Rudy Giuliani’s Five Big Lies About 9/11ルドルフジュリアーニの5つの大嘘約9 / 11
On the stump, Rudy can’t help spreading smoke and ashes about his lousy record遊説中、ルディヘルプ広がって煙と灰になることができない彼のお粗末な記録について
Nearly six years after 9/11, Rudy Giuliani is still walking through the canyons of lower Manhattan, covered in soot, pointing north, and leading the nation out of danger’s way.ほぼ6年ぶりに9 / 11 、ルドルフジュリアーニはまだウォーキングを通じて、マンハッタン南部の峡谷、すすに覆われ、北を指して、危険とリードして国のうちのやり方だ。 The Republican frontrunner is campaigning for president by evoking that visual at every campaign stop, and he apparently believes it’sa picture worth thousands of nights in the White House.フロントランナーは、共和党の大統領選挙運動をして視覚evokingごとにキャンペーンを停止する、と彼は明らかに何千人もの価値があると信じて行える、写真は、ホワイトハウスの夜。
Giuliani has been leading the Republican pack for seven months, and predictions that the party’s evangelicals would turn on him have so far proven hollow.ジュリアーニ氏をリードしてきた共和党のパックを7カ月間、と予測して、党のevangelicalsは、彼がこれまでの実績をオンにする中空です。 The religious right appears as gripped by the Giuliani story as the rest of the country.右に表示されたら、宗教のとりこになるとして、ジュリアーニ氏の話として、残りの国です。
Giuliani isn’t shy about reminding audiences of those heady days.恥ずかしがり屋ではないジュリアーニについては、それらの観客を思い出させて酔わ終了。 In fact he hyperventilates about them on the stump, making his credentials in the so-called war on terror the centerpiece of his campaign.実際、彼は、かれらhyperventilates断端については、彼の信任状を作成している、いわゆる対テロ戦争への彼のキャンペーンの目玉です。 His claims, meanwhile, have been met with a media deference so total that he’s taken to complimenting “the good job it is doing covering the campaign.” Opponents, too, haven’t dared to question his terror credentials, as if doing so would be an unpatriotic bow to Osama bin Laden.彼の主張は、一方で、メディアの敬意を払ってきたので会って、彼の撮影をcomplimenting合計して、 "良い仕事をすることがやっているキャンペーンを覆っている。 "反対派は、あまりにも、彼のテロに疑問を敢えてしていない証明書は、まるで行うだからだろう、オサマビンラディン氏に屈する非国民。
Here, then, is a less deferential look at the illusory cloud emanating from the former mayor’s campaign .ここでは、その後、精管を見ることは少なく、架空の雲からやって来る前市長のキャンペーンです。 . 。 . 。
BIG LIE1 LIE1. ビッグlie1 lie1 。 ‘I think the thing that distinguishes me on terrorism is, I have more experience dealing with it.’ This pillar of the Giuliani campaign—asserted by pundits as often as it is by the man himself—is based on the idea that Rudy uniquely understands the terror threat because of his background as a prosecutor and as New York’s mayor. 'だと思うものを区別してテロとは、私には、私はもっと経験を扱うことです。 'ジュリアーニ氏は、このキャンペーンの柱にすることを主張した専門家たちは、できるだけ頻繁にされるのは、自分自身の男という考えに基づいて理解ルディユニークリー彼のために、テロの脅威を背景として、検事としてニューヨークの市長です。 In a July appearance at a Maryland synagogue, Giuliani sketched out his counterterrorism biography, a resume that happens to be rooted in falsehood.メリーランド州では、 7月のシナゴーグの外観は、彼のテロ対策の伝記ジュリアーニスケッチすると、偶然にも再開することに根差した虚偽です。
“As United States Attorney, I investigated the Leon Klinghoffer murder by Yasir Arafat,” he told the Jewish audience, referring to the infamous 1985 slaying of a wheelchair-bound, 69-year-old New York businessman aboard the Achille Lauro , an Italian ship hijacked off the coast of Egypt by Palestinian extremists. "米国で弁護士として、私はレオンクリンフォファー殺人事件の捜査をヤシールアラファト会長は、 "ユダヤ人の聴衆に言及し、悪名高い1985年の車いす生活を殺害、 69歳の実業家ニューヨークアキレラウロ号に乗って、イタリア語ハイジャックされた船エジプト沖のパレスチナ過激派による。 “It’s honestly the reason why I knew so much about Arafat,” says Giuliani. "正直なところ、それは分かっていた理由についてはそんなにアラファト議長は、 "ジュリアーニ氏によれば。 “I knew, in detail, the Americans he murdered. "私を知っていた、詳細には、彼は、アメリカ人を殺害した。 I went over their cases.”その件以上に出掛けた。 "
On the contrary, Victoria Toensing, the deputy assistant attorney general at the Justice Department in Washington who filed a criminal complaint in the Lauro investigation, says that no one in Giuliani’s office “was involved at all.” Jay Fischer, the Klinghoffer family attorney who spearheaded a 12-year lawsuit against the PLO, says he “never had any contact” with Giuliani or his office.とは逆に、ビクトリアtoensing 、アシスタントの副検事総長は、ワシントンで米司法省が刑事告発者に提出するlauro調査によると、ジュリアーニ氏の事務所がないことの1つに"すべてがかかわっている。 "ジェイフィッシャーは、ご家族のクリンフォファー12年の弁護士の人の陣頭指揮するPLOの訴訟を起こすのは、彼によれば"すべての連絡先は一度もなかった"とジュリアーニ氏や彼の事務所です。 “It would boggle my mind if anyone in 1985, 1986, 1987, or thereafter conducted an investigation of this case and didn’t call me,” he adds. "もし誰かが私の心尻込み1985年、 1986年、 1987年、あるいはその後、この事件の調査を実施しなかったと電話してね"と彼を追加します。 Fischer says he did have a private dinner with Giuliani in 1992: “It was the first time we talked, and we didn’t even talk about the Klinghoffer case then.”フィッシャーによれば、彼はそれがある民間の夕食を共にするジュリアーニ氏は1992年： "我々は今回が初めての話、そして私たちにも話をしなかった場合、次にクリンフォファー。 "
The dinner was arranged by Arnold Burns, a close friend of Fischer and Giuliani who also represented the Klinghoffer family.夕食に配置されたのは、アーノルドバーンズは、フィッシャーの親友とジュリアーニクリンフォファー家族の誰にも表されます。 Burns, who was also the finance chair of Giuliani’s mayoral campaign, was the deputy US attorney general in 1985 and oversaw the probe.バーンズ氏はまた、金融のジュリアーニ市長のいすのキャンペーンでは、検事総長は、米国では1985年に副監督のプローブとした。 “I know of nothing Rudy did in any shape or form on the Klinghoffer case,” he says. "私の知る限りでは何もないルディはいかなる形では、クリンフォファー場合は、 "と彼は言います。
Though Giuliani told the Conservative Political Action conference in March that he “prosecuted a lot of crime—a little bit of terrorism, but mostly organized crime,” he actually worked only one major terrorism case as US Attorney, indicting 10 arms dealers for selling $2.5 billion worth of anti-tank missiles, bombs, and fighter jets to Iran in 1986.かかわらずジュリアーニ氏は、保守的な政治的な行動をして彼は3月の会見で"多くの罪で起訴さ少々のテロには、主に組織犯罪しかし、 "彼は実際に働いて1つだけの主要なテロ事件として米連邦検事は、起訴するための10の武器ディーラー売り2.5ドル億ドル相当の対戦車ミサイル、爆弾は、イランや戦闘機を1986年にした。 The judge in the case ruled that a sale to Iran violated terrorist statutes because its government had been tied to 87 terrorist incidents.裁判官は、事件を支配してテロリストの法令に違反するイランに売却していたため、政府は87テロ事件につながれている。 Giuliani has never mentioned the case, perhaps because he personally filed papers terminating it in his last month as US Attorney: A critical witness had died, and a judge tossed out 46 of the 55 counts because of errors by Giuliani’s office.ジュリアーニ氏の言及がない場合は、おそらくなぜなら、彼は個人的に提出書類を終端することで米国の弁護士としての彼は先月：重要な目撃者が死亡した、と判断して揺られる46のエラーが発生したため、 55カウントジュリアーニ氏の事務所。
“Then, as mayor of New York,” Giuliani’s July speech continued, “I got elected right after the 1993 Islamic terrorist attack . "じゃあ、ニューヨーク市長としては、 " 7月のジュリアーニ氏の演説を続け、 "私は当選直後の1993年にイスラムテロ攻撃だ。 . 。 . 。 I set up emergency plans for all the different possible attacks we could have.私の緊急計画をセットアップするためのさまざまな可能性がある攻撃我々のすべての可能性がある。 We had drills and exercises preparing us for sarin gas and anthrax, dirty bombs.”私たちは私たちのための準備訓練や演習サリンや炭疽菌、汚い爆弾"と述べた。
