — has earned them scorching criticism from investors, regulators and Congress.他们转让的投资级评级的证券的基础上的高风险抵押贷款-并随后将其大规模降低这些评级作为默认的损失堆积了-他们赢得了比赛的批评投资者，管理者和国会。

Much of the criticism focused on the fact that the firms are paid lucrative fees for their ratings by bond issuers themselves — not investors — thereby creating potential conflicts of interest.大部分的批评集中于一个事实，即企业是有利可图的费用支付其评级由债券发行人本身-而不是投资者-从而创造潜在的利益冲突。 The firms also competed with one another to rate subprime loan securitizations, creating additional pressure to provide the most favorable possible ratings.该公司还竞争互相利率抵押贷款证券化，创造更多的压力，提供了最有利的可能等级。

The Securities and Exchange Commission investigated the rating firms this year and found “serious shortcomings” at Moody’s, Fitch and S&P, including lack of oversight of conflicts of interest.美国证券交易委员会的调查，评价公司今年发现“严重缺陷”穆迪，惠誉和标准普尔，包括缺乏监督的利益冲突。 Investigators also turned up evidence that employees apparently knew that some of the mortgage pools they were rating were potentially toxic.调查人员还发现的证据表明，员工显然知道，一些抵押贷款池他们评级有可能有毒。

In one instant-message exchange, an analyst reportedly called a deal “ridiculous.在一个即时信息交流，据说一位分析师所谓的协议“荒谬的。 . 。 . 。 . 。 We should not be rating it.” A colleague responded: “We rate every deal.我们不应该评价它。 “一位同事回答道： ”我们每处理率。 It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.”这可能是结构性的牛，我们将率它。 “

Critics such as Berenbaum contend that without mass securitizations of high-risk mortgages — with stamps of approval from the rating firms — far fewer subprime loans would have been made, and far fewer minority home buyers would have ended up in foreclosure.批评如伦包姆认为，没有大规模证券化的高风险抵押贷款-与邮票批准的评级公司-少得多次优抵押贷款将已经作出，而且要少得多少数购房者会已经结束了赎回。