Rudy Giuliani’s Five Big Lies About 9/11 رودي جولياني الخمس الكبرى تبعد حوالى 9 / 11
On the stump, Rudy can’t help spreading smoke and ashes about his lousy record على القرمه ، رودي لا يمكن ان تساعد على انتشار الدخان والرماد عن صاحب سجل رديء
By به Wayne Barrett وين باريت
Nearly six years after 9/11, Rudy Giuliani is still walking through the canyons of lower Manhattan, covered in soot, pointing north, and leading the nation out of danger’s way. ما يقرب من ست سنوات بعد 9 / 11 ، رودي جولياني لا يزال المشي من خلال الاخاديد من مانهاتن السفلى ، وغطت في السخام ، مشيرا الى الشمال ، وقيادة الامة من الخطر طريقه. The Republican frontrunner is campaigning for president by evoking that visual at every campaign stop, and he apparently believes it’sa picture worth thousands of nights in the White House. Frontrunner الجمهوري هو يناضلن من اجل الرئيس قبل ان الاستدعاء البصري في كل وقف الحملة ، ويبدو انه يعتقد it'sa الصورة قيمتها آلاف ليلة وليلة في البيت الأبيض.
Giuliani has been leading the Republican pack for seven months, and predictions that the party’s evangelicals would turn on him have so far proven hollow. جولياني قد تؤدي الجمهوري حزمة لمدة سبعة اشهر ، والتنبؤات ان الحزب سيكون بدوره على الانجيليين له حتى الآن ثبت جوفاء. The religious right appears as gripped by the Giuliani story as the rest of the country. الحق الديني وكما يبدو فإن جولياني يجتاح قصة مثل باقي البلاد.
Giuliani isn’t shy about reminding audiences of those heady days. جولياني ليست خجوله عن تذكير الجماهير من تلك خلال ايام. In fact he hyperventilates about them on the stump, making his credentials in the so-called war on terror the centerpiece of his campaign. في الواقع انه hyperventilates عنها على القرمه ، مما يجعل من اوراق اعتماده في ما يسمى الحرب على الارهاب محور حملته. His claims, meanwhile, have been met with a media deference so total that he’s taken to complimenting “the good job it is doing covering the campaign.” Opponents, too, haven’t dared to question his terror credentials, as if doing so would be an unpatriotic bow to Osama bin Laden. ادعاءاته ، في غضون ذلك ، وقد اجتمع مع وسائل الاعلام حتى الاحترام مجموع انه 'sالمتخذة لمدح" العمل الجيد هو العمل الذي يغطي الحملة ". المعارضين ، ايضا ، لم يتجرأ على السؤال بلدة الرعب وثائق التفويض ، كما لو كانت تفعل ذلك سيكون غير وطنيين ان انحني اجلالا واكبارا لاسامة بن لادن.
Here, then, is a less deferential look at the illusory cloud emanating from the former mayor’s campaign . هنا ، اذن ، هو اقل deferential انظروا هميه سحابة المنبثقة عن العمده السابق للحملة. . .
BIG LIE1 LIE1. Lie1 lie1 كبيرة. ‘I think the thing that distinguishes me on terrorism is, I have more experience dealing with it.’ This pillar of the Giuliani campaign—asserted by pundits as often as it is by the man himself—is based on the idea that Rudy uniquely understands the terror threat because of his background as a prosecutor and as New York’s mayor. 'واعتقد ان الشيء الذي يميز لي على الارهاب ، ولقد أكثر خبرة التعامل معها.' في هذا الركن من حملة جولياني - تؤكدها كلما كان المثقفون ومن جانب الرجل نفسه - تقوم على فكرة ان تتفهم رودي فريد الارهاب تهديد بسبب خلفيته بوصفها المدعي العام وحسب رئيس بلدية نيويورك. In a July appearance at a Maryland synagogue, Giuliani sketched out his counterterrorism biography, a resume that happens to be rooted in falsehood. فى يوليو المظهر كنيس في ميريلاند ، جولياني رسمت بها صاحب السيره الذاتية لمكافحة الارهاب ، وهو ما يحدث لاستئناف تكون متاصله في الباطل.
“As United States Attorney, I investigated the Leon Klinghoffer murder by Yasir Arafat,” he told the Jewish audience, referring to the infamous 1985 slaying of a wheelchair-bound, 69-year-old New York businessman aboard the Achille Lauro , an Italian ship hijacked off the coast of Egypt by Palestinian extremists. "حسب النائب العام في الولايات المتحدة ، حقق ليون الأول klinghoffer القتل على يد ياسر عرفات ،" وقال لجمهور اليهودي ، واشار الى الشائن 1985 قتل من المقعد على كرسي ذي عجلات ، ويبلغ من العمر 69 عاما رجل الأعمال نيويورك على متن اكيلي لاورو ، ايطالي السفينة المخطوفه قبالة ساحل مصر التى يقوم بها المتطرفون الفلسطينيون. “It’s honestly the reason why I knew so much about Arafat,” says Giuliani. "انه بصراحة السبب كنت اعرف الكثير عن عرفات ،" يقول جولياني. “I knew, in detail, the Americans he murdered. "كنت اعرف ، في التفصيل ، وقال انه قتل الأميركيين. I went over their cases.” ذهبت اكثر من قضاياهم ".
On the contrary, Victoria Toensing, the deputy assistant attorney general at the Justice Department in Washington who filed a criminal complaint in the Lauro investigation, says that no one in Giuliani’s office “was involved at all.” Jay Fischer, the Klinghoffer family attorney who spearheaded a 12-year lawsuit against the PLO, says he “never had any contact” with Giuliani or his office. بل على العكس ، فيكتوريا toensing ، نائب مساعد المدعي العام في وزارة العدل في واشنطن والتي رفعت شكوى جناءيه في اورو التحقيق ، ويقول ان لا احد في مكتب جولياني "كان ينطوي على الاطلاق." جاي فيشر ، klinghoffer الاسرة المحامي الذي قاد آ (12 عاما) دعوى قضائية ضد منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية ، ويقول انه "لم يعقد قط اي اتصال" مع جولياني او مكتبه. “It would boggle my mind if anyone in 1985, 1986, 1987, or thereafter conducted an investigation of this case and didn’t call me,” he adds. "ومن تحير خاطري ولو أن أحدا في 1985 ، 1986 ، 1987 ، او بعد ذلك اجرى التحقيق في هذه القضية وعدم دعوتي ،" يضيف. Fischer says he did have a private dinner with Giuliani in 1992: “It was the first time we talked, and we didn’t even talk about the Klinghoffer case then.” يقول فيشر فعل لها عشاء خاصة مع جولياني في عام 1992 : "كانت هذه هي المرة الأولى تحدثنا ، ونحن لا نتكلم حتى عن klinghoffer ثم القضية."
The dinner was arranged by Arnold Burns, a close friend of Fischer and Giuliani who also represented the Klinghoffer family. العشاء كان مرتبة حسب أرنولد بيرنز ، صديق مقرب من فيشر وجولياني الذي يمثل ايضا klinghoffer الاسرة. Burns, who was also the finance chair of Giuliani’s mayoral campaign, was the deputy US attorney general in 1985 and oversaw the probe. بيرنز ، والذي هو ايضا رئيس للتمويل جولياني 'sمايورال الحملة ، وكان نائب المدعي العام للولايات المتحدة في العام 1985 وأشرف على التحقيق. “I know of nothing Rudy did in any shape or form on the Klinghoffer case,” he says. "اعرف شيئا لم رودى فى اي صورة او شكل على klinghoffer القضية ،" يقول.
Though Giuliani told the Conservative Political Action conference in March that he “prosecuted a lot of crime—a little bit of terrorism, but mostly organized crime,” he actually worked only one major terrorism case as US Attorney, indicting 10 arms dealers for selling $2.5 billion worth of anti-tank missiles, bombs, and fighter jets to Iran in 1986. رغم ان جولياني أبلغ مؤتمر العمل السياسي المحافظ في اذار / مارس انه "ملاحقة الكثير من الجريمة - قليلا من الارهاب ، ولكن معظم تلك الجريمة المنظمه ،" انه يعمل فعلا رئيسية واحدة فقط قضية الارهاب باعتبارها المدعي العام للولايات المتحدة ، وتوجيه الاتهام الى 10 تجار الأسلحة للبيع بمبلغ 2.5 بلايين الدولارات من القذائف المضاده للدبابات والقنابل ، وطائرات نفاثه مقاتلة لايران فى عام 1986. The judge in the case ruled that a sale to Iran violated terrorist statutes because its government had been tied to 87 terrorist incidents. القاضي الذي ينظر في القضية ان حكمت على بيع ايران انتهكت قوانين ارهابية لان الحكومة كانت مربوطه الى 87 في حوادث ارهابية. Giuliani has never mentioned the case, perhaps because he personally filed papers terminating it in his last month as US Attorney: A critical witness had died, and a judge tossed out 46 of the 55 counts because of errors by Giuliani’s office. جولياني قط القضية المذكورة ، وربما لانه شخصيا قدمت اوراق عن انهائها في تقريره الشهر الماضي ، المدعي العام للولايات المتحدة : حرجة الشاهد قد مات ، وقذف قاض من اصل 46 من 55 التهم بسبب اخطاء من قبل مكتب جولياني.
“Then, as mayor of New York,” Giuliani’s July speech continued, “I got elected right after the 1993 Islamic terrorist attack . "آنذاك ، كما هو الحال عمدة نيويورك" جولياني 'sيوليو خطاب وتابع :" حصلت على حق المنتخب بعد الهجوم الارهابى الذى وقع عام 1993 الاسلامية. . . I set up emergency plans for all the different possible attacks we could have. انا انشاء خطط للطوارئ لجميع هجمات محتملة مختلفة كان بامكاننا ان. We had drills and exercises preparing us for sarin gas and anthrax, dirty bombs.” كنا التدريبات والتمارين لاعداد علينا بغاز الاعصاب والجمره الخبيثه ، والقنابل القذره ".