In fact, Giuliani was oblivious to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing throughout his mayoralty.実際には、ジュリアーニ氏は、 1993年に気付いていないの世界貿易センタービル爆破を通して彼の市長です。 A month after the attack, candidate Giuliani met for the first time with Bill Bratton, who would ultimately become his police commissioner. 1カ月後の攻撃は、候補者のために会ったのは初めてでジュリアーニbratton法案は、最終的に誰が彼の警察本部長になる。 The lengthy taped meeting was one of several policy sessions he had with unofficial advisers.長時間の会議の録音されたいくつかの政策の1つのセッションで彼は非公式のアドバイザーです。 The bombing never came up; neither did terrorism.爆撃を思い付いたのは決して;どちらもテロでした。 When Giuliani was elected a few months later, he immediately launched a search for a new police commissioner.ジュリアーニ氏は、当選したときには数ヵ月後、彼はすぐに検索を開始するために、新しい警察本部長。 Three members of the screening panel that Giuliani named to conduct the search, and four of the candidates interviewed for the job, said later that the bombing and terrorism were never mentioned—even when the new mayor got involved with the interviews himself.メンバーは、 3つのパネルをスクリーニングして検索を行うという名前のジュリアーニ氏は、 4人の候補者の面接や就職のため、それ以降によると、その爆破事件やテロに言及がない場合でも、新しい市長が自身のインタビューに関わっています。 When Giuliani needed an emergency management director a couple of years later, two candidates for the job and the city official who spearheaded that search said that the bombing and future terrorist threats weren’t on Giuliani’s radar.ジュリアーニ氏、緊急時に必要に応じて2,3年後に管理局長は、二人の候補者のための仕事と市の関係者によると、爆撃の陣頭指揮して検索すると将来のテロの脅威ではないのレーダージュリアーニ。 The only time Giuliani invoked the 1993 bombing publicly was at his inauguration in 1994, when he referred to the way the building’s occupants evacuated themselves as a metaphor for personal responsibility, ignoring the bombing itself as a terrorist harbinger.ジュリアーニ氏だけで呼び出された時の爆撃を公然とは、 1993年に就任し、 1994年には、ときに言及して避難方法では、建物の居住者自身の個人的な比喩としての責任は、それ自体として無視してテロ爆破事件の前触れだ。
US Attorney Mary Jo White and the four assistants who prosecuted the 1993 bombing said they were never asked to brief Giuliani about terrorism, though all of the assistants knew Giuliani personally and had actually been hired by him when he was the US Attorney.米連邦検事メアリージョーホワイトと、 1993年の4つの爆破事件で起訴さアシスタントの人によると彼らは決して簡単な質問にジュリアーニテロについては、すべてのアシスタントかかわらず個人的に知っていたジュリアーニ氏と彼が実際に採用されたとき、彼は、米国の弁護士に相談します。 White’s office, located just a couple hundred yards from City Hall, indicted bin Laden three years before 9/11, but Giuliani recounted in his own book, Leadership , that “shortly after 9/11, Judith [Nathan] got me a copy of Yossef Bodansky’s Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America ,” which had warned of “spectacular terrorist strikes in Washington and/or New York” in 1999.白の事務所には、ただのカップルに位置一〇 〇ヤード市役所からは、 3年前にビンラディン氏の起訴9 / 11 、 recountedしかし、ジュリアーニ氏は、自分自身の本は、 リーダーシップは、その"直後に9 / 11 、私には、ジュディス[ネイサン] ビンラディン氏のコピーをyossef bodansky ：アメリカの戦争を宣言していた男は、 "これが舞い込み、 "テロリストの攻撃を見張るワシントンおよび/またはニューヨーク"は1999年です。 As an example of how he “mastered a subject,” Giuliani wrote that he soon “covered” Bodansky’s prophetic work “in highlighter and notes.”一例として、どのように彼は"マスターの件名は、 "彼はすぐにジュリアーニ氏が書いた"距離"の予言bodansky仕事"との注意事項をハイライト表示した"と述べた。
The 1995 sarin-gas drill that Giuliani cited in his July speech was also prophetic, anticipating many of the breakdowns that hampered the city’s 9/11 response. 1995年のサリンガスドリルジュリアーニ引用して彼のスピーチは7月にも予言は、故障の多くは、予想を妨げ、街の9 / 11の反応だ。 The drill was such a disaster that a follow-up exercise was cancelled to avoid embarrassment.ドリルは、このような災害のフォローアップを行使しては恥ずかしさを避けるためにキャンセルされます。 More than a hundred of the first responders rushed in so recklessly that they were “killed” by exposure to the gas. 100人以上が殺到したため、無謀にも第一対応者は、彼らが"殺した"のガスにさらされる。 Radio communications were described in the city’s own report as “abysmal,” with police and fire “operating on different frequencies.” The command posts were located much too close to the incident.無線通信には独自の報告書に記載され都市としての"底抜けのは、 "警察や消防に"別の周波数で動作しています。 "とは、コマンドの投稿があまりにも近くに位置し、事件だ。 All three failings would be identified years later in official reviews of the 9/11 response.すべての3つの欠点は、数年後に発見される公式のレビューは、 9 / 11の反応だ。
Giuliani went on, in this stump speech, to list other examples of his mayoral experience confronting terrorism.ジュリアーニ氏はつづけます、この街頭演説は、他の例をリストに彼の市長が直面するテロの経験です。 There was the time, he says, “we had what we thought was a sarin gas attack.” And there were also the 50th anniversary commemoration of the United Nations and the 2000 millennium celebration to contend with, times, he said, “when we had a lot of warnings and had to do a tremendous amount to prepare.” And let’s not forget, he pointed out, the 1997 NYPD arrest of two terrorists who “were going to blow up a subway station.” Giuliani used this thwarted attack as proof of the city’s readiness: “A very, very alert young police officer saw those guys,” he said.時間があった、と彼は言います、 "私たちは何を考えたのは我々サリン事件。 2000ミレニアムのお祝いをして戦う、タイムズは、彼によると、 "われが、多くの警告とする際には途方もない金額を準備しています。 "としてみましょう忘れないで、彼の指摘は、 1997年に逮捕された2つのテロリストたちnypd "が行く地下鉄駅を爆破する"と述べた。ジュリアーニ使用され、この挫折させられた攻撃の証拠として、市内の即応性： "非常に、非常に警戒の警察官を見た若い連中だ"と述べた。 “They looked suspicious, [so he] reported them to the desk sergeant. "彼らを見不審、 [そこで]軍曹机の上に報告しています。 The police department executed a warrant and shot one of the men as he was about to hit a toggle switch.”警察署令状を実行すると、 1つのショットについては、男性としての彼はトグルスイッチを放った。 "
Each of the claims in Giuliani’s self-serving account is inaccurate.ジュリアーニ氏は、それぞれの利己的な主張では、不正確なアカウントです。 The supposed “sarin attack” was simply the discovery of an empty canister marked “sarin” in the home of a harmless Queens recluse.そのはず"サリン事件"の発見は、単に、空の容器にマーク"サリン"は、ホームページのクイーンズ世捨て人無害です。 It was sitting next to an identical container labeled “compressed air” with a smiley-face logo.隣に座っていたのと同じ容器ラベル"圧縮空気"のロゴとスマイリーの顔だ。 Jerry Hauer, the city’s emergency management director at the time, was in London, on the phone with Giuliani constantly.ジェリーハウアー、市の緊急事態管理局長は当時、ロンドンでは、ジュリアーニ氏は、携帯電話を常にです。 Hauer finds it ironic that Giuliani is still talking about the incident, since they both thought it was “comically” mishandled then.皮肉なことを見つけることハウアージュリアーニ氏は、まだこの事件について話し、 2人とも思っていたので"とおどけて"と当時の対応を誤った。 “The police went there without any suits on and touched all the containers without proper clothing. "警察に行ったスーツでもなく、そこに触れたことなく適切な衣類のすべてのコンテナです。 They turned it into a major crime scene, with a hundred cops lining the street.彼らの主要な犯罪現場に電源が入って、その通りにして100コップスライニング。 Rudy at one point said to me, ‘Here we have the mayor, the fire commissioner, the chief of the police department, and one of my deputy mayors standing on the front lawn of this house.ルディ私には1つのポイントによると、 'ここで我々は、市長は、消防総監は、警察署の主任は、私の副市長と1つの前庭の芝生の上に立って、この家です。 Shouldn’t we be across the street in case this stuff ignites?’” This overhyped emergency led to a misdemeanor arrest subsequently dismissed by the district attorney.通りの向こう側にはならない我々は、この事件ignitesものですか？ "このため、緊急overhyped軽犯罪で逮捕された後に解雇さ地方検事。
Similarly, the security concerns during the 1995 UN anniversary focused on Cuba and China and didn’t involve Arab terrorist threats.同様に、 1995年に国連安全保障上の懸念の中に集中して周年のキューバと中国とアラブのテロの脅威を巻き込むしなかった。 The millennium target, well established at subsequent trials, was the Los Angeles International Airport, not New York.ミレニアム目標は、十分に確立さその後の裁判で、ロサンゼルス国際空港には、ニューヨークでいない。 While there’s no doubt the Clinton administration did put the country and city on terrorist alert for Y2K and other reasons, it was an arrest on the Washington/Canadian border that busted up a West Coast plot.中にあるのは間違いない、クリントン政権の国や都市を入れるために2000年のテロの警告やその他の理由により、逮捕していたワシントン州/カナダの国境をして逮捕された西海岸にプロットする。
