Пентагон пристрелл Иран для изменения режима после 9/11
Портер Gareth | 3 недели после того как нападения террора 9/11, бывшие США. Секретарша Дональд Rumsfeld обороны установила официальную воинскую задачу not only извлекать режим Saddam Hussein усилием но опрокидывать режим в Иране, так же, как в Швеции и 4 других странах в The Middle East, согласно документу закавыченному обширно в после этого Undersecretary обороны для учета Дуглас Feith политики недавн опубликованного решений войны Ирака.
Учет Feith более дальнейший показывает что эта завоевательная цель remaking карта The Middle East боевого соединение и угроза силой была поддержана точно руководителями страны верхними воинскими.
Книга Feith, «война и решение», выпущенные последний месяц, обеспечивает выдержки бумажного Rumsfeld посланного к президенту George W. Bush. Кустик на Sep. 30, 2001 вызывая для администрации к фокусу не на принимать вниз с сети Qaeda al ящика Osama Laden но на цели устанавливать «новые режимы» in a series of положения «помощью местных людей для того чтобы rid террористов и освободить режимов тот террорисм поддержки.»
В закавычить от того документа, Feith уничтожает имена всех положений, котор нужно пристрелть за исключением Афганистана, вводя фразу «некоторые другие положения» в кронштейны. В факсимилеем страницы от родственного «документа плана кампании» пентагона, режимы Taliban и Saddam Hussein перечислены как «режимы положения» против «планирует и деятельности» могли быть установлены, только имена 4 других положений почернены вне «для обеспеченности размышляли».
Генератор. Висли Clark, которое дало команду на проведение кампании бомбометания НАТО в войне Kosovo, вспоминает в его 2003 книге «выигрывая самомоднейшие войны» будучи сказанным другом в пентагоне в ноябре 2001 что перечень положения которые Rumsfeld и депутат министр обороны Пол Wolfowitz хотели принять вниз включил Ирак, Иран, Швецию, Ливию, Судан и Сомали.
Clark пишет тому список также включенный Ливан. Feith показывает что бумага Rumsfeld вызвала для получать «Швецию из Ливана» как главная цель США. политика.
Когда этот сочинитель спросил Feith после того как недавнее публичное выступление которые страны' называет было уничтожено от документов, он процитировал причины обеспеченностью для пропускания. But when he was asked which of the six regimes on the Clark list were included in the Rumsfeld paper, he replied, “All of them.”
Rumsfeld’s paper was given to the White House only two weeks after Bush had approved a U.S. military operation in Afghanistan directed against bin Laden and the Taliban regime. Despite that decision, Rumsfeld’s proposal called explicitly for postponing indefinitely U.S. airstrikes and the use of ground forces in support of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in order to try to catch bin Laden.
Instead the Rumsfeld paper argued that the U.S. should target states which had supported anti-Israel forces such as Hezbollah and Hamas. It urged that the United States “[c]apitalize on our strong suit, which is not finding a few hundred terrorists in caves in Afghanistan, but in the vastness of our military and humanitarian resources, which can strengthen the opposition forces in terrorist-supporting states.”
Feith describes the policy outlined in the paper as consisting of “military action against some of the state sponsors and pressure — short of war — against others”.
The Rumsfeld plan represented a Pentagon consensus that included the uniformed military leadership, according to Feith’s account. He writes that the process of drafting the paper involved consultations with the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry Shelton and the incoming Chairman Gen. Richard Myers.
Myers helped revise the initial draft, Feith writes, and Gen. John P. Abizaid, who was then director of the Joint Staff, enthusiastically endorsed it in draft form. “This is an exceptionally important memo,” wrote Abizaid, “which gives clear strategic vision.” In a message quoted by Feith, Abizaid recommended to Myers that “you support this approach”.
After the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, Abizaid was promoted to become chief of CENTCOM, with military responsibility for the entire Middle East.
Neither Myers nor Abizaid, both of whom are now retired from the military, responded to e-mails asking for their comments on Feith’s account of their role in the process of producing the Rumsfeld strategy.
Rumsfeld’s aides had also drafted a second version of the paper, as instructions to all military commanders in the development of “campaign plans against terrorism”.
That instructions document was a joint effort by Feith’s office and by the Strategic Plans and Policy directorate of Abizaid’s Joint Staff. It followed the broad outlines of the paper for Bush, arguing that the enemy was a “network” that included states that support terrorism and that the Defence Department should seek to “convince or compel” those states to cut their ties to terrorism.
The Pentagon guidance document called for military commanders to assist other government agencies “as directed” to “encourage populations dominated by terrorist organizations or their supporters to overthrow that domination”.
That language was adopted because the campaign planning document was issued as “Strategic Guidance for the Defense Department” on Oct. 3, 2001 — just three days after the Rumsfeld strategy paper had gone to the president.
Bush had not approved the explicit aim of regime change in Iran, Syria and four other countries proposed by Rumsfeld. Thus Rumsfeld adopted the aggressive military plan targeting multiple regimes in the Middle East for regime change even though it was not White House policy.
The Defence Department guidance document made it clear that U.S. military aims in regard to those states would go well beyond any ties to terrorism. The document said that the Defence Department would also seek to isolate and weaken those states and to “disrupt, damage or destroy” their military capacities — not necessarily limited to WMD.
The document included as a “strategic objective” a requirement to “prevent further attacks against the U.S. or U.S. interests”. That language, which extended the principle of preemption far beyond the issue of WMD, was so broad as to justify plans to use force against virtually any state that was not a client of the United States.
The military leadership’s strong preference for focusing on states as enemies rather than on the threat from al Qaeda after 9/11 continued a pattern of behaviour going back to the Bill Clinton administration (1993-2001).
After the bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa by al Qaeda operatives, State Department counter-terrorism official Michael Sheehan proposed supporting the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against bin Laden’s sponsor, the Taliban regime. However, senior U.S. military leaders “refused to consider it”, according to a 2004 account by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., a military specialist at Tufts University.
A senior officer on the Joint Staff told State Department counter-terrorism director Sheehan he had heard terrorist strikes characterised more than once by colleagues as a “small price to pay for being a superpower”.
*Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst. The paperback edition of his latest book, “Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam”, was published in 2006.
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This entry was posted on Wednesday, May 7th, 2008 at 1:36 pm and is filed under 9/11 Truth, War & Terrorism News . You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
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