In fact, Giuliani was oblivious to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing throughout his mayoralty. في الواقع ، كان جولياني غافلين 1993 الى تفجير مركز التجارة العالمي طوال حياته mayoralty. A month after the attack, candidate Giuliani met for the first time with Bill Bratton, who would ultimately become his police commissioner. بعد مضي شهر على الهجوم ، مرشح جولياني اجتمعت للمرة الاولى مع bratton مشروع القانون ، الذي من شأنه في نهاية المطاف ان تصبح بلدة مفوض الشرطة. The lengthy taped meeting was one of several policy sessions he had with unofficial advisers. مسجلة الجلسة المطوله التي هي واحدة من عدة دورات السياسات غير الرسمية التي اجراها مع مستشارين. The bombing never came up; neither did terrorism. القصف جاء تصل ابدا ، ولم الارهاب. When Giuliani was elected a few months later, he immediately launched a search for a new police commissioner. جولياني عندما انتخب بعد بضعة اشهر ، وقال انه على الفور بدأت البحث عن الجديد مفوض الشرطة. Three members of the screening panel that Giuliani named to conduct the search, and four of the candidates interviewed for the job, said later that the bombing and terrorism were never mentioned—even when the new mayor got involved with the interviews himself. ثلاثة اعضاء من فريق الفرز ان جولياني اسمه لاجراء البحث ، واربعة من مقابلات مع المرشحين لهذه المهمة ، قال لاحقا ان القصف والارهاب ، لم يذكر - حتى عندما العمده الجديد اشتركت مقابلات مع نفسه. When Giuliani needed an emergency management director a couple of years later, two candidates for the job and the city official who spearheaded that search said that the bombing and future terrorist threats weren’t on Giuliani’s radar. عندما جولياني حاجة طارئة مدير ادارة عامين في وقت لاحق ، واثنين من المرشحين للوظيفه الرسمية في المدينة والذي قاد البحث ان قال ان القصف والتهديدات الارهابيه في المستقبل لم تكن على جولياني رادار. The only time Giuliani invoked the 1993 bombing publicly was at his inauguration in 1994, when he referred to the way the building’s occupants evacuated themselves as a metaphor for personal responsibility, ignoring the bombing itself as a terrorist harbinger. والمرة الوحيدة جولياني الاحتجاج عام 1993 كان القصف علنا في افتتاحه في عام 1994 ، عندما أشار إلى طريقة شاغلي المبنى اخلي نفسها كرمز للمسؤولية الشخصيه ، ويتجاهل تفجير نفسها بإنها بادرة ارهابية.
US Attorney Mary Jo White and the four assistants who prosecuted the 1993 bombing said they were never asked to brief Giuliani about terrorism, though all of the assistants knew Giuliani personally and had actually been hired by him when he was the US Attorney. المدعي العام للولايات المتحدة ماري جو وايت ، واربعة مساعدين لعام 1993 الذي يحاكم التفجير وقال انها لم تكن أبدا لطلب جولياني موجزة عن الارهاب ، على الرغم من جميع مساعدي جولياني يعرف شخصيا وفعلا قد تم التعاقد عليه من قبل عندما كان المدعي العام للولايات المتحدة. White’s office, located just a couple hundred yards from City Hall, indicted bin Laden three years before 9/11, but Giuliani recounted in his own book, Leadership , that “shortly after 9/11, Judith [Nathan] got me a copy of Yossef Bodansky’s Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America ,” which had warned of “spectacular terrorist strikes in Washington and/or New York” in 1999. مكتب البيضاء ، تقع بضع مائة يارده من مبنى البلدية ، لوائح اتهام بن لادن ثلاث سنوات قبل 9 / 11 ، ولكن جولياني وسرد في ذلك بلده الكتاب ، والقيادة ، وانه "بعد فترة وجيزة من 9 / 11 ، جوديث [ناثان] حصلت لي نسخة من yossef Bodansky 'sبن لادن : الرجل الذي اعلن الحرب على اميركا" ، التي حذرت من "المدهش الضربات الارهابيه في واشنطن و / او نيويورك" في 1999. As an example of how he “mastered a subject,” Giuliani wrote that he soon “covered” Bodansky’s prophetic work “in highlighter and notes.” كمثال على كيفية انه "تفننت في موضوع ما ،" كتب جولياني انه قريبا "تغطية" Bodansky 'sالنبويه العمل" في highlighter وتلاحظ ".
The 1995 sarin-gas drill that Giuliani cited in his July speech was also prophetic, anticipating many of the breakdowns that hampered the city’s 9/11 response. 1995 - غاز السارين الحفر جولياني ان استشهد في بلدة يوليو كانت كلمة ايضا النبويه ، وتوقع الكثير من الاعطال التي تعوق المدينة 9 / 11 رد. The drill was such a disaster that a follow-up exercise was cancelled to avoid embarrassment. المثقاب هو كارثه كهذه ان متابعة العملية الغيت لتجنب الاحراج. More than a hundred of the first responders rushed in so recklessly that they were “killed” by exposure to the gas. اكثر من مائة من أول المستجيبين حتى اندفعت في استهتار انهم "قتلوا" عن طريق التعرض الى الغاز. Radio communications were described in the city’s own report as “abysmal,” with police and fire “operating on different frequencies.” The command posts were located much too close to the incident. اتصالات لاسلكيه وصفت في المدينة ذاتها التقرير بانها "باءسه" مع الشرطة والنار "التي تعمل على ترددات مختلفة." القيادة وظائف تقع قريبة جدا لهذا الحادث. All three failings would be identified years later in official reviews of the 9/11 response. جميع العيوب ثلاث سنوات سيتم تحديدها في وقت لاحق من الاستعراضات الرسمية من 9 / 11 رد.
Giuliani went on, in this stump speech, to list other examples of his mayoral experience confronting terrorism. جولياني مضت ، في هذا الخطاب القرمه ، الى قائمة امثلة اخرى من بلدة مايورال تجربة مواجهة الارهاب. There was the time, he says, “we had what we thought was a sarin gas attack.” And there were also the 50th anniversary commemoration of the United Nations and the 2000 millennium celebration to contend with, times, he said, “when we had a lot of warnings and had to do a tremendous amount to prepare.” And let’s not forget, he pointed out, the 1997 NYPD arrest of two terrorists who “were going to blow up a subway station.” Giuliani used this thwarted attack as proof of the city’s readiness: “A very, very alert young police officer saw those guys,” he said. وكان هناك وقت ، ويقول : "كنا ما كنا نظن ان كان هجوم غاز السارين. 2000 الالفيه الى مواجهة مع الاحتفال ، مرات ، وقال :" عندما قمنا وكان الكثير من التحذيرات وكان القيام بقدر هائل لاعداد ". ودعنا لا ننسى ، واشار الى ، 1997 nypd اعتقال اثنين من الارهابيين الذين" يذهبون لتفجير محطة قطار الانفاق. "جولياني يستخدم هذا احبط الهجوم بانه دليل على استعداد المدينة : "جدا ، جدا تنبيه الشباب ضابط شرطة وشهدت تلك الرجال ،" قال. “They looked suspicious, [so he] reported them to the desk sergeant. "نظروا المشبوهة ، [ولهذا فهو] عنها الى مكتب الرقيب. The police department executed a warrant and shot one of the men as he was about to hit a toggle switch.” ادارة الشرطة تنفذ امر واطلقت النار على احد رجال كما كان ، ليصل الى حوالي الف مفتاح التبديل ".
Each of the claims in Giuliani’s self-serving account is inaccurate. كل مطالبه في جولياني الذي يخدم مصالح ذاتية حساب غير دقيق. The supposed “sarin attack” was simply the discovery of an empty canister marked “sarin” in the home of a harmless Queens recluse. المفترض "هجوم غاز السارين" هو مجرد اكتشاف علبة فارغه تحمل علامة "السارين" في منزل احد غير مءذيه كوينز recluse. It was sitting next to an identical container labeled “compressed air” with a smiley-face logo. وكان يجلس بجوار حاويه متطابقه المسمى "الهواء المضغوط" مع وجه مبتسم وجه الشعار. Jerry Hauer, the city’s emergency management director at the time, was in London, on the phone with Giuliani constantly. جيري hauer ، المدينة مدير ادارة الطوارئ في ذلك الوقت ، كان في لندن ، على الهاتف مع جولياني باستمرار. Hauer finds it ironic that Giuliani is still talking about the incident, since they both thought it was “comically” mishandled then. Hauer يرى انه من المفارقات ان جولياني ما زال يتحدث عن الحادث ، اذ كان يعتقد على حد سواء "comically" اساءت ذلك الحين. “The police went there without any suits on and touched all the containers without proper clothing. "الشرطة ذهبت هناك دون أي دعاوى على وتطرق جميع الحاويات دون الالبسه. They turned it into a major crime scene, with a hundred cops lining the street. انها حولتها الى مسرح الجريمة الكبرى ، مع مئة الشرطة تصطف في الشوارع. Rudy at one point said to me, ‘Here we have the mayor, the fire commissioner, the chief of the police department, and one of my deputy mayors standing on the front lawn of this house. رودي عند نقطة واحدة وقال لى ، 'لدينا هنا العمده ، ومفوض النار ، ورئيس ادارة الشرطة ، واحد نائبي رؤساء البلديات يقفون على الجبهة العشب هذا البيت. Shouldn’t we be across the street in case this stuff ignites?’” This overhyped emergency led to a misdemeanor arrest subsequently dismissed by the district attorney. اننا لا ينبغي ان يكون عبر الشارع في حالة يفجر هذه الأشياء؟ "هذا overhyped الطوارئ ادى الى جنحة القبض في وقت لاحق رفضت من قبل النائب العام.