The subway bombing, meanwhile, wasn’t stymied by the NYPD.地下鉄の爆破事件は、一方で、窮地に立たされるのではないnypd 。 An Egyptian friend of the bomber—living with him in the apartment where the pipe bomb was being built—told two Long Island Rail Road police officers about it.エジプトの友人は、爆撃機には、彼のアパートに住んでどこのパイプ爆弾が内蔵された2つのロングアイランド鉄道と道路の警察官だ。 When the NYPD subsequently raided the apartment, they shot two Palestinians who were there—one of whom, hit five times and gravely wounded, was later acquitted at trial. nypdときにアパートを襲撃し、その後、やつらに撃たれた2つのパレスチナ人たちの一人がそこには、 5回のヒット重傷を負うと、それ以降は、裁判で無罪に。 No one had tried to set off the bomb at the time of the arrest, though news stories reported that; the bomber had reached for an officer’s gun, according to the trial testimony.誰もがオフにしようとしている時点で、爆弾の逮捕が、ニュース記事によると、この爆撃機に達していたため、警官の銃は、裁判の証言によると、 。 The news stories also initially suggested a link to Hamas, though the lone bomber was actually an amateur fanatic with no money and no network.また、ニュース記事へのリンクを最初に提案したハマスは、ローンかかわらず、爆撃機は、実際にはお金がないとアマチュアの狂信的なネットワークをなしています。 As conservative a source as Bill Gertz of The Washington Times wrote that FBI counterterrorism investigators were “concerned that the initial alarmist statements about the case made by Mayor Rudy Giuliani”—apparently a reference to leaks about Hamas and the toggle switch—”will prove embarrassing.”保守することで、ソースとしての法案としては、ワシントンタイムズ gertz書いたことFBIのテロ対策捜査官は、 "人騒がせな発言を懸念して、最初のケースについては、ルディジュリアーニ市長は作られる"と明らかにリファレンスをリークについて-ハマスとのトグルスイッチ- "は、恥ずかしいことを証明する"と述べた。
Giuliani’s terrorism biography is bunk.ジュリアーニ氏は、寝台のテロの伝記。 As mayor, his laser-beam focus was street thugs, and as a prosecutor, it was the mob, Wall Street, and crooked politicians.市長としては、彼のレーザービームの焦点は、街の凶悪犯は、検事として、そして、それは、暴徒には、ウォール街では、政治家と曲がった。 He can’t reach back to those years and rewrite such well-known chapters of his life.彼はその年に戻るに達することができないと書き換えるようなよく知られた彼の人生の支部です。
BIG LIE 大うそ
2. 2 。 ‘I don’t think there was anyplace in the country, including the federal government, that was as well prepared for that attack as New York City was in 2001.’ This assertion flies in the face of all three studies of the city’s response—the 9/11 Commission, the National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), and McKinsey & Co., the consulting firm hired by the Bloomberg administration. 'どこにもないと思いますが、その国は、連邦政府を含め、そのために準備していたとしても攻撃としては、 2001年にニューヨーク市です。 'このアサーションハエに直面し、市内のすべての3つのタイプの応答- 9 / 11委員会は、米国立標準＆テクノロジー（ nist ） 、およびマッキンゼーアンドカンパニーは、ブルームバーグ政権のコンサルティング会社に雇われている。
Actually, Giuliani didn’t create the OEM until three years after the 1993 bombing, 27 months into his term.実際には、ジュリアーニしなかったのOEMを作成した後、 1993年までの3年間の爆撃は、任期を27カ月です。 And he didn’t open the OEM’s new emergency command center until the end of 1999—nearly six years after he’d taken office.そして、彼はそれを開けないの新たな緊急指揮センターのOEM末までにほぼ6年後の1999年に取らオフィス思っているんです。 If he “assumed from the moment I came into office that NYC would be the subject of a terrorist attack,” as he told Time when it made him “Person of the Year” in 2001, he sure took a long time to erect what he describes as the city’s front line of defense.もし彼"と仮定事務所に入ってきた瞬間から私の主題となることnyc 、テロリストの攻撃では、 " 時期として同相は、それは彼を"今年の人"は2001年に、彼は確かに長い時間が彼には何を逆立てて説明として、街の前面の防衛線です。
The OEM was established so long after the bombing because, contrary to Giuliani’s revisionism, the decision to create it had nothing to do with the bombing.そんなに長い間、 OEMの設立のための爆破事件の後、ジュリアーニ氏の修正に反して、その決定を作成することは、何の関係も爆撃した。 Several memos, unearthed from the Giuliani archive and going on at great length, reveal that the initial rationale for the agency was “non-law enforcement events,” particularly the handling of a Brooklyn water-main break shortly after he took office that the mayor thought had been botched.いくつかのメモは、ジュリアーニ氏のアーカイブから出土長々と起こっていると、その根拠を明らかにして、最初の代理店は、 "法執行機関以外のイベントは、 "特に、ブルックリンの取り扱いについて、主水彼が就任直後にブレークして、市長おざなりな考えていた。 Before that, in December 1994, when an unemployed computer programmer carried a bomb onto a subway in an extortion plot against the Transit Authority, Giuliani was upset that he couldn’t even get a count of patients from the responding services for his press conference.その前に、 94年12月には、失業中のコンピュータープログラマーを運んだ際に折れ、地下鉄で爆弾恐喝の転覆を狙った陰謀交通局は、ジュリアーニ氏は、番狂わせでも取得することができない患者のカウントから、彼の記者会見での応答サービスです。
Jerry Hauer, who was handpicked by Giuliani to head the OEM, testified before the 9/11 Commission that Giuliani was “unable to get the full story” at the firebombing and “heard about the huge street collapse” that followed the water-main break “on TV,” adding: “That’s what led the mayor to set up OEM.” Hauer went through five interviews for the job, and the only time terrorism came up was when Giuliani briefly discussed the failed sarin-gas drill.ジェリーハウアー氏は、頭のOEM供給を厳選されたジュリアーニ氏は、証言する前に、 9 / 11委員会が、ジュリアーニ氏は、 "完全な物語を取得できません"とfirebombingは、 "巨大な街の崩壊を聞いた"として水に続いて、メインのブレーク"テレビで、 "追加： "それはどのような市長をセットアップするのOEMを主導した"と述べた。ハウアーをくぐり抜けた5つの面接のための仕事は、テロとの時間だけで簡単に議論を思い付いたのは、故障したときにジュリアーニサリンガスドリルです。 He even met with Giuliani’s wife, Donna Hanover; no one said a word about the 1993 bombing.ジュリアーニ氏にも会って彼の妻、ドナハノーバー;なしによると、 1つの単語については、 1993年の爆破事件です。 Hauer’s own memos at the time the OEM was launched in 1996 emphasize “the visibility of the mayor” during emergencies (rather than the police commissioner) as a major objective of the agency.ハウアー自身のメモは、 1996年に発足時のOEM供給を強調する"とは、可視性の市長"と、緊急時に（というより、警察本部長）は、代理店として、主要な目的です。 The now- ballyhooed new office was, however, so underfunded from the start that Hauer could only hire staffers whose salaries would be paid for by other agencies like the NYPD.鳴り物入りの新しいオフィスは、今では、しかし、今からスタートして資金不足ハウアースタッフを雇うことしかできなかったの給料が支払われるように、他の機関nypd 。
With that kind of history, it’s hardly surprising that the OEM was anything but “invaluable” on 9/11.そのような歴史が、それはほとんど何も驚くべきことで、 OEMには、しかし、 "かけがえのない"として9 / 11 。 Sam Caspersen, one of the principal authors of the 9/11 Commission’s chapter on the city’s response, says that “nothing was happening at OEM” during the 102 minutes of the attack that had any direct impact on the city’s “rescue/evacuation operation.” A commission staff statement found that, even prior to the evacuation of the OEM command center at 7 World Trade an hour after the first plane hit, the agency “did not play an integral role” in the response.サムcaspersen 、校長の著者の1つは、 9 / 11委員会の章では、市の対応によれば、 "何が起きて、 OEMの" 102分の中に攻撃していた、市内のすべての直接的な影響を与える"レスキュー/避難作戦だ"と、委員会の職員が見つかりました声明でも、事前に避難OEMのコマンドは、世界貿易センターでは7時間後の最初の飛行機のヒットとなり、その代理店"の役割を積分プレーしなかった"と回答した。 Despite Giuliani’s claim today that he and the OEM were “constantly planning for different kinds” of attacks, none of the OEM exercises replicated the 1993 bombing.ジュリアーニ氏の主張にもかかわらず、今日のOEMにして、彼とは、 "いろいろな種類を絶えず計画"の攻撃は、いずれも、 1993年のOEMの爆撃演習にレプリケートされます。 No drill occurred at the World Trade Center, and none involved the response to a high-rise fire anywhere.ドリルが発生していないで、世界貿易センター、およびnoneかかわって、高層ビル火災に対応していけます。 In fact, the OEM had no high-rise plan—its emergency-management trainers weren’t even assigned to prepare for the one attack that had already occurred, and the one most likely to recur.実際、 OEMにはなかった高層の緊急事態管理計画にも割り当てられていないトレーナーは、 1つの攻撃に備えるため、すでに発生しており、 1つの再発する可能性が最も高い。 Kevin Culley, a Fire Department captain who worked as a field responder at OEM, said the agency had “plans for minor emergencies,” but he couldn’t recall “anybody anticipating another attack like the ‘93 bombing.”ケビンculley 、消防署のキャプテンとして働いた人のOEMフィールドに応答では、代理店によると、 "緊急事態計画をマイナーは、 "しかし、彼を思い出すことができなかった"他の誰にも予想'93爆破事件のような攻撃です。 "