Similarly, the security concerns during the 1995 UN anniversary focused on Cuba and China and didn’t involve Arab terrorist threats. وبالمثل ، فان المخاوف الامنية خلال عام 1995 بالذكرى السنويه للأمم المتحدة التي تركز على كوبا والصين والعرب لا ينطوي على التهديدات الارهابيه. The millennium target, well established at subsequent trials, was the Los Angeles International Airport, not New York. الالفيه المستهدفة ، راسخه في المحاكمات اللاحقه ، وكان مطار لوس انجلس الدولي ، وليس نيويورك. While there’s no doubt the Clinton administration did put the country and city on terrorist alert for Y2K and other reasons, it was an arrest on the Washington/Canadian border that busted up a West Coast plot. وبينما لا يوجد شك في ان ادارة كلينتون لم يضع البلد والمدينة على تنبيه الارهابيه لعام 2000 وغيرها من الاسباب ، كانت واشنطن القبض على / الحدود الكنديه ان يصل busted أ مءامره الساحل الغربي.
The subway bombing, meanwhile, wasn’t stymied by the NYPD. تفجير قطارات الانفاق ، وفي الوقت نفسه ، لم يكن وضع حرج قبل nypd. An Egyptian friend of the bomber—living with him in the apartment where the pipe bomb was being built—told two Long Island Rail Road police officers about it. مصري صديق من منفذها - تعيش معه في الشقه حيث الأنابيب وكانت القنبله التي يجري بناؤها - قال لونغ ايلاند اثنين من ضباط الشرطة على الطرق والسكك الحديديه حول هذا الموضوع. When the NYPD subsequently raided the apartment, they shot two Palestinians who were there—one of whom, hit five times and gravely wounded, was later acquitted at trial. Nypd في وقت لاحق عندما داهمت الشقه ، واطلقوا الرصاص على اثنين من الفلسطينيين الذين كانوا هناك واحد منهم ، وأصيب خمسة اضعاف خطير والجرحى ، وقد برئ في وقت لاحق من المحاكمه. No one had tried to set off the bomb at the time of the arrest, though news stories reported that; the bomber had reached for an officer’s gun, according to the trial testimony. لم يكن أحد قد حاول يفجر القنبله في وقت إلقاء القبض ، على الرغم من الانباء التي افادت ؛ منفذها قد وصلت لضابط بندقيه ، وفقا لشهادة المحاكمه. The news stories also initially suggested a link to Hamas, though the lone bomber was actually an amateur fanatic with no money and no network. التقارير الاخباريه كما اقترحت في البداية وصلة لحركة حماس ، رغم ان لون منفذها هو فعلا احد الهواه متعصب مع أي مال وليس الشبكه. As conservative a source as Bill Gertz of The Washington Times wrote that FBI counterterrorism investigators were “concerned that the initial alarmist statements about the case made by Mayor Rudy Giuliani”—apparently a reference to leaks about Hamas and the toggle switch—”will prove embarrassing.” كما المحافظ مصدر بيل غيرتس من صحيفة واشنطن تايمز يقول ان مكتب التحقيقات الفدرالي لمكافحة الارهاب ان المحققين في الحادث "بالقلق من ان البيانات الأولية مثيرا حول القضية ادلى بها رودي جولياني عمدة" - فيما يبدو اشارة الى التسريبات حول حماس ومفتاح التبديل - "سيثبت محرجه ".
Giuliani’s terrorism biography is bunk. جولياني 'sالارهاب السيره هو السرير. As mayor, his laser-beam focus was street thugs, and as a prosecutor, it was the mob, Wall Street, and crooked politicians. كما عمدة بلدة شعاع الليزر - وكان التركيز في الشارع السفاحين ، وبوصفها المدعي العام ، وكان الغوغاء ، وول ستريت ، واعوج السياسيين. He can’t reach back to those years and rewrite such well-known chapters of his life. وقال انه لا يمكن التوصل الى تلك السنوات الى الوراء واعادة كتابة هذه معروفة فصول حياته.
BIG LIE بالكذبه الكبرى
2. 2. ‘I don’t think there was anyplace in the country, including the federal government, that was as well prepared for that attack as New York City was in 2001.’ This assertion flies in the face of all three studies of the city’s response—the 9/11 Commission, the National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), and McKinsey & Co., the consulting firm hired by the Bloomberg administration. 'لا اعتقد ان هناك في أي مكان في البلاد ، بما فيها الحكومة الاتحادية ، كما ان الاعداد الجيد لهذا الهجوم كما كانت مدينة نيويورك في 2001.' هذا الزعم الذي ترفعه في وجه كل ثلاث دراسات من المدينة - فإن الاستجابة 9 / 11 لجنة ، والمعهد الوطنى للمعايير والتكنولوجيا (nist) ، وشركة McKinsey وشركاه ، الشركة الاستشاريه الذين عينتهم الادارة بلومبرغ.
Actually, Giuliani didn’t create the OEM until three years after the 1993 bombing, 27 months into his term. في الواقع ، لم جولياني تهيئة تصنيع المعدات الاصليه حتى بعد ثلاث سنوات من القصف 1993 ، 27 شهرا في ولايته. And he didn’t open the OEM’s new emergency command center until the end of 1999—nearly six years after he’d taken office. وقال إنه لا يفتح تصنيع المعدات الاصليه الجديد في مركز قيادة الطوارئ حتى نهاية عام 1999 - بعد ما يقرب من ست سنوات وهو مكتب تريد اتخاذها. If he “assumed from the moment I came into office that NYC would be the subject of a terrorist attack,” as he told Time when it made him “Person of the Year” in 2001, he sure took a long time to erect what he describes as the city’s front line of defense. اذا كان "يفترض منذ اللحظة التي جئت الى مكتب مدينة نيويورك من شأنه ان يكون موضوعا لهجوم ارهابي" ، كما قال مرة عندما جعلت منه "شخصية العام" في 2001 ، وقال انه متأكد من أستغرق وقتا طويلا لبناء مصنع ما اسماه كما يصف المدينة الخط الامامي للدفاع.
The OEM was established so long after the bombing because, contrary to Giuliani’s revisionism, the decision to create it had nothing to do with the bombing. وقد انشئت تصنيع المعدات الاصليه حتى بعد مضي وقت طويل بسبب القصف ، على عكس جولياني للمراجعة ، واتخذ القرار بانشاء فلا علاقة لذلك مع قصف. Several memos, unearthed from the Giuliani archive and going on at great length, reveal that the initial rationale for the agency was “non-law enforcement events,” particularly the handling of a Brooklyn water-main break shortly after he took office that the mayor thought had been botched. عدة مذكرات ، وتربي من ارشيف جولياني ويجري باستفاضه كبيرة ، وتكشف ان الأولي والأساس المنطقي لوكاله "عدم انفاذ القانون الاحداث ،" وخصوصا معالجة مجموعة بروكلين المياه الرئيسية - كسر بعد فترة وجيزة من توليه منصبه أن عمدة الفكر كان botched. Before that, in December 1994, when an unemployed computer programmer carried a bomb onto a subway in an extortion plot against the Transit Authority, Giuliani was upset that he couldn’t even get a count of patients from the responding services for his press conference. وقبل ذلك ، في كانون الاول / ديسمبر 1994 ، عندما العاطل مبرمج حاسوب يحمل قنبلة على احد قطارات الانفاق في وجود مءامره ضد الابتزاز هيئة النقل العام ، وكان جولياني بالضيق انه لا يستطيع حتى احصل على العد من المرضى من الاستجابة لخدمات مؤتمره الصحافي.
Jerry Hauer, who was handpicked by Giuliani to head the OEM, testified before the 9/11 Commission that Giuliani was “unable to get the full story” at the firebombing and “heard about the huge street collapse” that followed the water-main break “on TV,” adding: “That’s what led the mayor to set up OEM.” Hauer went through five interviews for the job, and the only time terrorism came up was when Giuliani briefly discussed the failed sarin-gas drill. Hauer جيري ، الذي كان من قبل handpicked جولياني لرئاسة تصنيع المعدات الاصليه ، وشهد قبل 9 / 11 لجنة جولياني انه كان "لا يمكن الحصول على القصة الكاملة" في firebombing و"سمعنا عن الانهيار الكبير في الشارع" التي اعقبت فترة انقطاع المياه الرئيسية "على التلفزيون" ، واضاف : "هذا ما ادى عمدة لاقامة تصنيع المعدات الاصليه". Hauer مرت خمس مقابلات لهذه المهمة ، والمرة الوحيدة التي جاءت الارهاب حتى عندما كان جولياني مناقشتها بايجاز الفاشله - غاز السارين الحفر. He even met with Giuliani’s wife, Donna Hanover; no one said a word about the 1993 bombing. حتى انه التقى مع زوجة جولياني ، دونا هانوفر ؛ ولا احد قال كلمة واحدة عن تفجير 1993. Hauer’s own memos at the time the OEM was launched in 1996 emphasize “the visibility of the mayor” during emergencies (rather than the police commissioner) as a major objective of the agency. Hauer المذكرات الخاصة في الوقت الذي بدأ تصنيع المعدات الاصليه في عام 1996 التأكيد على "وضوح العمده" أثناء حالات الطوارئ (بدلا من مفوض الشرطة) باعتباره الهدف الرئيسى للوكاله. The now- ballyhooed new office was, however, so underfunded from the start that Hauer could only hire staffers whose salaries would be paid for by other agencies like the NYPD. الآن ballyhooed مكتب الجديد ، ولكن ، حتى الكافي من البداية لا يمكن إلا أن hauer الاستئجار العاملون رواتبهم وسوف يسدد للمن جانب وكالات أخرى مثل nypd.