Instead of being the best-prepared city, New York’s lack of unified command, as well as the breakdown of communications between the police and fire departments, fell far short of the efforts at the Pentagon that day, as later established by the 9/11 Commission and NIST reports.最良の代わりに準備されている都市は、ニューヨークの統一コマンドの欠如だけでなく、その内訳は、警察や消防署の間の通信は、はるかに及ばない落ちたの努力は、米国防総省は同日、として確立された後、 9 / 11委員会報告書やnist 。 When the 280,000-member International Association of Fire Fighters recently released a powerful video assailing Giuliani for sticking firefighters with the same radios that “we knew didn’t work” in the 1993 attack, the presidential campaign attacked the union.そのときのメンバー280000 -国際消防士連合assailingジュリアーニ氏は最近のビデオを発売する強力な消防士と、同じ無線付着して"我々は仕事を知っていた"は、 1993年の攻撃は、大統領選挙の労働組合を攻撃した。 “This is an organization that supported John Kerry for president in 2004,” Giuliani aide Tony Carbonetti said. "これは、組織をサポートするためのジョンケリー大統領が2004年には、 "ジュリアーニ氏の側近によると、トニーcarbonetti 。 “So it’s no shock that they’re out there going after a credible Republican.” While the IAFF did endorse Kerry, the Uniformed Firefighters of Greater New York, whose president starred in the video, endorsed Bush. "ショックがないので、彼らはそこに行くアウト後、共和党の信憑性"と述べた。 iaff中には、ケリー候補を支持する、大ニューヨークの消防士の制服を着た、その社長に主演したビデオの中で、ブッシュ大統領を支持した。 Its former president, Tom Von Essen—currently a member of Giuliani Partners—was the fire commissioner on 9/11 precisely because the union had played such a pivotal role in initially electing Giuliani.元大統領は、トムフォンエッセン-現在のメンバーには、消防総監ジュリアーニパートナーして9 / 11正確にプレーしたので、このような労働組合が選ばれたジュリアーニ氏は当初極めて重要な役割を果たす。
The IAFF video reports that 121 firefighters in the north tower didn’t get out because they didn’t hear evacuation orders, rejecting Giuliani’s claim before the 9/11 Commission that the firefighters heard the orders and heroically decided to “stand their ground” and rescue civilians.ビデオiaff消防士の報告によると、 121は、北タワーしなかった聞こえなかったから抜け出すために退避命令は、ジュリアーニ氏の主張を却下する前に、 9 / 11委員会は、消防士の受注と雄々しく聞いたことを決めた"とスタンドの地面"と民間人を救助した。 Having abandoned that 2004 contention, the Giuliani campaign is now trying to blame the deadly communications lapse on the repeaters, which were installed to boost radio signals in the towers.コンテンション放棄して2004年には、ジュリアーニ氏のキャンペーンでは、致死のせいにしようとしてリピータ通信経過して、インストールされた無線信号は、タワーを高める。 But the commission concluded that the “technical failure of FDNY radios” was “a contributing factor,” though “not the primary cause,” of the “many firefighter fatalities in the North Tower.” The commission compared “the strength” of the NYPD and FDNY radios and said that the weaknesses of the FDNY radios “worked against successful communication.”しかし、委員会の結論は、 "技術的な失敗fdnyラジオ"とは"寄与因子は、 "かかわらず"の主な原因は、 "の"消防士犠牲者の多くは、北タワーです。 "同委員会に比べて"強さ"のnypdとfdnyやラジオによると、無線fdnyの弱点は、 "成功したコミュニケーションに不利に働いた。 "
The commission report also found that “it’s impossible to know what difference it made that units in the North Tower weren’t using the repeater channel,” because no one knows if it “remained operational” after the collapse of the south tower, which fell on the trade-center facilities where the repeater and its console were located.同委員会は、報告書はまた"それは不可能であることを知る前にどのような違いがユニットは、北タワーがリピータを使用していないチャネルは、 "もしそれが誰にも分からない"とは依然作戦"サウスタワーの崩壊後、が下落して貿易センターコンソールとその施設がどこにあるのリピータです。 The collapse also drove everyone out of the north tower lobby, leaving no one to operate the repeater console.車を運転してもみんなの崩壊は、北タワーのロビーには、 1つ残していないリピータコンソールを操作する。 In addition, the commission concluded that fire chiefs failed to turn on the repeater correctly that morning—another indication of the lack of training and drills at the WTC between the attacks.また、同委員会の結論をオンにして消防長に失敗し、その日の朝に別の指示を正しくリピータは、訓練の欠如との間の攻撃訓練は、 106 。 In the end, firefighters had to rely exclusively on their radios, and the inability of the Giuliani administration to find a replacement for the radios that malfunctioned in 1993 left them unable to talk to each other, even about getting out of a tower on the verge of collapse.最後には、全面的に依存していた消防士の無線機は、ジュリアーニ氏と、できないことは、政権交代のための無線機を見つけることができませんでしたmalfunctionedかれらは1993年に残って話をして、お互いを知ってもらうことでもあるタワーの瀬戸際に立たされて崩壊した。
The mayor had also done nothing to make the radios interoperable—which would have enabled the police and firefighters to communicate across departmental lines—despite having received a 1995 federal waiver granting the city the additional radio frequencies to make that possible.市長は、無線機を作るも何も行わ-これは、相互運用が有効になって、警察や消防隊員と通信回線部門横断するのにもかかわらず、 1995年に連邦政府の放棄を意味するの付与を受け取って、市の無線周波数を追加していくことが可能です。 That meant the fire chiefs had no idea that police helicopters had anticipated the partial collapse of both towers long before they fell.つまり、消防長のアイデアはないと予想していた警察のヘリコプターが部分的に崩壊する前に、両方の塔の長い下落した。
It’s not just the radios and the OEM: Giuliani never forced the police and fire departments to abide by clear command-and-control protocols that squarely put one service in charge of the other during specified emergencies.それだけではないとの無線機のOEM ：ジュリアーニ決して強制警察や消防署をクリアするコマンドを順守してまともに制御のプロトコルを担当して1つのサービスに他の緊急事態時に指定します。 Though he collected $250 million in tax surcharges on phone use to improve the 911 system, he diverted this emergency funding for other uses, and the 911 dispatchers were an utter disaster that day, telling victims to stay where they were long after the fire chiefs had ordered an evacuation, which potentially sealed the fates of hundreds.収集二五〇 〇 〇 〇 〇 〇 〇ドルかかわらず、彼は携帯電話を使用して税課徴金を向上させるため、 911のシステムは、緊急時彼は、この資金を流用他の用途では、 911とは、全くの災害dispatchersは同日、犠牲者の話はどこに滞在した後、彼らは長い間いた消防長避難指示は、運命の女神は数百人が潜在的に密閉された。 And, despite the transparent lessons of 1993, Giuliani never established any protocols for rooftop or elevator rescues in high-rises, or even a strategy for bringing the impaired and injured out—all costly failings on 9/11.そして、 1993年にもかかわらず、透明性の教訓は、ジュリアーニ氏は決して確立するためのプロトコルやエレベーター屋上で救助高層ビル、あるいは戦略を持参すると、障害を持つすべての手痛い失敗をしてけがをして9 / 11 。
But perhaps the best evidence of the Giuliani administration’s lack of readiness was that no one at its top levels had a top-secret security clearance on 9/11.しかし、恐らく最も信頼できる証拠は、ジュリアーニ氏は、政権の即応性の欠如がないことで、 1つのトップレベルには、極秘のセキュリティクリアランスして9 / 11 。 Hauer, who had left the OEM in 2000 to become a top biochemical adviser at the US Department of Health and Human Services, was invited to Gracie Mansion within days of 9/11 for a strategy session with Giuliani and a half-dozen of his top advisers, including Police Commissioner Bernie Kerik, Tom Von Essen, and Richie Sheirer, who succeeded Hauer at the OEM.ハウアーは、左のOEM供給者は、 2000年にトップになることで、米国の生化学的アドバイザー保健社会福祉省、グレーシー邸内に招待された日の9 / 11のセッションのための戦略を半ダースジュリアーニ氏と彼のトップへアドバイザーは、警察本部長を含むkerikバーニー、トムフォンエッセン、 sheirerとリッチーさんは、 OEMのハウアーに成功した。 Hauer, who had the highest-level clearance, says that “no one else in the room had one at all.” He was told that the FBI “was trying to get them expedited clearances.”ハウアーは、最も高いレベルのクリアランスていたによれば、 "他に誰がすべて1つの部屋にいた。 "と彼は言ったが、米連邦捜査"の整理は、迅速に取得しようとしています。 "
Hauer had previously taken Sheirer down to the White House to meet with top counterterrorism brass and learned on his way into the meeting that Sheirer hadn’t “filled out the questionnaire.” When Kerik’s nomination as homeland security secretary blew up in 2004, news accounts also indicated that he’d never filled it out.ダウンを取らsheirerハウアーさんは、以前、ホワイトハウスと会談し、テロ対策の真ちゅう製のトップとの会議で学んだことを自分の道をsheirerなかった"とのアンケートに記入した。 2004 、ニュースのアカウントでも彼は決して満たされたことを示しています。 Von Essen was so out of the loop that he said that prior to 9/11, he was told “nothing at all,” and that he started hearing “talk of an organization called al Qaeda and a man named Osama bin Laden” a few hours after the attack.フォンエッセンは蚊帳の外だったので彼によると、その前に9 / 11 、彼は言った"何もない、すべては、 "聴聞会として始めた"と話すの組織アルカイダと呼ばれる一人の男の名前オサマビンラディン"数数時間後に、攻撃です。 “It meant nothing to me,” he wrote in his own book. "私に深い意味はない"と彼は、自分自身の本を書いています。
“I was reading the daily intelligence in Washington,” Hauer recalled, “and I didn’t feel comfortable talking about things that people weren’t cleared for. "私は日々の情報を読んワシントンでは、 "リコールハウアー、 "と私のことを話していないことが居心地がいい人がいないためにクリアされます。 Talking in general with Rudy one-on-one was one thing, but talking to Richie and Bernie and Tommy violated my security clearances.” Though Giuliani’s top team had failed to seek the clearances they needed prior to 9/11, Kerik and Giuliani attacked the FBI for not sharing information with local law enforcement officials when they testified a month after the attack at a House subcommittee hearing.一般的に話をしていたルディ1対1の1つのものだけど、リッチーと話をすると私のセキュリティバーニーとトミーの整理に違反しています。 "かかわらずジュリアーニのトップチームは彼らの整理に失敗し、必要に応じて求める前に9 / 11 、およびkerikジュリアーニ氏を攻撃したため、米連邦捜査情報を共有していないときに地元の法執行機関の関係者の証言で、 1カ月後に下院小委員会の公聴会を攻撃した。
BIG LIE 大うそ
3. 3 。 Don’t blame me for 7 WTC, Rudy says. In response to his critics’ most damning sound bite, Giuliani is attempting to blame a once-valued aide for the decision to put his prized, $61 million emergency-command center in the World Trade Center, an obvious terrorist target. 私を責めないでは7 、 106 、ルディは述べている。に対応して彼の批評家'最も破滅的サウンドバイトは、ジュリアーニ氏は、一度のせいにしようとする大切な補佐官を置く彼の見事な意思決定のため、緊急時のコマンドセンター61000000ドルの世界貿易センタービルのは、明白なテロの標的だ。 The 1997 decision had dire consequences on 9/11, when the city had to mobilize a response without any operational center.恐ろしい結果、 1997年に決定していた9 / 11 、シティいたときに応答なしに運用センターを動員する。
“My director of emergency management recommended 7 WTC” as “the site that would make the most sense,” Giuliani told Chris Wallace’s Fox News Channel show in May, pinpointing Jerry Hauer as the culprit. "私の推奨7 wtcの緊急事態管理ディレクター"として"このサイトを最大限に活用することが意味では、 "クリスウォレスジュリアーニ氏はフォックスニュースチャンネルの番組の5月には、その原因としてpinpointingジェリーハウアー。
Wallace confronted Giuliani, however, with a 1996 Hauer memo recommending that the bunker be sited at MetroTech in Brooklyn, close to where the Bloomberg administration eventually built one.ウォレス直面ジュリアーニ氏は、しかし、 1996年にハウアーメモを推薦することで、バンカーにsited metrotechブルックリンでは、最終的に近い場所に建てブルームバーグ政権の1つです。 The mayor brushed the memo aside, continuing to insist that Hauer had picked it as “the prime site.” The campaign then put out statements from a former deputy mayor who said that Hauer had supported the trade-center location at a high-level meeting with the mayor in 1997.つや消しのメモ市長はさておき、ハウアーの継続を主張していたことを選んだ"内閣総理サイトです。 "との声明を出すからキャンペーンそれから前副市長を支持していた人によると、貿易センターハウアー場所で、高レベルの会議市長は1997年にしています。
Hauer doesn’t dispute that he eventually backed the 7 WTC location, but he clearly favored MetroTech.ハウアーはない紛争を背景にして彼は結局、 7 wtcの場所が、彼を明確に好まmetrotech 。 His memo said that MetroTech “could be available in six months,” while it took four and a half more years to get the bunker up and running at 7 WTC. metrotech彼のメモによると、 " 6カ月間で利用できる可能性がある"としながらかかった4年半の詳細を取得すると、実行中のバンカーは、 7 、 106 。 He said that MetroTech was secure and “not as visible a target as buildings in Lower Manhattan”— a prophetic comparison.彼によると、セキュリティで保護されたとmetrotech "としては、ターゲットとして目に見える建物で、マンハッタン南部の" -比較を予言した。 Listing eight positives about MetroTech, the memo also mentioned negatives, but said they weren’t insurmountable.陽性者の約8 metrotechリスティングは、メモにも言及したネガが、かれらはないと乗り越えられない。 “The real issue,” Hauer concluded, “is whether or not the mayor wants to go across the river to manage an incident. "本当の問題は、 "ハウアー結論は、 "するかどうかは、市長へ行きたいの川向こうにある出来事を管理します。 If he is willing to do this, MetroTech is a good alternative.” Notes from meetings indicate that Hauer continued to push MetroTech in the discussions with the mayor and his top deputy.彼は喜んでこれを行う場合は、代替metrotechが良い"と述べた。ハウアーノートからミーティングによりますと、引き続き議論をプッシュmetrotechの副市長と彼のトップです。
But Hauer says Denny Young, the mayor’s alter ego, who has worked at his side for nearly three decades, eventually “made it very clear” that Giuliani wanted “to be able to walk to this facility quickly.” That meant the bunker had to be in lower Manhattan.しかし、若いデニーハウアーによれば、第2の自我、市長のは、彼の側に勤務してきた三十年近くも、結局"前には非常に明確な"ジュリアーニ指名手配して"をできるように、この施設を急いで歩く。 "という意味のバンカーマンハッタン南部にはならなかった。 Since the City Hall area is below the floodplain, the command center—which was built with a hurricane-curtain wall—had to be above ground.以来、市役所のはんらん原圏では、以下のとおり、内蔵されたのは、コマンドセンターにハリケーン-カーテンウォール-地上にならなかった。 The formal city document approving the site said that it “was selected due to its proximity to City Hall,” a standard set by Giuliani and Giuliani alone.市の正式な文書によると、同サイトを承認すること"を選択したため、市役所に近接して、 "標準設定されるとジュリアーニジュリアーニだけです。
The 7 WTC site was the brainchild of Bill Diamond, a prominent Manhattan Republican that Giuliani had installed at the city agency handling rentals. 7 、 106のサイトには、ダイヤモンドの発案の法案は、共和党の著名マンハッタンにインストールしていたジュリアーニ氏は、市内の賃貸取り扱い代理店です。 When Diamond held a similar post in the Reagan administration a few years earlier, his office had selected the same building to house nine federal agencies.ダイヤモンドの際に行われた後には、レーガン政権同様、数年前、彼の事務所は、同じ建物を一軒一軒ナイン選択した連邦政府機関です。 Diamond’s GOP-wired broker steered Hauer to the building, which was owned by a major Giuliani donor and fundraiser.ダイヤモンドの共和党ハウアー-有線操縦して、建物のブローカーは、大手ジュリアーニ氏が所有していたとドナー資金集めています。 When Hauer signed onto it, he was locked in by the limitations Giuliani had imposed on the search and the sites Diamond offered him.ハウアーに入るときに署名することは、彼が閉じ込められていたの制限が課せジュリアーニ氏は、ダイヤモンドを提供するサイトを検索していた。 The mayor was so personally focused on the siting and construction of the bunker that the city administrator who oversaw it testified in a subsequent lawsuit that “very senior officials,” specifically including Giuliani, “were involved,” which he said was a major difference between this and other projects.個人的に集中していたので、市長の立地とは、バンカーには、都市建設管理者は、その後の訴訟で証言することを監督は、 "非常に幹部は、 "具体的ジュリアーニ氏を含め、 "にかかわって、 "これは、彼によると、主な違いこの他のプロジェクトとします。 Giuliani’s office had a humidor for cigars and mementos from City Hall, including a fire horn, police hats and fire hats, as well as monogrammed towels in his bathroom.ジュリアーニ氏の事務所には、葉巻をヒュミドールmementosから市役所とは、火災を含め、ホーンは、警察や消防帽子帽子だけでなく、彼の浴室のタオルモノグラム。 His suite was bulletproofed and he visited it often, even on weekends, bringing his girlfriend Judi Nathan there long before the relationship surfaced. bulletproofedと彼は、彼のスイートを訪れたこともしばしばでも、週末には、持参ジュディネイサンは、ガールフレンドとの関係が表面化する前に長いです。 He had his own elevator.彼は、自分のエレベーターです。 Great concern was expressed in writing that the platform in the press room had to be high enough to make sure his head was above the cameras.書面で大きな懸念を表明していたプラットフォームは、プレスルームには十分に高いことを確認して彼の頭の上にはカメラです。 It’s inconceivable that the hands-on mayor’s fantasy command center was shaped—or sited—by anyone other than him.それは想像して手にして市長のファンタジーコマンドセンターまたはsited -された形に彼以外の誰にも。