With that kind of history, it’s hardly surprising that the OEM was anything but “invaluable” on 9/11. ويقترن هذا النوع من التاريخ ، وانه من المستغرب ان تصنيع المعدات الاصليه لم يكن سعيدا "لا يقدر بثمن" على 9 / 11. Sam Caspersen, one of the principal authors of the 9/11 Commission’s chapter on the city’s response, says that “nothing was happening at OEM” during the 102 minutes of the attack that had any direct impact on the city’s “rescue/evacuation operation.” A commission staff statement found that, even prior to the evacuation of the OEM command center at 7 World Trade an hour after the first plane hit, the agency “did not play an integral role” in the response. سام caspersen ، أحد أهم المؤلفين من 9 / 11 لجنة الفصل على المدينة وردا على ذلك ، ويقول ان "لا شيء يحدث في تصنيع المعدات الاصليه" خلال 102 دقيقة من الهجوم ان كان أي تأثير مباشر على المدينة "الانقاذ / عمليات اجلاء محتملة." لجنة الموظفين البيان ان وجدت ، حتى في المرحلة السابقة لاجلاء من تصنيع المعدات الاصليه قيادة مركز التجارة العالمية في 7 ساعة بعد اول طائرة تصل ، الوكالة "لا تقوم بدور اساسي" في الاستجابة. Despite Giuliani’s claim today that he and the OEM were “constantly planning for different kinds” of attacks, none of the OEM exercises replicated the 1993 bombing. جولياني رغم مطالبة اليوم انه وتصنيع المعدات الاصليه هي "التخطيط باستمرار لأنواع مختلفة" للهجمات ، فان ايا من تصنيع المعدات الاصليه تدريبات محاكاه عمليات القصف لعام 1993. No drill occurred at the World Trade Center, and none involved the response to a high-rise fire anywhere. أي تمرين وقعت فى مركز التجارة العالمى ، واحدا ينطوي على الاستجابة لشاهقه النار في اي مكان. In fact, the OEM had no high-rise plan—its emergency-management trainers weren’t even assigned to prepare for the one attack that had already occurred, and the one most likely to recur. وفي الواقع ، فإن تصنيع المعدات الاصليه قد لا الشاهقه - خطة الطوارئ - ادارة المدربين لم تكن حتى المنتدبين للتحضير لاحد ان الهجوم قد وقع بالفعل ، وعلى الارجح واحدة تتكرر. Kevin Culley, a Fire Department captain who worked as a field responder at OEM, said the agency had “plans for minor emergencies,” but he couldn’t recall “anybody anticipating another attack like the ‘93 bombing.” كيفن culley ، ادارة الاطفاء الذين عملوا القبطان بانه مجال تصنيع المعدات الاصليه في الرد ، وقالت الوكالة قد "خطط لحالات الطوارئ طفيفة" ، لكنه لا يمكن ان يذكر "اي شخص توقع هجوما آخر على غرار'93 القصف. "
Instead of being the best-prepared city, New York’s lack of unified command, as well as the breakdown of communications between the police and fire departments, fell far short of the efforts at the Pentagon that day, as later established by the 9/11 Commission and NIST reports. بدلا من ان تكون على استعداد افضل - المدينة ، نيويورك افتقار القيادة الموحدة ، فضلا عن انهيار الاتصالات بين الشرطة وادارات النار ، وقصرت جهود البنتاجون في ذلك اليوم ، كما وضعتها في وقت لاحق من 9 / 11 لجنة وnist التقارير. When the 280,000-member International Association of Fire Fighters recently released a powerful video assailing Giuliani for sticking firefighters with the same radios that “we knew didn’t work” in the 1993 attack, the presidential campaign attacked the union. عندما 280000 - عضو الرابطه الدولية لرجال الاطفاء افرج عنهم مؤخرا قوية فيديو بالاعتداء على رجال الاطفاء جولياني للالتصاق مع نفس الاذاعات ان "عرفناه لم ينجح" فى الهجوم 1993 ، وحملة الانتخابات الرءاسيه هاجم الاتحاد. “This is an organization that supported John Kerry for president in 2004,” Giuliani aide Tony Carbonetti said. "هذه المنظمه التي ايدت جون كيري للرئيس في 2004 ،" جولياني المعاون قال توني carbonetti. “So it’s no shock that they’re out there going after a credible Republican.” While the IAFF did endorse Kerry, the Uniformed Firefighters of Greater New York, whose president starred in the video, endorsed Bush. "لذلك فانه من الصدمه التي لا يذهبون الى هناك بعد الذهاب موثوق الجمهوري". Iaff في حين لم تؤيد كيري ، ويرتدون الزى العسكرى من اكبر رجال الاطفاء في نيويورك ، والرئيس الذي له نجمة في الفيديو ، وايد بوش. Its former president, Tom Von Essen—currently a member of Giuliani Partners—was the fire commissioner on 9/11 precisely because the union had played such a pivotal role in initially electing Giuliani. رئيسها السابق ، توم فون ايسن - حاليا عضو جولياني الشركاء - كانت النار على مفوض 9 / 11 على وجه التحديد لأن الاتحاد قد لعبوا مثل هذا الدور المحوري في البداية انتخاب جولياني.
The IAFF video reports that 121 firefighters in the north tower didn’t get out because they didn’t hear evacuation orders, rejecting Giuliani’s claim before the 9/11 Commission that the firefighters heard the orders and heroically decided to “stand their ground” and rescue civilians. فان iaff الفيديو التقارير ان 121 من رجال الاطفاء في الشمال برج لا خروج لانهم لم نسمع اوامر الاخلاء ، ورفض جولياني مطالبة قبل 9 / 11 لجنة على ان استمع لاوامر رجال الاطفاء وقررت ببطولة الى "الوقوف على ارض الواقع "وانقاذ المدنيين. Having abandoned that 2004 contention, the Giuliani campaign is now trying to blame the deadly communications lapse on the repeaters, which were installed to boost radio signals in the towers. وبعد ان تخلت عن الزعم 2004 ، وحملة جولياني يسعى الآن الى القاء اللوم على القاتل الاتصالات مضى على الراسبين ، والتى تم تركيبها لزيادة اشارات الراديو في الابراج. But the commission concluded that the “technical failure of FDNY radios” was “a contributing factor,” though “not the primary cause,” of the “many firefighter fatalities in the North Tower.” The commission compared “the strength” of the NYPD and FDNY radios and said that the weaknesses of the FDNY radios “worked against successful communication.” ولكن اللجنة خلصت الى أن "من fdny عطل فني لاسلكي" كان "عاملا مساهما ،" رغم ان "ليس السبب الرئيسي ،" من "firefighter العديد من القتلى فى برج الشمالي." اللجنة مقارنة "القوة" من nypd وfdny اجهزة الراديو وقال ان الضعف من fdny اجهزة اللاسلكي "عملت ضد اتصالات الناجحة".
The commission report also found that “it’s impossible to know what difference it made that units in the North Tower weren’t using the repeater channel,” because no one knows if it “remained operational” after the collapse of the south tower, which fell on the trade-center facilities where the repeater and its console were located. اللجنة التقرير ايضا ان وجدت "انه من المستحيل معرفة ما هو الفرق ان تقدم الوحدات في الشمال لم تكن برج تقوية الارسال باستخدام قناة ،" لان احدا لا يعرف اذا كان "لا يزال التنفيذية" بعد انهيار البرج الجنوبي ، التي سقطت على مركز التجارة - المرافق فيها اعادة الارسال وconsole موجودين. The collapse also drove everyone out of the north tower lobby, leaving no one to operate the repeater console. انهيار ايضا دفع الجميع للخروج من شمال برج اللوبي ، وهذا لم يترك واحد لتشغيل اجهزة التقويه يحدث. In addition, the commission concluded that fire chiefs failed to turn on the repeater correctly that morning—another indication of the lack of training and drills at the WTC between the attacks. وبالاضافة الى ذلك ، خلصت اللجنة الى ان النيران رؤساء فشلت بدورها على اعادة الارسال بشكل صحيح ان الصباح - مؤشرا آخر على عدم وجود تدريب وتمارين في WTC بين الهجمات. In the end, firefighters had to rely exclusively on their radios, and the inability of the Giuliani administration to find a replacement for the radios that malfunctioned in 1993 left them unable to talk to each other, even about getting out of a tower on the verge of collapse. وفي النهاية ، من رجال الاطفاء واضطرت الى الاعتماد حصرا على اجهزة اللاسلكي ، وعجز من جولياني الادارة لايجاد بديل لاسلكي متعطل في عام 1993 ان يترك لهم غير قادر على الحديث مع بعضها البعض ، وحتى حول سبل الخروج من برج على شفير من الانهيار.
The mayor had also done nothing to make the radios interoperable—which would have enabled the police and firefighters to communicate across departmental lines—despite having received a 1995 federal waiver granting the city the additional radio frequencies to make that possible. عمدة كما تفعل شيئا لجعل اجهزة اللاسلكي - البيني الذي من شأنه ان يمكن الشرطة ورجال الاطفاء لخطوط الاتصال عبر الادارات - على الرغم تلقت 1995 الاتحادية تنازل منح المدينة الاضافيه الترددات الراديويه ، لجعل ذلك ممكنا. That meant the fire chiefs had no idea that police helicopters had anticipated the partial collapse of both towers long before they fell. يعني ان الحريق قد لا رؤساء فكرة ان مروحيات الشرطة كانت تتوقع انهيار جزئي من كلا البرجين قبل وقت طويل من وقعوا.