Of course, the consequences of putting the center there were predictable.もちろん、その結果の予見可能性があったの中心にパッティング。 The terrorist who engineered the 1993 bombing told the FBI they were coming back to the trade center.設計者は、 1993年の爆破テロは、米連邦捜査かれらは、貿易センタービルに戻ってきます。 Opposing the site at a meeting with the mayor, Police Commissioner Howard Safir called it “Ground Zero” because of the earlier attack.このサイトで、会議に反対して、市長、警察本部長と呼ばれることsafirハワード"グラウンドゼロ"のため、以前の攻撃。 Lou Anemone, the highest-ranking uniformed officer in the NYPD, wrote memos slamming the site.ルーアネモネは、最高位の制服警官nypdでは、同サイトをバタンと書いたメモです。 “I’ve never seen in my life ‘walking distance’ as some kind of a standard for crisis management,” Anemone said later. "私は一度も見たことが私の人生'徒歩'としていくつかの種類の標準的な危機管理のために、 "アネモネによると後で。 “But you don’t want to confuse Giuliani with the facts.” Anemone had done a detailed vulnerability study of the city for Giuliani, pinpointing terrorist targets. "しかし、ジュリアーニ氏とを混同しないようにして事実です。 "アネモネの脆弱性の詳細な調査が完了するため、市のジュリアーニ氏は、テロリストの標的pinpointing 。 “In terms of targets, the WTC was number one,” he says. "目標の点では、 106番号1つは、 "と彼は言います。 “I guess you had to be there in 1993 to know how strongly we felt it was the wrong place.” "多分あなたがそこにいるのが、 1993年に知っていることを強く感じていた私たちの悪い場所です。 "
Bizarrely, Giuliani even tried in the Wallace interview to deny that the early evacuation of the bunker left him searching for a new site, contrary to the account of that frantic morning he’s given hundreds of times, often for honoraria reaching six figures.異様には、ジュリアーニ氏にもインタビューを試みたが、ウォレスの早期避難を否定することは、彼の左のバンカーに新しいサイトを探して、そのアカウントに反して、死に物狂いの朝に与えられた彼は何百回とは、頻繁に至るまでの6つの数字を謝礼です。 “The way you’re interpreting it,” he told Wallace, “it was as if that was the one fixed command center. "のように解釈すること君は、 "ウォレス同相は、 "それはまるで、 1つの固定されたコマンドセンターです。 It was not.それはない。 There were backup command centers.” To minimize the effect of the loss of the bunker, Giuliani said that, “within a half hour” of the shutdown of the bunker, “we were able to move immediately to another command center.”コマンドセンターのバックアップがあった"と述べた。損失を最小限に抑えるための効果は、バンカーには、ジュリアーニ氏によると、 " 30分以内"のシャットダウンをバンカーは、 "私たちは、すぐに移動できるようにして別のコマンドセンターです。 "
In fact, as Giuliani himself has told the dramatic tale, he and his entourage were briefly trapped in a Merrill Lynch office, “jimmied the lock” of a firehouse, and took over a deluxe hotel until they realized it was “sheathed in windows.” They considered going to City Hall, but learned it was covered in debris.事実、彼自身としては、ジュリアーニ氏は、劇的な物語は、彼と彼の随行員が簡潔に挟まれてメリルリンチ事務所は、 " jimmiedロック"は、消防署、および引き継いだすることが実現するまでは、デラックスホテル"シースは、 Windowsです。 "彼ら考慮して市役所に行くが、学んだことが瓦礫に覆われています。 The only backup center that existed was the small one at police headquarters that had been put out of business when the WTC bunker opened; but Giuliani said its phones weren’t working.その存在だけでは、バックアップセンターの1つで、小規模の警察本部営業していたときに、 106を出すのバンカーにオープン;しかし、ジュリアーニ氏によると、同社は携帯電話働いている。 “We’re going to have to find someplace,” Giuliani said, according to his Time account, which described it as a “long and harrowing” search. "私たちはどこかに行くのを見つけるには、 "ジュリアーニ氏は、自分の時間によると、アカウントには、どのように記述すること"と悲惨なロング"を検索します。 “Our government no longer had a place to work,” he wrote in Leadership . "我々は、もはや政府の仕事をする場所を、 "彼のリーダーシップを書きました。
They wound up at the police academy uptown and, according to the account Giuliani and company gave Time , “we are up and operating by 4 pm”—seven hours, not a half-hour, after the attack.かれらは、緊張しているアップタウンポリスアカデミーとは、ジュリアーニ氏と同社によると、アカウントに与えた時間は、 "我々は午後4時までとオペレーティングさ"の7時間、 1時間半ではありませんが、それ以降は攻撃です。 But Giuliani told the 9/11 Commission that they quickly decided the academy “was too small” and “were able to establish a command center” at Pier 92 “within three days,” virtually building it from scratch.しかし、ジュリアーニ氏は、 9 / 11委員会の決定を素早くしてアカデミー"が小さすぎる"と"コマンドセンターを設立することができました"と、桟橋92 " 3日以内には、 "事実上ゼロから構築することだ。 Hauer said he’d asked for a backup command center years before 9/11, “but they told me there was no money for it.” After Hauer left, and shortly before 9/11, the city announced plans to build a backup center near police headquarters—a site quickly jettisoned by the Bloomberg administration.ハウアーによると思っているんですを要請するには、バックアップコマンドセンター年前に9 / 11 、 "しかし、彼らはお金がないと言われています。 "左後ハウアー、および直前の9 / 11は、市のバックアップセンターを構築する計画を発表しましたすぐに近くの警察本部サイトjettisoned -ブルームバーグ投与される。 Police officials told reporters that they were looking for space outside Manhattan and underground, citing the lessons of 9/11.警察当局者は記者団に対し、かれらは、マンハッタンの外の地下空間を探して、その教訓を理由に9 / 11 。
BIG LIE 大うそ
4. 4 。 ‘Democrats do not understand the full nature and scope of the terrorist war against us.’ Giuliani blames what he calls Bill Clinton’s “decade of denial” for the mess we’re in, and uses it to tarnish the rest of Clinton’s party. '連の性質を理解していないの全範囲は、テロとの戦いだ。 'ジュリアーニ通話クリントン彼のせいには何の" 10年の否定"のために私たちは混乱し、変色の残りの部分を使っているクリントン'秒党です。 “Don’t react, kind of let things go, kind of act the way Clinton did in the ’90s” is his favorite way of characterizing the Democratic response to the threat of terrorism. "反応しないで、物事に行くようなせ、そのような行為は、 1990年代にはクリントン大統領の方法"の特徴は、彼のお気に入りの民主的な方法でテロの脅威に対応しています。 “We were attacked at Khobar Towers, Kenya, Tanzania, 17 of our sailors were killed on the USS Cole , and the United States government, under then-president Clinton, did not respond,” Giuliani told the rabidly anti-Clinton audience at Pat Robertson’s Regent University. "我々が攻撃khobarタワーでは、ケニア、タンザニア、我々の船員17人が死亡して米海軍駆逐艦コール 、および、米国政府は、当時のクリントン大統領の下では、返答は得られなかった"とジュリアーニ氏は、クリントン大統領の観客を熱狂的に反パットロバートソンのリージェント大学です。 “It was a big mistake to not recognize that the 1993 bombing was a terrorist act and an act of war,” he added. "それは大きな間違いだと認識していないのは、 1993年の爆破テロ行為や戦争行為だ"と述べた。 “Bin Laden declared war on us. "ビンラディン氏の戦争を宣言してください。 We didn’t hear it.我々は耳にしなかったことだ。 I thought it was pretty clear at the time, but a lot of people didn’t see it, couldn’t see it.”と思っていた時にかなり明確ではなく、たくさんの人々を参照していないことは、それを見ることができない"と述べた。
This is naked revisionism—and not just because of his own well established, head-in-the-sand indifference to the 1993 bombing.これは裸の修正しているだけでなく、自分のために確立されると、頭の中の砂を、 1993年の無差別爆撃。 It’s as unambiguously partisan as his claim that on 9/11, he looked to the sky, saw the first fighter jets flying over the city well after the attack, and thanked God that George W. Bush was president.党派としての彼のように明確に主張して9 / 11 、彼は目を空には、最初に見たの井戸市の上空を飛ぶ戦闘機の攻撃の後、神に感謝の意をしていたブッシュ米大統領の大統領です。 Bob Kerrey, the former Democratic senator who sat on the 9/11 Commission, put it fairly: “Prior to 9/11, no elected official did enough to reduce the threat of Al Qaeda. Neither political party covered itself in glory.”
Giuliani’s lifelong friend Louis Freeh, the former FBI head who has endorsed him for president, wrote in his 2005 autobiography that “the nation’s fundamental approach to Osama bin Laden and his ilk was no different after the inauguration of January 21, 2001, than it had been before.” As Bob Kerrey noted, the five Democrats and five Republicans on the 9/11 Commission said much the same thing. Giuliani’s lifelong friend Louis Freeh, the former FBI head who has endorsed him for president, wrote in his 2005 autobiography that “the nation’s fundamental approach to Osama bin Laden and his ilk was no different after the inauguration of January 21, 2001 , than it had been before.” As Bob Kerrey noted, the five Democrats and five Republicans on the 9/11 Commission said much the same thing. Freeh added that both administrations “were fighting criminals, not an enemy force” before 9/11, and Giuliani is now making precisely the same policy point, but limiting his critique to Clinton. Even the fiercely anti-Clinton Freeh credited the former president with “one exception,” saying his administration did go after bin Laden “with a salvo of Tomahawk missiles in 1998 in retaliation for the embassy bombings in East Africa.”
The best example of Giuliani’s partisan twist is the USS Cole , which was attacked on October 12, 2000, three weeks before the 2000 election. The 9/11 Commission report found that in the final Clinton months, neither the FBI, then headed by Freeh, nor the CIA had a “definitive answer on the crucial question of outside direction of the attack,” which Clinton said he needed to go to war against bin Laden or the Taliban. The 9/11 Commission report found that in the final Clinton months, neither the FBI, then headed by Freeh, nor the CIA had a “definitive answer on the crucial question of outside direction of the attack,” which Clinton said he needed to go to war against bin Laden or the Taliban. All Clinton got was a December 21 “preliminary judgment” from the CIA that Al Qaeda “supported the attack.” A month later, when the Bush team took office, the CIA delivered the same “preliminary” findings to the new president. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told the commission “there was never a formal, recorded decision not to retaliate for the Cole ” by the Bush administration, just “a consensus that ‘tit-for-tat’ responses were likely to be counterproductive.” Rice thought that was the case “with the cruise missile strikes of 1998,” meaning that the new administration was deriding the one response that Freeh praised. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told the commission “there was never a formal, recorded decision not to retaliate for the Cole ” by the Bush administration, just “a consensus that ‘tit-for-tat’ responses were likely to be counterproductive.” Rice thought that was the case “with the cruise missile strikes of 1998,” meaning that the new administration was deriding the one response that Freeh praised. Bush himself told the commission that he was concerned “lest an ineffective air strike just serve to give bin Laden a propaganda advantage.” With all of this evidence of bipartisan paralysis, Giuliani has nonetheless limited his Cole attack to Clinton.
It is all part of a devoutly partisan exploitation of his 9/11 legend. Though Giuliani volunteered to execute bin Laden himself after 9/11, he’s never criticized Bush for the administration’s failure to capture him or the other two top culprits in the attack, Mullah Omar and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a silence more revealing than anything he actually says about terrorism. Though Giuliani volunteered to execute bin Laden himself after 9/11, he’s never criticized Bush for the administration’s failure to capture him or the other two top culprits in the attack, Mullah Omar and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a silence more revealing than anything he actually says about terrorism. The old evidence that Bush relied on Afghan proxies to capture bin Laden at Tora Bora, and the new evidence that he outsourced him to Pakistani proxies in Waziristan, evokes no Giuliani bark. Imagine if a Democratic president had done that—or had said, as Bush did, that “I just don’t spend that much time” on bin Laden.
At the Republican National Convention in 2004, Giuliani began his celebrated speech by fusing 9/11 and the Iraq War as only he could do, reminding everyone of Bush’s bullhorn declaration at Ground Zero that the people who brought down these towers “will hear from us,” and declaring that they “heard from us in Iraq”—a far more invidious connection on this question than Dick Cheney has ever made. At the Republican National Convention in 2004, Giuliani began his celebrated speech by fusing 9/11 and the Iraq War as only he could do, reminding everyone of Bush’s bullhorn declaration at Ground Zero that the people who brought down these towers “will hear from us,” and declaring that they “heard from us in Iraq”—a far more invidious connection on this question than Dick Cheney has ever made. Giuliani even went so far, in his 2004 testimony before the 9/11 Commission, to claim that if he’d been told about the presidential daily briefing headlined “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the US,” which mentioned New York three times, “I can’t honestly tell you we would have done anything differently.” Pressed about whether the city would have benefited from knowing about a spike in warnings so vivid that the CIA director’s “hair was on fire,” Giuliani just shrugged. Giuliani even went so far, in his 2004 testimony before the 9/11 Commission, to claim that if he’d been told about the presidential daily briefing headlined “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the US,” which mentioned New York three times, “I can’t honestly tell you we would have done anything differently.” Pressed about whether the city would have benefited from knowing about a spike in warnings so vivid that the CIA director’s “hair was on fire,” Giuliani just shrugged. He’d seen many close friends buried after 9/11, but his answer had more to do with the November election than the September attack that took their lives.
“They don’t see the threat,” he derides the Democrats wherever he goes, ridiculing even their adjectives. “During the Democratic debates, I couldn’t find one of them that ever mentioned the words ‘Islamic terrorist’—none of them,” he contends. “If you can’t say the words ‘Islamic terrorists,’ then you have a hard time figuring out who is our biggest enemy in the world.”
In fact, during the three Democratic debates, the candidates referred to “terrorism,” “terrorists,” or “terror” 24 times—only the modifier was missing, though John Edwards did warn in June that “radical Islam” could take over in Pakistan. In fact, during the three Democratic debates, the candidates referred to “terrorism,” “terrorists,” or “terror” 24 times—only the modifier was missing, though John Edwards did warn in June that “radical Islam” could take over in Pakistan. By focusing on “radical Islam” as opposed to “Islamic terrorism,” the Democrats may actually be avoiding any suggestion that America is engaged in a war against Islam—and even Giuliani would concede that Osama bin Laden is a perversion of Islam. Indeed, though Giuliani is claiming that he’s been “studying” Islamic terrorism since 1975, a search of Giuliani news stories and databases reveals that the first time he was cited using the term was in his May 2004 testimony before the 9/11 Commission: He made a passing reference to the sarin-gas drill and said it simulated an “Islamic terrorist attack.” If the use of this term is a measure of a leader’s understanding of the threat, what does it say about Giuliani’s own decade of denial that he never used it in the ’90s, when he was the mayor of the only American city to have experienced one? Indeed, though Giuliani is claiming that he’s been “studying” Islamic terrorism since 1975, a search of Giuliani news stories and databases reveals that the first time he was cited using the term was in his May 2004 testimony before the 9/11 Commission : He made a passing reference to the sarin-gas drill and said it simulated an “Islamic terrorist attack.” If the use of this term is a measure of a leader’s understanding of the threat, what does it say about Giuliani’s own decade of denial that he never used it in the ’90s, when he was the mayor of the only American city to have experienced one?