It’s not just the radios and the OEM: Giuliani never forced the police and fire departments to abide by clear command-and-control protocols that squarely put one service in charge of the other during specified emergencies. انها ليست مجرد أجهزة لاسلكي وتصنيع المعدات الاصليه : جولياني ابدا اجبرت الشرطة وادارات النار على الالتزام الواضح للقيادة والسيطرة مباشرة على البروتوكولات التي تضع خدمة واحدة في تهمة أخرى أثناء حالات الطوارئ المحددة. Though he collected $250 million in tax surcharges on phone use to improve the 911 system, he diverted this emergency funding for other uses, and the 911 dispatchers were an utter disaster that day, telling victims to stay where they were long after the fire chiefs had ordered an evacuation, which potentially sealed the fates of hundreds. رغم انه جمعت 250 مليون دولار في الضرائب والرسوم الاضافيه على استخدام الهاتف لتحسين نظام 911 ، وقال انه تحول هذا التمويل الطارئ لاستخدامات اخرى ، و911 المرسلون كانت كارثه على لفظ ذلك اليوم ، نقول للضحايا بالبقاء حيث هم بعد مضي وقت طويل على النار الزعماء وامرت الاجلاء ، والتي يحتمل ان يحسم مصير المئات. And, despite the transparent lessons of 1993, Giuliani never established any protocols for rooftop or elevator rescues in high-rises, or even a strategy for bringing the impaired and injured out—all costly failings on 9/11. وعلى الرغم من شفافية الدروس من عام 1993 ، أنشأت جولياني قط اي سقف او بروتوكولات للمصاعد الانقاذ في الارتفاعات العالية ، أو حتى استراتيجية لاحلال تاذت وجرح خارج جميع العيوب مكلفه على 9 / 11.
But perhaps the best evidence of the Giuliani administration’s lack of readiness was that no one at its top levels had a top-secret security clearance on 9/11. ولكن لعل أفضل دليل للادارة جولياني عدم الاستعداد هو ان لا احد في دورتها اعلى مستويات لها من اعلى الى تصاريح امنية سرية على 9 / 11. Hauer, who had left the OEM in 2000 to become a top biochemical adviser at the US Department of Health and Human Services, was invited to Gracie Mansion within days of 9/11 for a strategy session with Giuliani and a half-dozen of his top advisers, including Police Commissioner Bernie Kerik, Tom Von Essen, and Richie Sheirer, who succeeded Hauer at the OEM. Hauer ، الذين كانوا قد غادروا تصنيع المعدات الاصليه فى عام 2000 لتصبح اعلى البيوكيمياءيه المستشار فى وزارة الخارجية الامريكية للصحه والخدمات الانسانيه ، ودعي الى قصر جرايسي في غضون ايام من 9 / 11 لدورة استراتيجية مع جولياني ونصف دزينه من كبار المستشارين ، بما في مفوض الشرطة بيرني kerik ، توم فون ايسن ، وrichie sheirer ، hauer الذي نجح في تصنيع المعدات الاصليه. Hauer, who had the highest-level clearance, says that “no one else in the room had one at all.” He was told that the FBI “was trying to get them expedited clearances.” Hauer ، الذي كان اعلى مستوى التخليص ، ويقول ان "لا احد اخر في الغرفة ، وكان واحدا على الإطلاق." فقيل له ان مكتب التحقيقات الفيديرالي "كان يحاول الحصول على الموافقات المعجل لهم."
Hauer had previously taken Sheirer down to the White House to meet with top counterterrorism brass and learned on his way into the meeting that Sheirer hadn’t “filled out the questionnaire.” When Kerik’s nomination as homeland security secretary blew up in 2004, news accounts also indicated that he’d never filled it out. Hauer سبق لها اتخاذ sheirer نزولا الى البيت الأبيض للاجتماع مع كبار مكافحة الارهاب النحاسيه وعلم وهو في طريقه الى الاجتماع ان sheirer قد لا "بملء الاستبيان. 2004 ، اخبار الحسابات أيضا الى أنه تريد ان تملأ بها ابدا. Von Essen was so out of the loop that he said that prior to 9/11, he was told “nothing at all,” and that he started hearing “talk of an organization called al Qaeda and a man named Osama bin Laden” a few hours after the attack. فون ايسن كان ذلك من منطلق ان الحلقه قال انه قبل 9 / 11 ، وقيل له "لا شىء على الاطلاق" ، وانه بدأ الاستماع الى كلام "من منظمة تسمى القاعده ورجل اسمه اسامة بن لادن" قليلة بعد ساعات من الهجوم. “It meant nothing to me,” he wrote in his own book. "انها تعني شيئا بالنسبة لي ،" لقد كتب الكتاب في ذلك بلده.
“I was reading the daily intelligence in Washington,” Hauer recalled, “and I didn’t feel comfortable talking about things that people weren’t cleared for. "كنت في القراءة اليوميه الاستخبارات في واشنطن ،" hauer التذكير ، "وانا لم تشعر بالراحه يتحدث عن أشياء إن الناس لم تكن لتطهيرها. Talking in general with Rudy one-on-one was one thing, but talking to Richie and Bernie and Tommy violated my security clearances.” Though Giuliani’s top team had failed to seek the clearances they needed prior to 9/11, Kerik and Giuliani attacked the FBI for not sharing information with local law enforcement officials when they testified a month after the attack at a House subcommittee hearing. يتحدث في العام مع رودي خطوة تلو الاخرى وكأن شيئا واحدا ، وإنما يتحدث الى richie وبيرني تومي وتنتهك بلادي على الموافقات الامنية. "جولياني رغم ان كبار الفريق لم تلتمس التصاريح التي تحتاجها قبل 9 / 11 ، وkerik جولياني هاجمت المباحث الفيدراليه ليست تقاسم المعلومات مع الموظفين المحليين المكلفين بانفاذ القوانين عندما شاهد بعد مضي شهر على الهجوم على منزل جلسة استماع للجنة الفرعية.
BIG LIE بالكذبه الكبرى
3. 3. Don’t blame me for 7 WTC, Rudy says. In response to his critics’ most damning sound bite, Giuliani is attempting to blame a once-valued aide for the decision to put his prized, $61 million emergency-command center in the World Trade Center, an obvious terrorist target. لا الوم لي لWTC 7 ، ويقول رودي. ردا على منتقدي 'معظم اللعنه السليمه عضه ، جولياني هو محاولة لالقاء اللوم مرة واحدة قيمتها المعاون لقرار لوضع تقريره prized ، مبلغ 61 مليون دولار لحالات الطوارئ - مركز القيادة في العالم مركز التجارة ، واضحة هدف ارهابي. The 1997 decision had dire consequences on 9/11, when the city had to mobilize a response without any operational center. عام 1997 كان القرار من عواقب وخيمة على 9 / 11 ، عندما كانت المدينة لتعبئة رد التنفيذية دون اي مركز.
“My director of emergency management recommended 7 WTC” as “the site that would make the most sense,” Giuliani told Chris Wallace’s Fox News Channel show in May, pinpointing Jerry Hauer as the culprit. "بلادي مدير ادارة الطوارئ واوصى WTC 7" كما "الموقع من شأنه ان يجعل معظم معانيها ،" جولياني قال كريس والاس قناة فوكس نيوز تظهر في ايار / مايو ، على النحو الذي يبرز جيري hauer المذنب.
Wallace confronted Giuliani, however, with a 1996 Hauer memo recommending that the bunker be sited at MetroTech in Brooklyn, close to where the Bloomberg administration eventually built one. الاس في مواجهة جولياني ، ولكن ، مع التوصيه 1996 hauer المذكره ان تكون في موقع وقود النقل في metrotech في بروكلين ، وعلى مقربة من المكان فان بلومبرغ الادارة بنيت في نهاية المطاف واحدة. The mayor brushed the memo aside, continuing to insist that Hauer had picked it as “the prime site.” The campaign then put out statements from a former deputy mayor who said that Hauer had supported the trade-center location at a high-level meeting with the mayor in 1997. عمدة brushed نص المذكره جانبا ، واستمرار الاصرار على ان hauer استأنف نشاطه بانها "برئيس الموقع." الحملة ثم إطفائها من تصريحات نائب سابق لرئيس البلدية الذي قال انه قد يؤيد hauer التجارة - مقر المركز في اجتماع رفيع المستوى مع رئيس البلدية في 1997.
Hauer doesn’t dispute that he eventually backed the 7 WTC location, but he clearly favored MetroTech. Hauer لا نزاع انه في نهاية المطاف دعمت 7 WTC موقع ، لكنه من الواضح آثروا metrotech. His memo said that MetroTech “could be available in six months,” while it took four and a half more years to get the bunker up and running at 7 WTC. مذكرته ان metrotech وقال "يمكن ان تكون متاحة في ستة اشهر ،" في حين استغرق أربع سنوات ونصف سنة اكثر للحصول على وقود النقل وعاملة في 7 WTC. He said that MetroTech was secure and “not as visible a target as buildings in Lower Manhattan”— a prophetic comparison. وقال ان metrotech كان آمنا و"ليست واضحة كما مستهدف كما المبانى فى مانهاتن السفلى" -- النبويه المقارنة. Listing eight positives about MetroTech, the memo also mentioned negatives, but said they weren’t insurmountable. قائمة metrotech حوالى ثمانيه ايجابيات ، كما تتضمن ذكر السلبيات ، لكنها قالت انها ليست مستعصيه على الحل. “The real issue,” Hauer concluded, “is whether or not the mayor wants to go across the river to manage an incident. "القضية الحقيقية" hauer وخلص الى ان "ما اذا كان هو ام لا العمده يريد الذهاب عبر النهر لادارة حادثا. If he is willing to do this, MetroTech is a good alternative.” Notes from meetings indicate that Hauer continued to push MetroTech in the discussions with the mayor and his top deputy. اذا كان على استعداد للقيام بذلك ، metrotech هو بديل جيد. "يلاحظ من الاجتماعات تشير إلى ان hauer استمرت مندفعه metrotech في مناقشات مع رئيس البلدية ونائب له اعلى.
But Hauer says Denny Young, the mayor’s alter ego, who has worked at his side for nearly three decades, eventually “made it very clear” that Giuliani wanted “to be able to walk to this facility quickly.” That meant the bunker had to be in lower Manhattan. ولكن يقول hauer ديني الصغار ، العمده تغير انا ، الذي عمل الى جانبه من اجل ما يقرب من ثلاثة عقود ، في نهاية المطاف "اوضحت بجلاء" ان جولياني "تريد ان يكون قادرا على المشي الى هذا المرفق بسرعة." يعني ان الوقود وكان لا بد في مانهاتن السفلى. Since the City Hall area is below the floodplain, the command center—which was built with a hurricane-curtain wall—had to be above ground. منذ قاعة المدينة المجال هو أقل من الفيضانات ، ومركز القيادة - الذي شيد مع اعصار - الحائط الساتر - كان لا بد من فوق الأرض. The formal city document approving the site said that it “was selected due to its proximity to City Hall,” a standard set by Giuliani and Giuliani alone. مدينة الرسمي بالموافقه على وثيقة الموقع وقال انه "تم اختيار نظرا لقربها من مبنى البلدية ،" مجموعة موحدة من قبل جولياني جولياني وحدها.
The 7 WTC site was the brainchild of Bill Diamond, a prominent Manhattan Republican that Giuliani had installed at the city agency handling rentals. 7 WTC فإن الموقع هو من بنات افكار مشروع قانون الماس ، بارز مانهاتن الجمهوري إن جولياني قد تم تركيبها في المدينة وكالة المناوله الايجارات. When Diamond held a similar post in the Reagan administration a few years earlier, his office had selected the same building to house nine federal agencies. عندما عقد الماس وظيفة مماثلة في إدارة ريغان قبل سنوات قليلة ، وقال إن مكتبة مختارة من نفس المبنى لايواء تسع وكالات اتحاديه. Diamond’s GOP-wired broker steered Hauer to the building, which was owned by a major Giuliani donor and fundraiser. الحزب الجمهوري للالماس - سلكي السمسار ادار hauer الى المبنى ، والتي كان يملكها جولياني الرئيسية المانحه والتبرعات. When Hauer signed onto it, he was locked in by the limitations Giuliani had imposed on the search and the sites Diamond offered him. عندما وقعت على hauer ولم يكن باستطاعته ، مغلق في جولياني من القيود التي فرضتها على البحث والمواقع الماس عرضت عليه. The mayor was so personally focused on the siting and construction of the bunker that the city administrator who oversaw it testified in a subsequent lawsuit that “very senior officials,” specifically including Giuliani, “were involved,” which he said was a major difference between this and other projects. عمدة ذلك شخصيا ركزت على اختيار مواقع البناء والوقود للان مدير المدينة الذي اشرفت عليه شهدوا في دعوى قضائية لاحقة ان "مسؤولين كبار جدا ،" على وجه التحديد بما جولياني ، "كانوا متورطين" الذي قال انه فرق كبير بين هذه وغيرها من المشاريع. Giuliani’s office had a humidor for cigars and mementos from City Hall, including a fire horn, police hats and fire hats, as well as monogrammed towels in his bathroom. جولياني مكتب لها humidor لالسيجار وتذكارات من مبنى البلدية ، بما في حريق القرن ، وقبعات الشرطة النار القبعات ، وكذلك موقع بحروف الاسم مناشف الحمام في بلده. His suite was bulletproofed and he visited it often, even on weekends, bringing his girlfriend Judi Nathan there long before the relationship surfaced. وكان الجناح صاحب جعل مضادا للرصاص وانه زارها في كثير من الاحيان ، حتى في عطلة نهاية الاسبوع ، مما جعل صديقته judi ناثان هناك قبل وقت طويل من العلاقة السطح. He had his own elevator. وقال انه بلدة مصاعد. Great concern was expressed in writing that the platform in the press room had to be high enough to make sure his head was above the cameras. واعرب عن القلق الشديد في كتابه ان المنهاج في غرفة الصحافة قد تكون مرتفعة بما يكفي للتأكد من رأسه فوق كاميرات. It’s inconceivable that the hands-on mayor’s fantasy command center was shaped—or sited—by anyone other than him. ومن المتصور ان يكون التدريب العملي على العمده خيال مركز القيادة - او هو على شكل مواقع - من جانب اي شخص من دونه.
Of course, the consequences of putting the center there were predictable. وبطبيعة الحال ، فإن النتائج المترتبة على وضع المركز كانت هناك يمكن التنبؤ بها. The terrorist who engineered the 1993 bombing told the FBI they were coming back to the trade center. الارهابي الذي هندسيا لعام 1993 قصف ابلغ مكتب التحقيقات الفيديرالي كانوا يعودون الى المركز التجاري. Opposing the site at a meeting with the mayor, Police Commissioner Howard Safir called it “Ground Zero” because of the earlier attack. المعارضة الموقع في لقاء مع رئيس البلدية ، ومفوض الشرطة هوارد صفير يحمل اسم "ارض الصفر" نظرا للهجوم فى وقت سابق. Lou Anemone, the highest-ranking uniformed officer in the NYPD, wrote memos slamming the site. لو الانيمن ، وكبار ضباط يرتدون الزى الرسمى فى nypd ، كتب المذكرات الابعاد الموقع. “I’ve never seen in my life ‘walking distance’ as some kind of a standard for crisis management,” Anemone said later. "لقد قمت لم تشهد ابدا في حياتي' المشي مسافه 'باعتبارها نوعا من المعيار لادارة الازمات ،" الانيمن قال في وقت لاحق. “But you don’t want to confuse Giuliani with the facts.” Anemone had done a detailed vulnerability study of the city for Giuliani, pinpointing terrorist targets. "ولكنك لا تريد ان نخلط جولياني مع الوقائع". الانيمن قد فعلت الضعف دراسة تفصيليه للمدينة لجولياني ، وتشخيص الاهداف الارهابيه. “In terms of targets, the WTC was number one,” he says. "من حيث الاهداف ، WTC هو رقم واحد" ، يقول. “I guess you had to be there in 1993 to know how strongly we felt it was the wrong place.” "اظن انك قد تكون هناك فى عام 1993 لمعرفة كيفية بقوة شعرنا كأن المكان الخطأ."
Bizarrely, Giuliani even tried in the Wallace interview to deny that the early evacuation of the bunker left him searching for a new site, contrary to the account of that frantic morning he’s given hundreds of times, often for honoraria reaching six figures. Bizarrely ، بل حاولت جولياني في مقابلة مع الاس ان ننكر ان اوائل الاجلاء من الوقود تدعه البحث عن موقع جديد ، خلافا لحساب من ان المحموم الصباح انه بالنظر الى مئات المرات ، في كثير من الاحيان لمكافآت تصل الى ستة ارقام. “The way you’re interpreting it,” he told Wallace, “it was as if that was the one fixed command center. ان "الطريقة التي كنت تأويلها ،" قال والاس : "كان كما لو انه كان مركز قيادة واحدة ثابتة. It was not. ولم يكن. There were backup command centers.” To minimize the effect of the loss of the bunker, Giuliani said that, “within a half hour” of the shutdown of the bunker, “we were able to move immediately to another command center.” كانت هناك مراكز قيادة احتياطية. "تقليل اثر فقدان الوقود ، وقال جولياني انه" في غضون نصف ساعة "للاغلاق من الوقود ،" تمكنا من الانتقال مباشرة الى مركز قيادة اخر. "
In fact, as Giuliani himself has told the dramatic tale, he and his entourage were briefly trapped in a Merrill Lynch office, “jimmied the lock” of a firehouse, and took over a deluxe hotel until they realized it was “sheathed in windows.” They considered going to City Hall, but learned it was covered in debris. وفي الواقع ، وكما قال جولياني نفسه الدرامي الحكايه ، وقال انه وحاشيته كانوا بايجاز المحاصرين في مكتب ميريل لينش "فتح بعتله القفل" من محطة الاطفاء ، واحاط اكثر من فندق فاخر حتى ادركوا انه "مغمد في ويندوز. "واعتبروا الذهاب الى مبنى البلدية ، ولكن علمت انه تم تناوله في الحطام. The only backup center that existed was the small one at police headquarters that had been put out of business when the WTC bunker opened; but Giuliani said its phones weren’t working. مركز الاحتياطيه الوحيدة التي كانت موجودة وكانت صغيرة واحدة في مقر الشرطة التي تم اطفاؤها من الاعمال عندما فتحت WTC المحصن ؛ ولكن جولياني قالت هواتف لا تعمل. “We’re going to have to find someplace,” Giuliani said, according to his Time account, which described it as a “long and harrowing” search. "نحن ذاهبون الى ان نجد في مكان ما ،" قال جولياني ، وفقا لحساب وقته ، والتي وصفها بانها "طويلة ومؤلمة" البحث. “Our government no longer had a place to work,” he wrote in Leadership . "حكومتنا لم يعد لها مكان للعمل ،" انه كتب في القيادة.