BIG LIE
5. ‘Every effort was made by Mayor Giuliani and his staff to ensure the safety of all workers at Ground Zero.’ So read a Giuliani campaign statement in June, responding to a chorus of questions about the mayor’s responsibility for the respiratory plague that threatens the health of tens of thousands of workers at the World Trade Center site, apparently already having killed some. ‘Every effort was made by Mayor Giuliani and his staff to ensure the safety of all workers at Ground Zero.’ So read a Giuliani campaign statement in June, responding to a chorus of questions about the mayor’s responsibility for the respiratory plague that threatens the health of tens of thousands of workers at the World Trade Center site, apparently already having killed some.
The statement pointed a finger at then-EPA administrator Christine Todd Whitman, issuing a list of the many times that “Whitman assured New Yorkers the air was safe.” Instead of also detailing the many times Giuliani echoed Whitman—for example, “the air is safe and acceptable,” he said on September 28—the campaign cited several Fire Department “briefings” about “incident action plans” for the use of respirators, suggesting that the city had tried to get responders to protect themselves from the toxins at Ground Zero. The statement pointed a finger at then-EPA administrator Christine Todd Whitman, issuing a list of the many times that “Whitman assured New Yorkers the air was safe.” Instead of also detailing the many times Giuliani echoed Whitman—for example, “the air is safe and acceptable,” he said on September 28—the campaign cited several Fire Department “briefings” about “incident action plans” for the use of respirators, suggesting that the city had tried to get responders to protect themselves from the toxins at Ground Zero. The press release did not make a case that any of these “plans” had ever resulted in any real “action”; nor did it dispute the fact that as late as the end of October, only 29 percent of the workers at the site were wearing respirators. The press release did not make a case that any of these “plans” had ever resulted in any real “action”; nor did it dispute the fact that as late as the end of October, only 29 percent of the workers at the site were wearing respirators. Of course, the workers might have noticed that the photo-op mayor never put one on himself. Instead, the other 9/11 visual we all remember is Giuliani leading at Ground Zero by macho example: The most in the way of protective gear he was ever seen wearing was a dust mask on his mouth.
When the cleanup effort was widely hailed as under-budget and ahead of schedule, there was no doubt about who was in charge. “By Day 4,” the New York Times reported in a salute to the “Quick Job” at Ground Zero, “Mr. Giuliani, the Department of Design and Construction (DDC), the Office of Emergency Management, contractors and union officials decided it was time to bring order to the chaos.” Giuliani controlled access to the site as if it were his backyard. Yet, when the scope of the health disaster was clear on the fifth anniversary in 2006, he told ABC: “Everybody’s responsible.” Throwing federal, state, and city agencies into the mix, he diffused the blame. On the Today show the same morning, however, he was more accusatory: “EPA put out statements very, very prominent that you have on tape, that the air was safe, and kept repeating that and kept repeating that.”
The city had its own test results, of course, and when 17 of 87 outdoor tests showed hazardous levels of asbestos up to seven blocks away, they decided not to make the results public. An EPA chief, Bruce Sprague, sent an October 5 letter to the city complaining about “very inconsistent compliance” with respiratory protection. Sprague, who wrote the letter only after unsuccessful conversations with Giuliani aides, likened the indifference in a subsequent court deposition to sticking one’s head “over a barbecue grill for hours” and expecting no consequences. An internal legal memo to a deputy mayor estimated early in the cleanup that there could be 35,000 potential plaintiffs against the city, partly because rescue workers were “provided with faulty or no equipment (ie respirators).” Bechtel, the major construction firm retained by the city as its health and safety consultant, urged it to cut the exit-entry points from 20 to two so they could enforce the use of respirators and other precautions, just as was done at the Pentagon, but the recommendation was ignored. An internal legal memo to a deputy mayor estimated early in the cleanup that there could be 35000 potential plaintiffs against the city, partly because rescue workers were “provided with faulty or no equipment (ie respirators).” Bechtel, the major construction firm retained by the city as its health and safety consultant, urged it to cut the exit-entry points from 20 to two so they could enforce the use of respirators and other precautions, just as was done at the Pentagon, but the recommendation was ignored.
A Times editorial concluded in May that the Giuliani administration “failed in its duty to protect the workers at Ground Zero,” faulting its “emphasis on a speedy cleanup” and its unwillingness “to insist that all emergency personnel and construction workers wear respirators.” John Odermatt, a former OEM director working at the campaign, couldn’t tell the Times whether Giuliani had lobbied Congress on behalf of sick workers, nor could anyone at the campaign offer any evidence that Giuliani had ever, while earning millions at his new 9/11 consulting business in recent years, tried to secure federal funds for responders. A Times editorial concluded in May that the Giuliani administration “failed in its duty to protect the workers at Ground Zero,” faulting its “emphasis on a speedy cleanup” and its unwillingness “to insist that all emergency personnel and construction workers wear respirators.” John Odermatt, a former OEM director working at the campaign, couldn’t tell the Times whether Giuliani had lobbied Congress on behalf of sick workers, nor could anyone at the campaign offer any evidence that Giuliani had ever, while earning millions at his new 9 /11 consulting business in recent years, tried to secure federal funds for responders.
Should the current presidential frontrunners square off in 2008, Giuliani’s culpability and subsequent indifference at Ground Zero will, no doubt, be sharply contrasted to Hillary Clinton’s singular role in funding the Mount Sinai programs that have been aiding rescue workers for years. And the public price tag for the mismanagement at the pile (as the site was known among recovery and rescue workers) will run into the billions. Ken Feinberg, who ran the federally funded Victims Compensation Board, has already paid out $1 billion to the injured, concluding after individual hearings that hundreds “were diagnosed with demonstrable and documented respiratory injuries directly related to their rescue service.” Anthony DePalma, whose extraordinary Times stories have lifted the lid on Giuliani’s role, recently reported that the health-care costs for rescue workers could soar to as much as $712 million a year. And the city is administering a billion-dollar liability fund to satisfy the thousands of lawsuits.
Giuliani’s fellow Republican and former EPA chief Christine Todd Whitman did tell WNBC a couple of months ago that there were “telephone calls, telephone meetings, and meetings in person with the city” every day, with the EPA repeating “the message” and emphasizing the “necessity of wearing the respirators.” Whitman said she “would call my people at midnight after watching the 11 o’clock news and say, ‘I’m still seeing them without the respirators.’ ” The EPA, she said, “was very frustrated.” She also said “the better thing would’ve been to put out the fire sooner,” certainly a function of the city’s Fire Department, adding that it had “burned until January”—a continuous flame held to a smoking, toxic brew. Giuliani’s fellow Republican and former EPA chief Christine Todd Whitman did tell WNBC a couple of months ago that there were “telephone calls, telephone meetings, and meetings in person with the city” every day, with the EPA repeating “the message” and emphasizing the “necessity of wearing the respirators.” Whitman said she “would call my people at midnight after watching the 11 o’clock news and say, ‘I’m still seeing them without the respirators.’ ” The EPA, she said, “was very frustrated.” She also said “the better thing would’ve been to put out the fire sooner,” certainly a function of the city’s Fire Department, adding that it had “burned until January”—a continuous flame held to a smoking, toxic brew. Asked about the mayor himself, Whitman sputtered: “He was clearly in control and doing a good job. Everyone was applauding what was going on. EPA, we had some disagreements with things that were occurring on the pile, like not having people wear respirators—we wanted more emphasis on that. But overall, you know, it’s hard. Those are emotional times.”
The firefighters’ union pointed out that the respiratory debacle was, like the malfunctioning radios and so many other things, another symbol of the city’s failure to prepare for a major terrorist event. Fire Department memos after the 1993 bombing had urged better protective gear, just as they’d screamed for better radios. The UFA’s leaders pointed out that the department had “ignored many issues related to respiratory protection” for years. The union’s health-and-safety officer, Phil McArdle, likened the long-term effects of working at Ground Zero to Agent Orange in Vietnam. “We’ve done a good job of taking care of the dead,” he said, referring to the hunt for remains, “but such a terrible job of taking care of the living.”
Wayne Barrett is the co-author, with Dan Collins, of Grand Illusion: The Untold Story of Rudy Giuliani and 9/11 , which was just published in paperback by HarperCollins. USA News Section has more related reports Help keep RINF going..
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