They wound up at the police academy uptown and, according to the account Giuliani and company gave Time , “we are up and operating by 4 pm”—seven hours, not a half-hour, after the attack. انهم حتى الجرح في أعلى القرية واكاديميه الشرطة ، وفقا لحساب شركة جولياني وأعطى الوقت ، "اننا في مستوى التشغيل وبحلول الساعة 4" - سبع ساعات ، وليس لمدة نصف ساعة ، بعد الهجوم. But Giuliani told the 9/11 Commission that they quickly decided the academy “was too small” and “were able to establish a command center” at Pier 92 “within three days,” virtually building it from scratch. ولكن جولياني اخبر 9 / 11 لجنة انها سرعان ما قررت الاكاديميه "كان صغيرا جدا" و "تمكنوا من انشاء مركز قيادة" في الرصيف 92 "في غضون ثلاثة ايام ،" انه بناء تقريبا من الصفر. Hauer said he’d asked for a backup command center years before 9/11, “but they told me there was no money for it.” After Hauer left, and shortly before 9/11, the city announced plans to build a backup center near police headquarters—a site quickly jettisoned by the Bloomberg administration. Hauer قال انه سأل تريد احتياطية لقيادة مركز سنوات قبل 9 / 11 ، "ولكن قالوا لي لا يوجد المال لذلك". Hauer غادر بعد ، وقبل فترة وجيزة من 9 / 11 ، المدينة أعلنت عن خطط لبناء مركز الاحتياطيه - المقر العام للشرطة بالقرب من موقع بسرعة مرمى به الادارة بلومبرغ. Police officials told reporters that they were looking for space outside Manhattan and underground, citing the lessons of 9/11. عن مسؤولين في الشرطة للصحافيين ان أنهم يبحثون عن الفضاء خارج منهاتن ، وتحت الأرض ، مستشهدا دروس 9 / 11.
BIG LIE بالكذبه الكبرى
4. 4. ‘Democrats do not understand the full nature and scope of the terrorist war against us.’ Giuliani blames what he calls Bill Clinton’s “decade of denial” for the mess we’re in, and uses it to tarnish the rest of Clinton’s party. 'الديموقراطيين لا يفهمون طبيعه ونطاق كامل من الحرب الارهابيه ضدنا.' جولياني باللاءمه على ما يسميه بيل كلينتون "العقد من الحرمان" للفوضى نحن في ، وأنها تستخدم لتشويه بقية كلينتون ' دا الحزب. “Don’t react, kind of let things go, kind of act the way Clinton did in the ’90s” is his favorite way of characterizing the Democratic response to the threat of terrorism. "لا رد ، نوع من اسمحوا تسير الامور ، وذلك النوع من الافعال طريقة كلينتون فعلت في'90s "هي المفضلة لديه وسيلة لتحديد خصائص الديمقراطيه ردا على تهديد الارهاب. “We were attacked at Khobar Towers, Kenya, Tanzania, 17 of our sailors were killed on the USS Cole , and the United States government, under then-president Clinton, did not respond,” Giuliani told the rabidly anti-Clinton audience at Pat Robertson’s Regent University. "نحن هوجمت في ابراج الخبر ، كينيا ، تنزانيا ، لدينا 17 من البحاره قتلوا على كول ، وحكومة الولايات المتحدة ، ثم في ظل الرئيس كلينتون ، لم يستجب ،" جولياني قال كلينتون بشكل متطرف المضاده للجمهور فى بات روبرتسون للوصي الجامعة. “It was a big mistake to not recognize that the 1993 bombing was a terrorist act and an act of war,” he added. "كان خطأ كبيرا ، لا الى الاعتراف بان القصف كان 1993 للقيام بعمل ارهابي وعملا من أعمال الحرب ، واضاف ان". “Bin Laden declared war on us. "بن لادن يعلن الحرب علينا. We didn’t hear it. لم نسمع ذلك. I thought it was pretty clear at the time, but a lot of people didn’t see it, couldn’t see it.” اعتقدت أنه كان جميل واضحة في ذلك الوقت ، ولكن الكثير من الناس لم انظر اليها ، لا يمكن ان نراه. "
This is naked revisionism—and not just because of his own well established, head-in-the-sand indifference to the 1993 bombing. هذا هو مراجعة عاريه - وليس فقط لأن من بلدة راسخه ، والرأس في الرمال - فان اللامبالاة - 1993 الى القصف. It’s as unambiguously partisan as his claim that on 9/11, he looked to the sky, saw the first fighter jets flying over the city well after the attack, and thanked God that George W. Bush was president. Bob Kerrey, the former Democratic senator who sat on the 9/11 Commission, put it fairly: “Prior to 9/11, no elected official did enough to reduce the threat of Al Qaeda. Neither political party covered itself in glory.”
Giuliani’s lifelong friend Louis Freeh, the former FBI head who has endorsed him for president, wrote in his 2005 autobiography that “the nation’s fundamental approach to Osama bin Laden and his ilk was no different after the inauguration of January 21, 2001, than it had been before.” As Bob Kerrey noted, the five Democrats and five Republicans on the 9/11 Commission said much the same thing. Giuliani’s lifelong friend Louis Freeh, the former FBI head who has endorsed him for president, wrote in his 2005 autobiography that “the nation’s fundamental approach to Osama bin Laden and his ilk was no different after the inauguration of January 21, 2001 , than it had been before.” As Bob Kerrey noted, the five Democrats and five Republicans on the 9/11 Commission said much the same thing. Freeh added that both administrations “were fighting criminals, not an enemy force” before 9/11, and Giuliani is now making precisely the same policy point, but limiting his critique to Clinton. Even the fiercely anti-Clinton Freeh credited the former president with “one exception,” saying his administration did go after bin Laden “with a salvo of Tomahawk missiles in 1998 in retaliation for the embassy bombings in East Africa.”
The best example of Giuliani’s partisan twist is the USS Cole , which was attacked on October 12, 2000, three weeks before the 2000 election. The 9/11 Commission report found that in the final Clinton months, neither the FBI, then headed by Freeh, nor the CIA had a “definitive answer on the crucial question of outside direction of the attack,” which Clinton said he needed to go to war against bin Laden or the Taliban. The 9/11 Commission report found that in the final Clinton months, neither the FBI, then headed by Freeh, nor the CIA had a “definitive answer on the crucial question of outside direction of the attack,” which Clinton said he needed to go to war against bin Laden or the Taliban. All Clinton got was a December 21 “preliminary judgment” from the CIA that Al Qaeda “supported the attack.” A month later, when the Bush team took office, the CIA delivered the same “preliminary” findings to the new president. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told the commission “there was never a formal, recorded decision not to retaliate for the Cole ” by the Bush administration, just “a consensus that ‘tit-for-tat’ responses were likely to be counterproductive.” Rice thought that was the case “with the cruise missile strikes of 1998,” meaning that the new administration was deriding the one response that Freeh praised. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told the commission “there was never a formal, recorded decision not to retaliate for the Cole ” by the Bush administration, just “a consensus that ‘tit-for-tat’ responses were likely to be counterproductive.” Rice thought that was the case “with the cruise missile strikes of 1998,” meaning that the new administration was deriding the one response that Freeh praised. Bush himself told the commission that he was concerned “lest an ineffective air strike just serve to give bin Laden a propaganda advantage.” With all of this evidence of bipartisan paralysis, Giuliani has nonetheless limited his Cole attack to Clinton.
It is all part of a devoutly partisan exploitation of his 9/11 legend. Though Giuliani volunteered to execute bin Laden himself after 9/11, he’s never criticized Bush for the administration’s failure to capture him or the other two top culprits in the attack, Mullah Omar and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a silence more revealing than anything he actually says about terrorism. Though Giuliani volunteered to execute bin Laden himself after 9/11, he’s never criticized Bush for the administration’s failure to capture him or the other two top culprits in the attack, Mullah Omar and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a silence more revealing than anything he actually says about terrorism. The old evidence that Bush relied on Afghan proxies to capture bin Laden at Tora Bora, and the new evidence that he outsourced him to Pakistani proxies in Waziristan, evokes no Giuliani bark. Imagine if a Democratic president had done that—or had said, as Bush did, that “I just don’t spend that much time” on bin Laden.
At the Republican National Convention in 2004, Giuliani began his celebrated speech by fusing 9/11 and the Iraq War as only he could do, reminding everyone of Bush’s bullhorn declaration at Ground Zero that the people who brought down these towers “will hear from us,” and declaring that they “heard from us in Iraq”—a far more invidious connection on this question than Dick Cheney has ever made. At the Republican National Convention in 2004, Giuliani began his celebrated speech by fusing 9/11 and the Iraq War as only he could do, reminding everyone of Bush’s bullhorn declaration at Ground Zero that the people who brought down these towers “will hear from us,” and declaring that they “heard from us in Iraq”—a far more invidious connection on this question than Dick Cheney has ever made. Giuliani even went so far, in his 2004 testimony before the 9/11 Commission, to claim that if he’d been told about the presidential daily briefing headlined “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the US,” which mentioned New York three times, “I can’t honestly tell you we would have done anything differently.” Pressed about whether the city would have benefited from knowing about a spike in warnings so vivid that the CIA director’s “hair was on fire,” Giuliani just shrugged. Giuliani even went so far, in his 2004 testimony before the 9/11 Commission, to claim that if he’d been told about the presidential daily briefing headlined “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the US,” which mentioned New York three times, “I can’t honestly tell you we would have done anything differently.” Pressed about whether the city would have benefited from knowing about a spike in warnings so vivid that the CIA director’s “hair was on fire,” Giuliani just shrugged. He’d seen many close friends buried after 9/11, but his answer had more to do with the November election than the September attack that took their lives.
“They don’t see the threat,” he derides the Democrats wherever he goes, ridiculing even their adjectives. “During the Democratic debates, I couldn’t find one of them that ever mentioned the words ‘Islamic terrorist’—none of them,” he contends. “If you can’t say the words ‘Islamic terrorists,’ then you have a hard time figuring out who is our biggest enemy in the world.”
In fact, during the three Democratic debates, the candidates referred to “terrorism,” “terrorists,” or “terror” 24 times—only the modifier was missing, though John Edwards did warn in June that “radical Islam” could take over in Pakistan. In fact, during the three Democratic debates, the candidates referred to “terrorism,” “terrorists,” or “terror” 24 times—only the modifier was missing, though John Edwards did warn in June that “radical Islam” could take over in Pakistan. By focusing on “radical Islam” as opposed to “Islamic terrorism,” the Democrats may actually be avoiding any suggestion that America is engaged in a war against Islam—and even Giuliani would concede that Osama bin Laden is a perversion of Islam. Indeed, though Giuliani is claiming that he’s been “studying” Islamic terrorism since 1975, a search of Giuliani news stories and databases reveals that the first time he was cited using the term was in his May 2004 testimony before the 9/11 Commission: He made a passing reference to the sarin-gas drill and said it simulated an “Islamic terrorist attack.” If the use of this term is a measure of a leader’s understanding of the threat, what does it say about Giuliani’s own decade of denial that he never used it in the ’90s, when he was the mayor of the only American city to have experienced one? Indeed, though Giuliani is claiming that he’s been “studying” Islamic terrorism since 1975, a search of Giuliani news stories and databases reveals that the first time he was cited using the term was in his May 2004 testimony before the 9/11 Commission : He made a passing reference to the sarin-gas drill and said it simulated an “Islamic terrorist attack.” If the use of this term is a measure of a leader’s understanding of the threat, what does it say about Giuliani’s own decade of denial that he never used it in the ’90s, when he was the mayor of the only American city to have experienced one?
BIG LIE
5. ‘Every effort was made by Mayor Giuliani and his staff to ensure the safety of all workers at Ground Zero.’ So read a Giuliani campaign statement in June, responding to a chorus of questions about the mayor’s responsibility for the respiratory plague that threatens the health of tens of thousands of workers at the World Trade Center site, apparently already having killed some. ‘Every effort was made by Mayor Giuliani and his staff to ensure the safety of all workers at Ground Zero.’ So read a Giuliani campaign statement in June, responding to a chorus of questions about the mayor’s responsibility for the respiratory plague that threatens the health of tens of thousands of workers at the World Trade Center site, apparently already having killed some.
The statement pointed a finger at then-EPA administrator Christine Todd Whitman, issuing a list of the many times that “Whitman assured New Yorkers the air was safe.” Instead of also detailing the many times Giuliani echoed Whitman—for example, “the air is safe and acceptable,” he said on September 28—the campaign cited several Fire Department “briefings” about “incident action plans” for the use of respirators, suggesting that the city had tried to get responders to protect themselves from the toxins at Ground Zero. The statement pointed a finger at then-EPA administrator Christine Todd Whitman, issuing a list of the many times that “Whitman assured New Yorkers the air was safe.” Instead of also detailing the many times Giuliani echoed Whitman—for example, “the air is safe and acceptable,” he said on September 28—the campaign cited several Fire Department “briefings” about “incident action plans” for the use of respirators, suggesting that the city had tried to get responders to protect themselves from the toxins at Ground Zero. The press release did not make a case that any of these “plans” had ever resulted in any real “action”; nor did it dispute the fact that as late as the end of October, only 29 percent of the workers at the site were wearing respirators. The press release did not make a case that any of these “plans” had ever resulted in any real “action”; nor did it dispute the fact that as late as the end of October, only 29 percent of the workers at the site were wearing respirators. Of course, the workers might have noticed that the photo-op mayor never put one on himself. Instead, the other 9/11 visual we all remember is Giuliani leading at Ground Zero by macho example: The most in the way of protective gear he was ever seen wearing was a dust mask on his mouth.
When the cleanup effort was widely hailed as under-budget and ahead of schedule, there was no doubt about who was in charge. “By Day 4,” the New York Times reported in a salute to the “Quick Job” at Ground Zero, “Mr. Giuliani, the Department of Design and Construction (DDC), the Office of Emergency Management, contractors and union officials decided it was time to bring order to the chaos.” Giuliani controlled access to the site as if it were his backyard. Yet, when the scope of the health disaster was clear on the fifth anniversary in 2006, he told ABC: “Everybody’s responsible.” Throwing federal, state, and city agencies into the mix, he diffused the blame. On the Today show the same morning, however, he was more accusatory: “EPA put out statements very, very prominent that you have on tape, that the air was safe, and kept repeating that and kept repeating that.”
The city had its own test results, of course, and when 17 of 87 outdoor tests showed hazardous levels of asbestos up to seven blocks away, they decided not to make the results public. An EPA chief, Bruce Sprague, sent an October 5 letter to the city complaining about “very inconsistent compliance” with respiratory protection. Sprague, who wrote the letter only after unsuccessful conversations with Giuliani aides, likened the indifference in a subsequent court deposition to sticking one’s head “over a barbecue grill for hours” and expecting no consequences. An internal legal memo to a deputy mayor estimated early in the cleanup that there could be 35,000 potential plaintiffs against the city, partly because rescue workers were “provided with faulty or no equipment (ie respirators).” Bechtel, the major construction firm retained by the city as its health and safety consultant, urged it to cut the exit-entry points from 20 to two so they could enforce the use of respirators and other precautions, just as was done at the Pentagon, but the recommendation was ignored. An internal legal memo to a deputy mayor estimated early in the cleanup that there could be 35000 potential plaintiffs against the city, partly because rescue workers were “provided with faulty or no equipment (ie respirators).” Bechtel, the major construction firm retained by the city as its health and safety consultant, urged it to cut the exit-entry points from 20 to two so they could enforce the use of respirators and other precautions, just as was done at the Pentagon, but the recommendation was ignored.
A Times editorial concluded in May that the Giuliani administration “failed in its duty to protect the workers at Ground Zero,” faulting its “emphasis on a speedy cleanup” and its unwillingness “to insist that all emergency personnel and construction workers wear respirators.” John Odermatt, a former OEM director working at the campaign, couldn’t tell the Times whether Giuliani had lobbied Congress on behalf of sick workers, nor could anyone at the campaign offer any evidence that Giuliani had ever, while earning millions at his new 9/11 consulting business in recent years, tried to secure federal funds for responders. A Times editorial concluded in May that the Giuliani administration “failed in its duty to protect the workers at Ground Zero,” faulting its “emphasis on a speedy cleanup” and its unwillingness “to insist that all emergency personnel and construction workers wear respirators.” John Odermatt, a former OEM director working at the campaign, couldn’t tell the Times whether Giuliani had lobbied Congress on behalf of sick workers, nor could anyone at the campaign offer any evidence that Giuliani had ever, while earning millions at his new 9 /11 consulting business in recent years, tried to secure federal funds for responders.
Should the current presidential frontrunners square off in 2008, Giuliani’s culpability and subsequent indifference at Ground Zero will, no doubt, be sharply contrasted to Hillary Clinton’s singular role in funding the Mount Sinai programs that have been aiding rescue workers for years. And the public price tag for the mismanagement at the pile (as the site was known among recovery and rescue workers) will run into the billions. Ken Feinberg, who ran the federally funded Victims Compensation Board, has already paid out $1 billion to the injured, concluding after individual hearings that hundreds “were diagnosed with demonstrable and documented respiratory injuries directly related to their rescue service.” Anthony DePalma, whose extraordinary Times stories have lifted the lid on Giuliani’s role, recently reported that the health-care costs for rescue workers could soar to as much as $712 million a year. And the city is administering a billion-dollar liability fund to satisfy the thousands of lawsuits.
Giuliani’s fellow Republican and former EPA chief Christine Todd Whitman did tell WNBC a couple of months ago that there were “telephone calls, telephone meetings, and meetings in person with the city” every day, with the EPA repeating “the message” and emphasizing the “necessity of wearing the respirators.” Whitman said she “would call my people at midnight after watching the 11 o’clock news and say, ‘I’m still seeing them without the respirators.’ ” The EPA, she said, “was very frustrated.” She also said “the better thing would’ve been to put out the fire sooner,” certainly a function of the city’s Fire Department, adding that it had “burned until January”—a continuous flame held to a smoking, toxic brew. Giuliani’s fellow Republican and former EPA chief Christine Todd Whitman did tell WNBC a couple of months ago that there were “telephone calls, telephone meetings, and meetings in person with the city” every day, with the EPA repeating “the message” and emphasizing the “necessity of wearing the respirators.” Whitman said she “would call my people at midnight after watching the 11 o’clock news and say, ‘I’m still seeing them without the respirators.’ ” The EPA, she said, “was very frustrated.” She also said “the better thing would’ve been to put out the fire sooner,” certainly a function of the city’s Fire Department, adding that it had “burned until January”—a continuous flame held to a smoking, toxic brew. Asked about the mayor himself, Whitman sputtered: “He was clearly in control and doing a good job. Everyone was applauding what was going on. EPA, we had some disagreements with things that were occurring on the pile, like not having people wear respirators—we wanted more emphasis on that. But overall, you know, it’s hard. Those are emotional times.”
The firefighters’ union pointed out that the respiratory debacle was, like the malfunctioning radios and so many other things, another symbol of the city’s failure to prepare for a major terrorist event. Fire Department memos after the 1993 bombing had urged better protective gear, just as they’d screamed for better radios. The UFA’s leaders pointed out that the department had “ignored many issues related to respiratory protection” for years. The union’s health-and-safety officer, Phil McArdle, likened the long-term effects of working at Ground Zero to Agent Orange in Vietnam. “We’ve done a good job of taking care of the dead,” he said, referring to the hunt for remains, “but such a terrible job of taking care of the living.”
Wayne Barrett is the co-author, with Dan Collins, of Grand Illusion: The Untold Story of Rudy Giuliani and 9/11 , which was just published in paperback by HarperCollins. USA News Section has more related reports Help keep RINF going..
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